Engelking v. Carlson

88 P.2d 695, 13 Cal. 2d 216, 1939 Cal. LEXIS 247
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 24, 1939
DocketS. F. 16099
StatusPublished
Cited by70 cases

This text of 88 P.2d 695 (Engelking v. Carlson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Engelking v. Carlson, 88 P.2d 695, 13 Cal. 2d 216, 1939 Cal. LEXIS 247 (Cal. 1939).

Opinions

EDMONDS, J.

Each of the defendants in this case is a duly licensed and practicing physician and surgeon who has been sued by the plaintiff for physical injuries alleged to have been sustained as the result of his negligence in the performance of an operation. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s case a nonsuit was granted as to defendant Ream, and after hearing the evidence presented by the defendant Carlson, the trial judge directed a verdict in his favor. The appeal is from the judgments which followed the order and verdict.

Dr. Carlson, with the assistance of Dr. Ream, operated upon plaintiff for the purpose of correcting an instability of the left knee. The facts concerning this operation are not disputed. It appears that the operative work consisted of the repair of the exterior lateral and posterior crucial ligaments, which had been torn and ruptured as the result of a fall. The former of these structures runs alongside the knee where the femur comes in contact with the fibula; its function is to hold the knee steady and prevent lateral or sidewise movement. The other runs from the femur to the tibia and prevents an excess of gliding in the knee. The operation in[218]*218volved the removal of the damaged portions of the ligaments, and the substitution therefor of new material obtained by cutting sections from the fascia lata and the biceps muscle of the left leg. It was performed while plaintiff was unconscious and relaxed under the influence of an anaesthetic.

After the operation plaintiff began to suffer from a “foot drop ’ ’, that is, an inability to control the lifting and sidewise movement of the left foot, and also from a numbness in an extensive area of the lower left leg. Upon examination by another physician it was found that the external peroneal nerve in that leg was severed in the vicinity of the knee. This nerve runs down the side of the leg below the knee and affects the muscles which raise the foot. A severance of it, according to the medical testimony, will produce the difficulties experienced by plaintiff.

Dr. Carlson was the only physician called by the plaintiff who testified concerning what was done by him and Dr. Ream and the procedure ordinarily employed by surgeons performing an operation of the kind submitted to by the plaintiff. Admittedly, the peroneal nerve, the position of which does not vary normally, is in the operative field. Although this nerve can be isolated, said Dr. Carlson, it is not the practice to do so in operations of this kind. Accordingly, after he made the necessary incision and the cutting progressed through the skin, the fascia, and other structures down to the bone, the surrounding muscles and tissues were drawn aside and held back by blunt retractors, which were adjusted by him and maintained in position by Dr. Ream. Dr. Carlson handled all of the sharp instruments; Dr. Ream did nothing except to hold the retractors.

After the operation was completed a cheek was made to see whether the nerve was cut. This was done by looking at the tissues which had been dissected and all of them were identified. The nerve was not sutured, said Dr. Carlson, because, in his opinion, that was not required. Asked if “you can state positively that neither you nor Dr. Ream severed this nerve”, Dr. Carlson replied that he could not say, although he did not do any cutting “in the neighborhood of it”. “The severance of this nerve is a problem that is one of the difficulties of surgery.” Although it does not ordinarily happen, he continued, it is something which may occur. “The nerve can be injured by pulling on a blunt in[219]*219strument alone, and the problem as to whether or not that was true was our first problem after the operation.”

Asked a hypothetical question concerning what method would ordinarily be employed “by a physician and surgeon possessing the reasonáble degree of skill and knowledge possessed by others of his profession in good standing in the East Bay Area” to protect the peroneal nerve during such an operation, Dr. Carlson answered: “To retract it with its protective tissue. ’ ’ However, he said, in doing so it might be stretched with temporary loss of function. He also very frankly said that although the peroneal nerve is not difficult to locate and identify, a surgeon can miss it and thereby cause injury. Several instances where that had occurred were mentioned by him and his testimony in this regard was corroborated by two well-qualified surgeons who were called as witnesses in his behalf. One of them said that in average surgical practice the peroneal nerve is cut in five per cent of operations such as that undergone by the plaintiff; another stated that it is severed even by those using care and skill in over five per cent of the cases, some authorities claiming that the number runs to eight or nine per cent. Each of these witnesses declared that it is standard technique to leave the nerve covered in its own protective tissue rather than to expose it because exposure is more likely to cause injury; to retract the nerve with the tissues is the most conservative method.

The plaintiff contends that with this evidence before the jury the trial judge should not have granted a nonsuit or directed a verdict. He insists that the evidence offered by him together with the reasonable inferences legitimately deducible therefrom, would support a verdict in his favor upon the theory (1) that the condition of the left foot and leg subsequent to the operation was due to the severance of the peroneal nerve; (2) that this nerve became severed in the course of the operative work upon the ligaments; and (3) that such severance was the result of negligence in the performance of the surgical work.

The first of these propositions is supported by expert evidence introduced by the plaintiff, and is not controverted by the defendants. The second proposition also requires no consideration, because the defendants take the position that for the purpose of passing upon the particular rulings of the [220]*220trial court under review, “the sufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence upon this point and the reasonableness of his inference that the nerve became severed in the course of the operation, may be assumed”. The third proposition states the principal controversial point. Conceding that the evidence stands undisputed, the plaintiff contends that it justifies an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. He insists that he was unconscious; that the defendants had charge of the operation; that the result suffered by him does not ordinarily occur; and that in the absence of an explanation by the defendants justifying a verdict in their favor upon the ground that they were not negligent, they are liable to him in damages.

If this were the rule, as a practical proposition, no surgeon could ever operate without being an insurer of a medically satisfactory result. The medical testimony in this ease shows without any contradiction whatever that although the severance of the peroneal nerve is something which ordinarily does not occur in operations such as that performed by Dr. Carlson, yet even when the precautions prescribed by the approved technique are taken, there is a break of or injury to it in between five and nine per cent of the cases. There is nothing startling about such evidence and it affords no basis for the recovery of damages against a surgeon. Probably in every operation there is some hazard which the medical profession recognizes and guards against but which is not always overcome. To say that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
88 P.2d 695, 13 Cal. 2d 216, 1939 Cal. LEXIS 247, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/engelking-v-carlson-cal-1939.