Elite Semiconductor, Inc. v. Anchor Semiconductor, Inc., et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 22, 2026
• Docket: 5:20-cv-06846
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 ELITE SEMICONDUCTOR, INC., Case No. 5:20-cv-06846-EJD

9 Plaintiff, ORDER ON LIABILITY FOR FEES

v. 10 Re: Dkt. No. 486 11 ANCHOR SEMICONDUCTOR, INC., et al., 12 Defendants.

13 Before the Court is Defendants Anchor Semiconductor, Inc. (“Anchor”) and Chenmin 14 Hu’s motion for attorney’s fees. Motion (“Mot.”), ECF No. 486. At a status conference on 15 October 9, 2025, the Court decided to determine liability before addressing any fees. ECF No. 16 491. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that only Plaintiff Elite Semiconductor (“Elite”) 17 is liable for fees. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 20 A. Trade Secret Case 21 In September 2020, Elite sued Defendants, asserting trade secret misappropriation and 22 related claims. Elite alleged that Defendants stole its semiconductor technology in 2010. Order 23 Granting Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ Order”), ECF No. 436 at 1. Trade secret claims, 24 however, have a three-year statute of limitations. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d); Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.6. 25 Elite tried to circumvent the statute of limitations by taking advantage of the discovery rule, where 26 27 the limitations period does not begin until a plaintiff should have discovered the trade secret claim. Elite alleged that it could not have learned of its claim until 2019. But it became clear in 1 2 discovery that this was not the case: in 2013, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) had 3 rejected Elite’s patent application, citing Anchor’s earlier application (“the Anchor Application”). 4 On these grounds, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants. See MSJ Order. 5 B. Dispute Over Fees 6 Defendants sought fees from Elite and the various law firms that have represented Elite 7 during and after the litigation: Fish IP Law LLP (“Fish”), Thoits Law (“Thoits”), Jeffer Mangels 8 Butler & Mitchell LLP (“Jeffer Mangels”), and Sideman & Bancroft LLP (“Sideman”). On 9 10 August 4, 2025, the Court found that Defendants are entitled to fees from Elite, not entitled to 11 Rule 11 sanctions against Elite’s attorneys, and not entitled to fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 12 (“Section 1927”) against Sideman (Elite’s current counsel). Order on Fees, ECF No. 466. The 13 Court deferred the question of Section 1927 fees against Elite’s former law firms until those firms 14 “and any other third party from whom Defendants seek fees” had been served with the Court’s 15 order. Id. at 10. 16 On August 22, 2025, Defendants served the Court’s order on Fish, Thoits, and Jeffer 17 18 Mangels. ECF Nos. 468–70. Defendants also served the Court’s order on two non-parties not 19 mentioned in their initial request for fees: Mr. van Loben Sels (Elite’s attorney) and Legalist, Inc. 20 (“Legalist”) (Elite’s litigation funder). ECF Nos. 467, 471. Mr. van Loben Sels and Legalist both 21 objected to being served. See ECF No. 472 Ex. B; ECF No. 474. On October 3, 2025, Elite, Mr. 22 van Loben Sels, Fish, and Thoits filed responses explaining why they believe they should not be 23 liable for fees. See ECF Nos. 484, 485, 482, 483. 24 25 On October 9, 2025, the Court met with the parties, the former law firms, Mr. van Loben 26 Sels, and Legalist for a status conference. ECF No. 491. Following that conference, on October 27 16, 2025, the Court determined that it would first resolve liability for fees before considering the amount of fees. ECF No. 496 at 4. The Court ordered that Legalist submit briefing on liability, 1 2 focusing on their control over the litigation; Defendants submit a ten-page reply to Fish, Thoits, 3 Jeffer Mangels, Elite, Mr. van Loben Sels, and Legalist; and Fish, Thoits, Jeffer Mangels, Elite, 4 Mr. van Loben Sels, and Legalist file responses. ECF No. 496. 5 Legalist submitted briefing objecting to liability on October 22, 2025. Legalist Br., ECF 6 No. 498. Jeffer Mangels also submitted briefing objecting to liability, even though the Court did 7 not contemplate such a submission in its October 16 Order. ECF No. 499. Defendants submitted 8 three separate ten-page replies: one directed at Fish, Thoits, and Jeffer Mangels, Dfs.’ Reply to 9 10 Law Firms, ECF No. 501; one directed at Legalist, Inc., Dfs.’ Reply to Legalist, ECF No. 502; and 11 one directed at Mr. van Loben Sels and Elite, Dfs.’ Reply to Elite and JvLS, ECF No. 503.1 Jeffer 12 Mangels filed a Reply on December 19. Jeffer Mangels Reply, ECF No. 511. Fish, Thoits, Elite, 13 Mr. van Loben Sels, and Legalist all filed Replies on December 22, 2025. Fish Reply, ECF No. 14 512; Thoits Reply, ECF No. 513; Elite Reply, ECF No. 514; JvLS Reply, ECF No. 515; Legalist 15 Reply, ECF No. 516. 16 II. LIABILITY FOR FEES 17 18 A. Legal Standard 19 1. Section 1927 20 Section 1927 provides a mechanism for sanctioning conduct that occurs after a case is 21 commenced. It authorizes costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees against “any attorney or other 22 person . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 23 U.S.C. § 1927. Though some circuits have interpreted “any attorney” to include law firms, the 24 25

26 1 Even though the Court’s October 16 Order had contemplated a total of ten pages, the Court 27 issued an order stating it would consider all thirty pages in its determination as to liability. ECF No. 504. Ninth Circuit has clearly held that Section 1927 does not allow sanctions to be awarded against a 1 2 law firm. Kaas Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e hold 3 that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 does not permit the award of sanctions against a law firm.”). Liability under 4 Section 1927 also “requires a finding of bad faith.” MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Moore, 952 F.2d 1120, 5 1122 (9th Cir. 1991). Bad faith is measured under a subjective standard. Id. Knowing or reckless 6 conduct meets this standard, but negligence does not. Id. 7 2. Federal Courts’ Inherent Authority 8 Federal courts also have inherent authority to impose attorneys’ fees. They may do so for 9 10 “willful disobedience of a court order,” “when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, 11 wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,” or when counsel has “willfully abuse[d] judicial processes.” 12 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (citations omitted). As with Section 13 1927, the Court must find that the lawyer acted in bad faith, “which includes a broad range of 14 willful improper conduct.” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). It does not matter 15 whether the lawyer’s argument was colorable—it only matters whether the lawyer made the 16 argument out of “vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides.” In re Itel Sec. Litig., 791 F.2d 672, 675 17 18 (9th Cir. 1986). 19 B. Analysis 20 The Court addresses liability first as to Plaintiff, next as to the law firms (Fish, Thoits, and 21 Jeffer Mangels), then as to Mr. van Loben Sels, and finally as to Legalist. 22 1. Elite 23 The Court already found in its Order on Fees that “Defendants are entitled to fees from 24 25 Elite under federal and California trade secret law” as well as under the Court’s “inherent 26 authority.” Order on Fees at 8. 27 Elite then filed an objection to liability, which—by Elite’s own admission—rehashes the Court’s decision to grant summary judgment. Elite Objection, ECF No. 484 at 3 (“While this 1 2 submission is not a request for reconsideration, Elite believes and argues . . . that the Court should 3 revisit certain aspects of the Court’s Summary Judgment Order because they reflect clear error.”). 4 Elite claims that the Court “impermissibly resolved evidentiary inferences against Elite, the non- 5 movant,” that the Court incorrectly interpreted the case law, and that the Anchor Application did 6 not put Elite on inquiry notice of its claims. Id. at 8, 18, 22–23. 7 The Court has already found that Defendants are entitled to fees from Elite, and the Court 8 declines to revisit that finding here. Since Elite has not offered any other reason it should not be 9 10 liable, the Court reiterates its earlier holding that Elite is liable for fees under federal and 11 California trade secret law and the Court’s inherent authority. See Order on Fees. 12 2. Law Firms Fish, Thoits, and Jeffer Mangels 13 Defendants contend Section 1927, the Court’s inherent authority, and the principles of 14 equity all require holding the law firms liable for fees. Dfs.’ Reply to Law Firms at 5–10. The 15 Court takes each argument in turn. 16 a. Section 1927 17 18 Section 1927 authorizes costs, expenses, and fees against “any attorney or person” who 19 vexatiously multiplies proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Here, Defendants attempt to use Section 20 1927 to hold three law firms liable for fees. But the Ninth Circuit has held that Section 1927 21 “does not permit the award of sanctions against a law firm.” Kaas Law, 799 F.3d at 1293. The 22 Court thus finds that Fish, Thoits, and Jeffer Mangels are not liable under Section 1927. 23 In the alternative, Defendants ask that the Court award fees “against each of the individual 24 25 lawyers who vexatiously multiplied the proceedings on behalf of Elite and who conducted due 26 diligence on the firm’s engagement with Elite.” Dfs.’ Reply to Law Firms at 10. For the Court to 27 do that, Defendants would have needed to name those lawyers and establish that their conduct met the standard set by Section 1927. Defendants did not do so. 1 2 Consequently, the Court finds that Fish, Thoits, and Jeffer Mangels are not liable under 3 Section 1927. 4 b. Inherent Authority 5 Defendants also ask that the Court hold the law firms liable under the Court’s inherent 6 authority. Dfs.’ Reply to Law Firms at 5–9. 7 Defendants contend that Fish “frivolously filed and prosecuted this lawsuit without any 8 adequate pre-filing investigation.” Dfs.’ Reply to Law Firms at 7. Broadly speaking, Defendants’ 9 10 argument is that Fish did not conduct a proper pre-suit investigation of the statute of limitations, 11 that Fish “masterminded” the litigation, and that Fish repeatedly misrepresented facts to the Court. 12 Id. With respect to Thoits and Jeffer Mangels, Defendants claim that those firms conducted 13 review processes when they took the case but nonetheless misrepresented facts to the Court. Id. at 14 8–9. In sum, the argument is that Fish should have conducted a pre-suit investigation, and that 15 Thoits and Jeffer Mangels—which did conduct investigations—learned that their client’s suit was 16 frivolous but pursued it anyway. 17 18 Bad faith requires that the sanctioned party appreciated the wrongful nature of the conduct 19 and continued it anyway. In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., 655 F. Supp. 20 3d 899, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2023). Defendants posit that because the firms ran on contingency, and 21 because they misrepresented facts to the Court, the firms made the misrepresentations in bad faith. 22 Dfs.’ Reply to Law Firms at 8 (“Thoits’ motivations are obvious, as it too was ‘entitled to 30% of 23 any net settlement or judgment proceeds.’”). But that argument rests on the assumption that the 24 25 firms knew they were misrepresenting facts to the Court. Defendants offer no facts to substantiate 26 that assumption—just the inference that because Thoits and Jeffer Mangels investigated the case 27 before taking it on, they must have uncovered the fact that their client knew Anchor’s patent predated his own. This one inference is not enough to find that the firms acted with 1 2 “vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides.” In re Itel Sec. Litig., 791 F.2d at 675. 3 Consequently, the Court finds that the law firms are not liable for fees under the Court’s 4 inherent authority. 5 c. Equitable Principles 6 Finally, Defendants ask the Court to hold the law firms accountable under equitable 7 principles. Dfs.’ Reply to Law Firms at 10. Defendants’ argument is that because Elite and Mr. 8 van Loben Sels are unlikely to be able to satisfy the judgment, the Court should allow Defendants 9 10 to recover from the law firms. Id. Defendants cite Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th 11 Cir. 1994), in which the Ninth Circuit held that “a court can properly consider plaintiff’s ability to 12 pay monetary sanctions as one factor in assessing sanctions.” But there, the court had already 13 found the plaintiff liable and was simply considering whether it could reduce sanctions for a pro 14 se plaintiff. That does not allow a court to sanction parties who—as here—are not independently 15 liable. The law firms are not liable for fees under any equitable principle. 16 3. Mr. van Loben Sels 17 18 Defendants contend that Mr. van Loben Sels should be found liable for fees under Section 19 1927 and the Court’s inherent authority. Dfs.’ Reply to Elite and JvLS at 6. 20 a. Section 1927 21 Again, Section 1927 authorizes costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees against “any attorney 22 or other person . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 23 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Liability requires a finding of subjective bad faith. MGIC Indem. Corp., 952 24 25 F.2d at 1122. An attorney acts in bad faith when he or she knowingly or recklessly raises a 26 frivolous argument or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent. New 27 Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1989). Defendants contend that Mr. van Loben Sels acted in bad faith by (1) withholding evidence 1 2 regarding Elite’s awareness of Anchor’s patent application, (2) refusing to correct the record once 3 he realized his error, and (3) pursuing an aggressive discovery motion practice in hopes of 4 extracting a settlement. Dfs.’ Reply to Elite and JvLS at 6–10. The Court addresses each 5 argument in turn. 6 Whether Mr. van Loben Sels withheld evidence depends on whether he knew that evidence 7 existed. Mr. van Loben Sels claims that he was not aware of the critical fact—that Elite knew of 8 the Anchor Application in 2013—until December 2022. He blames his client for this failure. 9 10 Elite’s CEO Kevin Leu told Mr. van Loben Sels that he had first seen the Anchor Application in 11 2019, which would have put Elite’s claims within the statute of limitations. This was false: Elite 12 had been aware of the Anchor Application since 2013. JvLS Response, ECF No. 485 at 7–10. A 13 July 14, 2021, deposition, in which defense counsel used the PTO filing as an exhibit, alerted Mr. 14 van Loben Sels to the possibility that Mr. Leu might have seen the Anchor Application earlier than 15 2019. Id. at 9. Mr. van Loben Sels raised the issue with Mr. Leu, but Mr. Leu claimed he had not 16 seen the Anchor Application during the prosecution of Elite’s patents. Id. at 10. Mr. van Loben 17 18 Sels concluded that the U.S. patent prosecutors had not shared the Anchor Application with Elite. 19 Id. 20 Defendants contend that even if Mr. van Loben Sels’s client did not tell him that Elite 21 knew of the Anchor Application in 2013, his own team did. Dfs.’ Reply to Elite and JvLS at 8. In 22 April 2022, Mr. van Loben Sels’s team created a privilege log that showed that Mr. Leu received 23 the Anchor Application in 2013. Defendants argue that this shows that, by April 2022, Mr. van 24 25 Loben Sels knew that Elite had received the Anchor Application in 2013. Id. Defendants also 26 allege that the lawyers intentionally gave the document a vague title— “Prosecution of US Appl. 27 No. 13/1338331”—so that Defendants would not realize what the document was. Id. But Mr. van Loben Sels claims that he did not personally review the privilege log until December 2022. JvLS 1 2 Response at 13. When he finally reviewed the log and realized the error, he produced the 3 documents immediately. Id. 4 Bad faith requires knowledge or recklessness. New Alaska Dev. Corp., 869 F.2d at 1306. 5 The Court is not convinced that Mr. van Loben Sels knowingly misrepresented Mr. Leu’s 6 awareness of the Anchor Application. Lawyers may rely on a client’s statements unless the 7 client’s representations are known to be false. Est. of Tucker ex rel. Tucker v. Interscope Recs., 8 Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1036 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Mr. Leu told Mr. van Loben Sels he 9 10 had not seen the Anchor Application in 2013, and Mr. van Loben Sels reasonably believed him. 11 Mr. van Loben Sels also did not carefully investigate the privilege log until months after it was 12 produced, so he did not knowingly misrepresent its contents, either. 13 The Court is also not convinced that Mr. van Loben Sels acted recklessly. Recklessness 14 requires “much more than mere negligence: it is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person 15 would do.” Reckless, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Here, Mr. van Loben Sels 16 assigned a senior associate with the task of preparing the privilege log. JvLS Response at 12. 17 18 Though he reviewed the log before it was served, he did not review the logged documents. Id. A 19 more careful attorney would have reviewed the logged documents, or at least conducted a spot 20 check. But Mr. van Loben Sels’s total reliance on his associate’s work—though certainly 21 imprudent and possibly negligent—is not a gross deviation from reasonable behavior and does not 22 constitute recklessness. See Tallman v. CPS Sec. (USA), Inc., 655 F. App'x 602, 603 (9th Cir. 23 2016) (distinguishing between imprudence and recklessness). 24 25 Next, the Court takes up Defendants’ contention that Mr. van Loben Sels “refus[ed] to 26 correct the record” regarding Elite’s awareness of the Anchor Application. The Court finds this 27 argument unavailing, as well. Dfs.’ Reply to JvLS and Elite at 8. Elite’s lawyers—presumably led by Mr. van Loben Sels—failed to update the third amended complaint with the date that Elite 1 2 became aware of the Anchor Application. Id.; JvLS Reply at 5. Defendants argue this is a sign of 3 bad faith—of pursuing a baseless claim. But without any additional evidence to support that 4 argument, the Court finds that Mr. van Loben Sels was careless, but not reckless. 5 Finally, the Court considers Defendants’ allegation that Mr. van Loben Sels vexatiously 6 multiplied proceedings by withholding evidence and pursuing aggressive discovery. Dfs.’ Reply 7 to JvLS and Elite at 9–10; JvLS Reply at 7–8. The Court has already disposed of the notion that 8 Mr. van Loben Sels intentionally or recklessly withheld evidence. And Defendants’ complaints 9 10 about discovery, along with Mr. van Loben Sels’s responses, reflect the acrimony and distrust 11 animating the attorneys rather than any actionable bad faith on the part of Mr. van Loben Sels. 12 In sum, the Court finds that Mr. van Loben Sels is not liable for fees under Section 1927. 13 But the Court is nonetheless disappointed with Mr. van Loben Sels’ prosecution of this case. 14 Clearly, there were numerous opportunities throughout the litigation where Mr. van Loben Sels 15 could have realized that the statute of limitations barred his client’s claim. Had Mr. van Loben 16 Sels been less dogmatic about his case and perhaps less derisive toward opposing counsel, he 17 18 would have recognized his error sooner. The Court encourages Mr. van Loben Sels to exercise 19 greater humility in the future. 20 b. Inherent Authority 21 Defendants separately invoke the Court’s inherent authority as a basis for awarding fees 22 against Mr. van Loben Sels. The Court may award fees under its inherent authority if a party has 23 acted in bad faith. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991). Before doing so, 24 25 however, the Court must make an explicit finding of bad faith. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. 26 Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, the Court has not done so. See supra Part 27 II.B.3.a. As a result, Mr. van Loben Sels is not liable for fees under the Court’s inherent authority. 4. Legalist 1 2 Finally, Defendants also seek fees from Legalist, Elite’s litigation funder. Defendants 3 argue that Legalist should be held jointly and severally liable along with Elite under federal and 4 California trade secret law or, failing that, through the Court’s inherent authority. 5 Both of these arguments rely on the notion that Legalist controlled the litigation. 6 Defendants argue that litigation funders like Legalist can be held jointly and severally liable when 7 the funder controls what is later found to be vexatious litigation. Dfs.’ Response to Legalist, ECF 8 No. 476 at 3. Defendants support this argument by pointing to cases in other jurisdictions. The 9 10 District of Colorado has found that “[w]hen a separate person or entity funds litigation costs, a 11 number of courts have found that the funding person or entity who also controls what is later 12 found to be vexatious litigation can be deemed a party for purposes of paying costs and attorney’s 13 fees.” Stan Lee Media, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., No. 12-CV-02663-WJM-KMT, 2015 WL 14 5210655, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 8, 2015). Florida state courts have also held funders liable. One 15 found that a corporation that funded a lawsuit had sufficient control to make it party to the 16 litigation and thus liable for attorneys’ fees and costs. Abu–Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 17 18 693–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). And another found that when a litigation funder used the 19 plaintiff as a mere shell through which to assert frivolous claims, the funder was liable for fees. 20 Visoly v. Sec. Pac. Credit Corp., 768 So. 2d 482, 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 21 Legalist distinguishes these cases from the one before the Court. Legalist Br. at 5. Courts 22 have only found a funder liable when the funder exercised real control over the lawsuit. This 23 includes things like approving filings, controlling selection of attorneys, reviewing witnesses, and 24 25 vetoing settlement agreements. Stan Lee Media, Inc., 2015 WL 5210655, at *2 (citing Abu- 26 Ghazaleh, 36 So. 3d at 693–94). This is not the type of relationship Legalist had with Mr. van 27 Loben Sels or Elite. The operative contract expressly provided that Elite, not Legalist, retained control over settlement. ECF No. 480-1 at 9–10 (“The Plaintiff shall retain control over the 1 2 conduct of the Claim(s) and in particular over settlement of the Claim(s) with the Defendant.”). 3 And Mr. van Loben Sels’ declaration states that Legalist did not select or approve counsel, 4 determine litigation strategy, or exercise any authority over settlement offers. ECF No. 498-1 ¶¶ 5 5–10. 6 Defendants contest this characterization of the relationship, pointing out that in a previous 7 declaration, Mr. van Loben Sels stated that Legalist reviewed and approved the final version of the 8 complaint. Dfs.’ Response to Legalist at 3. Defendants also point out that Legalist required 9 10 detailed memoranda about the statute of limitations issue before agreeing to fund the case. Id. at 11 4. This shows that Legalist had significant control over one filing—the initial complaint. But the 12 Court finds that this does not rise to the level of control necessary to hold a funder liable.2 13 Because Legalist was not a party to and did not control the litigation, Legalist cannot be held 14 jointly and severally liable for fees under the trade secret statutes. This finding also weighs 15 against holding Legalist liable under the Court’s inherent authority. 16 Separately, Defendants contend that even if Legalist did not control the litigation, the 17 18 Court should nonetheless award fees against Legalist under the Court’s inherent authority because 19 Legalist “directly participated in the misconduct at issue in the hopes of profiting off a meritless 20 claim.” Id. at 4. The Court may exercise its inherent authority to impose fees on a non-party to 21 curb abusive litigation practices. Corder v. Howard Johnson & Co., 53 F.3d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 22 1994) (“a court may impose attorney’s fees against a non-party as an exercise of the court’s 23 24

25 2 Defendants contend they cannot tell how much control Legalist really had over the litigation without being allowed to pursue discovery. Dfs.’ Response to Legalist at 5. But in Stan Lee 26 Media, the court only allowed discovery after finding that the party seeking fees had made a colorable argument that the funder had controlled the case. Stan Lee Media, Inc. 2015 WL 27 5210655, at *3. That is not the situation here, so the Court declines to grant discovery. inherent power to impose sanctions to curb abusive litigation practices.”). But the party seeking 1 2 sanctions must make a showing of bad faith. See supra Part II.A.2. Defendants have not done so. 3 Legalist acted with appropriate caution, requiring Elite and its counsel to demonstrate the merits of 4 the case, including addressing Legalist’s concerns about the statute of limitations. ECF No. 498-2 5 at 5. This demonstrates diligence—not negligence and certainly not the recklessness or intent 6 required for a showing of bad faith. 7 In conclusion, the Court finds that Legalist is not liable for fees. 8 III. CONCLUSION 9 10 For the reasons stated above, the Court finds Elite liable for fees under federal and 11 California trade secret laws and the Court’s inherent authority. The Court finds that Fish, Thoits, 12 Jeffer Mangels, Mr. van Loben Sels, and Legalist are not liable for fees. 13 Having determined that only Plaintiff Elite is liable, the Court ORDERS as follows: 14 1. Defendants shall file an opening brief addressing the amount of fees to be awarded no 15 later than twenty-one days (21 days) from the date of this Order. Defendants’ brief shall 16 not exceed eight pages. Defendants shall include Lodestar submissions in support of their 17 18 brief. Because the Court has found only Elite liable for fees, Defendants’ brief shall 19 address how the requested fees reflect only those fees attributable to Elite’s conduct. 20 2. Elite shall file a response no later than fourteen days (14 days) after Defendants file 21 their opening brief. Elite’s response shall not exceed eight pages. 22 3. Defendants may file a reply no later than seven days (7 days) after Elite files its 23 response. Defendants’ reply shall not exceed five pages. 24 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// ] IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 || Dated: April 22, 2026 3 4 EDWARD J. DAVILA 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 a 12

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