ALDEN A. STOCKARD, Senior Judge.
This is a suit by Appellant Eminence R-l School District for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Eminence seeks a determination that pursuant to § 12.070, RSMo 1978,
it is entitled to a mandatory
distribution of forest reserve funds derived from the Mark Twain National Forest Reserve. Respondents, three Shannon County school districts that are situated wholly or partly within the national forest, contend that although Eminence is
eligible
to receive forest reserve funds under § 12.070, it is not necessarily entitled to a distribution of these funds. The trial court found that Eminence may be excluded from receiving forest reserve funds under § 12.070. The crucial issue is whether Eminence, a school district lying
adjacent to
the national forest, is entitled to a mandatory distribution of forest reserve funds under § 12.070. Because this appeal involves the construction of a state revenue statute, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Mo.Const.Art. V, § 3.
The facts are stipulated. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 500,
the State of Missouri receives twenty-five percent of all revenues derived by the federal government from the Mark Twain National Forest Reserve. The state is free to apply these forest reserve funds in any manner as long as the specified purposes of the federal statute are met, namely, to benefit public schools and roads of the counties in which the national forest reserve is situated.
King County v. Seattle School District No. 1,
263 U.S. 361, 364, 44 S.Ct. 127, 128, 68 L.Ed. 339, 341 (1923). Pursuant to § 12.070, Shannon County receives a share of the forest reserve funds based upon the proportional number of acres of the national forest located within the county. Section 12.070 mandates that seventy-five percent of the funds shall be expended for the benefit of school districts located partly, or wholly within, or adjacent to the national forest, and twenty-five percent shall be expended for the benefit of county roads within these school districts.
There are seven school districts or portions of school districts located in Shannon County. Of these, only the three respondent school districts have land within the national forest.
Eminence has land adjacent to, but not within, the forest.
Prior to 1977, all forest reserve funds received for the benefit of those school districts situated partly or wholly within or adjacent to the national forest were distributed based upon the proportional area of forest reserve land located within each
school district as compared to the total national forest acreage within the county. This distribution method will hereinafter be referred to as the “acreage formula.” As mentioned, Eminence does not have any forest reserve land located within its boundaries, but does have forest land adjacent thereto. Consequently, Eminence received no forest reserve funds prior to 1977.
In 1977, ten percent of the funds received by Shannon County were apportioned by the acreage formula. Ninety percent of the funds were apportioned by a so-called “inverse assessed valuation formula.” Pursuant to that formula, Eminence received a portion of the distribution. Needless to say, had the acreage formula been used exclusively, Eminence would have received no forest reserve funds in 1977.
The instant litigation arose when the Shannon County Court attempted to apply the acreage formula exclusively for funds received in 1978 and 1979. By stipulation of the parties, $23,000 of the funds received for the years 1978 and 1979 were paid to Eminence. It was further stipulated that $43,000, which is the object of the instant litigation, would be paid into the registry of the Circuit Court pending determination of the following issue: “Under Section 12.070 ... can National Forest Service monies be legally distributed by the Shannon County Court so as to exclude totally [Eminence], which boundaries lie adjacent to the Mark Twain National Forest?”
If the foregoing question is answered affirmatively, then the $43,000 plus accrued interest will be apportioned by the acreage formula and distributed to respondents. If the question is answered negatively, then the money will be distributed to Eminence.
The parties also requested the Circuit Court to decide the following stipulated issue for the purposes of declaratory relief only, and not being determinative of the distribution of the $43,000: “Under § 12.-070 ... does the Shannon County Court have discretion to distribute money to [Eminence] ... ?” The trial court answered both stipulated questions affirmatively.
On this appeal, Eminence contends that the county court must distribute forest reserve funds to a school district, such as Eminence, that lies adjacent to a national forest reserve; hence, the trial court erred in answering the first stipulated issue in the affirmative. We disagree.
Before construing the Missouri statute, we make some initial observations about the federal statute. The pertinent part of 16 U.S.C. § 500 provides as follows:
[T]wenty-five per centum of all moneys received during any fiscal year from each national forest shall be paid ... to the State ... in which such national forest is situated, to be expended as the State ... legislature may prescribe for the benefit of the public schools and public roads of the county or counties in which such national forest is situated ....
As mentioned previously, this provision clearly allows the states to distribute the forest reserve funds in any manner as long as the specified purposes of the statute are met, namely, to benefit public schools and roads of the counties in which the national forest is situated.
King County v. Seattle School District No. 1,
supra. It is also apparent that the funds distributed to the states are not based upon tax revenues lost due to government ownership of forest reserve lands. Thus, the federal statute cannot be viewed strictly as an in lieu of tax provision.
Although there is conflict as to whether the payments under 16 U.S.C. § 500 constitute a trust for the benefit of counties in recognition of the national interest in education and roadbuilding,
Trinity Independent School District v. Walker County,
287 S.W.2d 717, 722 (Tex.Civ.App.1956), or an absolute grant or gift to the states,
King County v. Seattle School District No. 1,
supra, it would appear that Congress intended to aid schools and roads upon which the impact of the federal presence falls most heavily.
In light of these observations, we turn to the Missouri statute. Section 12.070 provides in pertinent part: “The funds
shall
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ALDEN A. STOCKARD, Senior Judge.
This is a suit by Appellant Eminence R-l School District for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Eminence seeks a determination that pursuant to § 12.070, RSMo 1978,
it is entitled to a mandatory
distribution of forest reserve funds derived from the Mark Twain National Forest Reserve. Respondents, three Shannon County school districts that are situated wholly or partly within the national forest, contend that although Eminence is
eligible
to receive forest reserve funds under § 12.070, it is not necessarily entitled to a distribution of these funds. The trial court found that Eminence may be excluded from receiving forest reserve funds under § 12.070. The crucial issue is whether Eminence, a school district lying
adjacent to
the national forest, is entitled to a mandatory distribution of forest reserve funds under § 12.070. Because this appeal involves the construction of a state revenue statute, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Mo.Const.Art. V, § 3.
The facts are stipulated. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 500,
the State of Missouri receives twenty-five percent of all revenues derived by the federal government from the Mark Twain National Forest Reserve. The state is free to apply these forest reserve funds in any manner as long as the specified purposes of the federal statute are met, namely, to benefit public schools and roads of the counties in which the national forest reserve is situated.
King County v. Seattle School District No. 1,
263 U.S. 361, 364, 44 S.Ct. 127, 128, 68 L.Ed. 339, 341 (1923). Pursuant to § 12.070, Shannon County receives a share of the forest reserve funds based upon the proportional number of acres of the national forest located within the county. Section 12.070 mandates that seventy-five percent of the funds shall be expended for the benefit of school districts located partly, or wholly within, or adjacent to the national forest, and twenty-five percent shall be expended for the benefit of county roads within these school districts.
There are seven school districts or portions of school districts located in Shannon County. Of these, only the three respondent school districts have land within the national forest.
Eminence has land adjacent to, but not within, the forest.
Prior to 1977, all forest reserve funds received for the benefit of those school districts situated partly or wholly within or adjacent to the national forest were distributed based upon the proportional area of forest reserve land located within each
school district as compared to the total national forest acreage within the county. This distribution method will hereinafter be referred to as the “acreage formula.” As mentioned, Eminence does not have any forest reserve land located within its boundaries, but does have forest land adjacent thereto. Consequently, Eminence received no forest reserve funds prior to 1977.
In 1977, ten percent of the funds received by Shannon County were apportioned by the acreage formula. Ninety percent of the funds were apportioned by a so-called “inverse assessed valuation formula.” Pursuant to that formula, Eminence received a portion of the distribution. Needless to say, had the acreage formula been used exclusively, Eminence would have received no forest reserve funds in 1977.
The instant litigation arose when the Shannon County Court attempted to apply the acreage formula exclusively for funds received in 1978 and 1979. By stipulation of the parties, $23,000 of the funds received for the years 1978 and 1979 were paid to Eminence. It was further stipulated that $43,000, which is the object of the instant litigation, would be paid into the registry of the Circuit Court pending determination of the following issue: “Under Section 12.070 ... can National Forest Service monies be legally distributed by the Shannon County Court so as to exclude totally [Eminence], which boundaries lie adjacent to the Mark Twain National Forest?”
If the foregoing question is answered affirmatively, then the $43,000 plus accrued interest will be apportioned by the acreage formula and distributed to respondents. If the question is answered negatively, then the money will be distributed to Eminence.
The parties also requested the Circuit Court to decide the following stipulated issue for the purposes of declaratory relief only, and not being determinative of the distribution of the $43,000: “Under § 12.-070 ... does the Shannon County Court have discretion to distribute money to [Eminence] ... ?” The trial court answered both stipulated questions affirmatively.
On this appeal, Eminence contends that the county court must distribute forest reserve funds to a school district, such as Eminence, that lies adjacent to a national forest reserve; hence, the trial court erred in answering the first stipulated issue in the affirmative. We disagree.
Before construing the Missouri statute, we make some initial observations about the federal statute. The pertinent part of 16 U.S.C. § 500 provides as follows:
[T]wenty-five per centum of all moneys received during any fiscal year from each national forest shall be paid ... to the State ... in which such national forest is situated, to be expended as the State ... legislature may prescribe for the benefit of the public schools and public roads of the county or counties in which such national forest is situated ....
As mentioned previously, this provision clearly allows the states to distribute the forest reserve funds in any manner as long as the specified purposes of the statute are met, namely, to benefit public schools and roads of the counties in which the national forest is situated.
King County v. Seattle School District No. 1,
supra. It is also apparent that the funds distributed to the states are not based upon tax revenues lost due to government ownership of forest reserve lands. Thus, the federal statute cannot be viewed strictly as an in lieu of tax provision.
Although there is conflict as to whether the payments under 16 U.S.C. § 500 constitute a trust for the benefit of counties in recognition of the national interest in education and roadbuilding,
Trinity Independent School District v. Walker County,
287 S.W.2d 717, 722 (Tex.Civ.App.1956), or an absolute grant or gift to the states,
King County v. Seattle School District No. 1,
supra, it would appear that Congress intended to aid schools and roads upon which the impact of the federal presence falls most heavily.
In light of these observations, we turn to the Missouri statute. Section 12.070 provides in pertinent part: “The funds
shall
be used to aid in maintaining the schools and
roads of those school districts that lie or are situated
partly or wholly within or adjacent to
the national forest in the county.” (Emphasis added.) Eminence would argue that the use of word “shall” mandatorily requires a distribution to all eligible school districts,
i.e.,
those that are partly or wholly within or adjacent to the national forest.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider words used in the statute in their plain and ordinary meaning.
State v. Kraus,
530 S.W.2d 684, 685 (Mo. banc 1975). Legislative intent and the meaning of words used in the statute can in many instances be found from the general purposes of the legislative enactment.
Bank of Crestwood v. Gravois Bank,
616 S.W.2d 505, 510 (Mo. banc 1981). Another aid in ascertaining legislative intent is the rule that the entire act must be construed together and all provisions must be harmonized, if reasonably possible, and every word, clause, sentence, and section given some meaning.
City of Willow Springs v. Missouri State Librarian,
596 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Mo. banc 1980).
At the outset we note that § 12.070 does not provide for a distribution of funds based upon the percentage of tax revenues lost by each school district. This fact coupled with the explicit inclusion of the word “adjacent” indicates to this Court a legislative intent not to provide in lieu of tax payments inasmuch as an adjacent school district does not contain forest reserve lands which could be subject to local taxation.
Thus, we find the preferable interpretation of legislative intent underlying the enactment of § 12.070 as one based upon compensation to those school districts most heavily burdened or financially affected by the presence of the national forest.
While we agree with Eminence that it is the geographical location of a school district which determines its
eligibility
for forest reserve funds, we cannot conclude that this eligibility is equivalent to an absolute right to receive a share of the funds. Although the statute uses the mandatory term “shall,” the provision does not mandate a particular method of distribution. We view the use of the word “shall” as mandating the expenditure of forest reserve funds for those school districts having the proper geographic location. This does not mean that these school districts must receive something. Rather, the use of the disjunctive connector “or” after the word “within” indicates to this Court a legislative intent that the county court apportion to the eligible school districts alternatively or collectively.
Therefore, we hold that the legislative silence as to the method of distribution of forest reserve funds, and the intent of the legislature to exclude from eligibility those school districts not situated properly, indicates an intent to repose in the county court the discretion to determine the relative impact of the national forest in each eligible district and then to determine how much money each eligible district should receive. Accordingly, the county court can determine, in its discretion, that any of the eligible school districts are not in need of or entitled to receive forest reserve funds. Thus, Eminence can legally be excluded from the distribution of these funds.
Needless to say, if the county court could not in its discretion decide that Eminence
is
entitled to share in the distribution of funds, then the use of the word “adjacent” would be mere surplusage. Hence, the county court can also determine that Eminence is entitled to share in the distribution of forest reserve funds. The county court’s apportionment can be disturbed only if it abused or arbitrarily exercised its discretion.
Bradford
v.
Phelps County,
357 Mo. 830, 210 S.W.2d 996, 1001 (1948).
Eminence relies upon several foreign decisions, for example,
Anderson Union High School District
v.
Schreder, 56
Cal.App.3d 453, 128 Cal.Rptr. 529 (1976);
Oro Madre Unified School District v. Amador County Board of Education,
8 Cal.App.3d 408, 87
Cal.Rptr. 250 (1970), overruled on other grounds,
Anderson Union High School District v. Schreder,
supra. These decisions are inapposite inasmuch as the issue before us was not addressed.
This Court has considered the implications of two other Missouri statutes, namely, §§ 12.080
and 12.100, RSMo 1978.
The former relates to the distribution of funds derived from leases of land owned by the federal government and is clearly inapplicable to the receipt and expenditure of forest reserve funds under § 12.070.
As to § 12.100, it appears that the first sentence of that section merely reaffirms the duty of the county court to expend the funds received under § 12.070 for the benefit of schools and roads. Although the objective of the second sentence of § 12.100 is cryptic it appears to place a limitation on the county court to prevent apportionment of revenues derived under §§ 12.070-.080 for the exclusive benefit of the general revenue of the county. We conclude that neither § 12.080 nor § 12.100 dictate a particular method of distribution for funds derived under § 12.070.
The judgment is affirmed.
WELLIVER, P. J., and HIGGINS and SEILER, JJ., concur.