Emily Kate-Marie Brown v. State of Arkansas

2025 Ark. App. 609

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: December 10, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 609 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CR-24-832

Opinion Delivered December 10, 2025

EMILY KATE-MARIE BROWN APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CLEVELAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 13CR-22-55]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE DAVID W. TALLEY, JR., APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

Appellant Emily Brown appeals her conviction by a Cleveland County jury of the

first-degree murder of her ex-boyfriend, Christopher Miller. On appeal, she argues that the

State did not negate her justification defense with substantial evidence and that the circuit

court erred in admitting a portion of her custodial interview into evidence. We affirm.

At trial, the State presented the following evidence. On August 6, 2022, Miller and

his stepfather, Frelon Newsom, were traveling from Newsom’s home in Alabama, where

Miller was staying while recovering from Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, to Arkansas so that

Miller could visit the son he shared with Brown. Miller was staying with his mother and

stepfather following a two-week hospitalization, which included a period of time in a medically induced coma. Newsom was driving because Miller was, in Newsom’s words, “still

swirly headed, . . . he couldn’t be up over five or six minutes . . . because he’d fall down.”

Newsom testified that when they arrived at Brown’s father’s house, Newsom got out

of the car to stretch his back and visit with Brown’s father while Miller went around to the

back of the house where Brown was waiting for him. Newsom said that, moments later,

I heard two gunshots go off and I heard my son holler, “Daddy, help,” and then I seen my son fall out from behind the house. . . . And then she walked over right over the top of him and shot some more into him. . . .I saw her put some more bullets in him, swap hands with the gun and reach down and feel for his pulse to make sure he was dead[.]

Dr. Stephen Erickson performed Miller’s autopsy. Dr. Erickson testified that Miller

sustained six gunshot wounds. The shots were labeled one through six for the purposes of

the autopsy, but Dr. Erickson testified that he could not tell in what order the shots were

fired or which shot killed Miller. Gunshot one entered Miller’s left pinky and exited his

thumb. Gunshot two entered the right side of Miller’s chest, traveling right to left,

downward, and front to back. This shot went through Miller’s lung and liver, ultimately

lodging in his spinal column. Gunshot three traveled left to right, slightly front to back and

downward. It hit Miller’s spinal column and destroyed his spinal cord and would have

paralyzed him from his navel down.

Shots three, four, five, and six appeared to be related because they each traveled in

the same direction and hit Miller’s body within eight or ten inches of each other on the left

side of Miller’s chest. Dr. Erickson testified that the grouping of shots four, five, and six were

a sign that either the shots were fired in quick succession or Miller was not moving when

2 they were fired. Dr. Erickson could not conclusively say from how far away the shots were

fired on the basis of his exam, but it was likely more than three feet. Two of the gunshots

traveled at downward angles.

Chief Deputy Gary Young with the Cleveland County Sheriff’s Office was the lead

investigator on Brown’s case. He interviewed Brown at the sheriff’s office on the night of

August 6, 2022. In that interview, Brown stated that she had been in an abusive relationship

with Miller, and they had been separated for around a year and a half. When she started

dating someone new, Miller would send her and her boyfriend hateful messages. On one

occasion, Miller “stalked” her and her boyfriend when they went to the store, prompting her

to seek an order of protection against Miller. She had trouble getting Miller served with the

order, though, so she told him he could come get his son with the intention of never letting

him see his son; instead, she intended to serve him with the order of protection.

Brown said she “started the plan” that morning when she went into town and stopped

at the sheriff’s office. She told the dispatcher “what was going on” and was told that if Miller

showed up, let them know so they could get a deputy over to serve the protective order. She

was advised by Sheriff Jack Rogers that if Miller showed up, she should stay inside the house,

lock the door, and contact the sheriff’s office.

When Miller arrived, she told him she had to go inside to get their son’s bag. She

went inside, put some clothes in a Dollar Store bag, and called the sheriff’s office. When

Brown went back outside, she handed Miller the bag, smiled at him, and told him he was

going to have to stay there because law enforcement was coming to serve him.

3 She claimed that at that point, he took a step forward and threatened to kill her, so

she pulled her gun out and shot him. She claimed she was backing up while she shot and

that she did not shoot him after he was already on the ground. She also claimed he was

moving forward for the first few shots, but he eventually moved backward and hit the ground.

She estimated that she shot him one or two times while he was moving backward.

Deputy Young and Lieutenant Oscar Gerard conducted a second interview of Brown

on August 8, 2022. During the second interview, Lieutenant Gerard questioned Brown

about the shell casings and blood trail at the scene of the shooting. Before trial, Brown had

moved to exclude the following statements made by Lieutenant Gerard for lack of

foundation:

Here’s the, here’s the, have a seat, Katy. Here’s the issue: Okay. And I’m just gonna tell you what the scene shows. Okay? The shell casing starts at the truck door and they work their way to the actual body. Okay? There is a blood trail, seven foot. Okay? From him, where it starts to where he landed, he fell back seven feet. He did. Okay? You follow me? So with that being said, where he ended up is not where he was shot initially, so the first shell casing that I find is three foot from his left arm. Actually, it’s closer than that, because I measured [from the] center mass of his body. That shell casing is under three foot from his left arm, so that would indicate to me that shot was fired after he was down in that final resting place. How did that casing get there?

The court denied the motion to exclude the portion of the interview but did agree

that, unless a foundation was laid, Lieutenant Gerard would not be allowed to offer opinion

testimony on the matter during direct examination. The court also ruled that Brown could

offer a limiting instruction to inform the jury that the purpose of interrogation of a witness

is to elicit information. Brown objected to Lieutenant Gerard’s testimony about the shell

casings and the blood trail but did not offer any limiting instruction when the interview was

4 entered into evidence and played for the jury. On direct, Gerard testified that there was

about a seven-foot trail of blood leading to and away from Miller’s body. He also detailed

where each of the shell casings was found, with one being about three feet away from Miller’s

body.

After the State rested, Brown moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence

demonstrated that she was justified in using deadly force against Miller due to the continuing

pattern of domestic abuse along with his threats to kill her while he came at her. She also

argued that the only evidence offered by the State to negate her self-defense claim was

Newsom’s testimony, which she argued was contradicted by Dr. Erickson’s report and

testimony that there was no close-range fire. The court denied the motion for a directed

verdict, reasoning that the evidence left room for doubt about whether Brown was afraid of

Miller. It also noted that Newsom’s testimony was not incompatible with Dr. Erickson’s

findings.

Kimberly Poupore and Karen King testified on Brown’s behalf. They both worked at

a dentist’s office where Brown was a patient and testified that they had concerns that Brown

was a victim of domestic violence based on their observations of Brown’s injuries and their

records.

Brown testified on her own behalf. She and Miller started dating in May 2015, and

they moved in together two months later. Miller hit her for the first time in August 2015.

Brown then went on to provide an extensive account of the physical and sexual violence she

experienced by Miller. She detailed multiple instances of rape, injuries like black eyes and a

5 broken nose, and how he would lock her in a room. He kept her driver’s license, debit card,

and Social Security card in his wallet.

She left Miller in February 2021 and began dating someone else in May 2022. Brown

said that Miller’s behavior escalated when he found out she was dating, including stalking

her and her boyfriend and confronting them at a Walmart in June 2022. This led her to seek

a protective order against Miller on July 28, 2022. When she came to Arkansas on August 5,

2022, she went to the sheriff’s office to see about getting the protective order served; she had

devised a plan to tell Miller she would let him see his son, but her real intention was to get

him served.

Brown testified that Miller was angry and “flustered” as soon as she saw him on

August 6. She told him their son was with a babysitter, and she needed to go inside to get

clothes and call the babysitter to bring their son back. Brown went inside the house and

called the sheriff’s office to tell them Miller had arrived. When she went back out, she tossed

the bag to Miller because she “was staying out of reach of him.” She told him the babysitter

was on her way so there would be time for law enforcement to arrive. During the

conversation Miller apparently asked her why she was smirking, and Brown told him law

enforcement was on its way.

Brown testified that Miller then told her, “I’m going to kill you, you stupid fucking

bitch,” and started walking toward her. Brown said she stepped backward, drew her gun, and

started firing rapidly while walking backward. He took a few more steps toward her while she

was shooting him, but just before the gun was empty, he stumbled back. By the time he hit

6 the ground, the gun was empty. As she walked toward him, she dropped the gun. When she

got to him, she dropped to her knees and screamed. She claimed that Newsom saw her at

the point when she was on her knees next to Miller. She attempted to render first aid to

Miller by applying pressure to his wounds and performing CPR.

Brown rested and renewed her motion for directed verdict, reiterating her previous

argument. The State also moved for a directed verdict on the justification defense, arguing

that Brown provoked Miller and therefore had a duty to retreat. The court denied both

motions.

Brown was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to thirty five years in the

Arkansas Division of Correction. She appealed. On appeal, she argues that (1) the State did

not present sufficient evidence to negate her justification defense, and (2) the court

committed reversible error in allowing the entirety of her second recorded interview into

evidence and not excluding the portion in which Lieutenant Gerard made inferences based

on the position of blood trails and shell casings.

Brown’s first argument concerns the sufficiency of the evidence. Brown’s position was

that she was acting in self-defense when she shot Miller, and once a justification defense is

asserted, it becomes an element of the offense that the State must disprove. Severance v. State,

2024 Ark. App. 87, at 10–11, 684 S.W.3d 610, 618. In other words, it was the State’s burden

to negate that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(5)(C) (Supp.

2021). Brown argues that the State did not sufficiently negate her defense that she was

justified in her actions because of the continuation of a pattern of domestic abuse.

7 Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-2-607(a)(3) (Supp. 2021) provides that a person

is justified in using deadly physical force against another person if she reasonably believes

that the other person is imminently endangering her life or about to victimize her from the

continuation of a pattern of domestic abuse.

In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we view evidence in the light most favorable to

the State and consider only evidence supporting the verdict. Severance, 2024 Ark. App. 87,

at 10–11, 684 S.W.3d at 618. A conviction is affirmed if substantial evidence exists to

support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will,

with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion without resorting to speculation or

conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it

must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable

conclusion. Id. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is for the jury to

decide. Id. Likewise, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury; it is free to believe all,

part, or none of any testimonial evidence and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony

and inconsistent evidence. Id.

But whether Brown was abused is not the end of the inquiry. Without question,

Brown presented extensive evidence of a continuing pattern of domestic abuse, and the State

did not contest Brown’s account that she had been mistreated by Miller in the past. However,

the existence of abuse does not, by itself, justify the use of deadly force. The focus of Brown’s

argument on appeal is that there was a history of domestic violence, but it ignores the other

elements of the defense, which is whether she reasonably believed that deadly force was

8 immediately necessary to prevent imminent harm. The jury was entitled to find, on the basis

of the physical evidence and eyewitness testimony, that she did not.

Circumstantial evidence presented by the State undermined Brown’s contention that

she was facing an imminent threat when she shot Miller. The jury heard testimony that

Brown arranged for Miller—who was so weak from his recent illness that he could not stand

for more than five minutes and could not drive himself—to come to Arkansas under false

pretenses. Newsom testified that he heard two shots fired; heard Miller cry for help; saw

Miller fall down; and saw Brown walk over to Miller, stand over him, and fire more rounds

into his body after he was down. Consistent with Newsom’s account, investigators recovered

a shell casing within three feet of Miller’s body, and the medical examiner testified that

several wounds indicated bullets entered Miller’s body from above at downward angles.

Justification for deadly force ends when the threat of endangerment or victimization

of abuse is no longer imminent. Arkansas Code Ann. § 5-2-607(a)(3). The State presented

evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that any threat to Brown had ended

before, at a minimum, the final shots were fired.

Brown argues that Newsom’s testimony that she stood over Miller and continued to

fire after Miller had fallen was contradicted by the medical examiner’s opinion that the

gunshots were not fired from close range. But these accounts are not necessarily

irreconcilable. Dr. Erickson testified only that the wounds lacked the characteristics of shots

fired from within approximately three feet; his testimony did not exclude the possibility that

the shots were fired from a slightly greater distance while Miller was on the ground.

9 Accordingly, the State presented evidence sufficient to rebut Brown’s justification

defense.

Brown next argues that the circuit court erred when it allowed the jury to hear the

portion of her second interview with Deputy Gerard during which he explained his

inferences because of where the shell casings were located in an attempt to coax more

information from Brown. At trial, the court agreed with Brown that Gerard could not testify

concerning any conclusions (lay opinions) he made from the location of the shell casings and

blood trail so that the jury could reach its own conclusions with the information provided.

(Gerard concluded that, because of where the blood splatters and shell casings were, Brown

must have shot Miller once he was already down or backing away.)

Nevertheless, the jury did ultimately hear some of those same conclusions when a

portion of Brown’s custodial interview with Gerard was played.

Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. E.g., Hopkins v. State, 2017

Ark. App. 273, at 2, 522 S.W.3d 142, 144. Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does

not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision but requires that the circuit court act

improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. E.g., id. at 3, 522 S.W.3d at 144.

Even if a circuit court does abuse its discretion in admitting evidence, the decision is still

subject to a harmless-error analysis, meaning the appellant must demonstrate that the

improperly admitted evidence is also prejudicial. Romick v. State, 2025 Ark. 57, at 10, 709

S.W.3d 816, 823 (overruling Vasquez v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 328, at 7–8, 652 S.W.3d 586,

590).

10 Brown cites Vasquez for the proposition that the error here was an abuse of discretion

and prejudicial because the testimony ultimately affected her credibility with the jury; but

Romick explains that lay witnesses are not required to check their knowledge, training, and

experience at the courthouse doors, and they may testify to their opinions. Romick, 2025 Ark.

57, at 11, 709 S.W.3d at 824.1 Moreover, even if the evidence here was admitted in error,

we cannot say that it was prejudicial. Prejudice is not assumed from evidentiary errors. Here,

the circuit court offered a limiting instruction regarding Gerard’s recorded statements in the

interview. It is well settled that an admonition to the jury usually cures a prejudicial statement

unless it is so patently inflammatory that justice could not be served by continuing the trial.

Butler v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 555, at 12. If the possible prejudice could have been cured

by an admonition to the jury, the supreme court has found no abuse of discretion when

defense counsel has refused the circuit court’s offer of such a curative instruction. Id. Brown’s

failure to pursue curative measures after invitation to do so precludes reversal on this point.

Id.

Affirmed.

GLADWIN and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Ogles Law Firm, P.A., by: John Ogles, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

1 We do not fault Brown’s counsel for arguing Vasquez. It was a well-made point with law that was still in effect when the initial brief was filed.