Emerick v. Harris

1 Binn. 416, 1808 Pa. LEXIS 59
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 24, 1808
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 1 Binn. 416 (Emerick v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 1808 Pa. LEXIS 59 (Pa. 1808).

Opinion

On this day the judges delivered their opinions.

Yeates J.

On the first question argued in this case, I have no doubt whatever, that this court is vested with the legitimate power of deciding on the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. The judicial authority of this state comprehends the exercise of this right as well on principle as precedent.

The constitution, being the act of the people, and the compact according to which they have agreed with each other that the government which they have established shall be administered, is a law to the government; and a sacred reverence for it is an indispensable requisite in the character and conduct of every public agent. 1 Tuck. app. to Black. Comm. 29.

It cannot be denied that an anxious desire is expressed by the people in the formation of the constitution of the United States, and of this state, to keep the powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, distinct and independent of each other. They are separate and coordinate branches of the government, and are expressly recognised as such, by a special enumeration of their respective powers and rights. By the 6th article of the constitution of the United States, “ the “ senators and representatives in congress, and the members of “ the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial “ officers both of the United States and of the several states, shall “ be bound by oath or affirmation to support the constitution.” This is further enforced by a law of the United States passed on the 1st June 1789. 1 U. S. Laws 26. By the 8th article of the constitution of this state, “ members of the general assem- “ bly, and all officers, executive and judicial, shall be bound by “ oath or affirmation to support the constitution of this com- “ monwealth, and to perform the duties of their respective “ offices with fidelity.” On what grounds are these provisions [420]*420made,unless, as j udge Tucker observes,the constitution regards the judicial exposition of that instrument, as the bulwark provided against the undue extension of legislative power? 1 Tuck. app. 288. The judiciary power, far from being an emanation from the executive, is intended by the American constitutions as a counterpoise-or check to its excesses, and those of the legislature. 3 Tuck. Black. 24. note 2. See Federalist, No. 78.

The 10th section of the 1st article of the constitution of the United States provides, among other things, that u no “ state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law “ impairing the obligation of contracts;” and the 17th section of the 9th article of the state constitution expressly directs, that “ no ex post facto law, nor any law impairing contracts shall be made;” and the 18th section'asserts that “no person shall be attainted of treason or felony by the legislature.” Put a strong ca'se, which for the honour of human nature we can scarcely suppose the possibility of: that the legislature should, under very peculiar circumstances, (as in the case of sir John Fenwicke in England) pass an act of attainder against an obnoxious citizen for treason, and the attorney general should demand of the court to award execution. Will it be said that we are compellable to pass such sentence, against the express words, and plain meaning of both constitutions, and the tenor of our oaths of office? Would it not be our bounden duty to refuse to pass the sentence, and to put the party on his trial according to the ordinary course of law, as was done by the judges of the general court in Virginia, on an Act passed to attaint Josiah Phillips in May 1778, unless he should render himself to justice within a limited time? 1 Tuck. Black, app. 293.

The obligation of an oath imposed upon us to support both constitutions would be nugatory, if it were dependen t upon either of the other branches of the government, or in any manner sub - ject to their control; since such control might operate to the destruction instead of the support of either constitution. Nor can it escape observation, that to require such an oath on the part of the judges on the one hand, and yet suppose them bound by acts of the legislature which may violate the constitution, they have sworn to support, carries with it such a degree of impiety as well as absurdity, as no man who pays any regard to the obligations of an oath, can be supposed either to contend for [421]*421pr defend. 1 Tuck. Black, append. 355. My idea of the obligations arising from the oath to support the constitutions of the United States and this state, prescribed by each of those solemn instruments, is plainly this: Whether the party moves in the sphere of the legislative, executive, or judicial department, he is bound to maintain and uphold those compacts made with the people. Possessed of a portion of the lawmaking power, he is interdicted from exercising his legislative right in such a manner, as may injure or impair the sources from which his authority is derived. In the executive branch, he shall carefully avoid every act which may have that injurious tendency. In the judiciary, he shall fairly and patiently compare legislative acts with both constitutions, and honestly pronounce upon them as his judgment and conscience shall dictate, without regarding consequences. A due conformity to the oath of office in a judge, creates duties beyond those of passive obedience. It requires the active energies of the mind to determine on the constitutionality of those laws, which may be brought before him in judgment; and in his decisions he shall protect those paramount laws which he has sworn to support.

Every one can readily see that the judges may be thrown into a delicate situation by the exercise of this constitutional right. They are subjected to the lawmaking power by impeachment, or by removal for causes which do no-t furnish ground of impeachment; and may therefore in one sense be supposed to owe their existence to the lawmakiug power, I can only answer, the constitution of this state contemplates no wilful perversion of the power of impeachment or removal; and it is to be hoped, for the honour of human nature, that such instances will seldom occur. WheneveE it does happen, the judge must derive consolation from the integrity of his own mind, and the honest feelings that he has discharged his duty with fidelity to the government. When he accepted his commission he knew the tenure of his office; and it is much better that individuals should suffer a private inconvenience, than the community sustain a public injury. Posterity sooner or later will do him complete justice.

The power of the judiciary branch to pronounce against the validity of the laws of the union and of individual states', is taken for granted by the act of congress of Sept. 24fth 1/89, sec. 25. In certain cases where is drawn in question the [422]*422validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under5 the United States, and the decision is against their validit)'; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States,

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Bluebook (online)
1 Binn. 416, 1808 Pa. LEXIS 59, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/emerick-v-harris-pa-1808.