SHERAN, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of district court discharging petitioner’s writ of certio-
rari and affirming respondent School Board’s decision that petitioner received a proper seniority number in conformity with the master contract between respondent and the South Saint Paul Federation of Teachers (the Federation).
Petitioner was first hired by respondent on June 9, 1954. At that time respondent had no formal maternity leave policy, and women teachers who became pregnant were forced to resign their positions. Pursuant to this policy, petitioner resigned her teaching position effective December 15, 1955. After her child was born, she did some tutoring and substitute teaching, but she did not seek a full-time teaching position with respondent until 1969.
Some time after 1955 respondent modified its policy of hiring teachers without degrees from four-year colleges or universities. Since petitioner had possessed only a two-year teaching certificate when she was originally hired by respondent, she had to upgrade her education before she would be considered for a full-time teaching position.
Petitioner completed her college education in 1969 and executed her second contract with respondent on April 7,1969. She continued in the employment of respondent until being placed on unrequested leave of absence at the end of the 1976-77 school year.
Under the Public Employment Labor Relations Act of 1971 (PELRA), codified at Minn.St. 179.61 to 179.76, respondent and the Federation, the exclusive representative of the teachers in the district, were authorized to negotiate a Master Agreement. Minn.St. 179.61, 179.70, subd. 1. The Master Agreement at issue in this lawsuit was negotiated on October 16, 1974. In 1974, the legislature amended Minn.St. 125.12, which governs individual teacher contracts, to permit school districts, after negotiating the procedures to be followed with the teachers’ union, to place tenured teachers on unrequested leaves of absence for “discontinuance of position, lack of pupils, financial limitations, or merger of classes caused by consolidation of districts.” Minn.St. 125.12, subd. 6a.
Provisions to this effect were included as Article XIII of the Master Agreement at issue here.
On November 13, 1975, respondent and the Federation executed an amendment to the 1974-75 Master Agreement which es
tablished a mechanism for adjusting the seniority of women teachers with “a break in continuous service in the past related to maternity reasons.”
The effect of this
amendment was to treat the break in service as a retroactive maternity leave for which no seniority is lost and thus to compute seniority from the date of the initial contract between the teacher and respondent. After negotiations between respondent and the Federation over the number of women to be included in the amendment’s effect, five women teachers had their seniority numbers modified. The breaks in service of these women ranged from under 1 year to 2 years and 17 days. Petitioner was not among those benefited.
The 1975 seniority list was posted in December of 1975. Although petitioner’s seniority number was the same in 1975 as in 1976, she did not formally object to her seniority number at that time. When the 1976 seniority list was posted on December 1, 1976, petitioner was proposed for placement on unrequested leave of absence. Pursuant to Article XIII of the Master Agreement, and within the time limit specified therein, she requested a hearing to object to her seniority number of 232. Following her hearing she was placed on unrequested leave of absence.
Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari in district court. After oral arguments presented by both sides, the trial court affirmed respondent’s action and discharged the writ. The trial court found petitioner to be unprotected by the 1975 amendment to the Master Agreement:
“While Petitioner’s resignation initially was for maternity reasons, her leave did not continue for 13 years solely for maternity reasons. It would be stretching both the letter and the spirit of this amendment to hold that it entitled Petitioner to a 13 year maternity leave of absence.”
Petitioner’s appeal to this court presents two issues for decision:
(1) Whether petitioner’s failure to exhaust the remedies contemplated in the Master Agreement precludes access to the courts; and
(2) If not, whether the writ was properly discharged.
1. It is clear that both PELRA and the Master Agreement contemplate that grievances be arbitrated rather than litigated in the courts. Minn.St. 179.70, subd. 1 (“All contracts shall include a grievance procedure which shall provide compulsory binding arbitration of grievances.”); Article XV, § 8 of the Master Agreement. Moreover, Minnesota has a strong public policy of favoring arbitration as a means of resolving labor disputes. State
v. Berthiaume,
Minn., 259 N.W.2d 904 (1977);
In re Discharge of Johnson,
288 Minn. 300, 180 N.W.2d 184 (1970);
Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of the University,
266 Minn. 284, 123 N.W.2d 371; Minn.St. 179.61 to 197.77, 572.08 to 572.30. Thus, ordinarily we would hold that petitioner’s failure to grieve precludes her from having access to the courts at this time.
Cunningham v. Federal Cartridge Corp.,
265 Minn. 534, 122 N.W.2d 208 (1963).
As we stated in
Cunningham, supra,
however, exceptions to the rule exist “ * * * ‘[w]here it can be shown that the employer and union conspire together to defeat the rights of an employee or * * that it would be futile for the employee to seek redress under the contract * * *.’ ” 265 Minn. 537, 122 N.W.2d 211. Petitioner argues that because both the school superintendent and. the union advised her that her problem was not grievable, she should not be precluded from asserting her rights in court under one of the exceptions.
Although we recognized exceptions in
Cunningham,
we also warned against the dangers of applying them too readily.
“Collective bargaining agreements are designed to promote harmonious labor relations. They would soon be emasculated if an employee could
ignore
established procedures by simply stating she believed
them to be futile.” 265 Minn. 538, 122 N.W.2d 211.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
SHERAN, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of district court discharging petitioner’s writ of certio-
rari and affirming respondent School Board’s decision that petitioner received a proper seniority number in conformity with the master contract between respondent and the South Saint Paul Federation of Teachers (the Federation).
Petitioner was first hired by respondent on June 9, 1954. At that time respondent had no formal maternity leave policy, and women teachers who became pregnant were forced to resign their positions. Pursuant to this policy, petitioner resigned her teaching position effective December 15, 1955. After her child was born, she did some tutoring and substitute teaching, but she did not seek a full-time teaching position with respondent until 1969.
Some time after 1955 respondent modified its policy of hiring teachers without degrees from four-year colleges or universities. Since petitioner had possessed only a two-year teaching certificate when she was originally hired by respondent, she had to upgrade her education before she would be considered for a full-time teaching position.
Petitioner completed her college education in 1969 and executed her second contract with respondent on April 7,1969. She continued in the employment of respondent until being placed on unrequested leave of absence at the end of the 1976-77 school year.
Under the Public Employment Labor Relations Act of 1971 (PELRA), codified at Minn.St. 179.61 to 179.76, respondent and the Federation, the exclusive representative of the teachers in the district, were authorized to negotiate a Master Agreement. Minn.St. 179.61, 179.70, subd. 1. The Master Agreement at issue in this lawsuit was negotiated on October 16, 1974. In 1974, the legislature amended Minn.St. 125.12, which governs individual teacher contracts, to permit school districts, after negotiating the procedures to be followed with the teachers’ union, to place tenured teachers on unrequested leaves of absence for “discontinuance of position, lack of pupils, financial limitations, or merger of classes caused by consolidation of districts.” Minn.St. 125.12, subd. 6a.
Provisions to this effect were included as Article XIII of the Master Agreement at issue here.
On November 13, 1975, respondent and the Federation executed an amendment to the 1974-75 Master Agreement which es
tablished a mechanism for adjusting the seniority of women teachers with “a break in continuous service in the past related to maternity reasons.”
The effect of this
amendment was to treat the break in service as a retroactive maternity leave for which no seniority is lost and thus to compute seniority from the date of the initial contract between the teacher and respondent. After negotiations between respondent and the Federation over the number of women to be included in the amendment’s effect, five women teachers had their seniority numbers modified. The breaks in service of these women ranged from under 1 year to 2 years and 17 days. Petitioner was not among those benefited.
The 1975 seniority list was posted in December of 1975. Although petitioner’s seniority number was the same in 1975 as in 1976, she did not formally object to her seniority number at that time. When the 1976 seniority list was posted on December 1, 1976, petitioner was proposed for placement on unrequested leave of absence. Pursuant to Article XIII of the Master Agreement, and within the time limit specified therein, she requested a hearing to object to her seniority number of 232. Following her hearing she was placed on unrequested leave of absence.
Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari in district court. After oral arguments presented by both sides, the trial court affirmed respondent’s action and discharged the writ. The trial court found petitioner to be unprotected by the 1975 amendment to the Master Agreement:
“While Petitioner’s resignation initially was for maternity reasons, her leave did not continue for 13 years solely for maternity reasons. It would be stretching both the letter and the spirit of this amendment to hold that it entitled Petitioner to a 13 year maternity leave of absence.”
Petitioner’s appeal to this court presents two issues for decision:
(1) Whether petitioner’s failure to exhaust the remedies contemplated in the Master Agreement precludes access to the courts; and
(2) If not, whether the writ was properly discharged.
1. It is clear that both PELRA and the Master Agreement contemplate that grievances be arbitrated rather than litigated in the courts. Minn.St. 179.70, subd. 1 (“All contracts shall include a grievance procedure which shall provide compulsory binding arbitration of grievances.”); Article XV, § 8 of the Master Agreement. Moreover, Minnesota has a strong public policy of favoring arbitration as a means of resolving labor disputes. State
v. Berthiaume,
Minn., 259 N.W.2d 904 (1977);
In re Discharge of Johnson,
288 Minn. 300, 180 N.W.2d 184 (1970);
Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of the University,
266 Minn. 284, 123 N.W.2d 371; Minn.St. 179.61 to 197.77, 572.08 to 572.30. Thus, ordinarily we would hold that petitioner’s failure to grieve precludes her from having access to the courts at this time.
Cunningham v. Federal Cartridge Corp.,
265 Minn. 534, 122 N.W.2d 208 (1963).
As we stated in
Cunningham, supra,
however, exceptions to the rule exist “ * * * ‘[w]here it can be shown that the employer and union conspire together to defeat the rights of an employee or * * that it would be futile for the employee to seek redress under the contract * * *.’ ” 265 Minn. 537, 122 N.W.2d 211. Petitioner argues that because both the school superintendent and. the union advised her that her problem was not grievable, she should not be precluded from asserting her rights in court under one of the exceptions.
Although we recognized exceptions in
Cunningham,
we also warned against the dangers of applying them too readily.
“Collective bargaining agreements are designed to promote harmonious labor relations. They would soon be emasculated if an employee could
ignore
established procedures by simply stating she believed
them to be futile.” 265 Minn. 538, 122 N.W.2d 211.
In this ease petitioner had a right to grieve the issue, and neither the approval of the superintendent nor of the union was required as a prerequisite.
Thus, she has not demonstrated the futility of the grievance procedure.
Despite our conclusion that petitioner should have utilized the grievance ma
chinery contained in the Master Agreement, her failure to do so is not devastating, because respondent did not object to the issuance of the writ below on this ground.
Skeim v. Independent School District No. 115,
305 Minn. 464, 234 N.W.2d 806 (1975);
Anderson v. Twin Cities Rapid Transit Co.,
250 Minn. 167, 84 N.W.2d 593 (1957). In
Skeim,
a case very similar to this one, the master contract contained a grievance procedure as required by Section 179.70 of PELRA. Yet, .because the school board’s answer did not allege failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we held that it “has waived whatever right it may have had to insist that the grievance procedure be followed.” 305 Minn. 474, 234 N.W.2d 813. Respondent admitted at the oral argument that it never specifically requested dismissal on this ground.
Thus, we are compelled to hold that it waived its right to force petitioner to arbitrate her grievance.
2. As we long ago stated in
State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education of City of Duluth,
213 Minn. 550, 571, 7 N.W.2d 544, 556 (1943), certiorari exists only to permit the court to determine whether or not respondent’s findings of fact are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Thus, “neither the district court on
certiorari
nor this court on appeal [can] interfere with the school board in its decision as to the existence of statutory grounds for discharge, provided the board acted in good faith and on a correct interpretation of the law.” 213 Minn. 571, 7 N.W.2d 556. The trial court, after reviewing the transcript of petitioner’s hearing before the school board, found that respondent’s decision not to adjust petitioner’s seniority number was reasonable. Since petitioner has failed to persuade us that the trial court erred in discharging the writ of certiorari, we sustain the decision.
Affirmed.
OTIS and TODD, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.