Enthone, Inc. v. Bannon

560 A.2d 971, 211 Conn. 655, 1989 Conn. LEXIS 183
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJune 27, 1989
Docket13594
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 560 A.2d 971 (Enthone, Inc. v. Bannon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Enthone, Inc. v. Bannon, 560 A.2d 971, 211 Conn. 655, 1989 Conn. LEXIS 183 (Colo. 1989).

Opinion

Callahan, J.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Enthone, Incorporated (Enthone),1 from a hazardous [656]*656waste assessment imposed by the defendant commissioner of revenue services (commissioner) pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-132.2

[657]*657On or about October 1,1987, the commissioner issued a billing notice to Enthone for $5726.32, reflecting the commissioner’s assessment3 on hazardous waste material shipped by Enthone from its plant in West Haven during the period March 31, 1984, through December 31, 1986. Enthone disputed the assessment and, after an unfavorable final decision by the commissioner, appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court heard the matter on a stipulation of facts and the briefs of counsel and rendered a decision upholding the commissioner’s assessment. Enthone appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the matter to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. We find error.

Enthone is a manufacturer of specialty chemicals. Among other things, it manufactures products that are not hazardous waste when they leave Enthone’s facil[658]*658ities and are shipped to its customers. Once the products are utilized by Enthone’s customers, however, the resulting material is classified as hazardous waste. Some of Enthone’s customers return this hazardous waste material to Enthone’s West Haven facility for recycling. The hazardous waste material returned to Enthone by its customers is shipped under a hazardous waste manifest and Enthone’s customers returning such material are assessed by the commissioner for their shipments under § 22a-132.

Once Enthone receives the hazardous waste material it makes a decision whether to recycle the material itself or to ship it on to a hazardous waste treatment facility for processing. The commissioner claims that the hazardous waste material not recycled by Enthone itself, but transshipped for treatment elsewhere, subjects Enthone to a hazardous waste assessment for the material shipped. Enthone, on the other hand, contends that because it does not generate the hazardous waste in question it is not subject to a hazardous waste assessment under the applicable statutes and regulations.4

The statutory authority for the imposition of a hazardous waste assessment by the commissioner is General Statutes § 22a-132 (a), which provides, in pertinent part, for the payment of a hazardous waste assessment by three categories of taxpayers: “(1) a generator of hazardous waste required to file a manifest pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.), as from time to time amended and regulations adopted by the department of environmental protection, (2) a treatment facility required to file a manifest for hazardous wastes resulting from [659]*659their treatment process, and (3) a generator of hazardous waste shipping hazardous waste to treatment or disposal facilitites located in the state . . . .’’(Emphasis added.)

Enthone obviously does not fall under subdivision (2) of § 22a-132 (a) because the hazardous waste at issue in the instant appeal did not “[result] from [Enthone’s] treatment process.” Nor does the commissioner claim that Enthone is liable for a hazardous waste assessment under subdivision (3) of § 22a-132 (a). The commissioner argues, rather, that Enthone is liable for a hazardous waste assessment under § 22a-132 (a) (1) because it must file the uniform hazardous waste manifest required by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 and is subject to state and federal environmental regulations applicable to generators of hazardous waste when it transships such waste to other facilities for treatment. See, e.g., Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 22a-449 (c)-5 (d) (3);5 40 C.F.R. § 262.10 (f);6 40 C.F.R. § 264.71 (c).7

Enthone does not dispute the fact that federal and state regulations require that it comply with the standards applicable to “generators]” of hazardous waste when it transships such material from its West Haven facility to other destinations. Nor does it contest that such regulations require it, when transshipping such material, to file a uniform hazardous waste manifest and to adhere to the same rigid state and federal [660]*660requirements concerning packaging, labeling, marking, managing and disposing of hazardous wastes that apply to “generator[sj” of hazardous waste. It argues, however, that neither the statutes nor the regulations authorize the imposition of an assessment on hazardous waste that is not generated by the shipper. We agree.

General Statutes § 22a-132 (a) (1), the statutory authority cited by the commissioner for imposition of the hazardous waste assessment upon Enthone, states that the “generator” of hazardous waste is subject to a hazardous waste assessment. The statute does not state that an entity treated as a “generator” of hazardous waste for certain regulatory purposes is subject to a hazardous waste assessment. The term “generator” is not defined in the statutes. State and federal environmental regulations, however, both define a “generator” of hazardous waste as one “whose act or process produces hazardous waste ... or whose act first causes a hazardous waste to become subject to regulation.” (Emphasis added.) Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 22a-449 (c)-(1) (c);* ****8 40 CFR § 260.10.9 The activities of Enthone that are the subject of this appeal do not fit within either prong of that definition. The material in question was not produced by Enthone but only transshipped by Enthone for treatment. Further, the hazardous material in question was first subject to regulation, not when it was transshipped by Enthone, but when it was shipped to Enthone by the customer that produced it.

[661]*661It is true that Enthone did identify itself in the space labeled “Generator” on the uniform hazardous waste manifest form. That form was adapted from the federal environmental form, 40 C.F.R. part 262, and was designed to standardize industry practices and to eliminate multiple state manifests for interstate shipments of hazardous waste. Federal law prohibits any modification of the standardized form by state regulatory agencies. See D. Stever, Law of Chemical Regulation and Hazardous Waste (1986) § 5.03[4]. The form does, however, contain instructions and space allowing the entity labeled the “Generator” of hazardous waste on the form to cite and explain any reason for exemption from the assessment provisions of § 22a-132. It is undisputed that Enthone did avail itself of that opportunity to identify its shipments of the hazardous waste materials in question as “transshipments.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
560 A.2d 971, 211 Conn. 655, 1989 Conn. LEXIS 183, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/enthone-inc-v-bannon-conn-1989.