EllaMay Artis v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided November 30, 2023·No. AT-0752-21-0374-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ELLAMAY ARTIS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-21-0374-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: November 30, 2023 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Nathaniel David Johnson , Esquire, Waldorf, Maryland, for the appellant.

Kristin Langwell , Esquire, Hines, Illinois, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her involuntary resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 2 On petition

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2 The appellant’s petition for review was untimely filed by 3 days. Initial Appeal File, Tab 7, Initial Decision at 6; Petition for Review File, Tab 1. However, in light of our findings regarding the Board’s lack of jurisdiction over this appeal, we need not reach the question of whether the appellant had good cause for the untimely filing. See Rosell v. Department of Defense, 100 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 5 (2005) (stating that the

for review, the appellant claims that the administrative judge did not consider the full record and continues to argue the merits of her appeal. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 13-18. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify the appropriate burden of proof placed on the agency in taking an action under 38 U.S.C. § 714, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

¶2 The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to nonfriovlously allege that her resignation was coerced or otherwise involuntary, and thus, it is outside of the Board’s jurisdiction. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID) at 5-6. 3 The appellant’s arguments on review do not

existence of Board jurisdiction is the threshold issue in adjudicating an appeal and ordinarily should be determined before reaching the issue of timeliness), aff’d, 191 F. App’x 954 (Fed. Cir 2006). 3 Below, the appellant argued, among other things, that she was subjected to harassment and discrimination on the basis of race. IAF, Tab 5 at 6, 8-10. The administrative judge appropriately considered this claim within the context of the voluntariness of the appellant’s resignation, but ultimately reasoned that “the appellant could have filed an [equal employment opportunity (EEO)] complaint to address her concerns and awaited the outcome.” ID at 5. This appears to be a misstatement of the record. In a declaration submitted below, the appellant stated that: (1) she filed an EEO complaint on July 17, 2019; (2) the initial investigator found in her favor; and (3) the agency assigned the EEO complaint to a second investigator thereafter, who, according to the

provide a basis to disturb this finding. 4 As a part of this finding, the administrative judge acknowledged the appellant’s challenges to her proposed removal but found that the agency “had a good faith basis upon which to propose the appellant’s removal,” especially under the lighter substantial evidence standard set forth at 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(2)(A). ID at 6 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(2)(A)). 5

¶3 Although 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(2)(A) provides that an administrative judge shall uphold an agency’s decision to, among other things, remove an employee if the decision is supported by substantial evidence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified in Rodriguez v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 8 F.4th 1290, 1296-1301 (2021) that the Department of Veterans Affairs may only appellant, “ultimately reached a result consistent with Orlando VA managers’ objectives.” IAF, Tab 5 at 9-10. Despite the misstatement of the record in the initial decision, neither the initial report nor subsequent report of the investigators’ findings are in the record, and we are, therefore, unable to consider their context in assessing the voluntariness of the appellant’s August 2020 resignation. As such, this adjudicatory error did not prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights and does not provide a basis to disturb the initial decision. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of the initial decision). 4 On review, the appellant continues to argue that her working conditions were so intolerable that she felt compelled to resign. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-18. In addition to the circumstances discussed by the administrative judge, she also argues on review that, in April 2020, while reviewing her personnel file, she learned that a performance appraisal dated September 30, 2019, had been placed in her personnel file without notification by the rating official. Id. at 12. The performance appraisal rated her performance as “Not Fully Acceptable,” while her previous performance appraisals rated her as “Fully Successful.” Id. at 43-57, 108-13. This argument appears to be raised for the first time on review, and thus, was not considered by the administrative judge. IAF, Tabs 1, 5; PFR File, Tab 1. Generally, the Board will not consider an argument raised for the first time on review absent a showing of new and material evidence not previously available before the record closed despite the party’s due diligence. See Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶6 (2016). Here, the performance appraisal is dated November 5, 2019, and the appellant became aware of it on April 20, 2020. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12, 112. The record in this appeal closed on or around May 26, 2021. The appellant has not explained why she was unable to make this argument below. 5 The administrative judge’s citation to 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(2)(A) appears to be a typo; he likely intended to reference section 714(d)(2)(A).

take the action in the first instance when it is supported by preponderant evidence. Thus, as is relevant here, in order for the appellant to show that her resignation was involuntary, she needed to show that the agency knew that it could not prove the charges against her by preponderant evidence. See Rodriguez, 8 F.4th at 1296-1301; see also Barthel v. Department of the Army, 38 M.S.P.R. 245, 250-51 (1988) (explaining that, if an appellant can show that the agency knew that the reasons for a proposed action could not be substantiated, the proposed action would be purely coercive and would render the resulting retirement involuntary, his appeal within the Board’s jurisdiction, and entitle him to reinstatement).

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EllaMay Artis v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2023).

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