Emanuel v. Commissioner

9 T.C. 779, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 51
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedOctober 28, 1947
DocketDocket No. 11435
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 9 T.C. 779 (Emanuel v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Emanuel v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 779, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 51 (tax 1947).

Opinion

OPINION.

Opper, Judge-.

The deficiency in controversy is in Federal estate tax in the amount of $2,701.02. The sole contested issue is whether four bank deposits placed in trust by decedent during her life are to be considered “property subject to general claims” for the purpose of determining the allowance for previously taxed property under section 812 (c), Internal Revenue Code. All of the facts have been stipulated and are hereby found accordingly. Decedent died a resident of the State of Pennsylvania on July 13,1944. Edward Cornell Emanuel and Louis E. Voigt are the executors under her last will and testament, which was probated on July 18, 1944, letters testamentary having been granted on the same day. The Federal estate tax return was filed with the collector for the twenty-third collection district of Pennsylvania.

During decedent’s lifetime she opened four savings accounts in a Pittsburgh savings bank in which the total balance at her death was $40,517.75. They were denominated trusts for her son, daughter, grandson, and granddaughter, respectively. The deposit books were in decedent’s exclusive possession at her death. The amount of the deposits was not included in the estate inventory filed with the Register of Wills of Allegheny County, but was included in the estate tax return.

An issue as to the amount of one of the deposits is now conceded by respondent. On the remaining question, respondent determined in the notice of deficiency that the savings accounts were not subject to the general claims of creditors. Purporting to apply the provisions of section 812 (c), he reduced the property previously taxed proportionately, reaching the result that no deduction on this account was allowable.

There is substantial agreement between the parties on all matters of law, as well as fact, except one narrow technical point which presents the only issue. They agree, in short, that decedent established “tentative trusts” by means of inter vivos bank deposits, the legal effect of which, to quote from Restatement of the Law of Trusts (sec. 58), is that “the intended trust is enforceable by the beneficiary upon the death of the depositor as to any part remaining on deposit on his death * * They now agree on the amounts involved, and apparently there is no doubt as to the necessity of inclusion in the gross estate. The issue is whether such deposits are “subject to general claims” of creditors, within the meaning of section 812 (c), Internal .Revenue Code,1 as amended by section 405 (b) of the 1942 Act, dealing with the computation of the deduction for prior taxed property,2 though there is even apparent agreement otherwise as to the amount of tbe property previously taxed and as to the correct method of computation,3 once the single point in controversy is settled.

The issue may, however, be narrowed even further. Although the beneficiaries are entitled to these funds'as against general or residuary legatees, rights of estate creditors are not wholly eliminated. To quote again from the Restatement, which, it is not contested, is accepted in Pennsylvania — petitioner’s situs: “* * * on the death of the depositor if the deposit is needed for the payment of his debts, his creditors can reach it. So also, if it is needed it can be applied to the payment of his funeral expenses and the expenses of the administration of his estate, if he has not sufficient other property which can be applied for these purposes.” See also Beake’s Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137; 112 N. Y. S. 529. The present parties agree that the petitioner estate was sufficient to pay all claims without resorting to the deposits, so that the controversy is reduced to the question whether it is the potential, or the actual, resort to the property in question which renders it “subject to general claims,” within the meaning of section 812 (c).

Respondent makes no rejoinder to petitioner’s assertion that, if these deposits are not “subject to general claims,” neither is any real property left by a decedent. As in the case of “tentative trusts,” real property ordinarily bypasses the administration of the estate, but may be resorted to, if necessary, “for the payment of debts if the personal estate is insufficient for that purpose.” Merkel's Estate, 131 Pa. 584; 18 Atl. 931. The situation of the beneficiaries of these trusts is not dissimilar to a legatee’s under a specific legacy.4 He also can insist on the payment of general creditors out of the estate residue. In re Torchiana's Estate, 292 Pa. 470; 141 Atl. 294. Yet it could scarcely be contended that real estate or property left specifically was not in the class or kind of property which is “subject to general claims.”

These considerations, coupled with the apparent point of attack of the legislation5 and the absence from the regulations of any warrant for respondent’s present action, require disapproval of the deficiency.

Reviewed by the Court.

Decision will be entered, wider Buie 50.

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Related

Weber v. Commissioner
29 T.C. 1170 (U.S. Tax Court, 1958)
Schaeffer v. Commissioner
7 T.C.M. 657 (U.S. Tax Court, 1948)
In re the Estate of Ayer
192 Misc. 419 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1948)
Emanuel v. Commissioner
9 T.C. 779 (U.S. Tax Court, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
9 T.C. 779, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 51, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/emanuel-v-commissioner-tax-1947.