Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.

100 F. Supp. 2d 917, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21852, 1999 WL 1893681
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedJanuary 12, 1999
DocketIP-96-0491-C-B/S
StatusPublished

This text of 100 F. Supp. 2d 917 (Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 917, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21852, 1999 WL 1893681 (S.D. Ind. 1999).

Opinion

REDACTED ENTRY

BARKER, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment as to Defendants’ claim that Plaintiffs patents that are the subject matter of this litigation are invalid for violating the “best mode” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to disclose the best mode for carrying out the invention with respect to (1) the inventor’s preferred method for synthesizing p-trifluoromethylphenol, a starting material for the patented compound fluoxetine hydrochloride and (2) the inventor’s preferred recrystallization solvent for purification and recovery of fluox-etine hydrochloride. For the reasons set forth in the Court’s discussion below, Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment is denied, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment as to the starting material is granted and Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment as to the recrystallization solvent is granted.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party on the particular issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Methodist Med. Center v. American Med. Sec., Inc., 38 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir.1994). A disputed fact is *919 material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir.1997). Moreover, “in rendering a decision on a motion for summary judgment, a court must ‘view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden’ that would inhere at trial.” Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 880-881 (Fed.Cir.1998) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513). In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must draw all justifiable inferences in a light most favorable to the opposing party and must resolve any doubt against the moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513; Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir.1992).

While the burden rests squarely on the party moving for summary judgment to show “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the nonmoving party may not simply rest on the pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate by specific factual allegations that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Billups v. Methodist Hosp. of Chicago, 922 F.2d 1300, 1302 (7th Cir.1991). Conclusory allegations by a party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion. See Smith v. Shawnee Library System, 60 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir.1995). “The moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law 1 [if] the nonmoving party has failed to' make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. However, if doubts remain as to the existence of a material fact, those doubts should be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party and summary judgment denied. See Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir.1989).

INVALIDITY: BEST MODE VIOLATION

Barr and Lilly filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Barr’s affirmative defense that Lilly’s patents are invalid for failure to comply with the “best mode” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. 1 Barr challenges Lilly’s patents on two grounds, asserting that Lilly failed to disclose (1) its method for synthesizing p-trifluoromethyl-phenol, a starting material for the patented compound fluoxetine hydrochloride and (2) its preferred recrystallization solvent. In order to conduct a thorough analysis of this issue, we will consider the motions together.

Statement of Material Facts

On January 10, 1974, Plaintiff, Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly”), filed a patent application that ultimately resulted in the two patents at issue in this case, U.S. Patent No. 4,314,081 (“the ’081 patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 4,626,549 (“the ’549 patent”). Claim 5 of the ’081 patent claims the chemical compound fluoxetine hydrochloride. See Barr Mot. Summ. Judg., Exh. Bl. Claim 7 of the ’549 patent claims a method of blocking the uptake of serotonin by brain neurons in animals comprising administering to the animal a serotonin-blocking amount of fluoxetine hydrochloride. See Barr Mot. Summ. Judg., Exh. B2. Lilly sued Defendant, Barr Laboratories, Inc. (“Barr”), for infringement of claim 5 of the ’081 patent and claim 7 of the ’549 patent. Both patents identify p-trifluoromethylphenol as a *920 starting material for making fluoxetine hydrochloride. See Barr Exhs. Bl, B2.

Lilly scientists, led by Dr. Bryan Molloy (“Dr. Molloy”), the inventor of the ’081 and ’549 patents, first made a sample of fluoxetine hydrochloride in February 1973. See Barr Exh. A, Hauser Dep. at 264.

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