Elvin Hamilton v. County of Kern, et al.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 8, 2026·No. 1:25-cv-00979·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELVIN HAMILTON, Case No. 1:25-cv-00979-CDB

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 13 v. (Doc. 28) 14 COUNTY OF KERN, et al., ORDER VACATING HEARING 15 Defendants.

16 17 Background 18 On August 7, 2025, Plaintiff Elvin Hamilton initiated this action with the filing of a 19 complaint asserting causes of action against Defendant County of Kern and others under 42 20 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, arising out of a traffic stop that occurred on February 27, 2025. 21 (Doc. 1 at 4-6). 22 On November 19, 2025, the Court granted Defendants’ unopposed motion to stay 23 proceedings pending the resolution of the criminal matter arising out of the same incident. (Doc. 24 22). On February 25, 2026, the parties filed a joint report providing that the criminal matter was 25 dismissed and that Plaintiff’s counsel had recently learned that Plaintiff no longer wished to be 26 represented by current counsel and was seeking to retain new counsel. (Doc. 24). The following 27 day, after considering the parties’ representations and balancing the competing equities, the 1 2026. (Doc. 25). Following the scheduling conference, the Court granted counsels’ joint request 2 to continue proceedings to permit time for Plaintiff to retain new counsel and file a notice of 3 appearance. (Doc. 27). 4 On March 30, 2026, the law firm of Kirakosian Law, APC, counsel for Plaintiff, filed a 5 motion to withdraw as counsel, supported by a declaration from Greg L. Kirakosian. (Docs. 28, 6 28-1). In their motion, counsel state that withdrawal is warranted under California Rule of 7 Professional Conduct 1.16(b)(4) because Plaintiff’s persistent failure to communicate with 8 counsel has rendered it unreasonably difficult to carry out the representation effectively. (Doc. 9 28 at 6). Counsel assert that Plaintiff’s “pattern of conduct … has made it impossible for 10 [c]ounsel to fulfill its obligations to Plaintiff,” and that counsel cannot asses the criminal matter, 11 nor advise Plaintiff regarding civil proceedings, nor prepare the case for the scheduling 12 conference without Plaintiff’s cooperation. Id. at 7. Counsel represent that Defendants do not 13 oppose the motion and that withdrawal will not prejudice Defendants, will not undermine the 14 administration of justice nor materially delay resolution of this case, and that Plaintiff’s counsel 15 has complied with the procedural requirements to bring this motion as set forth in the Local 16 Rules. Id. at 8-9. 17 Mr. Kirakosian declares that, on February 25, 2026, the parties filed a joint report 18 regarding the status of Plaintiff’s criminal matter and, in that report, he “requested an extension 19 of the stay, in part, on the grounds that Plaintiff is actively seeking to retain new legal 20 representation.” (Doc. 28-1 ¶ 7). Mr. Kirakosian states that, since January 2025,1 he and other 21 individuals from his office have made several attempts to speak with Plaintiff to determine 22 whether he has obtained new counsel or whether he wishes to proceed pro se but Plaintiff “will 23 not engage in any meaningful conversations with myself nor with any other individuals from my 24 office.” (Doc. 28-1 ¶ 11). Mr. Kirakosian represents that, since March 17, 2025,2 his office has 25 “made multiple attempts to communicate with Plaintiff to ascertain whether he has obtained new 26 counsel, but Plaintiff has failed to respond” and that, on March 24, 2026, he “called Plaintiff

27 1 The Court presumes counsel intended to state “since January [2026],” as the complaint was filed in August 2025. See (Doc. 1). 1 again, twice, and he did not answer,” as did another attorney with his office that day, and Plaintiff 2 did not answer. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. 3 Mr. Kirakosian states that, on March 24 and March 27, 2026, his office notified Plaintiff 4 via electronic mail that they would be filing a motion to withdraw. Id. ¶ 15. On March 27, 2026, 5 Plaintiff’s counsel met and conferred telephonically with Defendants’ counsel regarding the 6 motion to withdraw, and Defendants’ counsel indicated that they would not oppose the motion. 7 Id. ¶ 16. 8 Governing Authority 9 The decision to grant or deny an attorney’s motion to withdraw is ultimately committed to 10 the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2009). “In 11 ruling on a motion to withdraw as counsel, courts consider (1) the reasons why withdrawal is 12 sought; (2) the prejudice withdrawal may cause to other litigants; (3) the harm withdrawal might 13 cause to the administration of justice; and (4) the degree to which withdrawal will delay the 14 resolution of the case.” Beard v. Shuttermart of Cal., Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00594-WQH-NLS, 2008 15 WL 410694, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008) (citing Nat’l Career Coll., Inc. v. Spellings, No. 07- 16 cv-00075-HG-LK, 2007 WL 2048776, at *2 (D. Haw. July 11, 2007)); see CE Res., Inc. v. 17 Magellan Grp., LLC, No. 2:08-cv-02999-MCE-KJM, 2009 WL 3367489, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 18 2009) (noting that “[u]ltimately, the court’s ruling must involve a balancing of the equities”). 19 In addition to the above factors, withdrawal of counsel is governed by the Local Rules. 20 Local Rule 182(d) provides that if withdrawal would leave a client without counsel, an attorney 21 must file a formal motion and provide the client and all other parties with notice of the motion to 22 withdraw. Id. The attorney must also submit an affidavit providing the current or last known 23 address of the client and describing the efforts made to notify the client of the motion to withdraw. 24 Id. 25 Further, “[w]ithdrawal as attorney is governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct of the 26 State Bar of California, and the attorney shall conform to the requirements of those Rules.” Id. 27 The California Rules of Professional Conduct provide that if the rules of a court require permission 1 without the permission of such court. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(c). Also, counsel must take 2 reasonable steps to avoid prejudicing the rights of the client, including providing notice, allowing 3 time for the client to employ other counsel, and complying with applicable laws and rules. Cal. R. 4 Prof. Conduct 1.16(d). Grounds for permissive withdrawal exist when “the client by other conduct 5 renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively.” Cal. R. 6 Prof. Conduct 1.16(b)(4). 7 Discussion 8 First, counsel’s motion is deficient under Local Rule 182(d) it does not identify Plaintiff’s 9 last known address. Second, the motion is deficient under Local Rule 135 as it is not accompanied 10 by a proof of service upon Plaintiff and there otherwise is no basis to conclude that Plaintiff has 11 had an opportunity to review and respond to the motion and appear for the hearing. 12 Third, counsel provide insufficient details to permit the Court to adequately balance the 13 equities in deciding whether to grant the relief requested based on the grounds asserted (a 14 breakdown in communications). See Carter, 560 F.3d at 1113; CE Res., 2009 WL 3367489, at *2. 15 Thus, for instance, although counsel’s motion appears to implicate Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(b)(4), 16 Mr. Kirakosian’s declaration does not demonstrate that the recent breakdown in communications 17 he attests to experiencing with his client “renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry 18 out the representation effectively.” Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(b)(4). 19 For example, counsel declares that Plaintiff is actively seeking to retain new legal 20 representation.

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Elvin Hamilton v. County of Kern, et al., (E.D. Cal. 2026).

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