Emil Olson, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue

293 N.W.2d 831, 1980 Minn. LEXIS 1392
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedMay 9, 1980
Docket49763
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 293 N.W.2d 831 (Emil Olson, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Emil Olson, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 293 N.W.2d 831, 1980 Minn. LEXIS 1392 (Mich. 1980).

Opinion

SCOTT, Justice.

This appeal was commenced by a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of a three-judge panel of the Minnesota Tax Court which concluded, inter alia, that relator Emil Olson, Inc., violated Minn. Stat. Ch. 297A (1978) by failing to charge and collect a sales tax on six particular transactions. We affirm.

Relator is a corporation engaged in the sand and gravel business. As part of its operation, relator excavates gravel in its virgin state, and then crushes, screens and sizes it for use by contractors in construction. Since the virgin rock varies in size from pebbles to pieces measuring 20 inches in diameter, the raw material is unsuitable for construction purposes. After relator has worked with the rock, however, the gravel is transformed into a uniform size of one inch in diameter and thus may be used in construction.

In the six transactions at issue here, 1 relator excavated virgin rock, crushed, screened, sized and stockpiled the gravel, which was then transferred to roadbuilding contractors for money consideration. The contractors used the gravel for the purpose of constructing an interstate highway. In all six cases, the virgin material was owned by a third party, other than relator or its customer. Either relator or the customer, or a combination of both, would pay the gravel pit owner for the virgin material removed.

For the six transactions in question, relator failed to charge or collect a sales tax upon transfer of the gravel to the contractor. The Tax Court concluded that these sales were subject to the sales tax imposed by Minn.Stat. § 297A.02 (1978). Relator now challenges the Tax Court’s ruling by way of certiorari. An amicus brief, supporting the position of relator, has been filed on behalf of the following organizations: Minnesota Asphalt Pavement Association, Inc.; Aggregate Ready-Mix of Minnesota Association, Inc.; and Concrete Paving Association of Minnesota, Inc.

This case presents the following questions for our determination:

(1) Does relator’s transfer of crushed gravel to the contractors in question constitute a “sale” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 3 (1978)?

(2) Is the sale of crushed gravel to a contractor for use in constructing an interstate highway exempt from sales tax under Minn.Stat. § 297A.25, subd. 1(h) (1978)?

1. A prerequisite to the imposition of the sales tax under Minn.Stat. § 297A.02 (1978) is that a “sale” must be involved. Relator argues that, in this case, it rendered a service to the contractors which does not qualify as a “sale” within the scope of Chapter 297A. We do not agree.

In those transactions where relator paid the gravel pit owner for the rock removed, the subsequent transfer by relator of the crushed gravel to the contractors for money consideration constitutes a “sale” under Minn.St. § 297A.01, subd. 3(a) (1978). That provision states that a “sale” takes place upon “[a]ny transfer of title or possession, or both, of tangible personal property, * * * for a consideration in money * * * »

As for the situations in which the contractors compensated the owner of the virgin material for the rock removed, § 297A.01, subd. 3(b) defines a “sale” as “[t]he production, fabrication, printing or processing of tangible persona] property for a consideration for consumers who furnish either directly or indirectly the materials used in the production, fabrication, printing *834 or processing" (emphasis added). We believe that relator’s modification of the virgin rock constitutes “processing of tangible personal property” within the meaning of the above statutory section. “Process” is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 1808 (Unabridged 1966), as “to subject to a particular method, system, or technique of preparation, handling, or other treatment designed to effect a particular result.” 2 Relator’s activity of crushing, screening, and sizing virgin gravel clearly is a “method of preparation * * * to effect a particular result.” Indeed, by utilizing a certain method, relator transforms the virgin material, which is unsuitable for construction purposes, into crushed gravel of uniform size so that it may be put to a particular commercial use.

This application of § 297A.01, subd. 3(b) is consistent with Sales and Use Tax Regulation 107, which states:

Producing, fabricating and processing include any operation which results in the creation or production of tangible personal property, or which is a step in a process or in a series of operations resulting in the creation or production of tangible personal property.
Application of labor to tangible personal property so that such property may continue to be used in the same form and for the purpose for which acquired represents repairs and does not constitute producing, fabricating or processing of property. Where the expenditure is made for the purpose of modifying, altering or assembling it in some other manner, the application of labor thereto represents a sale under the, provisions of Minn.Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 3(b). (Emphasis added.)

Relator’s transformation of the virgin material into a commercially usable state certainly amounts to an alteration as contemplated by this tax regulation. 3 Further, case law from other states supports the view that the crushing, screening and sizing of virgin rock is “processing of tangible personal property” under sale tax legislation. 4 See, France Co. v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 455, 55 N.E.2d 652 (1944); Linwood Stone Products Co. v. State Dep’t of Rev., 175 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1970). We therefore reject relator’s contention.

Nor are we persuaded by the argument that the contractors who furnish relator with the material to be processed are not “consumers” within the scope of § 297A.01, subd. 3(b). It seems obvious that when the term “consumers” is used in this context it refers to the retail purchaser of the product in question. Since under Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 4 (1978) it is clear that the sales to the contractors involved in this case are “at retail,” 5 we necessarily *835 conclude that the contractors are retail purchasers and thus consumers as contemplated by § 297A.01, subd. 3(b).

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the six transactions at issue in this case are “sales” within the meaning of Chapter 297A.

2. Relator also argues that the subject transactions are excluded from the imposition of the sales tax pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 297A.25, subd. 1(h) (1978). That section exempts the following from sales tax:

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Bluebook (online)
293 N.W.2d 831, 1980 Minn. LEXIS 1392, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/emil-olson-inc-v-commissioner-of-revenue-minn-1980.