Endy Guerra-Portillo v. Todd Blanche, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ENDY GUERRA-PORTILLO, Case No.: 3:26-CV-3625 JAO (DEB)

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

14 TODD BLANCHE, et al., (ECF No. 1) 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Endy Guerra-Portillo’s (“Petitioner”) 19 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Also 20 before the Court is Respondents Todd Blanche’s (Acting Attorney General), Markwayne 21 Mullin’s (Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)), Christopher 22 LaRose’s (Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center), Daniel Brightman’s (San Diego ICE 23 Field Office Director), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (collectively, 24 “Respondents” or the “Government”) Return to the Petition, ECF No. 5, and Petitioner’s 25 Traverse to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 6. For the reasons set forth 26 below, the Court GRANTS the Petition on due process grounds. 27

28 1 BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, entered the United States with his mother and 3 sister on April 13, 2019, when he was fifteen years old. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 16. Petitioner 4 and his family sought asylum, and after a brief period of detention by immigration 5 officials, Petitioner was released with an Order of Release on Recognizance on April 17, 6 2019. See id. At that time, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear dated April 15, 7 2019, which did not include a date or time for a hearing.1 See id. ¶ 17. Nevertheless, per 8 officer instruction, Petitioner appeared in Miami Immigration Court and was told he 9 would be mailed a notice of hearing. See id. 10 Petitioner’s mother filed an affirmative asylum application on August 6, 2019 and 11 included Petitioner as her derivative. See id. ¶ 18. Petitioner was issued a Social 12 Security Number and an employment authorization document in March 2020, the latter of 13 which he renewed in 2024. See id. 14 On or about April 6, 2026, Petitioner was detained while traveling with his 15 employer to the Navy Seal Base in Key West, Florida. See id. ¶ 19. Petitioner was 16 detained in Florida before being transferred to the Otay Mesa Detention Center, where he 17 remains detained. See id. ¶ 21. Petitioner was not provided with any notice or 18 information on why he was being re-detained, see id., and was provided no updated 19 information suggesting that he had been determined to be a flight risk or a danger to the 20 community, see id. ¶ 35. He was then issued a second Notice to Appear dated April 16, 21 2016. See id. ¶ 20. 22 Petitioner now alleges that his detention violates the Due Process Clause of the 23 Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. ¶¶ 24 44–53. 25 LEGAL STANDARD 26 27 28 1 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 2 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district 3 of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole 4 judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or 5 removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas 6 v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109- 7 13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral 8 issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of 9 indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 10 Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other 11 grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. 12 Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). 13 DISCUSSION 14 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his release without notice or a 15 hearing violates the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 44–51. The Court agrees. 16 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 17 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 18 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 19 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 20 533 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment 21 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 22 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a 23 hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 24 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their 25 liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a 26 protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. 27 Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an 28 individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to 1 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that 2 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the 3 . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 4 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 5 pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a 6 protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 7 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 8 Respondents contend that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 9 1225(b)(2),” but “acknowledge[] that this Court, and Courts in this District, have 10 repeatedly reached the opposite conclusion under the same and/or similar facts.” See 11 ECF No. 5 at 1–2. Thus, they “do[] not oppose the petition.” See id. 12 Petitioner was released with an Order of Release on Recognizance on April 17, 13 2019. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 16. He has complied with his release conditions, applied for 14 asylum, and demonstrated for the past seven years that he is not a flight risk or danger to 15 the community. See id. ¶ 17. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 16 approved his employment authorization documents in 2020, which he renewed in 2024. 17 See id. ¶ 18. 18 Petitioner thus has a protected liberty interest continuing to remain out of custody. 19 See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after 20 [his] initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that [he] was 21 neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest 22 in remaining at liberty unless [he] no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 23 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] 24 present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is 25 afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga 26 Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding the petitioner 27 had a protected liberty interest in his release). 28 1 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 2 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. 3 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally 4 sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 5 See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: 6 (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 7 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 8 additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved and the 9 fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 10 procedural requirement would entail.” 11 Id. 12 The Court finds that all three factors support a determination that the 13 Government’s revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an 14 opportunity to be heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed 15 above, Petitioner has a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to 16 his release in 2019. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 17 detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due 18 Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in 19 remaining with his family and continuing the asylum process. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 20 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is 21 free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal 22 life.”). 23 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as 24 Respondents revoked Petitioner’s release from custody without providing Petitioner with 25 notification, reasoning, or a hearing. Since DHS’s initial determination in 2019 that 26 Petitioner should be released because he posed no danger to the community and was not a 27 flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. 28 Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination 1 by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). 2 Indeed, after his release from custody, Petitioner attended all Immigration Court hearings, 3 has not been arrested or accused of any criminal activity, has work authorization, and is 4 seeking asylum. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 16–18. “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law 5 prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal 6 proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially 7 changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has 8 become a flight risk[.]” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. “Where as here, ‘the 9 petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous 10 deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an 11 opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 12 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. 13 Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up). 14 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 15 and a hearing is “low.” See Alvarenga Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1130; Pinchi, 792 F. 16 Supp. 3d at 1036; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the 17 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 18 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). 19 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release in 20 violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Monroy 21 Martinez v. Lyons, 2026 WL 1047937, at * 5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026) (granting a writ of 22 habeas corpus on due process grounds where the petitioner’s release on bond was 23 revoked); Navarro Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 24 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the 25 conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds).2 26 2 The Court need not address Petitioner’s claim arising under the APA because the Petition can be 27 resolved on due process grounds. However, the Court notes that other courts have found violations of 28 the APA based on similar grounds. See, e.g., Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding 1 |} /// 2 CONCLUSION 3 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition for Writ of 4 || Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release 5 || Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting release. The Court 6 ||} ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of 7 || the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to 8 determine whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear the burden of 9 || establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the 10 |}community or a risk of flight. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038. The Parties are 11 |} ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by July 9, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has 12 released.* 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: July 2, 2026 15 gE, fay og ‘2 ff a 17 a & VS 18 % Jill A. Otake 19 D> a S United States District Judge “Ty, a3 a ee 20 21 22 23 24 || for the revocation); Noori, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1168 (concluding that revocation of release violated the APA). Similarly, the Court need not address Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Al Saadi 25 || v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-1779-GPC-JLB, 2026 WL 892831, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2026); Tulyakov v. LaRose, No. 3:26-CV-01695-BTM-BLM, 2026 WL 981218, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2026); Jolcin v. 26 Noem, No. 26-CV-1786-JES-BJW, 2026 WL 898282, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2026). 07 > Petitioner requested attorney’s fees, related expenses, and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (““EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See ECF No. 1 at 23. Petitioner’s counsel may submit an appropriate 28 || EAJA fee application within 30 days of the issuance of this Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).