Emerson v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Emerson v. State

727 S.W.2d 267

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas

DecidedMarch 4, 1987

Docket033-84

StatusPublished

Cited by23 cases

This text of 727 S.W.2d 267 (Emerson v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Emerson v. State, 727 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1987).

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OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

ONION, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted in the 263rd District Court of the misdemeanor offense of “official oppression” under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 39.02. The indictment alleged, in effect, that the appellant while acting as a City of Houston police officer, unlawfully detained the female complainant “in order to pressure and persuade her to engage in sexual intercourse with him.” The appellant pleaded not guilty. The jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment at one (1) year’s confinement in the county jail and at a fine of $2,000.00.

On appeal the appellant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, but in two grounds of error (1) challenged the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain the misdemeanor offense of “official oppression” and (2) urged the court’s charge was fatally defective. The Court of Appeals overruled both grounds of error and affirmed the conviction, holding in part that the offense charged was within the ambit of the phrase “official misconduct” as used in the State Constitution (Article V, § 8) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 4.05) and that the district court had jurisdiction of the offense charged. Emerson v. State, 662 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex.App.Houston [1st] 1983). This Court granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that jurisdiction was properly in the district court.

Only recently in Gallagher v. State, 690 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), we decided in effect the same question here presented, quoting with approval excerpts from the Court of Appeals’ opinion in the instant case (Emerson v. State, supra.) Gallagher, however, was tried in County Criminal Court at Law No. 1 of Harris County for the misdemeanor offense of official oppression, and his appeal was a direct appeal to this Court. Gallagher urged that by virtue of Article V, § 8 of the Texas Constitution and Article 4.05, V.A.C.C.P., the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over all misdemeanors involving “official mis[269]*269conduct,” and the offense of official oppression is “official misconduct” as that phrase or term is used in the State Constitution. We agreed and held that the said county court was without jurisdiction to try Gallagher’s case. The judgment was reversed and the information ordered dismissed.

For the same reasons stated in Gallagher we hold that the district court here had jurisdiction over the misdemeanor offense charged.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

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OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

ONION, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted in the 263rd District Court of the misdemeanor offense of “official oppression” under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 39.02. The indictment alleged, in effect, that the appellant while acting as a City of Houston police officer, unlawfully detained the female complainant “in order to pressure and persuade her to engage in sexual intercourse with him.” The appellant pleaded not guilty. The jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment at one (1) year’s confinement in the county jail and at a fine of $2,000.00.

On appeal the appellant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, but in two grounds of error (1) challenged the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain the misdemeanor offense of “official oppression” and (2) urged the court’s charge was fatally defective. The Court of Appeals overruled both grounds of error and affirmed the conviction, holding in part that the offense charged was within the ambit of the phrase “official misconduct” as used in the State Constitution (Article V, § 8) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 4.05) and that the district court had jurisdiction of the offense charged. Emerson v. State, 662 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex.App.Houston [1st] 1983). This Court granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that jurisdiction was properly in the district court.

Only recently in Gallagher v. State, 690 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), we decided in effect the same question here presented, quoting with approval excerpts from the Court of Appeals’ opinion in the instant case (Emerson v. State, supra.) Gallagher, however, was tried in County Criminal Court at Law No. 1 of Harris County for the misdemeanor offense of official oppression, and his appeal was a direct appeal to this Court. Gallagher urged that by virtue of Article V, § 8 of the Texas Constitution and Article 4.05, V.A.C.C.P., the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over all misdemeanors involving “official mis[269]*269conduct,” and the offense of official oppression is “official misconduct” as that phrase or term is used in the State Constitution. We agreed and held that the said county court was without jurisdiction to try Gallagher’s case. The judgment was reversed and the information ordered dismissed.

For the same reasons stated in Gallagher we hold that the district court here had jurisdiction over the misdemeanor offense charged.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

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