BRIAN ELLEDGE, NO. 2:23-CV-02288-JAM-DB Plaintiff, v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT COUNTY COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, ET OF SAN JOAQUIN’S MOTION TO AL., DISMISS Defendants. On September 12, 2023, Plaintiff Brian Elledge (“Elledge”) filed this action in San Joaquin County Superior Court, alleging four (4) causes of action against defendants County of San Joaquin, John Canepa, and Brian Merritt (collectively, “Defendants”). Compl., Exh. A to Notice of Removal (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1. Defendant San Joaquin County (“County”) removed the action to this Court on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. On February 20, 2024, County filed the instant motion to dismiss (“Motion”).1
1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for April 9, 2024. Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 11. County argues Elledge’s first, second, and fourth causes of action do not contain sufficient factual matter to support a cause of relief. Id. at 3. Elledge filed an opposition. Opp’n, ECF No. 12. County filed a reply. Reply, ECF No. 15. The facts are taken from the Complaint and assumed to be true for purposes of the Motion. In May of 2022, a San Joaquin County Sheriff water patrol boat (“patrol boat”) stopped Elledge’s boat while on the San Joaquin River. Compl. ¶ 11. The patrol boat was operated by defendants John Canepa and Brian Merritt (collectively, “Deputy Sheriffs”). Id. Deputy Sheriffs stopped Elledge because they did not see a required registration sticker adhered to his boat. Id. After the registration issue was resolved, Deputy Sheriffs ordered Elledge to board the patrol boat to submit to a blood alcohol test. Id. Elledge was ordered, without any assistance from Deputy Sheriffs, to step on the railing of the patrol boat, then step down approximately three feet to the steel deck of the boat. Id. While stepping down to the steel deck of the boat, Elledge landed hard on his right foot, resulting in an injury to his right ankle and a ruptured Achilles tendon. Id. A. Legal Standard A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plausibility requires “factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While “detailed factual allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. Conclusory allegations are not to be considered in the plausibility analysis. Id. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). When a plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” the Court must dismiss the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). B. Analysis 1. First Cause of Action – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Elledge’s first cause of action is for “Unreasonable Detention, Custody, And Control, (42 U.S.C. § 1983)” (hereinafter, “1983 Claim”). Compl. at 5, 6. The 1983 Claim focuses on the actions of Deputy Sheriffs. Id. It is not clear from the Complaint whether the claim is against all defendants, or only Deputy Sheriffs. Id. However, Elledge does allege that Deputy Sheriffs were under the control of County. Id. ¶ 15. County seeks to dismiss the 1983 Claim with prejudice against County on the grounds that “Elledge does not set forth any facts that an unconstitutional County policy resulted in Elledge’s alleged injury.” Mot. at 4. Assuming the 1983 Claim is against both Deputy Sheriffs and County, the Court agrees. To establish liability for governmental entities under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove the entity had “a policy, practice, or custom” that was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). An official policy includes a formal policy, such as a rule or regulation, adopted by the entity that directly results in the constitutional violation in question. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986). A practice or custom, by contrast, includes repeated, widespread, and consistent actions that constitute the standard operating procedure of the entity. Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002). Upon review of Elledge’s 1983 Claim, the only mention of County includes the following allegation:“[t]he conduct of [Deputy Sheriffs] was done under the [instruction, orders, and control] of command level officers and managers of [County’s] Sheriff’s Office.” Id. ¶ 15. The bulk of the 1983 Claim focuses on the actions of Deputy Sheriffs. Id. ¶¶ 13-15, 17. Elledge does not provide sufficient facts in his first cause of action to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that a policy, practice, or custom of County’s led to Elledge’s alleged constitutional violation. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. /// /// /// Looking beyond the 1983 Claim and to the Complaint as a whole, Elledge’s “Introduction” alleges: The policies and customs behind the detention and taking into custody and control of boat operators on the San Joaquin River in the County of San Joaquin without probable cause to believe said boat operators were under the influence of alcohol are fundamentally unconstitutional and constitute a menace of major proportions to the public. . . . Compl. ¶ 2. Albeit confusing, Elledge appears to contend that County has an unconstitutional policy and custom of detaining boat operators on the San Joaquin River and accusing them, without probable cause, of operating under the influence. This conclusory allegation does not pass muster under the Twombly plausibility standard. Elledge does not allege any specific facts that there is a formal policy of County’s, such as a rule or regulation, that led to any alleged constitutional violation. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84. Elledge also does not allege any specific facts that there is a widespread practice or custom that led to any alleged constitutional violation. Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Elledge takes a single, isolated event and make a conclusory statement that there was a policy and custom in place that caused the alleged constitutional violation. Isolated or sporadic incidents alone cannot form the basis of a 1983 Claim against government entities. Sabra v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 44 F.4th 867, 884 (9th Cir. 2022). The Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations regarding the key elements of a possible 1983 Claim against County and therefore Elledge’s first cause of action against County is dismissed with leave to amend. 2. Second
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BRIAN ELLEDGE, NO. 2:23-CV-02288-JAM-DB Plaintiff, v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT COUNTY COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, ET OF SAN JOAQUIN’S MOTION TO AL., DISMISS Defendants. On September 12, 2023, Plaintiff Brian Elledge (“Elledge”) filed this action in San Joaquin County Superior Court, alleging four (4) causes of action against defendants County of San Joaquin, John Canepa, and Brian Merritt (collectively, “Defendants”). Compl., Exh. A to Notice of Removal (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1. Defendant San Joaquin County (“County”) removed the action to this Court on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. On February 20, 2024, County filed the instant motion to dismiss (“Motion”).1
1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for April 9, 2024. Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 11. County argues Elledge’s first, second, and fourth causes of action do not contain sufficient factual matter to support a cause of relief. Id. at 3. Elledge filed an opposition. Opp’n, ECF No. 12. County filed a reply. Reply, ECF No. 15. The facts are taken from the Complaint and assumed to be true for purposes of the Motion. In May of 2022, a San Joaquin County Sheriff water patrol boat (“patrol boat”) stopped Elledge’s boat while on the San Joaquin River. Compl. ¶ 11. The patrol boat was operated by defendants John Canepa and Brian Merritt (collectively, “Deputy Sheriffs”). Id. Deputy Sheriffs stopped Elledge because they did not see a required registration sticker adhered to his boat. Id. After the registration issue was resolved, Deputy Sheriffs ordered Elledge to board the patrol boat to submit to a blood alcohol test. Id. Elledge was ordered, without any assistance from Deputy Sheriffs, to step on the railing of the patrol boat, then step down approximately three feet to the steel deck of the boat. Id. While stepping down to the steel deck of the boat, Elledge landed hard on his right foot, resulting in an injury to his right ankle and a ruptured Achilles tendon. Id. A. Legal Standard A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plausibility requires “factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While “detailed factual allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. Conclusory allegations are not to be considered in the plausibility analysis. Id. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). When a plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” the Court must dismiss the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). B. Analysis 1. First Cause of Action – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Elledge’s first cause of action is for “Unreasonable Detention, Custody, And Control, (42 U.S.C. § 1983)” (hereinafter, “1983 Claim”). Compl. at 5, 6. The 1983 Claim focuses on the actions of Deputy Sheriffs. Id. It is not clear from the Complaint whether the claim is against all defendants, or only Deputy Sheriffs. Id. However, Elledge does allege that Deputy Sheriffs were under the control of County. Id. ¶ 15. County seeks to dismiss the 1983 Claim with prejudice against County on the grounds that “Elledge does not set forth any facts that an unconstitutional County policy resulted in Elledge’s alleged injury.” Mot. at 4. Assuming the 1983 Claim is against both Deputy Sheriffs and County, the Court agrees. To establish liability for governmental entities under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove the entity had “a policy, practice, or custom” that was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). An official policy includes a formal policy, such as a rule or regulation, adopted by the entity that directly results in the constitutional violation in question. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986). A practice or custom, by contrast, includes repeated, widespread, and consistent actions that constitute the standard operating procedure of the entity. Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002). Upon review of Elledge’s 1983 Claim, the only mention of County includes the following allegation:“[t]he conduct of [Deputy Sheriffs] was done under the [instruction, orders, and control] of command level officers and managers of [County’s] Sheriff’s Office.” Id. ¶ 15. The bulk of the 1983 Claim focuses on the actions of Deputy Sheriffs. Id. ¶¶ 13-15, 17. Elledge does not provide sufficient facts in his first cause of action to allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that a policy, practice, or custom of County’s led to Elledge’s alleged constitutional violation. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. /// /// /// Looking beyond the 1983 Claim and to the Complaint as a whole, Elledge’s “Introduction” alleges: The policies and customs behind the detention and taking into custody and control of boat operators on the San Joaquin River in the County of San Joaquin without probable cause to believe said boat operators were under the influence of alcohol are fundamentally unconstitutional and constitute a menace of major proportions to the public. . . . Compl. ¶ 2. Albeit confusing, Elledge appears to contend that County has an unconstitutional policy and custom of detaining boat operators on the San Joaquin River and accusing them, without probable cause, of operating under the influence. This conclusory allegation does not pass muster under the Twombly plausibility standard. Elledge does not allege any specific facts that there is a formal policy of County’s, such as a rule or regulation, that led to any alleged constitutional violation. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84. Elledge also does not allege any specific facts that there is a widespread practice or custom that led to any alleged constitutional violation. Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Elledge takes a single, isolated event and make a conclusory statement that there was a policy and custom in place that caused the alleged constitutional violation. Isolated or sporadic incidents alone cannot form the basis of a 1983 Claim against government entities. Sabra v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 44 F.4th 867, 884 (9th Cir. 2022). The Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations regarding the key elements of a possible 1983 Claim against County and therefore Elledge’s first cause of action against County is dismissed with leave to amend. 2. Second Cause of Action – California Civil Code § 52.1 Elledge’s second cause of action is for “Violation of California Civil Rights Act – Civil Code §52.1” (hereinafter, “Bane Act Claim”) against all defendants. Compl. at 6. County seeks to dismiss the Bane Act Claim with prejudice because “there are no facts that the individual defendants engaged in egregious activity and intended to cause Elledge’s alleged injury.” Mot. at 3. County does not mention itself in its Bane Act argument and focuses solely on the actions of Deputy Sheriffs. Id. at 5. To the extent County seeks to make arguments on behalf of Deputy Sheriffs, the Court declines to address such arguments. Haley v. Ornelas, No. CV 16-3177-AG(E), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202077, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2016). The Motion is filed on behalf of County alone. See Mot. County admits neither of the Deputy Sheriffs have been served yet. Id. at 1. Subject to a limited exception, a party must assert their own legal rights or interests, not those of third parties. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129-30 (2004) (discussing the limited exception as “(1) the party asserting the right has a close relationship with the person who possesses that right and (2) whether there is a hindrance to the possessor’s ability to protect their own interests.”). County does not provide any legal analysis or support for its belief that it can assert the rights of Deputy Sheriffs in this motion. County “may not properly act as a surrogate” for Deputy Sheriffs. Ornelas, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202077, at *6. To the extent County is attempting to dismiss the Bane Act Claim on behalf of Deputy Sheriffs, this request is denied without prejudice. If County is attempting to dismiss the Bane Act Claim against itself, without even mentioning itself, County has failed to provide any factual or legal grounds to support its dismissal motion. Fed. R. Civ. 7(b) (a motion must state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order.). County’s motion to dismiss the Bane Act Claim against itself is also denied without prejudice. 3. Fourth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Injury Elledge’s fourth cause of action is labeled as a claim for “Intentional Infliction of Injury” against Deputy Sheriffs. Compl. at 9. Based on the header alone, this cause of action appears to be a battery claim against Deputy Sheriffs. However, the cause of action includes the following allegations: [County’s] Sheriff’s Office, and its management and command officers, “deliberately and purposely neglected and failed to instruct, to so train and teach all deputy sheriffs, at all levels of the [County’s] Sheriff’s Office. . . . [Defendants] and each of them . . . knew, [sic] were subject to a duty of care to know and to train and teach all deputy sheriffs . . . what acts and conduct that violated the law . . . [Defendants] knew they were . . . to train and teach all deputy sheriffs, at all levels to determine if any laws were broken by [Elledge] before detaining [Elledge] . . . [Deputy Sheriffs] knew . . . what acts and conduct violated the laws . . . detained [Elledge] . . . without any probable cause . . . The conduct of [Deputy Sheriffs] . . . was in total and utter disregard of the rights of [Elledge] and with the knowledge that [Elledge] would be subject to a dangerous condition . . . Said conduct was malicious, wanton, oppressive, and fraudulent. Said conduct was extreme and outrageous . . . [Elledge] suffered severe personal injuries, pain and suffering, medical and incidental expenses, loss of income and extreme mental and emotional distress and consequential damages. . . . See Compl. ¶¶ 29-33. Based on these allegations, the fourth cause of action appears to not only be a battery claim against Deputy Sheriffs, but also a failure to train claim against County, a deliberate indifference claim against Deputy Sheriffs, and an emotional distress claim against Deputy Sheriffs or County or both. County interprets this cause of action as only an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (“IIED”) against Deputy Sheriffs. Mot. at 5-7. Elledge’s opposition to the County’s motion fails to provide any clarity. The opposition focuses only on the acts of Deputy Sheriffs, includes an irrelevant discussion on peace officers’ standards and trainings, and concludes that Deputy Sheriffs were in violation of Elledge’s constitutional rights to be “free from search and seizure” which was “extreme and outrageous.” Opp’n at 11-12. Not only is the opposition inconsistent with the multiple legal theories discussed in the Complaint, but it also mirrors Elledge’s first cause of action for “Unreasonable Detention, Custody, And Control.” Compl. ¶¶ 12-17. What is unambiguously clear to the Court is that this cause of action, as currently pled, cannot go forward. Elledge fails to present a cognizable claim and put the defendants or the Court on fair notice of the grounds entitling him to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 10. “The Court should not be required to ascertain what are or will be the litigable issues of fact and law by a process of speculation or surmise.” Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Therefore, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES Elledge’s fourth cause of action in its entirety with leave to amend. County’s motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action is DENIED as moot. For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS County’s motion to dismiss Elledge’s first cause of action, the 1983 Claim, with leave to amend. The Court DENIES County’s motion to dismiss Elledge’s second cause of action, the Bane Act Claim, without prejudice. The Court, on its own motion, DISMISSES Elledge’s fourth cause of action in its entirety with leave to amend. County’s motion to dismiss Elledge’s fourth cause of action is DENIED as moot. eee nee I I EIDE IIE ID IEEE INO IE EI IRE IRE IIE DE ES eee
If Elledge elects to file an amended complaint, he must do so no later than twenty days from the date of this Order. Defendants shall file their responsive pleadings no later than twenty (20) days thereafter. Dated: May 7, 2024 . SM as JOHN A. MENDEZ SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10