Elyse M. Marchese v. Daniel G. Marchese

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: June 29, 2026
• Docket: A-2446-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2446-24

ELYSE M. MARCHESE,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DANIEL G. MARCHESE,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted June 3, 2026 – Decided June 29, 2026

Before Judges Mayer and Vanek.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FM-14-1273-14.

The Marchese Law Firm, LLC, attorney for appellant (Daniel G. Marchese, on the briefs).

Cadicina Law, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Thomas R. McConnell, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Daniel G. Marchese appeals from a December 9, 2024 post-

judgment matrimonial order requiring him to pay child support arrears to his ex-

wife, plaintiff Elyse M. Marchese, and to reimburse college expenses for the

parties' eldest daughter, pursuant to their Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA).

Defendant also appeals from a February 28, 2025 order denying reconsideration.

We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

I.

The parties were divorced pursuant to a December 20, 2017 Dual

Judgment of Divorce (DJOD), which incorporated their MSA. In the MSA,

defendant agreed to pay all out-of-pocket post-secondary educational expenses

for the parties' children as follows:

The parties acknowledge that the Children may seek a post-secondary education. Both parties shall support the aspiration and opportunity for the Children and shall not constrain the opportunity and choice available for the Children at that time. The cost of preparation courses and/or application fees must be discussed and agreed upon prior to incurring this expense. The Children's post-high school educational expenses, for undergraduate college, junior college, vocational or trade school, shall be funded first from grants and/or scholarships and by way of financial aid, such as subsidized or unsubsidized loans. Thereafter, the parties agree that the Husband shall be responsible for the Children's reasonable post-high school educational expenses, for undergraduate college, junior college, vocational or trade school. Such educational expenses

A-2446-24 2 shall include all necessary charges for pre-admission standardized tests, traveling and accommodations associated with visiting schools or interviewing at schools, application fees, tuition, room, board, activity fees[,] lab fees, books and supplies and transportation. Both parties shall cooperate fully in the Children's application process, both for admission and for financial aid, loans, grants and/or scholarships. They shall fully and promptly provide any necessary information, including tax returns and financial statements, and complete all necessary forms in a timely manner. If one party's failure to provide such information in a timely manner results in late fees or other financial penalties, that party shall bear the full cost of such fees or penalties. The parties shall begin discussing the Children's college education during the middle of each child's junior year of high school.

On October 7, 2024, plaintiff moved to enforce litigant's rights, seeking

to enforce the MSA for "overdue [a]limony and child support" and to obtain

reimbursement from defendant for the eldest daughter's college expenses

totaling $111,873.32. The motion record demonstrates that the relationship

between the eldest daughter and her father soured prior to the parties' execution

of the MSA.1 Although the eldest child had graduated college in December

2023, plaintiff explained in her supporting certification she did not file the

1 The genesis of the break in the relationship between father and child is not relevant to our disposition of this appeal. A-2446-24 3 motion sooner because she did not know she could seek enforcement of the MSA

without legal representation and she could not afford an attorney.

Plaintiff demonstrated defendant was involved in this daughter's college

application process—she had provided defendant with a list of schools, informed

him of her college visits, and kept him updated on acceptances and scholarships.

According to plaintiff, defendant was disruptive and controlling, and continued

to insist the daughter pursue certain schools and programs that she was not

interested in.

Plaintiff stated defendant was unhappy with the daughter's decision to

attend the University of South Carolina (USC), along with the child's decision

not to speak with him. However, there is no evidence in the record that

defendant sought post-judgment relief as to the daughter's attendance at college

or his financial obligation for her decision to attend USC's nursing program .

Plaintiff submitted a list of expenses she had incurred for college

attendance and included an account summary which contained a list of charges

and payments for USC tuition, fees, housing, and other college-related expenses.

Plaintiff also documented off-campus rent and utility payments for the

daughter's housing accommodations during her last year and a half of school.

A-2446-24 4 Defendant opposed plaintiff's motion and cross-moved to reduce his child

support obligation because the parties' youngest child began residing with him.

Defendant argued the MSA should not be enforced because the eldest child had

been "completely estranged" from him for over seven and a half years, beginning

three months before the parties had executed the MSA. Defendant also asserted

plaintiff's motion should be denied because she had failed to file the motion for

reimbursement before the eldest daughter or child graduated college, she did not

resolve his acrimonious relationship with the child, and she failed to sufficiently

document the college expenses for which she sought reimbursement.

Defendant contended he was not involved in the eldest child's college

selection process and was not presented with any bills for college expenses until

the verge of her graduation. Defendant stated before the eldest child started

college, he had verbally told plaintiff he would not pay for the college expenses

pursuant to the MSA unless the child either spoke with him or had a relationship

with him and suggested the child should attend community college instead.

Defendant admitted he had paid for college application fees but asserted he

wanted the child to apply to other universities and pursue a physician assistant

program rather than the nursing program she ultimately attended. Defendant

A-2446-24 5 alleged plaintiff had taken out loans and retained the funds instead of paying for

the child's education.

On December 9, 2024, the judge granted plaintiff's motion and entered an

order compelling defendant to reimburse plaintiff for the eldest child's college

expenses based on an oral statement of reasons. The judge found plaintiff

adequately supported her motion with invoices and billing statements

confirming the amounts paid for the eldest child's education after deducting

funds for loans and grants. The judge found the MSA enforceable, reasoning

this case was distinguishable from Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 544 (1982),

which the judge stated would have required a "college contribution analysis."

The judge concluded a Newburgh analysis allocating college contributions

between the parties was unnecessary because the MSA, through which defendant

undertook the obligation to pay 100% of the children's college expenses, was

enforceable.

The judge also reasoned this case was distinguishable from Gac v. Gac,

186 N.J. 535 (2006), finding defendant was aware of the eldest child's college

selection process because he had paid the application fees and had been critical

of her decisions. Therefore, the judge ordered defendant to "pay the college

A-2446-24 6 expense in the amount that was set forth in the papers," without specifying that

amount. The judge entered an order providing in part as follows:

1. Defendant shall reimburse [p]laintiff for college expenses in the amount set forth in the papers filed by [p]laintiff, and such reimbursement shall be paid by [d]efendant, beginning July 1, 2025, through meaningful payments.

2. Defendant is to relay to [p]laintiff's counsel . . . all cases that [d]efendant settles or may settle through his law practice, for as long as [d]efendant bears an obligation to [p]laintiff for alimony payments.

3. Defendant shall make a lump sum payment to [p]laintiff in the amount of $5,000 by December 31, 2024.

4. Defendant shall provide his financial information to [plaintiff's counsel] within twenty (20) days from the date of this [o]rder. Defendant and [plaintiff's counsel] shall execute a child support guideline based upon the financial information provided, and the [p]arties shall submit a [c]onsent [o]rder to the [c]ourt for [m]odification of the [c]hild [s]upport [o]rder.

5. Counsel fees are hereby awarded in favor of [p]laintiff, to be paid by [d]efendant within ninety (90) days, in the amount of $2,000.

Defendant moved for reconsideration, which the judge denied in a

February 28, 2025 order and written statement of reasons. In denying the

motion, the judge rejected defendant's reiteration of the same arguments raised

A-2446-24 7 previously and found defendant's reconsideration motion did not warrant an

award of counsel fees to plaintiff.

On appeal, defendant argues because the eldest child has not spoken to

him in over seven and a half years, he is not obligated to pay for her college

education. Alternatively, he requests we remand the matter for a determination

on the amount of college expenses he is required to pay.

II.

Our scope of review of Family part orders is narrow. Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Accordingly, we give "particular deference to the

Family Part because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters,"

Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, 154

N.J. at 413), and we will not overturn the Family Part's findings of fact when

they are "supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare, 154

N.J. at 412.

We also will not disturb the Family Part's factual findings and legal

conclusions that flow from them unless they are "so manifestly unsupported by

or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence

as to offend the interests of justice." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 564

(App. Div. 2017) (quoting Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (App. Div.

A-2446-24 8 2015)). However, we review a Family Part's legal determinations de novo. Id.

at 565.

We review a judge's denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of

discretion. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). "The

rule applies when the court's decision represents a clear abuse of discretion

based on plainly incorrect reasoning or failure to consider evidence or a good

reason for the court to reconsider new information." Pressler & Verniero,

Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 4:49-2 (2026).

III.

Defendant argues the judge erred in enforcing the parties' MSA because

the eldest child has not spoken to him for over seven and a half years. He relies

on Moss v. Nedas, 289 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 1996), to support his position.

We disagree and discern no error in the judge's conclusion that the parties' MSA

is enforceable and requires defendant to pay the entirety of the eldest child's out-

of-pocket college expenses.

The Legislature and Supreme Court "have long recognized a child's need

for higher education." Gac, 186 N.J. at 542. Although courts consider the non-

exhaustive list of twelve factors delineated in Newburgh when evaluating a

claim for contribution towards the cost of a child's higher education , id. at 543,

A-2446-24 9 where, as here, the parties' agreement imposed the obligation to pay 100% of all

out-of-pocket college expenses on defendant, the trial court need not apply the

Newburgh factors. Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 588

(App. Div. 2016). Instead, the court must enforce the agreement as written. See

Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 35-36 (2016); see also Gac, 186 N.J. at 544-45

(addressing college expenses in the absence of an agreement); Cf. Newburgh,

88 N.J. at 534 (discussing factors to be considered absent an agreement

regarding college expenses).

Our decisional law reflects New Jersey's well-settled "policy favoring the

use of consensual agreements to resolve marital controversies." Konzelman v.

Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999). "Voluntary agreements that address and

reconcile conflicting interests of divorcing parties support our 'strong public

policy favoring stability of arrangements' in matrimonial matters." Ibid.

(quoting Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 360 (1977)). We reaffirmed these

principles in Catabran, stating "[a]bsent 'compelling reasons to depart from the

clear, unambiguous, and mutually understood terms of the [MSA],' a court is

generally bound to enforce the terms of a [MSA]." 445 N.J. Super. at 589

(quoting Quinn, 225 N.J. at 55). Defendant has not supported his argument that

he should not be required to fulfill his contractual obligation to pay for the

A-2446-24 10 entirety of the eldest child's college expenses under the MSA because she refuses

to speak with him based on any controlling decisional law.

Here, the parties unequivocally agreed in their MSA defendant would be

solely responsible for payment of all the children's college expenses without any

conditions or qualifications. As such, defendant's obligations are "not measured

by legal duties otherwise imposed," Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App.

Div. 2006), but by his own undisputed assent to the parties' contractual

agreement.

Although we have long recognized that, where the "circumstances have

changed in such a way that requiring [a party] to pay for college would no longer

be equitable and fair, the court also remains free to alter the prior arrangement ."

Moss, 289 N.J. Super. at 359-60 (quoting Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 161 n.12

(1983)). However, defendant has not alleged a change in circumstances. By his

own admission, the eldest child's refusal to communicate with him predated the

MSA.

Thus, this case is distinguishable from Moss where changed

circumstances warranted revisiting the MSA. In Moss, the trial judge initially

required a father to pay a share of his daughter's college tuition in accordance

with the parent's settlement agreement. 289 N.J. Super. at 354-56. After the

A-2446-24 11 daughter transferred to a different college without notifying the father, the court

reduced his obligation for that school year and ordered that the father would not

be responsible for any further contribution "unless and until he is fully advised

of all choices considered" by the daughter. Ibid. We affirmed, finding no abuse

of discretion and noting prior arrangements can be set aside when a change in

circumstances no longer makes them fair and equitable. Ibid.

Accordingly, defendant's argument that he does not have a relationship

with the eldest child and that she perceives him as a "wallet" and "only seeks

money" from him does not support extinguishing his contractual obligations to

pay for her college expenses. Defendant does not contest the MSA language he

agreed to, which does not condition his payment for college expenses to his

children's love, affection, or relationship with him. Although defendant alleges

he was not involved in the eldest child's college decision-making process, the

judge found the record belied those unsupported contentions. We defer to the

judge's factual determination on this issue as well supported by the motion

record.

Applying our deferential standard of review, we affirm the judge's

decision to enforce the MSA because defendant has failed to allege "changed

circumstances" after signing the MSA. See Lepis, 83 N.J. at 148. Indeed,

A-2446-24 12 defendant concedes that the eldest child stopped communicating with him three

months before the parties executed the MSA, that he paid for her college

application process, and that he knew of her college selection despite his

contrary wishes. Defendant acknowledges the eldest child received a $100,000

scholarship to another university but does not provide any evidence or argument

rebutting plaintiff's assertion that USC was less expensive even after accounting

for the scholarship she received from another school. Instead, defendant argues

the other university offering the scholarship would have been a "better value,"

but that is not the standard.

Although we discern no error in the judge's conclusion that the MSA is

enforceable, we vacate and remand in part for the judge to comply with Rule

1:7-4 solely to articulate a basis for the calculation of the amount defendant

owes plaintiff for the eldest child's college expenses and to state that specific

amount in an order. The judge did not provide a detailed factual analysis or

make specific findings regarding the sufficiency of plaintiff's proofs, which

defendant alleges do not substantiate the amount of requested reimbursement.

Affirmed as to the enforcement of defendant's obligation to pay the eldest

child's college expenses pursuant to the parties' MSA. Vacated and remanded

A-2446-24 13 for the judge to comply with Rule 1:7-4 as to the specific amount owed by

defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-2446-24 14