Elvic Import Corp. v. United States

38 Cust. Ct. 13
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedJanuary 11, 1957
DocketC. D. 1837
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 38 Cust. Ct. 13 (Elvic Import Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Elvic Import Corp. v. United States, 38 Cust. Ct. 13 (cusc 1957).

Opinions

Ford, Judge:

The record consists of the testimony of 5 witnesses for the plaintiff and 2 witnesses for the defendant, plus 12 illustrative exhibits by the plaintiff and 2 exhibits by the defendant. At the beginning of the trial, it was agreed between counsel that the subject merchandise was made on a lace or net machine and that it was not made on a bobbinet machine.

At the trial, counsel for the plaintiff proceeded upon the theory that the classification of the subject merchandise was governed by the rule of chief use. In view of the holding of the Court of Customs Appeals in Tiedeman & Sons v. United States, 8 Ct. Cust. Appls. 134, T. D. 37268, it would appear that counsel’s theory is correct. We quote the following from the above case:

The term “veilings” as used in the tariff act is a designation which signifies a material chiefly or exclusively used for the making of veils. A veil is a piece of cloth or other material, usually thin and light, designed to be worn over the head and face as an ornament or to protect or wholly or partly conceal the face from view.

The merchandise in the Tiedeman case, supra, was described by the Court of Customs Appeals as follows :

It appears from the uncontradicted testimony in the case and the samples in evidence that the goods in question are black, thin-woven silk chiffons, about 36 inches wide and from 60 to 70 yards long. They have a selvage on each side, and down the center, marking the line along which the material must be cut before using, are two closely woven stripes which serve the purpose of selvages when the goods are split. It is established that although silk fabrics of this character are purchased from the manufacturer in the double width they are never used unless split, and that by far the larger percentage of the goods is split abroad on account of the labor cost. A very small percentage, however, of double widths is imported into this country and sold to undertakers who split the fabric and use the single widths thus produced to cover the face panels of caskets.

[15]*15Also, in Van Raalte v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. Appls. 299, T. D. 36868, tbe Court of Customs Appeals expressed tbe view tbat tbe rule of chief use was proper for determining wbetber tbe merchandise in tbat case was veils or silk wearing apparel. The following is quoted from tbe Van Baalte case:

Upon a review of the record we find that the articles in question are chiefly used by women as a covering for their hats or faces, or both, while riding in automobiles. They are also used in the evening by women to cover their heads and keep their hair intact when without a hat or bonnet. They are also sometimes used in the evening to throw around the shoulders of the wearer. Some of the witnesses testify that the articles are known in the trade as veils, or as automobile and chiffon veils, and also as automobile scarfs. Other witnesses testify that they are generally known in the trade as scarfs, but that they are also known as automobile veils and as chiffon veils. The testimony is therefore divided into the two classes — that which supports the claim that the articles are known in the trade under the unqualified name of veils, and that which denies that the articles are thus known in the trade, but admits that they are known there as automobile veils and as chiffon veils.
We think that upon this testimony the board was justified in sustaining the assessment of the articles as veils. Not only the trade testimony, but also the conceded use and character of the articles support this view. The articles are chiefly worn by women over their heads for the various purposes of protecting their hats, their hair, their faces, or all of these, while riding in automobiles. Articles like these, designed for such uses, fall within the common understanding of the word “veils.” This statement is supported by the following definition of the word:

Standard Dictionary:

1. A piece of cloth or other material, usually thin and light, worn over the face or head for concealment, protection or ornament. (1) A strip of cloth wound about the face to conceal it from view, as by oriental women, usually leaving the eyes visible, and not often covering only the mouth and chin. (2) In the ordinary dress of the women of modern western nations, a piece, as of gauze or crape, tied or pinned about the face or hanging from the hat or bonnet, as for protection from sun or wind.
It is claimed by the importers that fabrics used in part for the purpose of protecting the hats or shoulders of the wearers should not be called veils, but scarfs, the importers contending that the name veils properly applies only to such articles as cover and protect the face of the wearer only. There being no eo nomine provision for scarfs in the act, the articles would fall under this claim within the general classification of silk wearing apparel.
We think, however, that this is too narrow a definition of the term veils as used in the act and that the name is broad enough to cover such fabrics as the present ones, even though they may be used in part to cover and protect the wearer’s hat as well as her face, and this conclusion is furthermore abundantly sustained by the testimony in relation to the trade usage of the term.
It should also be noted'that if the term veils as generally used in the trade covers and includes the present articles, then they would respond to that term as used in the cited paragraph, even though the articles are sometimes also called scarfs. Lidenberg v. Robertson (41 Fed., 763); Loewenthal v. United States (2 Ct. Oust. Appls., 43; T. D. 31592).

[16]*16In the Summary of Tariff Information, 1929, on the Tariff Act of 1922, page 2026, is found the following:

Veiling is a general commercial term covering a wide variety of articles, such as chiffon, grenadine, fancy netting (having fancy “veiling” meshes, or ornamented with a bar or border or figuring), used chiefly or exclusively for the making of veils. A veil is a particular length of veiling.

The above volume is a comprehensive summary of available tariff information and was compiled by the United States Tariff Commission for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means, in connection with an examination of the Tariff Act of 1922, for the purpose of making any readjustments in said act, where found necessary.

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Related

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53 Cust. Ct. 318 (U.S. Customs Court, 1964)
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40 Cust. Ct. 412 (U.S. Customs Court, 1958)
Twin Textiles Co. v. United States
39 Cust. Ct. 512 (U.S. Customs Court, 1957)
Julien Giguet, Inc. v. United States
39 Cust. Ct. 489 (U.S. Customs Court, 1957)
Dynamo Tulle Importing Co. v. United States
39 Cust. Ct. 485 (U.S. Customs Court, 1957)
William H. Katzenberg, Inc. v. United States
39 Cust. Ct. 396 (U.S. Customs Court, 1957)
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39 Cust. Ct. 396 (U.S. Customs Court, 1957)
Elvic Import Corp. v. United States
39 Cust. Ct. 360 (U.S. Customs Court, 1957)
Stollberg v. United States
39 Cust. Ct. 334 (U.S. Customs Court, 1957)

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Bluebook (online)
38 Cust. Ct. 13, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/elvic-import-corp-v-united-states-cusc-1957.