1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 E.M.M.O., No. 1:26-cv-00585-DJC-CSK 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 MINGA WOFFORD, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner, a noncitizen from Nicaragua, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 18 Corpus (Pet. (ECF No. 1)) and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Mot. (ECF 19 No. 2)) seeking release from the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 20 (“ICE”).1 The Government has represented that it does not oppose converting the 21 1 Petitioner also seeks to proceed under a pseudonym. (ECF No. 3.) The Court grants Petitioner’s 22 request to proceed under a pseudonym. “The normal presumption is that parties must use their real 23 names.” Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Fed. R. Civ. 24 P. 17(a)(1) (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”). However, it is common for courts to permit parties to proceed under a pseudonym “when anonymity is necessary to 25 preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature[.]” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up and citations omitted) (holding “that a 26 party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in 27 knowing the party’s identity”). Petitioner has sufficiently alleged the sensitive and highly personal nature of his request, which concerns his fear of harassment and retaliation. (See generally ECF No. 3.) 28 Nor have Respondents opposed Petitioner’s request. Finally, the public’s interest in open judicial 1 Motion to one for a Preliminary Injunction. In the interest of judicial economy, 2 because the Court finds that the Government has violated Petitioner’s due process 3 rights under the Fifth Amendment, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Habeas Petition.2 5 Petitioner entered the country in 2021 near Eagle Pass, Texas, surrendered 6 himself to immigration authorities, and requested asylum. (Pet. ¶ 14, 26; E.M.M.O. Aff. 7 (ECF No. 1-2) ¶ 6.) After several days, he was released from custody, allegedly 8 pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5, and has since complied with the conditions of his release. 9 (Pet. ¶¶ 26–27; E.M.M.O. Aff. ¶¶ 9–10.) Prior to his re-detention, Petitioner lived with 10 his wife and daughter in Milpitas where he was actively involved in caring for his family 11 and providing household support. (E.M.M.O. Aff. ¶ 3.) He was employed in 12 construction and held a valid United States driver’s license. (Id. ¶ 4.) At the time of his 13 arrest, Petitioner was completing his application for an Employment Authorization 14 Document. (Id.) Petitioner has now been re-detained when he was arrested at a 15 regularly scheduled immigration check-in. (Pet. ¶ 28.) Petitioner remains detained at 16 Mesa Verde Detention Facility. (E.M.M.O. Aff. ¶ 19.) 18 Petitioner’s habeas petition asserts two claims for relief: (1) that Respondents 19 have violated his right procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the 20 United States Constitution, and (2) that Respondents have violated his substantive due 21 process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Pet. 22 ¶¶ 63–73). The Court GRANTS Petitioner’s first claim for relief. 23 24
25 action beyond using a pseudonym for his name. (Id. at 4.) The Court finds that good cause is met as 26 the public’s interest in knowing Petitioner’s identity is outweighed by his need for anonymity. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request to proceed under a pseudonym is GRANTED. 27 2 Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) as 28 moot. 1 I. Protected Liberty Interest 2 Petitioner is entitled to procedural due process. Petitioner contends that his re- 3 detention was enacted without notice or an opportunity to be heard and was not 4 predicated on any changed circumstances since Petitioner’s release. (See generally 5 Pet.) The Government contends that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject 6 to mandatory detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and that Petitioner’s prior 7 release in the discretion of the Department of Homeland Security “does not have the 8 effect of having converted petitioner’s presence in the United States into an 9 admission” and that he consequently does not have a liberty interest. (Opp’n at 1–2.) 10 The Court disagrees with the Government. 11 To the extent Petitioner asserts that he was released pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 12 § 212.5 (Pet. ¶ 14), the Court understands this assertion to mean that Petitioner was 13 granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Under section 1182(d)(5)(A), 14 noncitizens may be temporarily released on parole for “urgent humanitarian reasons 15 or significant public benefit.” Release under this section requires a determination that 16 the noncitizen poses neither “a security risk nor a risk of absconding.” 8 C.F.R. 17 § 212.5. “Once released, a parolee acquires an interest in his or her continued 18 liberty.” Chavarria v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-0175-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3533606, at *3 19 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); see also Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. 20 Cal. 2025) (“[T]he government's decision to release an individual from custody creates 21 ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be 22 revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the ... conditions [of release].’”) (citing 23 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). 24 Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in his continued release. See Zadvydas v. 25 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Other district courts in this Circuit, including this one, 26 have found that releasing a noncitizen on parole endows them with a protected liberty 27 interest in remaining out of custody. See M.B. v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00005-DJC-AC, 28 2026 WL 74155 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026) (reviewing cases); see also Chavarria, 2025 WL 1 3533606, at *3 (same). Accordingly, due process entitles Petitioner to notice and an 2 opportunity to be heard in the revocation of his section 1182 parole. The 3 Government’s argument that any previous discretionary decision to release Petitioner 4 does not create a liberty interest is just plain wrong. A parolee’s liberty interest “is 5 valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the [Fifth] Amendment.” 6 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Accordingly, Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in 7 his continued release. 8 Applying the balancing test described in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 9 (1976), the Court finds that Petitioner has a substantial private interest in maintaining 10 his out-of-custody status, the risk of erroneous deprivation here is considerable, and 11 Respondents’ interest in detention is low as the effort and costs required to provide 12 Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 E.M.M.O., No. 1:26-cv-00585-DJC-CSK 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 MINGA WOFFORD, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner, a noncitizen from Nicaragua, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 18 Corpus (Pet. (ECF No. 1)) and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Mot. (ECF 19 No. 2)) seeking release from the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 20 (“ICE”).1 The Government has represented that it does not oppose converting the 21 1 Petitioner also seeks to proceed under a pseudonym. (ECF No. 3.) The Court grants Petitioner’s 22 request to proceed under a pseudonym. “The normal presumption is that parties must use their real 23 names.” Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Fed. R. Civ. 24 P. 17(a)(1) (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”). However, it is common for courts to permit parties to proceed under a pseudonym “when anonymity is necessary to 25 preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature[.]” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up and citations omitted) (holding “that a 26 party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in 27 knowing the party’s identity”). Petitioner has sufficiently alleged the sensitive and highly personal nature of his request, which concerns his fear of harassment and retaliation. (See generally ECF No. 3.) 28 Nor have Respondents opposed Petitioner’s request. Finally, the public’s interest in open judicial 1 Motion to one for a Preliminary Injunction. In the interest of judicial economy, 2 because the Court finds that the Government has violated Petitioner’s due process 3 rights under the Fifth Amendment, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Habeas Petition.2 5 Petitioner entered the country in 2021 near Eagle Pass, Texas, surrendered 6 himself to immigration authorities, and requested asylum. (Pet. ¶ 14, 26; E.M.M.O. Aff. 7 (ECF No. 1-2) ¶ 6.) After several days, he was released from custody, allegedly 8 pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5, and has since complied with the conditions of his release. 9 (Pet. ¶¶ 26–27; E.M.M.O. Aff. ¶¶ 9–10.) Prior to his re-detention, Petitioner lived with 10 his wife and daughter in Milpitas where he was actively involved in caring for his family 11 and providing household support. (E.M.M.O. Aff. ¶ 3.) He was employed in 12 construction and held a valid United States driver’s license. (Id. ¶ 4.) At the time of his 13 arrest, Petitioner was completing his application for an Employment Authorization 14 Document. (Id.) Petitioner has now been re-detained when he was arrested at a 15 regularly scheduled immigration check-in. (Pet. ¶ 28.) Petitioner remains detained at 16 Mesa Verde Detention Facility. (E.M.M.O. Aff. ¶ 19.) 18 Petitioner’s habeas petition asserts two claims for relief: (1) that Respondents 19 have violated his right procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the 20 United States Constitution, and (2) that Respondents have violated his substantive due 21 process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Pet. 22 ¶¶ 63–73). The Court GRANTS Petitioner’s first claim for relief. 23 24
25 action beyond using a pseudonym for his name. (Id. at 4.) The Court finds that good cause is met as 26 the public’s interest in knowing Petitioner’s identity is outweighed by his need for anonymity. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request to proceed under a pseudonym is GRANTED. 27 2 Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) as 28 moot. 1 I. Protected Liberty Interest 2 Petitioner is entitled to procedural due process. Petitioner contends that his re- 3 detention was enacted without notice or an opportunity to be heard and was not 4 predicated on any changed circumstances since Petitioner’s release. (See generally 5 Pet.) The Government contends that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject 6 to mandatory detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and that Petitioner’s prior 7 release in the discretion of the Department of Homeland Security “does not have the 8 effect of having converted petitioner’s presence in the United States into an 9 admission” and that he consequently does not have a liberty interest. (Opp’n at 1–2.) 10 The Court disagrees with the Government. 11 To the extent Petitioner asserts that he was released pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 12 § 212.5 (Pet. ¶ 14), the Court understands this assertion to mean that Petitioner was 13 granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Under section 1182(d)(5)(A), 14 noncitizens may be temporarily released on parole for “urgent humanitarian reasons 15 or significant public benefit.” Release under this section requires a determination that 16 the noncitizen poses neither “a security risk nor a risk of absconding.” 8 C.F.R. 17 § 212.5. “Once released, a parolee acquires an interest in his or her continued 18 liberty.” Chavarria v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-0175-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3533606, at *3 19 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); see also Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. 20 Cal. 2025) (“[T]he government's decision to release an individual from custody creates 21 ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be 22 revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the ... conditions [of release].’”) (citing 23 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). 24 Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in his continued release. See Zadvydas v. 25 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Other district courts in this Circuit, including this one, 26 have found that releasing a noncitizen on parole endows them with a protected liberty 27 interest in remaining out of custody. See M.B. v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00005-DJC-AC, 28 2026 WL 74155 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026) (reviewing cases); see also Chavarria, 2025 WL 1 3533606, at *3 (same). Accordingly, due process entitles Petitioner to notice and an 2 opportunity to be heard in the revocation of his section 1182 parole. The 3 Government’s argument that any previous discretionary decision to release Petitioner 4 does not create a liberty interest is just plain wrong. A parolee’s liberty interest “is 5 valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the [Fifth] Amendment.” 6 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Accordingly, Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in 7 his continued release. 8 Applying the balancing test described in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 9 (1976), the Court finds that Petitioner has a substantial private interest in maintaining 10 his out-of-custody status, the risk of erroneous deprivation here is considerable, and 11 Respondents’ interest in detention is low as the effort and costs required to provide 12 Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. 13 As to Petitioner’s substantial private interest, freedom from imprisonment is at 14 the core of the Due Process Clause. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Since his initial 15 release, Petitioner has built a life for himself and his family, plays a pivotal role in 16 supporting his wife and child, and has meaningful connections within his community. 17 (E.M.M.O. Aff. ¶¶ 21, 23.) The risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable as 18 Petitioner has not received a bond hearing, nor has the Government asserted that 19 Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Finally, the Government’s 20 interest in detention is low. As the United States Supreme Court has said, “[n]or are 21 we persuaded by the argument that revocation [of parole] is so totally a discretionary 22 matter that some form of hearing would be administratively intolerable.” Morrissey, 23 408 U.S. at 483. 24 The Court concludes that Petitioner has established that he has a protected 25 liberty interest under the Due Process Clause and that he was owed some process 26 before his re-detention. 27 28 1 II. Irreparable Harm 2 Petitioner has also established irreparable harm based on the deprivation of 3 constitutional rights via immigration detention. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 4 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that irreparable harm 5 occurs in the “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities.” 6 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017). On this point, Plaintiff has 7 alleged that “[d]etention has been extremely difficult. The food is poor quality and 8 causes me nausea and stomach pain. I have been given medication by the doctor, but 9 the food remains non-nutritious.” (E.M.M.O. Aff. ¶ 19.) Petitioner also experiences 10 “constant anxiety and fear about my immigration situation.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Thus, Petitioner 11 has adequately established irreparable harm. 12 III. Balance of the Harms & the Public Interest 13 The balance of the equities and public interest are merged as the Government is 14 the non-moving party, and these factors clearly weigh in Petitioner’s favor. See 15 Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002; Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The 16 government also cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable 17 sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” (internal citations and 18 quotation marks omitted)); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1037 (“[T]he public has 19 a strong interest in upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and 20 the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention 21 are staggering.”). As discussed, Petitioner has established that he is suffering 22 irreparable harm nor is the Government harmed by being prevented from continuing 23 to inflict constitutional harm. 25 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 26 1. Petitioner’s Habeas Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. 27 2. Petitioner’s Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym (ECF No. 3) is 1 3. Respondents are ordered to immediately release Petitioner E.M.M.O. from 2 their custody. Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on 3 him, unless that is determined to be necessary at a future pre- 4 deprivation/custody hearing. 5 4. Respondents are PERMANANTLY ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re- 6 arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional 7 protections, which include, at a minimum, pre-deprivation notice describing 8 the change of circumstances necessitating his arrest and detention, and a 9 timely hearing. At any such hearing, the Government shall bear the burden 10 of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a 11 danger to the community or a risk of flight, and Petitioner shall be allowed 12 to have his counsel present. 13 5. Petitioner's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) is 14 DENIED as moot. 15 6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and enter judgment for 16 Petitioner. This Order resolves all pending motions. 17 18 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 19 | Dated: _February 2, 2026 “Daal A CoO □□□□ Hon. Daniel alabretta 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28