Emerald City Pet Rescue v. Benner-Snyder

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 6, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00532
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT SEATTLE 6 7 EMERALD CITY PET RESCUE, Case No. C25-532-RSM 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT v. 9 MELODY BENNER-SNYDER, 10 Defendant. 11

12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Emerald City Pet Rescue’s Motion for 14 Default Judgment. Dkt. #20. Having considered the record in this case, including Defendant 15 Melody Benner-Snyder’s failure to appear and the Clerk of Court’s entry of an Order of Default 16 (Dkt. #13), the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion and enters a permanent injunction against 17 Defendant, as described below. 18 II. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff, a Washington nonprofit that rehabilitates and rehomes animals, owns the federal 20 registered trademarks “Emerald City Pet Rescue” and “Emerald City Pet Rescue Love Can Save 21 Lives” [the “Emerald City Pet Rescue Marks”]. Id. at ⁋⁋ 10-11. 22 Since “at least January 26, 2024,” Defendant has operated as an animal boarding and 23 adoption service provider under the mark “Emeral City Rescue Coalition.” Id. at ⁋⁋ 24, 31. 24 1 “Upon information and belief, Defendant operates her business as a for-profit sole proprietor[,]” she “has not registered any trade names with the Washington State Department of Revenue, nor 2 has she filed as a business entity or charity with the Washington Secretary of State[,]” and she 3 “operate her business without a Washington business license.” Id. at ⁋⁋ 25-27. Using statements 4 such as “you can make a difference,” “help support our mission,” and “ways you can help us, 5 help them,” Defendant’s website encourages payments through “a series of links to cash-transfer 6 platforms such as Venmo, Cashapp, and Zelle” to pay Defendant “rather than any non-profit 7 entity.” Id. at ⁋ 28. 8 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s use of “Emerald City Rescue Coalition” violates federal 9 and state law because it is confusing, misleading, deceptive, and has caused and continues to 10 harm Plaintiff’s reputation and customer service. Id. at ⁋⁋ 53-73. Plaintiff lists numerous 11 communications from customers and others, as well as at least one negative Google review, 12 confusing Plaintiff with Defendant. Id. at ⁋⁋ 37-43. 13 On September 17 and October 25, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel sent cease-and-desist letters 14 to Defendant but received no response. Id. at ⁋ 45-46. On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff emailed 15 a draft of its Complaint and called Defendant but received no response. Id. at ⁋ 47. 16 On March 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed its Complaint, alleging claims for trademark 17 infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and violations of the Washington 18 Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”). Dkt. #1 at ⁋⁋ 53-73. After several failed service attempts, 19 Plaintiff served Defendant with the summon and complaint on May 13, 2025. Dkt. #11 at 2. 20 On June 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for default. Dkt. #11. Defendant has not filed 21 or served an answer, appeared in this action, contacted Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s counsel, or 22 otherwise demonstrated any intent to participate in this action. Accordingly, on June 12, 2025, 23 the Clerk entered an Order of Default against Defendant. Dkt. #13. Plaintiff filed the instant 24 1 Motion on July 17, 2025. Dkt. #20. III. DISCUSSION 2 The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because, taking the factual allegations 3 in the Complaint as true, Defendant is domiciled in and operates her business at issue here in 4 Washington. Dkt. #1 at ⁋ 4. The Court also has subject matter over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant 5 to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a) and 1367(a) because Plaintiff has alleged violations of the Lanham Act 6 and a related state-law claim. Id. at ⁋ 3. 7 A. Default Judgment 8 Given the entry of default in this case, the Court may use its discretion to enter a default 9 judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); see also LCR 55(b). When examining the merits of a 10 default judgment, the Court takes well-pled allegations in a complaint as true. See Fair Hous. of 11 Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 12 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). Though default judgments are “ordinarily disfavored, the Court 13 analyzes seven factors to determine whether default judgment is appropriate. Eitel v. McCool, 14 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Those factors are: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the 15 plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim(s); (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; 16 (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material 17 facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying 18 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Id. 19 In applying this test, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint to be well-pled and therefore 20 takes its allegations as true. 21 (1) Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiffs 22 The Court finds that there is a great possibility of prejudice to Plaintiff without a default 23 judgment. Although Defendant was served, she has failed to defend, appear, or otherwise 24 1 participate in this action. Therefore, without a default judgment, Plaintiff will have no remedy. See Criminal Prods., Inc. v. Gunderman, 2017 WL 664047, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 17, 2017). 2 (2) Merits of the Substantive Claims and 3 (3) Sufficiency of the Complaint 4 The second and third Eitel factors are “often analyzed together. Curtis v. Illumination 5 Arts, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 2014). After analyzing each of Plaintiff’s 6 claims, the Court finds that these factors support default judgment. 7 a. Claims One and Two: Federal Trademark Infringement and Unfair 8 Competition

9 Plaintiff’s first claim, trademark infringement, requires that Plaintiff establish (1) a 10 protected interest in the mark and (2) the accused infringing party’s use of that mark is likely to 11 cause consumer confusion. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th 12 Cir. 1985). “The test for likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably prudent consumer’ in 13 the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of the good or service bearing one of the 14 marks.” Dreamwerks Prod. Grp. Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). 15 Federal registration of a mark provides prima facie evidence of its validity, entitling the plaintiff 16 to a strong presumption that the mark is protectable. See Yellow Cab. Co. of Sacramento v. 17 Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2005). 18 Plaintiff has established that it owns the Emerald City Pet Rescue Trademarks, thus it has 19 a protected interest in these marks. The Complaint alleges numerous instances of other 20 businesses and customers mistakenly contacting Plaintiff and leaving Plaintiff a negative Google 21 review in reference to Defendant’s business. See Dkt. #1 at ⁋⁋ 37-42. Taking these allegations 22 as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established that Defendant’s business and advertisements 23 using the similar “Emerald City Rescue Coalition” mark likely cause (and actually caused) 24 1 consumer confusion. Regarding Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim, “the elements of infringement and unfair 2 competition are essentially the same; the rulings stand or fall together.” E. &J. Gallo Winery v. 3 Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1288 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992). Because the Court has determined 4 that Plaintiff adequately established a trademark infringement claim, Plaintiff has also 5 established its unfair competition claim. 6 b. Claim Three: Violation of the CPA 7 “Absent unusual circumstances, the analysis of a CPA claim will follow that of the 8 [federal] trademark infringement and unfair competition claims; it will turn on the likelihood of 9 confusion regarding a protectable mark.” Safeworks, LLC v. Teupen Am., LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 10 1181, 1192 (W.D. Wash. 2010). Because the CPA claim analysis tracks that for a federal 11 trademark claim, and there do not appear to be any unusual circumstances dictating a different 12 result, Plaintiff has established its CPA claim. 13 (4) Sum of Money at Stake 14 “In weighing this factor, courts take into account the amount of money requested in 15 relation to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, whether large sums of money are involved, 16 and whether the recovery sought is proportional to the harm caused by defendant’s conduct.” 17 Curtis, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1212 (quotations omitted). 18 However, other than statutory costs and attorney fees discussed below, Plaintiff seeks a 19 permanent injunction, enjoining Defendant from: (1) “[s]elling, marketing, advertising, or 20 promoting the Emerald City Rescue Coalition Mark or any other mark that is a confusingly 21 similar variation or imitation” of Plaintiff’s marks; (2) making representations that Defendant’s 22 services are connected with Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s services; (3) “[u]sing or authorizing any third 23 party” to “falsely” associate with Plaintiff; and (4) registering or applying for a mark or name 24 1 “consisting of or incorporating the Emerald City Rescue Marks or any other mark that infringes or is likely to be confused with” Plaintiff. Dkt. #20-1, Proposed Order. 2 Under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a), the Court may “grant injunctions according to principles of 3 equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable” in order to prevent trademark 4 violations. Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006). The 5 Washington CPA also allows for permanent injunctions to prevent violations. See RCW 6 19.86.090. 7 When deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction, a court is engaging in “an act of 8 equitable discretion” and must apply “traditional equitable principles” embodied in a four-factor 9 test. eBay Inc.v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Under that test, a plaintiff 10 must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, 11 such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 12 balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 13 (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. Id. 14 The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the above test. First, Defendant’s infringement 15 has caused irreparable harm to Plaintiff’s reputation through confused customers and bad 16 business reviews. Second, Plaintiff has shown, as well as Defendant through her lack of 17 participation in this case, that money damages alone are insufficient to prevent further 18 infringement and harm. Third, the balance of hardship favors Plaintiff, who is seeking to enjoin 19 Defendant from engaging in further illegal conduct that only benefits Defendant. Finally, an 20 injunction protecting Plaintiff from further harm and infringement on Plaintiff’s trademarks will 21 serve the public interest. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of an entry of default judgment, 22 and the Court will grant Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction. 23 (5) Possibility of Dispute as to Material Facts 24 1 Given the record here, as well as Defendant’s lack of appearance, the Court finds little possibility of a dispute concerning material facts. 2 (6) Excusable Neglect 3 The Court is satisfied that Defendant was served with notice of this case, and there is no 4 evidence that Defendant’s failure to appear is due to excusable neglect. Accordingly, the Court 5 finds that this factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. 6 (7) Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits 7 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that, where, as here, Defendant’s failure to appear makes 8 a decision on the merits “impractical, if not impossible,” any preference for deciding cases on 9 the merits does not preclude the Court from entering a default judgment. Dkt. #20 at 6 (quoting 10 Burciaga v. AAJP 2, Inc., No. C23-0981-KKE, 2025 WL 459882, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 11 2025). 12 B. Damages 13 Plaintiff seeks costs and attorney fees in the amount of $23,920, as well as a permanent 14 injunction against Defendant. Dkt. #20 at 6. Plaintiff’s requested attorney fees of $20,000 15 represent the majority of the work by Plaintiff’s counsel, Ms. Lewis, “the primary author” of 16 Plaintiff’s motions.” Id. at 7; see Dkt. #21, Lewis Decl., at ⁋⁋ 4-7 (describing over 70 hours of 17 work by 3 attorneys, amounting to over $36,000 in total fees). Plaintiff’s requested costs of 18 $3,920 include the $405 filing fee, the $228 first process server fees, and the $2663 private 19 investigator fees. Id. 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) allows the prevailing party to be awarded “costs,” as does the 21 Lanham Act. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The Ninth Circuit has upheld 22 awards of attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) ‘solely because, by entry of default 23 judgment, the district court determined, as alleged in [plaintiff’s] complaint, that [defendant’s] 24 1 acts were committed knowingly, maliciously, and oppressively, and with an intent to . . . injury [plaintiff].’” Studio 010 Inc. v. Digital Cashflow LLC, No. 2:20-CV-01018-DGE, 2023 WL 2 6793974, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2023) (quoting Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 3 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2008)). For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the 4 above costs and fees are reasonable and will grant Plaintiff’s request. 5 IV. CONCLUSION 6 Having reviewed the instant Motion, declarations, and remainder of the record, the Court 7 hereby finds and ORDERS: 8 1. Plaintiff Emerald City Pet Rescue’s Motion for Default Judgment, Dkt. #20, is 9 GRANTED. 10 2. Defendant Melody Benner-Snyder is enjoined from: 11 a. Selling, marketing, advertising, or promoting the Emerald City Rescue 12 Coalition Mark or any other mark that is a confusingly similar variation or 13 colorable imitation of Emerald City Pet Rescue’s Marks; 14 b. Making or displaying any statement, representation, or depiction that is likely 15 to lead the public or trade to believe that (i) Defendant Benner-Snyder’s 16 services are in any manner approved, endorsed, licensed, sponsored, 17 authorized, or franchised by, or associated, affiliated, or otherwise connected 18 with Emerald City Pet Rescue; or (ii) Emerald City Pet Rescue’s services are 19 in any manner approved, endorsed, or otherwise connected with Defendant 20 Benner-Snyder; 21 c. Using or authorizing any third party to use in connection with any business, 22 goods, or services any false description, false representation, or false 23 designation of origin, or any marks, names, words, symbols, devices, or trade 24 1 dress that falsely associates such business, goods, and/or services with Emerald City Pet Rescue or tend to do so; and 2 d. Registering or applying to register any trademark, service mark, domain name, 3 trade name, or other source identifier or symbol of origin consisting of or 4 incorporating the Emerald City Pet Rescue Marks or any other mark that 5 infringes or is likely to be confused with Emerald City Pet Rescue’s Marks or 6 Emerald City Pet Rescue. 7 3. The Court AWARDS Plaintiff $23,920.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as post- 8 judgment interest at a rate fixed under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. Defendant Benner-Snyder 9 is liable for this amount, to be paid no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this 10 Order. 11

12 DATED this 6th day of October, 2025. 13 A 14 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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