Elisa Cervantes Chavez v. Moises Becerra, et al.

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 ELISA CERVANTES CHAVEZ, Case No. 1:25-cv-02058-KES-SAB-HC

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS, DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND DENY 14 MOISES BECERRA, et al., PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 15 Respondents. (ECF Nos. 1, 13, 15) 16 17 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition 18 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 19 I. 20 BACKGROUND 21 On December 30, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion 22 for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On January 13, 2026, the assigned 23 district judge denied Petitioner’s motion for TRO and referred the matter “to the assigned 24 magistrate judge for further proceedings and/or other appropriate action, including as to whether 25 the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 10 at 4.) On January 14, 26 2026, the Court issued a briefing schedule. (ECF No. 11.) 27 On January 14, 2026, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 13.) On January 30, 2026, Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and a motion for preliminary 1 injunction. (ECF Nos. 14, 15.) The district judge referred the motion for preliminary injunction 2 to the undersigned. (ECF No. 16.) On February 11, 2026, Respondents filed a response to the 3 motion for preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 18.) To date, no reply has been filed, and the time 4 for doing so has passed. 5 II. 6 DISCUSSION 7 In the petition, Petitioner alleges that Respondents have forcibly administered HIV 8 medication without diagnosis, consent, or due process, in violation of the substantive and 9 procedural protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and that the conditions of 10 her confinement are unconstitutionally punitive in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 11 1.) In the motion for preliminary injunction, Petitioner alleges that “despite documented 12 psychiatric conditions including anxiety, depression, panic disorder, prior psychotropic 13 medication, and a clinical determination that a psychiatric consult is indicated, Respondents 14 continue to detain her without providing meaningful mental health evaluation or treatment.” 15 (ECF No. 15 at 2.) Petitioner contends that the “government may not continue detaining a civil 16 [immigration detainee] while ignoring serious psychiatric needs” and that “[d]etention under 17 these circumstances is punitive, unconstitutional, and incompatible with the Fifth Amendment.” 18 (Id. at 5.) Petitioner requests immediate release or alternatively, “an independent psychiatric 19 evaluation and appropriate remedial relief.” (Id.) 20 Respondents move to dismiss the petition because Petitioner’s “sole claim relates to 21 medical treatment that she claims she is receiving against her will, and thus is a conditions of 22 confinement claim not cognizable in a petition for writ of habeas corpus” and “her claims are 23 factually incorrect in that she has not been administered HIV medication at all, let alone forcibly 24 administered HIV medication.” (ECF No. 13 at 2.) In the response to the motion for preliminary 25 injunction, Respondents note that the “allegations in the motion for preliminary injunction are 26 divergent of both the original petition for writ of habeas corpus (which alleged forcible 27 administration of HIV medication) and of the subject matter for 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition 1 matter, Respondents offer documentary support that Petitioner was offered and is receiving 2 mental health care,” and “Respondents otherwise submit on their previous arguments that these 3 challenges to medical care are not properly raised to the Court in § 2241 review.” (ECF No. 18 at 4 1.) 5 In denying the motion for TRO, the district judge stated: 6 As the Ninth Circuit has recently explained:

7 Pinson [v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059 (9th Cir. 2023)] solidified the rule that a habeas claim is one challenging the fact of confinement, 8 rather than the conditions of confinement. In Pinson, two inmates sought habeas relief, arguing that the conditions of their 9 incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic violated the Eighth Amendment. Pinson, 69 F.4th at 1062. This court rejected claimant 10 Sands’s argument that only habeas relief could ameliorate the harm inflicted on him by the government’s ongoing failure to 11 sufficiently treat his underlying illnesses and protect him from exposure to the coronavirus. Id. at 1063, 1065–66, 1075. In so 12 doing, this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claimant Sands’s habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction, delineating that 13 “the relevant question is whether, based on the allegations in the petition, release is legally required irrespective of the relief 14 requested.” Id. at 1072, 1076. In dismissing the petition, this court concluded that claimant Sands appeared to challenge only the 15 conditions of his confinement and not the underlying legal basis for that confinement, and therefore his claim was “outside the core 16 of habeas.” Id. at 1073.

17 Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2024).

18 In this case, the crux of petitioner’s challenge is to the conditions of her confinement: specifically, the alleged forced administration of HIV medication 19 “without documented diagnosis or consent.” She seeks for that medication to stop. Based on her allegations, that would be a change in the conditions of her 20 confinement. Petitioner does not challenge “the legality or duration of [her] confinement,” Pinson, 69 F.4th at 1069 (quoting Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 21 891 (9th Cir. 1979)), as required to seek relief through habeas. She does not dispute or even discuss the basis for her civil immigration detention, and she does 22 not establish that release would be “legally required” if she established the allegations in her petition. See Pinson, 69 F.4th at 1072. She fails to show that this 23 court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 over the claims that are the basis for her motion. 24 25 (ECF No. 10 at 3.) 26 A claim is cognizable in federal habeas corpus when a prisoner challenges “the fact or 27 duration of his confinement” and “seeks either immediate release from that confinement or the 1 rights action is the proper method to challenge the conditions of confinement. McCarthy v. 2 Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1991); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499. The Ninth Circuit has “long 3 held that prisoners may not challenge mere conditions of confinement in habeas corpus.” Nettles 4 v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (citing Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 5 891–92 (9th Cir. 1979)). See Shook v. Apker, 472 F. App'x 702, 702–03 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 6 that district court did not err in treating conditions of confinement claims as arising under Bivens 7 v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), rather than 28 U.S.C. § 2241); 8 Alcala v. Rios, 434 F. App'x 668, 669–70 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that district court did not err 9 in finding that conditions of confinement claims are not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 10 In Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059 (9th Cir. 2023), two federal prisoners “challenge[d] 11 the dismissals of their habeas corpus petitions in which they asserted that their incarceration 12 during the COVID-19 pandemic violated the Eighth Amendment and sought release from 13 custody.” Id. at 1062. Holding that “the relevant question is whether, based on the allegations in 14 the petition, release is legally required irrespective of the relief requested,” the Ninth Circuit 15 found that “Sands has failed to allege facts to support his legal contention that his detention was 16 unlawful because no set of conditions exist that would cure the constitutional violations.” Id. at 17 1072, 1075. “Because Sands’s claims lie outside the historic core of habeas corpus . . . the 18 district court properly found it lacked jurisdiction to hear Sands’s petition.” Id. at 1075. 19 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “Pinson solidified the rule that a habeas claim is 20 one challenging the fact of confinement, rather than the conditions of confinement.” Doe v. 21 Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2024). 22 In the opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner asserts that Respondents 23 mischaracterize Petitioner’s claim as “only a conditions-of-confinement challenge” because 24 “Petitioner challenges the legality of her continued detention itself, not merely the environment 25 in which she is confined.” (ECF No. 14 at 2.) “Petitioner does not seek improved conditions she 26 seeks release from detention that has become constitutionally impermissible.” (Id.) However, 27 “the relevant question is whether, based on the allegations in the petition, release is legally 1 “[c]ourts have long recognized that habeas jurisdiction exists where unconstitutional medical 2 neglect renders custody unlawful,” (ECF No. 14 at 2), but fails to cite authority supporting such 3 a contention. Despite the fact that Petitioner’s motion for TRO was denied based on Pinson, 4 Petitioner fails to address Pinson in the opposition to the motion to dismiss or the motion for 5 preliminary injunction. 6 In the petition and the motion for preliminary injunction, Petitioner “seeks freedom from 7 detention that [she claims] has become unlawful because the government [allegedly] cannot meet 8 its constitutional obligations” with respect to medical care. (ECF No. 14 at 4.) “Release is the 9 only available remedy—and thus a claim is at the core of habeas—if a successful petition 10 demonstrates that the detention itself is without legal authorization,” Pinson, 69 F.4th at 1070, 11 but Petitioner does not challenge the underlying legal basis or authority for her immigration 12 detention. Based on the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in the order denying Petitioner’s 13 motion for TRO, the Court recommends finding that Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable under 14 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 15 III. 16 RECOMMENDATION 17 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 18 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13) be GRANTED; 19 2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED; and 20 3. Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 15) be DENIED. 21 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 22 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 23 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 24 FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 25 written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any 26 exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 27 Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days 1 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 2 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 3 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 4 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 5 *|ortsso onnenen DFA (Be 7 | Dated: _ March 3, 2026 : STANLEY A. BOONE 8 United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28