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7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELIESER FELIX, JR., Case No. 1:25-cv-01084-CDB (PC)
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. TO DISMISS ACTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE (1) TO STATE A CLAIM AND 14 D. SATERFIELD, (2) TO PROSECUTE AND TO OBEY COURT ORDERS AND LOCAL RULES 15 Defendant. (Docs. 1, 7) 16 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 17 Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge 18 19 Plaintiff Elieser Felix, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 20 pauperis in this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 21 I. Relevant Background 22 Plaintiff initiated this action with the filing of a complaint on August 27, 2025. (Doc. 1). 23 On September 18, 2025, the Court entered the first screening order on Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 24 7). Because the Court found the complaint fails to state any cognizable claims against Defendants 25 D. Saterfield and the unknown correctional officer Defendant, and that Plaintiff may be able to 26 cure the deficiencies in his pleading, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to 27 cure the identified deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in good faith. Id. at 11. With its 28 screening order, the Court served on Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form and ordered him within 1 21 days from service of the order and form (i.e., October 10, 2025) to either file a first amended 2 complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in the order or in the alternative, file a 3 notice of voluntary dismissal if Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action. Id. Plaintiff was 4 forewarned that the failure to comply with the order will result in the “recommend[ation] that 5 this action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and for failure 6 to prosecute.” Id. (emphasis original). The time to comply with the order has passed and Plaintiff 7 failed to file either a first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal. Accordingly, the 8 undersigned issues the following findings and recommendations to dismiss this action for 9 Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim, and, separately, for failure to prosecute and to obey court orders 10 and Local Rules as set forth below. 11 II. Failure to State a Claim 12 A. Screening Requirement 13 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 14 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 15 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raises claims that are 16 frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief 17 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915A(b). The Court must dismiss a complaint if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to 19 allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1151 20 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006)). 21 B. Pleading Requirements 22 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 23 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 24 is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to 25 all civil actions, with limited exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). 26 The statement must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims and the grounds 27 supporting the claims. Id. at 512. 1 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 2 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 3 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 4 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not require probability, but it requires 5 more than the “sheer possibility” of a defendant’s liability. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 6 A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow the court to make reasonable inferences that the 7 defendant is liable for wrongful conduct. Id. However, a court “is not required to indulge 8 unwarranted inferences.” Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th 9 Cir. 2008). 10 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 11 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). This liberal 12 pleading standard applies to a plaintiff’s factual allegations but not to his legal theories. Neitzke 13 v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Moreover, a liberal construction of the complaint may 14 not supply essential elements of a claim not pleaded by the plaintiff. Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union 15 Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). The 16 mere possibility of misconduct and facts merely consistent with liability is insufficient to state a 17 cognizable claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 18 2009). Vague and conclusory allegations of official misconduct are insufficient to withstand a 19 motion to dismiss. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 20 2. Linkage and Causation 21 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 22 rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 23 section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the defendants 24 and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 25 362, 373–75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that a government actor may be liable under section 26 1983, if he performs an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or fails to perform 27 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the prisoner to suffer a deprivation of rights. 1 1976)). In addition to direct participation, a government actor may be liable for “setting in motion 2 a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to 3 inflict the constitutional injury.” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 4 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). 5 3. Supervisory Liability 6 Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their 7 subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Lemire v. Cal. 8 Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013). “A supervisor is only liable 9 for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the 10 violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 11 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Supervisory liability may be based on inaction in the training and 12 supervision of subordinates. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011). 13 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such defendant 14 and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 15 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of 16 supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 17 C. Discussion 18 1. Plaintiff’s Allegations1 19 Plaintiff’s complaint names as Defendants D. Saterfield, correctional officer at Sierra 20 Conservation Center (“SCC”), and one unknown SCC officer. (Doc. 1 at 2). Plaintiff asserts a 21 claim for relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for threat to safety. Id. at 3. Plaintiff 22 alleges that between 2023 and 2025, while he was in the custody of SCC, a correctional facility 23 under the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), he was assaulted 24 and injured by another inmate. Id. He alleges that Defendants Saterfield and other officers forced 25 inmate Hawkyard, who is mentally ill, to be celled with Plaintiff. Id. Inmate Hawkyard attacked 26 and bit Plaintiff’s finger, requiring medical attention. Id. Defendants thereafter charged Plaintiff 27
1The undersigned accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose 1 and placed him in Ad-Seg with disciplinary actions without a hearing before the disciplinary actions 2 were later reversed. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendants are employed at the prison and are personally 3 involved in the event relevant to the suit and “are under color of law.” Id. Plaintiff alleges he 4 sought the assistance of inmates within his custody to present claims because he is mentally 5 impaired, and due to this impairment, he seeks the Court’s assistance for appointment of counsel. 6 Plaintiff alleges injuries that required medical attention due to his finger being bit and from 7 being assaulted by another inmate. Id. Plaintiff indicates his claim has been administratively 8 exhausted. Id. In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks the Court grant a declaration that describes 9 the violation of his constitutional rights, compensatory and punitive damages against each 10 defendant, a jury trial, and any additional relief the Court deems just, proper, and equitable. Id. at 11 6. The complaint is signed and dated August 22, 2025, and Plaintiff indicates “various inmate 12 paralegals” assisted him in the preparation of the complaint. Id. 13 2. Analysis 14 a. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect 15 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. 16 Const. amend VIII. While the nature of imprisonment restricts significant rights, “convicted 17 prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement 18 in prison.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (citations omitted). The Eighth Amendment 19 protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and conditions of confinement. Farmer 20 v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). 21 “After incarceration, only the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ … constitutes cruel and 22 unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Ingraham v. Write, 430 U.S. 651, 670 23 (1977) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). No matter where prisoners are 24 housed, prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 25 clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th 26 Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 27 The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to protect prisoners from violence at the 1 penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833– 2 34 (1970); Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009). A prisoner seeking relief for an 3 Eighth Amendment violation must show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference to the 4 threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate. Labatad v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 5 (9th Cir. 2013). 6 To prevail on a failure-to-protect claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show 7 that a prison official’s act or omission (1) was objectively, “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the official 8 was subjectively, deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 9 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). A deprivation is sufficiently serious if the 10 conditions of confinement pose a “substantial risk of serious harm,” id. (citing Helling v. McKinney, 11 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)), and a prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of “the minimal 12 civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). 13 The second prong of the Farmer test is subjective and requires the prison official to have 14 a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302– 15 04). “Deliberate indifference” entails something more than negligence but less than acts or 16 omissions intended to cause harm or with knowledge that harm will result. Id. at 835 (following 17 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). To prove deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the official 18 knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate safety. Id. at 837. A prison official need not 19 “believe to a moral certainty” that a prisoner is at risk of harm “before [he] is obligated to take 20 steps to prevent such an assault,” but “he must have more than a mere suspicion that an attack will 21 occur.” Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). The obviousness 22 of the risk may be sufficient to establish knowledge. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. 23 Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). 24 Even if a prison official should have been aware of the risk but was not, there is no Eighth 25 Amendment violation, no matter how severe the risk. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th 26 Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should 27 have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under [the Supreme Court’s] 1 officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from 2 liability if they responded reasonably.” Id. at 844. “[S]peculative and generalized fears of harm at 3 the hands of other prisoners do not rise to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm to [an 4 inmate’s] future health.” Williams v. Wood, 223 Fed. Appx. 670, 671 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation 5 omitted). 6 Here, the complaint fails to state a claim for failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment 7 against Defendants. First, Plaintiff’s allegations—that, as a mentally ill inmate, he was forced to 8 be celled with Hawkyard, another inmate with mental illness—do not meet the first prong that such 9 placement was objectively, sufficiently serious under Farmer. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. While the 10 Court acknowledges that mentally ill inmates may present a danger to other inmates, the same may 11 also be true for non-mentally ill inmates. See Fosselman v. Dimmer, No. 1:12-cv-01302-DAD- 12 SAB (PC), 2017 WL 1254685, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2017) (“While there is certainly a 13 possibility that two inmates might at some point be involved in an altercation, the mere possibility 14 of such does not rise to the level of a substantial risk of serious harm sufficient to violate the 15 Constitution.”); Gibson v. Chua, No. 1:15-cv-00485-SKO (PC), 2015 WL 9489703, at *2 (E.D. 16 Cal. Dec. 30, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s premise that mentally ill inmates somehow present an unacceptable 17 risk of harm to non-mentally ill inmates due to their violent tendencies while not presenting a risk 18 to other mentally ill inmates is illogical.”); accord, Morales v. City of N. Las Vegas, 272 F. Supp. 19 3d 1216, 1222–23 (D. Nev. 2017) (“[D]ouble-celling an inmate with mental health issues, without 20 more, is not constitutionally impermissible.”); Jackson v. McMahon, No. CV 17-7296-AG (JPR), 21 2018 WL 6016981, at *18 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2018) (finding failure to protect claim insufficient 22 at screening where plaintiff “nowhere alleges that his cellmate or any other inmate threatened to or 23 did attack him because of his mental health or for any reason.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff must 24 allege more than merely being celled with another mentally ill inmate posed a substantial risk of 25 harm; instead, he must state factual allegations that characterize why the conditions or 26 circumstances of that placement were objectively and sufficiently serious. See, e.g., Tapia v. Diaz, 27 No. 1:20-cv-01790-NONE-EPG (PC), 2021 WL 916248, at *4-5 (finding Plaintiff’s failure to 1 was attacking his cellmates. Defendant [] knew this, yet failed to protect [p]laintiff, and even 2 returned the inmate to [p]laintiff’s cell a few hours after removing him.”). 3 Additionally, Plaintiff has not pled allegations to satisfy the second prong under Farmer – 4 that Defendants knew of and disregarded the excessive risk of celling inmate Hawkyard with 5 Plaintiff such that Defendants were subjectively and deliberately indifferent to his health or safety. 6 See Berg, 794 F.2d at 459 (“[The prison official] must have more than a mere suspicion that an 7 attack will occur.”); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[T]he official must both be aware of facts from 8 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exits, and [the official] 9 must also draw the inference.”). 10 Because Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to amend his claims to remedy these 11 deficiencies against Defendants, and Plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint correcting 12 the noted deficiencies, the undersigned assesses that leave to amend would be futile. See Hartman 13 v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2013). 14 b. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 15 The Fourteenth Amendment protects persons from deprivations of life, liberty, or property 16 without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. To state a due process claim, the plaintiff 17 must first “establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 18 (2005) (citations omitted). “The Due Process Clause standing alone confers no liberty interest in 19 freedom from state action taken ‘within the sentence imposed,’” including housing or classification 20 decisions. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 21 480 (1983)). 22 Protected liberty interests may arise from the Constitution or from state law. Wilkinson, 23 545 U.S. at 221. “A state may create a liberty interest through statutes, prison regulations, and 24 policies.” Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). When 25 a protected liberty interest is implicated, the Due Process Clause provides certain procedural 26 guarantees. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). The amount of 27 process or specific procedures required vary by context and the particular interest at stake. See 1 “[T]he Due Process Clause [does not] . . . protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer 2 from one institution to another within the state prison system. Confinement in any of the State’s 3 institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 4 (1976). Thus, prisoners lack a liberty interest in being housed in a particular facility or unit, unless 5 the state created a protected right “by placing substantive limitations on official discretion.” See 6 Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983). Moreover, the Due Process Clause does not 7 give prison inmates a liberty interest to remain within the general prison population. McFarland 8 v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1427-28 (9th Cir.1986). 9 To establish a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation, a prisoner 10 must show that his placement in segregation resulted in an “atypical and significant hardship ... in 11 relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Richardson v. Runnels, 12 594 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the “atypical and significant hardship” test 13 contemplated in Sandin). Placement in segregation for administrative purposes “is the sort of 14 confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their 15 incarceration,” and thus, generally does not violate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process 16 Clause. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 17 515 U.S. 472. 18 Where a substantive due process right is triggered by placement in administrative 19 segregation, certain procedural safeguards must be met. Prison officials must, within a reasonable 20 time after the prisoner’s placement, conduct an informal, non-adversarial review of the evidence 21 justifying the placement. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476. The prisoner must be provided notice of 22 any charges against him and an opportunity to respond. See id. at 477. 23 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to indicate that his placement in “Ag-Seg” 24 (i.e., administrative segregation) was atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary 25 incidents of prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; see Medina v. Morris, 676 Fed. Appx. 702, 703 26 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal of due process claim based on administrative segregation placement was 27 proper where plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to show a due process violation); Everett v. 1 segregation in and of itself does not implicate a protected liberty interest.” Serrano v. Francis, 2 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). Unlike the plaintiff in Serrano, Plaintiff has not alleged facts 3 asserting that, due to “a novel situation” or unusual personal characteristics, his placement in 4 administrative segregation presented an atypical and significant hardship compared to the level of 5 hardship routinely faced by other inmates in the same setting. Rather, Plaintiff’s complaint simply 6 alleges that he was charged and placed in administrative segregation “with disciplinary actions 7 without a hearing” and that those “disciplinary actions were reversed.” (Doc. 1 at 3). 8 Additionally, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The 9 undersigned acknowledges Plaintiff’s complaint alleges he was placed in administrative 10 segregation without a hearing (i.e., notice of any charges against him). See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476 11 (an informal, nonadversary hearing is sufficient “both for the decision that an inmate represents a 12 security threat and the decision to confine an inmate to administrative segregation pending 13 completion of an investigation into misconduct charges against him.”); Ireland v. Solano Cnty., No. 14 2:19-cv-1104-EFB P, 2019 WL 4955140, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2019) (“Due process requires, 15 inter alia, an informal, non-adversarial hearing regarding a prisoner’s placement in administrative 16 segregation.”) (citation omitted). However, there are no facts to indicate whether Plaintiff was 17 provided the opportunity to respond. The fact that Plaintiff’s disciplinary actions were ultimately 18 dismissed shows prison officials did not fail to conduct an informal, non-adversarial review of the 19 evidence justifying Plaintiff’s ag-seg placement within a reasonable time. Thus, it appears Plaintiff 20 received all the due process protections he was due. Therefore, he fails to state a cognizable due 21 process claim. 22 As noted above, Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to amend his to the extent he can in 23 good faith remedy these deficiencies against Defendants. Because he has failed to file an amended 24 complaint, the undersigned finds that leave to amend this claim would be futile. See Hartman, 707 25 F.3d at 1129-30. 26 c. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 27 The complaint seeks declaratory relief, specifically a declaration that the harm alleged 1 of a court of equity to strike a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the 2 consequences of giving the desired relief.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, Cal., 3 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). “Especially where governmental action is involved, courts should not 4 intervene unless the need for equitable relief is clear, not remote or speculative.” Id. Like other 5 forms of equitable relief, the Court has judicial discretion to grant declaratory judgment, exercised 6 in the public interest. Johnson v. Torres, No. 1:22-cv-01457-BAM (PC), 2023 WL 1823605, at 7 *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2023) (citing Eccles, 333 U.S. at 431), F.&R. adopted, 2022 WL 782342 8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2022). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful 9 purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and 10 afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” United States v. 11 Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). 12 Here, the complaint’s request for declaratory relief does not warrant the Court’s exercise 13 of its equitable authority. See Washington, 758 F.2d at 1357. Indeed, should this case proceed 14 to trial and a verdict is returned in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff will be entitled to damages, and that 15 verdict will be a finding that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated. Johnson, 2023 WL 16 1823605, at *4; Eccles, 333 U.S. at 431. Because such relief is unnecessary in this case, at 17 screening, Plaintiff’s prayer for unspecified declaratory and injunctive relief is not considered. 18 III. Failure to Prosecute and to Obey Court Orders and Local Rules 19 Apart from Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Plaintiff 20 has failed to comply with this Court’s order to file in response to the Court’s screening order 21 either an amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal and, as such, has failed to 22 prosecute this action. Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend Plaintiff’s complaint be 23 dismissed on this separate, independent ground. 24 A. Failure to Comply/Failure to Prosecute – Governing Legal Standard 25 Local Rule 110, corresponding with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provides that 26 “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules or with any order of the Court may 27 be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . within the inherent power of 1 may, in the exercise of that power, impose sanctions where appropriate, including dismissal of the 2 action. Bautista v. Los Angeles Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000). A court may dismiss an 3 action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey a court order, or comply with local 4 rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure 5 to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 6 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 7 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to prosecute and to comply with local 8 rules). 9 “In determining whether to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, the district court is 10 required to weigh several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) 11 the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 12 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 13 sanctions.” Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks & 14 citation omitted). These factors guide a court in deciding what to do and are not conditions that 15 must be met in order for a court to take action. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products 16 Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 17 B. Analysis 18 Here, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s order. Plaintiff has filed no response 19 to the Court’s order granting him leave to amend his complaint and the time to do so has passed. 20 There are no other reasonable alternatives available to address Plaintiff’s failure to respond and 21 otherwise obey this Court’s orders. Thus, the first and second factors—the expeditious resolution 22 of litigation and the Court’s need to manage its docket—weigh in favor of dismissal. Carey, 856 23 F.2d at 1440. 24 The third factor, risk of prejudice to Defendant, also weighs fairly in favor of dismissal 25 since a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an 26 action. See Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). This matter cannot proceed 27 further without Plaintiff’s participation to prosecute the case and file an amended complaint curing 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) if he no longer wishes to pursue this action. The 2 presumption of injury holds given Plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action. Thus, 3 the third factor—a risk of prejudice to the Defendant—also weighs in favor of dismissal. Carey, 4 856 F.2d at 1440. 5 The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors disposition 6 on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor 7 lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the 8 merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.” In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1228. 9 Plaintiff has not moved this case forward toward disposition on the merits. He has instead failed 10 to comply with this Court’s orders and, thus, is impeding the progress of this action. Therefore, the 11 fourth factor — the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 12 merits — also weighs in favor of dismissal. Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440. 13 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 14 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. 15 Here, the Court’s order granting Plaintiff leave to amend and requiring a response from Plaintiff 16 cautioned: “If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this 17 action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and for failure to 18 prosecute.” (Doc. 7 at 12) (emphasis original). Plaintiff was adequately forewarned that the failure 19 to timely file an amended complaint would result in terminating sanctions. 20 21 22 Remainder of This Page Intentionally Left Blank
23 24 25 26 27 1 IV. Conclusion, Order, and Recommendation 2 Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to randomly assign a District Judge 3 to this action. 4 And it is RECOMMENDED that: 5 1. The Court DISMISS this action for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief 6 may be granted, and separately, for his failure prosecute this action and to comply with 7 the Court’s orders. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 110; and 8 2. The Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to close this case. 9 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 10 assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days after 11 being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 12 objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to 13 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave 14 of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections, 15 but a party may refer to exhibits in the record by CM/ECF document and page number. Any pages 16 filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing 17 these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(C). A party’s failure to file any 18 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson 19 v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ October 20, 2025 22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28 14