Ellawendy v. Monterey County Superior Court

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMay 9, 2022
Docket5:20-cv-02708
StatusUnknown

This text of Ellawendy v. Monterey County Superior Court (Ellawendy v. Monterey County Superior Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ellawendy v. Monterey County Superior Court, (N.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ABDELFATAH ELLAWENDY, 11 Case No. 20-02708 BLF (PR) Petitioner, 12 ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE v. AMENDED PETITION; LIFTING 13 STAY ON BRIEFING; SETTING DEADLINE FOR PETITIONER’S 14 MONTEREY COUNTY SUPERIOR TRAVERSE COURT, 15 16 Respondent. (Docket No. 15)

17 18 Petitioner, a state parolee, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 19 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2019 state conviction out of Monterey County, which 20 involved charges for stalking, several counts of assault, and dissuading a witness from 21 testifying. Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 12-1 at 1-2. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, Petitioner 22 pleaded no contest to one count of assault with a deadly weapon, agreeing to serve no 23 more than two years; the trial court sentenced him to two years in state prison. Dkt. No. 24 12-1 at 2. The Court found the only cognizable claim in the petition was the claim 25 challenging the voluntary nature of Petitioner’s plea and dismissed all other claims; 26 Respondent was directed to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Dkt. No. 27 6. On January 27, 2021, Respondent filed an answer on the merits, Dkt. No. 12-1. 1 “petition for a writ of habeas corpus,” which the Court construed as a motion for leave to 2 file an amended petition. Dkt. No. 15. The Court directed Respondent to file an 3 opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motion and stayed briefing on 4 Respondent’s answer. Dkt. No. 16. Respondent filed an opposition, Dkt. No. 17, and 5 Petitioner filed a reply, Dkt. No. 23. 6 7 DISCUSSION 8 A. Leave to Amend 9 The Civil Rule governing pleading amendments, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 15, made applicable to habeas proceedings by 28 U.S.C. § 2242, Federal Rule of Civil 11 Procedure 81(a)(2), and Habeas Corpus Rule 11, allows amendments with leave of court 12 any time during a proceeding. Mayle v, Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 654-55 (2005) (citing Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 15(a)). Before a responsive pleading is served, pleadings may be amended once as 14 a matter of course, i.e., without seeking court leave. Id. at 655. Here, Petitioner filed his 15 proposed amended petition ten months after the Court ordered the matter served on 16 Respondent. Dkt. No. 6. Accordingly, Petitioner must obtain leave of court to proceed 17 with his amended petition. 18 Rule 15 applies to amendments to habeas answers as well. See Waldrip v. Hall, 548 19 F.3d 729, 731-33 (9th Cir. 2008). Public policy strongly encourages courts to permit 20 amendments. Id. at 731. In reviewing whether a grant of leave to amend was an abuse of 21 discretion, the appellate court “‘often consider[s] . . . bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to 22 the opposing party, futility of the amendment, and whether the party has previously 23 amended his pleadings.’” Id. 732 (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 24 1995)); see, e.g., id. at 732-33 (no undue delay when state’s motion to amend answer to 25 assert untimeliness defense was only filed after United States Supreme Court decision 26 made clear that Ninth Circuit authority was incorrect). 1 back to the date of the original pleading when the amendment “asserts one or more claims 2 that arise out of ‘the conduct, transaction, or occurrence’ that the original petition “set out” 3 or “attempted to . . . set out.” Ross v. Williams, 950 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2020) (en 4 banc) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B)). “An amended habeas petition . . . does not 5 relate back (and thereby escape AEDPA’s one-year time limit) when it asserts a new 6 ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original 7 pleading set forth.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650 (finding that new coerced confession claim did 8 not relate back to the original petition that raised only a factually distinct Confrontation 9 Clause claim). Only if the original and amended petition state claims that are tied to a 10 common core of operative facts will relation back be in order. Id. at 664. “[F]or all 11 purposes,” including relation back, the original petition consists of the petition itself and 12 any “written instrument[s]” that are exhibits to the petition. Ross, 950 F.3d at 1167 13 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c)) (specifying that, “[l]ike a brief, a court decision is a written 14 instrument” and holding that state appellate court’s order, attached to timely petition, was 15 incorporated by reference for relation back purposes). 16 In the original petition, Petitioner claimed the following: (1) invalid plea which was 17 made under duress and not voluntarily; (2) racial and gender bias by the police, 18 prosecution, and trial judge; (3) new evidence which was not available at the time of 19 judgment, including perjury by the witness; and (4) violation of his rights under the Sixth 20 and Fourteenth Amendments based on the witness lying under oath, no interpreter was 21 provided at the signing of the plea, and police fabricated evidence, among other 22 allegations. Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7. Petitioner was advised that a defendant who pleads guilty 23 cannot later raise in habeas corpus proceedings independent claims relating to the 24 deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the plea of guilty. Dkt. No. 6 at 3, 25 citing Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 3019-20 (1983) (guilty plea foreclose consideration 26 of pre-plea constitutional deprivation); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) 1 voluntary and intelligent character of the plea and the nature of the advice of counsel to 2 plead. Id. citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985); Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. 3 Accordingly, the Court found the first claim that his plea was made under duress was 4 cognizable and dismissed claims 2, 3, and 4 which related to the deprivation of 5 constitutional rights that occurred before the guilty plea. Id. 6 In the amended petition, Petitioner raises additional grounds challenging the 7 voluntary nature of his plea based on counsel’s deficient advice. Dkt. No. 15 at 1. 8 Petitioner also claims prosecutorial misconduct, bias by the trial judge, and new evidence. 9 Id. In opposition, Respondent asserts the amendment should be denied because Petitioner 10 fails to explain any reason for the lengthy delay and his failure to add the allegations 11 originally. Dkt. No. 17 at 2. Respondent also points out that the amended petition 12 includes the same claims that were already dismissed by the Court. Id. Furthermore, 13 Respondent asserts that the proffered amendments with respect to Plaintiff’s plea adds 14 nothing beyond what was already discussed in their answer. Id. at 3.

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Related

Tollett v. Henderson
411 U.S. 258 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Rose v. Lundy
455 U.S. 509 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Haring v. Prosise
462 U.S. 306 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Hill v. Lockhart
474 U.S. 52 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Rhines v. Weber
544 U.S. 269 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Mayle v. Felix
545 U.S. 644 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Ronald Ross v. Williams
950 F.3d 1160 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)

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Bluebook (online)
Ellawendy v. Monterey County Superior Court, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ellawendy-v-monterey-county-superior-court-cand-2022.