Elizabeth Cruz and Hilarino Aparicio v. City of San Diego, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELIZABETH CRUZ and HILARINO Case No.: 24-cv-0287-AJB-MSB APARICIO, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND Plaintiffs, DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS 14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., (Doc. No. 52) 15 Defendants. 16 17 Before the Court is Defendants City of San Diego (“the City”) and Chief David 18 Nisleit’s (“Chief Nisleit”) (collectively, “Defendants”)1 motion to dismiss Plaintiffs 19 Elizabeth Cruz and Hilarino Aparicio’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Third Amended 20 Complaint (Doc. No. 45, “TAC”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rule of Civil 21 Procedure.2 (Doc. No. 52.) The Court finds the motion suitable for determination on the 22 papers. See CivLR 7.1.d.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part 23 and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 24 25 1 Plaintiffs allege additional claims against Sergeant Matthew Ruggiero, Officer Jeremy Avalos, and 26 Officer Jonah Tafoya; however, because they are not subject to the cause of action at issue, the Court uses “Defendants” herein to the exclusion of Sergeant Matthew Ruggiero, Officer Jeremy Avalos, and Officer 27 Jonah Tafoya. 2 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 This action arises out of the death of Imanol Aparicio (“Decedent”) who was shot 3 by on-duty police officers on or about November 13, 2023. (TAC ¶¶ 3, 12.) Plaintiffs allege 4 that when police officers encountered Decedent, he ran from the police to evade arrest (Id. 5 ¶ 33.) In response, Police Officers fired numerous gunshots at Decedent, including after 6 Decedent was laying prong and incapacitated. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 16, 30.) 7 Relevant hereto, Plaintiffs allege that the City and Chief Nisleit trained police for 8 “combat shooting,” wherein police are trained to “empty” their gun instead of first 9 employing non-lethal methods. (Id. ¶ 18.) This policy requires officers to continue shooting 10 a suspect, even after the suspect is incapacitated. (Id.) The City and Chief Nisleit were 11 aware that California congressional hearings found such a policy and practice to result in 12 excessive force and death and that, as a result of such findings, California amended state 13 laws to direct use of non-lethal force as a preference to lethal force. (Id. ¶¶ 48, 59.) Despite 14 being aware of these findings and directives, Defendants continued to implement and train 15 officers to implement the policy preferring lethal force, including the police of emptying 16 firearms into incapacitated suspects. (Id.) 17 On January 30, 2026, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ 18 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC and provided leave to amend the negligent failure to 19 train claim. (Doc. No. 44 at 20–21.) On February 6, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the TAC. (Doc. 20 No. 45.) Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action pursuant to 21 Rule 12(b)(6). (See generally Doc. No. 52-1.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition (Doc. No. 55), 22 to which Defendants replied (Doc. No. 56). 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 25 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “The court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of law 26 for (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal 27 claim.” SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of California, Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 783 28 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat a motion to 1 dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 2 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 3 “In deciding such a motion, all material allegations of the complaint are accepted as 4 true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.” Navarro, 250 F.3d at 5 732; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“When there are well-pleaded 6 factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 7 plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”). Notwithstanding this deference, the 8 reviewing court need not accept legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “In sum, 9 for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and 10 reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling 11 the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) 12 (quotations and citation omitted). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action asserts that Defendants negligently failed to train 15 employees. Specifically, Defendants breached the duty to exercise reasonable care in 16 training, supervision, and oversight of San Diego Police Department officers regarding the 17 lawful use of force, including deadly force, under California law. (TAC ¶¶ 75–84.) 18 Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligent failure to train claim against the City and 19 Chief Nisleit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for numerous alleged deficiencies. (Doc. No. 52-1 20 at 4.) The Court will address each of Defendants’ arguments for dismissal in turn. 21 A. Claim Against Chief Nisleit 22 Defendants’ motion to dismiss targets Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for failing 23 to allege a duty of care Defendants owed Plaintiffs. (See Doc Nos. 52-1 at 5; 55 at 2–4.) 24 Defendants argue that, because police do not owe any duty to individual members of the 25 public, Plaintiffs must plead a special relationship between themselves and Defendants. 26 (Doc. No. 52-1 at 5 (citing first Von Batsch v. Am. Dist. Telegraph. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 27 1111, 1121 (1985); then C.A. v. Williams S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist. (“Hart”), 53 Cal. 28 4th 861, 877 (2012)).) Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ TAC fails to sufficiently allege the 1 element of duty because it contains no facts establishing a special relationship with Chief 2 Nisleit. (Id.) 3 “A plaintiff alleging negligent training under California law must show that the 4 employer negligently trained the employee as to the performance of the employee’s job 5 duties and as a result of such negligent instruction, the employee while carrying out his job 6 duties caused injury or damage to the plaintiff.” Garcia ex rel. Marin v. Clovis Unified Sch. 7 Dist., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 8 Here, Plaintiffs allege Defendants “owed Plaintiffs and Decedent a duty to exercise 9 reasonable care in the training, supervision, and oversight of the San Diego Police 10 Department officers regarding the lawful use of force, including deadly force, under 11 California law.” (TAC ¶ 76.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that “NISLEIT, in his capacity of 12 Chief of Police, and DOES 1-10, in their capacity of supervising, training, or commanding 13 personnel, owed a duty to ensure that officers received adequate training, supervision, and 14 guidance consistent with California standards governing the use of force, including proper 15 assessment, escalation, de-escalation, and reassessment once a suspect is incapacitated.” 16 (Id. ¶ 78.) Plaintiffs then allege that “Defendants breached their duties by inadequately 17 training and supervising reassessment of force after a suspect was incapacitated, the use of 18 verbal warnings, and the prohibition on continued lethal force when the threat had abated.” 19 (Id. ¶ 79.) “As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence, [officers involved 20 in the incident employed unreasonable and unsafe tactics and uses of force, including the 21 continued use of deadly force after Decedent was incapacitated], Decedent suffered severe 22 physical injury, conscious pain and suffering, and death, and Plaintiffs suffered economic 23 loss, loss of financial support, and other damages recovered under California law.” (Id. ¶¶ 24 80–82.) “Had defendant exercised reasonable care in the training and supervision of 25 officers, the officers would not have acted as they did, and the injuries and death suffered 26 by Decedent would not have occurred.” (Id. ¶ 81.) 27 Defendants argue that all claims for negligent supervision and training require a 28 special relationship, which Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege. (Doc. No. 56 at 2 (relying 1 on Hart, 53 Cal. 4th 861).) Specifically, Defendants argue that the special relationship 2 requirement derives from the settled principle that one generally owes no duty to control 3 another’s conduct absent a special relationship with either the person whose conduct needs 4 controlling or the person at risk. (Id. at 3.) 5 Defendants are generally correct about the principle of third-party harm; however, 6 as Plaintiffs identify (see Doc. No. 55 at 3–4), Defendants’ argument misapprehends 7 Plaintiffs’ theory. Plaintiffs allege Chief Nisleit negligently trained officers in use of lethal 8 force by training them in a “combat shooting” policy and implementation of Chief Nisleit’s 9 negligent trainings directly resulted in excessive use of force against Decedent, thereby 10 causing the alleged violations of Decedent’s Fourth and Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment 11 rights.3 12 Numerous courts have found that law enforcement supervisors have “a duty to 13 properly hire, train, control, and supervise” officer-employees that is owed “to individuals 14 who may be subjected to police officers’ unreasonable use of force.” See, e.g., French v. 15 City of L.A., No. EDCV20416JGBSHKX, 2021 WL 6752229, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 16 2021); see also Lopez v. Williams, No. EDCV17882JGBSPX, 2017 WL 10560529, at *11 17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2017) (“Plaintiff alleges a plausible duty on the part of MPD personnel 18 in charge of hiring, supervising, training, and retaining Williams and Mikowski to 19 adequately train the officers in the proper use of force because it is reasonably foreseeable 20 that officers who allegedly assaulted and beat citizens in the past may place other citizens 21 at risk in the absence of adequate training.”). Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that, despite 22

23 3 Similarly, to the extent Defendants seek the protection of the immunity offered by California 24 Government Code § 820.8, such reliance is misplaced because Plaintiffs are bringing a direct negligent 25 training claim against Chief Nisleit for his failure to reasonably train officers in use of lethal force. See A.B. v. Cnty. of S.D., 112 Cal. App. 5th 404, 430 (2025), as modified on denial of reh’g (July 18, 2025) 26 (rejecting reliance on Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.8 because a sheriff can be held directly liable for “his own wrongful acts or omissions” in negligently training officers who killed an individual by excessive force); 27 see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.8 (“Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.”). 28 1 knowing that the “combat shooting” policy violated the Constitution and California laws, 2 Chief Nisleit continued to train officers in the policy, which breached his “duty to ensure 3 that officers received adequate training, supervision, and guidance consistent with 4 California standards governing the use of force, including proper assessment, escalation, 5 de-escalation, and reassessment once a suspect is incapacitated.” Chief Nisleit’s allegedly 6 negligent training thus plausibly created the danger of harm to Decedent and Plaintiffs. See 7 Brown v. USA Taekwondo, 11 Cal. 5th 204, 214 (2021) (“[T]he law imposes a general duty 8 of care on a defendant only when it is the defendant who has created a risk of harm to the 9 plaintiff[.]”). 10 The seventh cause of action provides adequate factual allegations to state a claim of 11 negligent failure to train as pled directly against Chief Nisleit. Accordingly, the Court 12 DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the seventh cause of action as to Chief Nisleit. 13 B. Claim Against the City 14 Next, Defendants argue that the claim must be dismissed against the City to the 15 extent it is brought directly as “[t]here is no statutory basis for negligent hiring, training, 16 or supervision.” (Id. at 4 (citing de Villers v. Cnty. of S.D., 156 Cal. App. 4th 238, 252 17 (2007)).) 18 To support a claim of direct liability against a municipal entity, Plaintiffs must 19 identify a “specific statute either declaring the entity to be liable or creating a specific duty 20 of care apart from the general tort principles embodied in [California] Civil Code [§] 21 1714[.]” De Villers, 156 Cal. App. 4th at 251 (emphasis omitted); see also Eastburn v. 22 Reg’l Fire Protection Authority, 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1183 (2003) (“[D]irect tort liability of 23 public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least 24 creating some specific duty of care.”). 25 Plaintiffs do not raise a statutory basis for a negligent training and supervision claim 26 against the City. (See generally TAC; Doc. No. 55.) Instead, Plaintiffs expressly assert they 27 “do not allege direct entity liability,” only vicarious liability pursuant to California 28 Government Code § 815.2(a). (Doc. No. 55 at 5.) 1 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion insofar as the seventh cause 2 || of action asserts a theory of direct liability against the City. See, e.g., Est. of Nunis by & 3 || through Nunis v. City of Chula Vista, No. 21-CV-01627-AJB-DEB, 2023 WL 6035705, at 4 || *4—*5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2023). 5 Finally, with regard to the theory of vicarious liability against the City, Defendants 6 || argue that, because Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Chief Nisleit for direct liability, 7 vicarious claim against the City fails. (Doc. No. 52-1 at 4-5.) Plaintiffs respond that 8 || “[b]ecause [the TAC] adequately allege[s] negligence by public employees acting within 9 ||the scope of their employment, the City may be held vicariously liable pursuant to 10 || Government Code section 815.2(a).” (Doc. No. 55 at 3.) 11 Because Plaintiffs plead adequate factual allegations to state a claim of negligent 12 || failure to train against Chief Nisleit, the facts necessary to establish a vicarious liability 13 claim against the City have also been sufficiently pled. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a) (“A 14 || public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee 15 the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart 16 || from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal 17 ||representative.”). Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the theory of vicarious 18 || lability pled against the City. 19 CONCLUSION 20 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 21 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 52). 22 || Defendants must answer the operative complaint no later than April 30, 2026. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: April 16, 2026 © □ 25 Hon. Anthony J.Battaglia 26 United States District Judge 27 28