OPINION
LUMPKIN, Judge.
§°1 Appellant, Antonio Garcia Ellis, was tried by jury in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case Number CF-1999-218 and convicted of First Degree (Felony) Murder, in violation of 21 O.8.S8upp.1998, § 701.7(B). The jury set punishment at life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and the trial judge sentenced Appellant [1133]*1133in accordance with the jury's determination. Appellant now appeals his convictions and sentences.
T2 On January 6, 1999, at approximately 10:40 p.m., Christopher David Terry was washing and vacuuming his white Ford Explorer at the Vend-A-Car Wash in Oklahoma County, when he received a fatal gunshot wound to his chest. Terry was a teacher at Grace Christian Academy, and his murder received a great amount of media attention.
T3 The bulk of the State's case against Appellant, a Putnam City High School student, centered upon the eyewitness testimony of Michael Lang.1 At 10:41 p.m. on the night in question, Lang called 911, identified himself, and told the Warr Acres operator he had heard a gunshot. Lang said, "I've got someone on the ground over here...." Police arrived within a minute and found Terry lying outside his vehicle, bleeding profusely. Lang was still near the pay phone from which he had called.
4 Lang testified he was walking north on Ann Arbor Street that night when he saw Appellant. Lang knew who Appellant was because Lang knew Appellant's brother. Appellant reportedly approached Lang, who was smoking a cigar, and asked if he could have one. Lang did not have another cigar, so he allowed Appellant to drag his. As they approached 50th Street, Appellant brought Lang's attention to a white Ford Explorer and said he was going to "get that nigger." Terry had been vacuuming the Explorer.
T5 According to Lang, Appellant approached Terry, pointed a gun at him, repeatedly yelled "give me the keys," and then shot Terry. Lang saw Terry try to block himself from the bullet by putting his arm up. - Lang did not see Terry act aggressively and never heard him say a word. As Terry fell to the ground, Lang claimed Appellant briefly searched his body and then ran from the seene.
T6 Lang testified he and Appellant were the only ones around when Terry was shot; he saw no one leave by a car.
T7 Lang originally told police he had heard a gunshot and simply wandered upon the scene. He said nothing about knowing the shooter. His story began to change over time. At some point, he admitted seeing the shooting, but he told police his eyesight is bad and he did not know if the shooter was black or white. After flunking a polygraph exam, Lang admitted he knew more than he had originally reported, and he implicated Appellant as the murderer.
T8 Lang testified at trial that he had lied originally because he didn't want to get involved and didn't want anything to happen to him or his family. Appellant lived quite close to Lang, and, according to Lang, Appellant always wore blue clothing, which is the color worn by Crips gang members. Lang had assumed Appellant was in a gang, and he believed he might get shot if he told the truth. Lang was thoroughly cross-examined regarding the varying versions of the incident he reported to the police, including that he had lied to police up to eleven times. The lead investigating police officer admitted during cross-examination he originally made a recommendation to the District Attorney's office to charge both Appellant and Lang with the murder. Additionally, police officers admitted the case depended heavily on Lang's testimony.
{9 Police confronted Appellant at his apartment home the following day. After knocking on the door and announcing themselves, a female opened the door. Appellant, standing behind her, appeared startled and began moving rapidly toward the back sliding glass door. Officers stopped him and took him into custody. Appellant was wearing clothing that closely matched the description given by Lang. When told he was under arrest for murder, Appellant's only words were "[fluck you, mother fucker. Get out of my face."
10 An OSBI criminalist tested four samples from Lang's hands taken on the night of the murder and found no gunshot powder residue. An OSBI firearm examiner tested eight items of clothing from Appellant and one from Lang. No gunshot residue particles were found. Another expert testified that the fatal shot was made from a distance of be[1134]*1134tween one to two feet away from the victim. However, the murder weapon was never located.
{11 Appellant's friend, Justin Ward gave written and oral statements to police as follows: prior to the murder, Appellant told Ward he wanted a nine-millimeter gun for protection;2 Appellant told him on the day after the murder, while they were at school, that he shot Terry after trying to rob Terry of his Ford Explorer; and Michael Lang (whom Ward knows casually) was there when Appellant attempted to rob Terrys.3 At trial, Ward testified he lied to police. He claimed these statements were false and were given because police were accusing him of being connected to the murder. Ward claimed the police threatened him repeatedly. He admitted to being afraid of Appellant and seemed concerned about Appellant's possible gang affiliations, although he later testified he was not afraid and there were no gang affiliations. (At the preliminary hearing, Ward testified Appellant was a member of the Rolling 60's Crips.) At one point, Ward admitted lying during his direct examination.
112 Ward testified he was in a Home-bound program 4 on the day Appellant supposedly told him about shooting Terry.
113 Following several interviews with Lang, Lieutenant James Bauman of the Warr Acres Police Department went to Appellant's home, at about 6:00 p.m. on the day after the murder. Bauman asked Appellant's stepmother, Valencia Brown, when Appellant had come home the night before. Mrs. Brown said she did not remember. Mrs. Brown then spoke to her husband on the phone, and Bauman overheard Mrs. Brown tell her husband, "I believe that's what the detective and I are talking about, and I believe he came in at 11 o'clock."
1 14 During the trial, however, Mrs. Brown testified Appellant was home on the night in question. She asked him to go get her an Ieee at about 9:00 to 9:80 p.m. Appellant left and returned with the Ieee ten or fifteen minutes later, before 10 pm. She saw him playing video games later on. At about 10:45, she asked Appellant's brother Timmy where Appellant was, and Timmy said he had already gone to bed. She saw a telephone cord leading into Appellant's bedroom. Mrs. Brown testified she could hear the door make a bang if someone left the house, and she did not hear a bang that night between 10 and 11 pm. On cross-examination, however, Mrs. Brown admitted she had told her husband on the phone that Appellant came in at 11 p.m. and that this was still "true today."
115 Appellant's then girlfriend, Mallory Simms, testified Appellant came over to her apartment at 9:30 p.m. on the night of the murder. They talked for about ten minutes, and he left, Appellant called her later that night, at 10:15 p.m., and they spoke for thirty minutes. When Appellant was arrested, Mallory told her mother that they had been talking on the phone when the crime occurred. This story was somewhat corroborated by Mallory's mother Melanie.
T16 Melanie testified that Mallory received a call from someone at 10:15 p.m. on the night in question. Melanie remembered the call because Mallory was not supposed to receive calls after 10:00 p.m. She yelled at Mallory to get off the phone. Mallory told her the day after Appellant was arrested that she had been talking on the phone to Appellant at the time the murder allegedly occurred. Her mother, however, did not contact the police. When police contacted her, Melanie and Mallory told the police that Appellant was on the phone with Mallory during the relevant time period. Melanie testified the police did not seem to believe the story. Melanie had a caller ID machine, but did not check it to verify the story. At the prelimi[1135]*1135nary hearing, she testified she was in the habit of erasing the calls received on at least a daily basis.
I 17 Don Lowry testified that he was in his home near the Vend-A-Car-Wash on the night in question at about 10:80 to 10:85 when he heard a gunshot or car backfire. Moments later, he heard tires squealing from a car that was leaving the area pretty fast. Soon afterward, he heard emergency vehicles.
[ 18 Jason Doty testified he was delivering pizzas in the area that night when he saw a dark colored car pull out of the car wash at about 10:80 p.m. Doty then saw a black male lying on the ground near a truck and another black male standing by a pay phone. Doty went to his apartment and called 911.
119 Harland Lewis testified that he was driving near the area of the car wash that night at about 10:80 p.m., when he saw a young male run across the street in front of him. He believed the young man had on dark clothing, no hat, and was about six feet tail. Lewis originally reported the man was African American, but he could not really recall his race. Moments later, he saw a young man at the car wash walking around in circles and throwing his hands up in the air, like he was saying, "Oh my God." Lewis also saw a man lying face down beside a Ford Explorer. Lewis then saw approaching police lights.
1 20 Appellant's friends, Craig Collings and Chauney Lewis, testified Appellant owned a car and was not in the habit of walking around the neighborhood; he drove. There was also testimony that Appellant lacked money for gas that day.
{21 Dennis Burgland, a private investigator and former homicide detective, testified the police did not use proper interviewing techniques with Michael Lang. Burgland testified that "the detective was providing (Lang) with the information that the detective needed, necessary to fit the facts of the case as he knew them." Burgland believed this influenced Lang's testimony. He referred to the police investigation in this case as "shoddy."
122 Burgland interviewed many witnesses and reached the conclusion that Appellant had a solid alibi. He took his information to the police and told them to interview Appellant's girlfriend, but the police did not seem that interested. Burgland could not believe Mallory had not been interviewed before charges were filed against Appellant. He testified that he reviewed a 7-11 store tape from the night in question. Appellant purchased something, then left in a car.
123 During rebuttal, the State presented evidence, through a third party who entered the 7-11 store that night, indicating the approximate time Appellant entered the 7-11 was 7:83 p.m., not 9-9:830 p.m. as Mrs. Brown testified. He never reentered the store that night before the crime was committed. This differed from a State's witness, who placed the time between 8:80 and 9 p.m.
24 In proposition one, Appellant elaims his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 5 and Article II, §§ 6 and 20 of Oklahoma's Constitution6 was violated. He further claims he was denied the statutory expression of that right in 22 O.S8.Supp. 1999, § 812.1(A),7 or in the former expres[1136]*1136sion of that right set forth in 22 0.8.1991, §$ 812, repealed in 1999.8 Here, we note Oklahoma does not have a speedy trial act which sets forth a specific period of time for a matter to be brought to trial. But see Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 22 ©.9$.2001, § 1847.
125 When reviewing a claim of the denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, we apply the four balancing factors established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct., 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972):(1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (8) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. These are not absolute factors, but are balanced with other relevant circumstances in making a determination. Rainey v. State, 1988 OK CR 65, 755 P.2d 89, 90.
26 Appellant claims all four factors clearly weigh in his favor and that his speedy trial right has been unquestionably denied.
127 The State-while conceding the first and third factors weigh in Appellant's favor, i.e., the length of the delay and the defendant's assertion of his rights-claims Appellant's speedy trial rights were not violated, because there were good reasons for the delay and no prejudice suffered by the accused.
T28 The seriousness of this claim cannot be overstated. As the United States Supreme Court has stated,
The amorphous quality of the (speedy trial) right also leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indict, ment where the right has been deprived.
This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free.... Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 2188. Thus, regardless of the State's concessions with respect to factors one and three, we must review the facts relating to all four factors in order to apply the necessary balancing, mindful always of the Oklahoma Legislature's statutory expression on this topic.
129 Regarding the length of delay, Appellant was in jail for nearly two and a half years from the time he was jailed until his trial began.9 The information was filed on January 15, 1999, just nine days after the crime occurred. However, Appellant had been in custody since January 7, 1999, the day after the crime. (He was arraigned on January 19, 1999, at which time bond was denied.) His trial commenced on May 21, 2001. Thus, the delay was right at two years, four and one half months, or approximately 864 days.
1 30 This delay is sufficient, under our case law, to necessitate a review of the other three factors. Indeed, 22 O0.8.8upp.1999, § 812.1 indicates our Legislature considers any delay beyond one-year to require special review by the District Court. Even under the former statute, section 812, we have generally regarded the twelve-month interval as a threshold period of time in the speedy trial inquiry. See, e.g., Snow v. Turner, 1965 OK CR 115, 406 P.2d 509; State ex rel. Trusty v. [1137]*1137Graham, 1974 OK CR 146, 525 P.2d 1231, 1236 ("Under the 'Snow Rule' one informed against was required to be put to trial within a maximum period of twelve months, considering two terms of court.").
T31 We next consider the second factor, reason for the delay, and the third factor, the defendant's assertion of his right to speedy trial. These factors will be reviewed together, for it is difficult to separate the two under this record.
T32 Following the denial of child and youthful offender status, Appellant was bound over for trial as an adult on October 8, 1999 and bond was denied. His pretrial was set for November 23, 1999. Up to this point, the case was proceeding forward as any other first-degree murder case might. Appellant had been in jail for approximately nine months.
133 On November 9, 1999, Appellant filed a Motion to Set Bond, asserting he had been in custody since January 7, 1999, and that he was not a flight risk. The motion was to be heard at pretrial, but was continued for ten days because defense counsel had a conflict. When the matter was heard on December 2, 1999, bond was again denied, and the trial was scheduled for March 18, 2000.
134 On March 6, 2000, Assistant District Attorney Richard Wintory, who had recently been assigned to the case, filed a notice in which he claimed he had trial conflict with two other cases he was handling. Mr. Win-tory's notice states, "All three defendants have demanded a speedy trial and have indi-eated their opposition to any continuances in the above-styled matters." This is the first clear indication of the assertion of the speedy trial right we have found during a painstaking search of the record. A second followed at a motion hearing on March 28, 2000, wherein defense counsel told the trial judge his client would "highly object" to the moving of the trial date, based upon his speedy trial right. Nevertheless, trial was moved to April 24, 2000.
35 Therefore, the record reveals Appellant asserted his right to a speedy trial. The reason for the delay, however, is more complex.
1136 Two weeks before trial, Mr. Wintory moved for a continuance, claiming the State had interviewed a jailhouse snitch, one Roger Hymes, on November 22, 1999. Hymes had allegedly claimed Appellant told him he killed the victim and threw the murder weapon into a lake near the crime scene. The State, therefore, wanted to drain the lake in order to corroborate the witness and "in order to satisfy the letter and spirit" of this Court's opinion in Dodd v. State, 2000 OK CR 2, 993 P.2d 778, which required disclosure of certain matters relating to jailhouse informants prior to trial, on the basis that "Courts should be exceedingly leery of jailhouse informants. ..." Dodd, 993 P.2d at 783. Appellant responded by filing a written objection on April 13, 2000, which again asserted his speedy trial right and accused the State of deliberate delay tactics. Meanwhile, Appellant had been in jail for fifteen months.
137 The matter was heard before the Honorable Susan P. Caswell, Oklahoma County District Court Judge, the following day. Mr. Wintory argued the prosecution had an obligation to complete the investigation, while defense counsel, Mickey Homsey, argued the case was at the "eleventh hour . and they want to continue to investigate this case." Mr. Wintory responded by arguing that this Court's opinion in Dodd makes it "clear ... the corroboration of jailhouse testimony is at a premium...." The State had searched the lake repeatedly with divers, but had, as yet, been unable to locate a gun. Mr. Wintory estimated it would take three weeks to drain the lake.10
138 Thus, the State had a dilemma. To comply with Dodd, the State was required to provide the name of the jailhouse informant, a summary of his testimony, and his criminal background. But unless the State was able to somehow corroborate his story, the State was disinclined to use the informant's testimony at all.
139 Judge Caswell ruled the State had been diligent in its efforts to search the lake. She also found, "I think it's incumbent on the state to attempt to corroborate Mr. Hymes ... if his testimony is not corroborated, they may not even use him as a witness." Judge [1138]*1138Caswell also recognized that "there comes a point where we have to stop .... there will become a limit to how long we can put this off." Judge Caswell then ruled, "I will rely on the state, they have told me that they will satisfy all the requirements that they are required to of Dodd11 and of the discovery code if Mr. Hymes is going to be a witness." She then granted the State's Motion for continuance, and the trial was delayed two more months, until June 26, 2000.
[ 40 The trial court's lake ruling thus led to a procedural quagmire, the much-publicized dispute over the lake draining, which essentially resulted in a thirteen month delay of the trial from April 24, 2000 to May 21, 2001. Incidentally, the murder weapon was never located.
41 The lake draining resulted in numerous hearings upon the various engineering requirements related thereto, the rights of adjoining property owners, the sharing of costs, and ongoing progress.12 Nevertheless, the State proceeded with the lake's draining, and Court granted continuances due to what it found to be reasonable, diligent efforts by the State. Meanwhile, Appellant continued to assert his speedy trial rights. He also sought to have Judge Caswell disqualified from the ease, which was denied at the lower level.
1142 Appellant filed a Writ of Mandamus with this Court on August 3, 2000, seeking an order disqualifying Judge Caswell from the case. This Court stayed all district court proceedings on September 25, 2000, at Appellant's request, as he had yet to receive a ruling on his pending mandamus action. This ultimately led to this Court's Order of October 4, 2000, in which we granted the Writ of Mandamus and ordered Judge Cas-well to disqualify herself from the case, based upon "an abuse of discretion as the facts demonstrate an appearance of impropriety."
1 48 The parties proceeded back to District Court, and Appellant sought to disqualify the Assistant District Attorneys from the case on October 17, 2000. He also moved for sanctions, a due diligence hearing, and bond to be set. The motions were set before the Honorable Jerry D. Bass, District Judge, on November 15, 2000. The State, through Mr. Wintory, sought to continue the motion because of a conflict. Appellant objected, asserting, again, his right to speedy trial. On November 15, 2000, Judge Bass entered a scheduling order in which Appellant's trial was set for May 21, 2001, six months later.13 This wound up being the date Appellant's trial actually commenced.14
44 On the first day of trial, March 21, 2001, the State finally responded to Appellant's June 30, 2000 motion to dismiss for want of speedy trial, nearly nine months after it was originally filed. The State's response centered upon a lack of prejudice and Dodd, which, according to the State, "require(s) parties to be exceedingly cautious in [1139]*1139their use of informant testimony and to corroborate the same with additional evidence." Judge Black held a very brief hearing on the motion that day, the first day of trial, and overruled the motion to dismiss, finding no sign of any lack of due diligence.
145 Accordingly, as the State's brief readily concedes, the third speedy trial factor, the defendant's assertion of his right, weighs in Appellant's favor. "The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93.
T46 Turning to the second speedy trial factor, reason for the delay, we find the resolution is more complex, resting largely on the prosecution's efforts to locate the murder weapon in an effort to corroborate the statement of a jailhouse informant, a legal interpretation of this Court's holding in Dodd, and defense counsel's successful efforts to have Judge Caswell removed from the case for the appearance of impropriety.
¶ 47 Barker v. Wingo recognized that the second factor depends on the circumstances of the case. Deliberate delay weighs heavily against the government. Neutral reasons, like negligence or crowded courts, weigh slightly in a defendant's favor, for "ultimate responsibility for such cireum-stances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. And a "valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay." Id.
148 While Barker v. Wingo speaks of a "valid reason," our statute speaks of "appropriateness of the cause of the delay," while the former statute spoke of "good cause." 15 All of these phrases have essentially the same meaning and require the Court to ascertain what is causing the delay and then to ask if the cause is reasonable.
$49 Pursuant to 22 O.S.Supp.1999, § 812.1, Judge Caswell should have scheduled a hearing to determine if Appellant's right to speedy trial was being protected one year after his arrest, or on January 7, 2000. Of course, that statutory provision only became effective two months earlier, and the parties may not have been immediately aware of it.
150 Under the statute, it is clearly the trial judge's responsibility to manage his or her docket in such a way that ensures the right to speedy trial is being protected. However, the 1999 amendment does not contain a requirement to dismiss the case if the one-year period is exceeded.
151 Section 812.2(A)(2)(e) requires the Court to look at whether the delay occurred because "there is material evidence or a material witness which is unavailable and that reasonable efforts have been made to procure such evidence or witness, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence or witness can be obtained and trial commenced within a reasonable time." Thus, the statute acknowledges that the search for material evidence can constitute a reasonable cause for a delay, although this is not necessarily a constitutional protection. In this case, the District Court determined the efforts by the State to corroborate the statement of the jailhouse informant was reasonable under the unusual cireumstances. We find nothing in the record to contradict that finding.
T52 While the better procedure might have been for the District Attorney to have dismissed the case under 22 0.8.1991, § 815 and refiled the case later when the gun was [1140]*1140located, that was not required by the statute. Granted, if the State had followed that procedure, Appellant's liberty interest as a man "innocent until proven guilty" would have been better protected. However, he would have also been subject to a later re-filing, which could have extended the length of the prosecution.
€53 As part of his speedy trial argument dealing with reason for the delay, Appellant claims the "statement" police obtained from jailhouse informant Roger Hymes was inadmissible because the police had "told Hymes to engage in conversation with Mr. Ellis and elicit criminal information." - Appellant's Brief at 28. Appellant claims this was a violation of United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 2189, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), which held that a défendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the government intentionally created a situation likely to induce the defendant to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. Thus, Appellant claims the State's attempts to corroborate Hymes's story by draining the lake cannot be considered reasonable, as Hymes's statement was inadmissible and should have been suppressed.
11 54 We find this case distinguishable from Henry. It was Mr. Hymes, not the State, who initiated contact. The record reflects Mr. Hymes contacted his attorney, Roger McCoin, and informed him that Appellant had been bragging about shooting David Terry and throwing the gun in the lake. McCoin then wrote to the Assistant District Attorney and told her these points. A police interview was then set up with Hymes on November 22, 1999 to find out what he knew. During this interview, Hymes reported, among other things, that Appellant had said: the murder weapon would never be found; that the police had "drug a lake for it but they'll never find it"; that the gun "was in the lake"; that Hymes did not know where in the lake the gun was located; and that Appellant had been bragging about the killing. Near the close of the interviews, Hymes mentioned there was something important about "these cigars", but he could not remember what Appellant had said. At this point, one officer suggested Hymes could go back in and strike up another conversation, saying Hymes was intrigued by all this.
155 A second interview followed, and we would agree this second statement would have been inadmissible under the teachings of Henry. Nevertheless, this would not render the first statement inadmissible, and it was that first interview that alerted officers to Hymes's claim that Appellant had thrown the gun in the lake. Although there were credibility problems, the first statement was still constitutionally admissible. Besides, the State had an interest not only in corroborating Hymes, but also in further investigating an important lead. Thus, we find that most of Hymes's testimony would have been admissible, and corroboration of it was proper to consider as a part of the reason for delay.
156 One additional point must be considered. The final seven months of the delay was attributable to the stay Appellant sought with this Court while awaiting a ruling on his motion to disqualify Judge Caswell. While this Court did ultimately order Judge Cas-well removed for an appearance of impropriety, this seven-month period eannot weigh in Appellant's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316, 106 S.Ct. 648, 656, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986)(finding delay attributable to defendant's interlocutory appeal "ordinarily will not weigh in favor of a defendant's speedy trial claims."). In our view, the mandamus action, which was ultimately successful, should not be fairly weighed in Appellant's favor, for by all appearances Appellant would have gone to trial in October of 2000 had he not sought this relief. By the same token, we recognize a mandamus action is not the same as an interlocutory appeal and the remedy was sought, at least in part, to protect his speedy trial endeavors.
[ 57 Be that as it may, we find the second speedy trial factor, reason for the delay, weighs in the State's favor.
58 This brings us to the last factor, prejudice. Both parties correctly note that the United States Supreme Court has held that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice is not a prerequisite to a claim of denial of the right to speedy trial and that prejudice is not limited to detriment to the defense of the [1141]*1141accused. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 94 S.Ct. 188, 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973). Nevertheless, prejudice is one of the factors that must be considered, and Barker v. Wingo outlined three types: oppressive pretrial incarceration; anxiety and concern of the accused; and impairment of the defense. Of these factors, the Supreme Court considers the third the most serious "because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct at 2193; but see Doggett, 505 U.S. at 661-65, 112 S.Ct. at 2695-97 (Thomas, dissenting) (noting Barker's suggestion that preventing prejudice to the defense is a fundamental objective of the speedy trial clause is "plainly dictum" and contradicted by holdings of other cases).
T59 Appellant claims he suffered the following "extraordinary" prejudice: he was denied juvenile certification and thrown into an adult jail; his trial judge had to be removed from the case by this Court based upon an appearance of impropriety; he lost his girlfriend; he missed high school and continuation of his studies; his brother was forced to move to another city; and his father and step-mother divorced. He does not cite any particular impairment to his defense, nor does he support all of these claims with citations to the record.
T 60 Appellant's case for prejudice is fairly unsubstantial. No defense witness had an appreciable memory loss. He was afforded a hearing on his motion to certify as a juvenile or youthful offender, which was denied. His defense was in no way impaired. Indeed, the delay attributable to the bizarre lake search inured somewhat to Appellant's benefit, as the gun was not found and, as a result, the State did not present the testimony of the jailhouse informant, whose story could not be substantiated. Regarding the time Appellant sat in jail before trial, seven months was attributable to the stay his counsel sought in order to remove the trial judge. Also, he raised no speedy trial claims during the first nine months or so of the trial, which proceeded forward at a fairly normal rate.
{61 Yes, Appellant suffered some prejudice as a result of the deprivation of his liberty, but up to a year delay could be normally expected in such a case. Between the first year and the last seven months, Appellant's liberty was deprived for approximately nine and a half months, which is not as egregious as many cases. Thus, the fourth factor weighs in the State's favor.
1 62 To summarize, we find the first and third speedy trial factors weigh in Appellant's favor, but reasons for the delay and prejudice favor the State.
163 We consider this case a "close" call. Here, the Court faces the difficult task of weighing an extremely severe remedy in an isolated case with bad facts against the broader protections of an important Constitutional right. We do not take that responsibility lightly, for such decisions have important implications, no matter what we ultimately decide.
T64 After careful consideration, we find Appellant was not deprived of his speedy trial rights under the federal and state constitutions, based upon the finding of reasonable reasons for the delay, the absence of significant prejudice-including some eviden-tiary benefit Appellant received as a result of the delay-and the less-than egregious deprivation of liberty. Regarding the statutory violation, we find such error was harmless under the facts of this case. See Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690, 701-02.
165 In proposition two, Appellant claims the State's failure to provide notice of a rebuttal witness deprived Appellant of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. Appellant, somewhat disingenuously, claims that although he failed to provide the required statutory notice regarding alibi witness Valencia Brown, the State "had an obligation to provide notice of witnesses who would rebut her testimony." (Defense counsel lodged no such objection at trial.) This proposition is wholly without merit, as the defense had full opportunity to view the security tape in question and notice is not required with respect to rebuttal witnesses. Goforth v. State, 1996 OK CR 30, 921 P.2d 1291, 1292. Most certainly, there was no plain error.
Y66 In proposition three, Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient to sup[1142]*1142port his guilty verdict. However, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04.
%67 In proposition four, Appellant claims his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by: (1) failing to call available witnesses, utilize available evidence, and/or adequately investigate to identify evidence; and (2) failing to properly object to the State's alibi rebuttal witnesses. To support the matters alleged in section one, Appellant has filed, under seal, an Application for Evidentiary Hearing and request to supplement the record.16 However, "we find the application and affidavits do not contain sufficient information to show this Court by clear and convincing evidence there is a strong possibility trial counsel was ineffective for failing to utilize or identify the complained-of evidence. Rule 3.11, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2003). The application for evidentiary hearing is denied. Appellant has failed to show errors by counsel that were so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial, one with a reliable result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
DECISION
68 The judgment and sentence are hereby AFFIRMED.
JOHNSON, P.J., specially concurs.
LILE, V.P.J., concurs.
CHAPEL and STRUBHAR, JJ., dissent.