Eldon Samuel, III v. Terema Carlin

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 5, 2025
• Docket: 23-35408
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 5 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELDON GALE SAMUEL III, No. 23-35408

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00545-REP

v. MEMORANDUM* TEREMA CARLIN,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho Raymond Edward Patricco, Jr., Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 3, 2025** Portland, Oregon

Before: BEA, KOH, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Eldon Gale Samuel, III (“Samuel”) appeals the district court’s denial of his

habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). habeas relief. Ochoa v. Davis, 50 F.4th 865, 876 (9th Cir. 2022). We affirm.1

Because this petition is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we may grant relief only if the state court’s

decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or (2) “was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 97–98 (2011). The term “unreasonable” in § 2254(d) “refers not to

‘ordinary error’ or even to circumstances where the petitioner offers ‘a strong case

for relief,’ but rather to ‘extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice

syste[m.]’” Mays v. Hines, 592 U.S. 385, 391 (2021) (quoting Harrington, 562

U.S. at 102). “[A] federal court may intrude on a State’s sovereign power to punish

offenders only when a decision was so lacking in justification . . . beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. (cleaned up).

The district court concluded that Samuel failed to meet his burden under the

demanding AEDPA standard. We agree.

1. Samuel’s first claim for habeas relief is that the Idaho Supreme Court’s

decision upholding his Miranda waiver was an unreasonable application of clearly

1 Because the facts and procedural history are well known to the parties, we recount them only as needed to explain our decision.

2 established federal law and was based upon unreasonable factual determinations.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).

As a threshold matter, Respondent contends that claims based upon Miranda

violations are not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. Specifically,

Respondent argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S.

134 (2022), precludes habeas claims based upon Miranda violations. We disagree.

Respondent’s position ignores the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Withrow v.

Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), in which the Court rejected an attempt to prohibit a

habeas claim based upon a Miranda violation. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 683. In Vega,

the Supreme Court discussed the holding and reasoning of Withrow approvingly,

recognizing that Withrow “engaged in cost-benefit analysis to define the scope” of

Miranda’s holdings. Vega, 597 U.S. at 147. Then, the Court explained that 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claims based on Miranda were unnecessary because Miranda’s

“prophylactic purpose is served by the suppression at trial of statements obtained

in violation of Miranda and by the application of that decision in other recognized

contexts.” Id. at 151 (emphasis added). Thus, Vega recognized that, based on

Withrow, post-trial habeas petitions are another “recognized context[]” in which a

federal court can remedy Miranda violations. Id. Moreover, even assuming these

precedents were somehow in tension, we do “not engage in anticipatory overruling

of [U.S.] Supreme Court precedent.” Newman v. Wengler, 790 F.3d 876, 880 (9th

3 Cir. 2015).

We agree with Respondent, however, that Samuel fails to meet the

demanding standard for relief under AEDPA based upon his Miranda claim.

The Idaho Supreme Court reasonably concluded, after considering the

totality of the circumstances, that Samuel’s Miranda waiver was knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979);

see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (“[E]valuating whether

a rule application was unreasonable [under AEDPA] requires considering the

rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in

reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”). Specifically, the Idaho

Supreme Court noted that Detective Wilhelm gave Samuel a copy of the Miranda

waiver form and accurately read Samuel his Miranda warnings. Wilhelm also

stopped to confirm Samuel was following along during the warnings and

confirmed Samuel’s understanding multiple times after giving the warnings. The

court noted that Samuel repeatedly affirmed that he understood these rights, by oral

and written confirmations. The court specifically considered the impact that

Wilhelm’s “inartful statements” might have had on the clarity of the warnings

given and weighed Samuel’s youth, education, and intelligence in reaching its

determination. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S 218, 226 (1973); see also

Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (“The inquiry is simply whether

4 the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.”)

(cleaned up).

As explained above, the term “unreasonable” in AEDPA refers not to

“ordinary error” or even to circumstances where the petitioner offers “a strong case

for relief,” but rather to “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice

system.” Mays, 592 U.S. at 391. Because a possibility for “fairminded

disagreement” exists here, Samuel’s claim fails to meet the demanding standard

under AEDPA. Id.

2. Samuel’s second claim for habeas relief is that the Idaho Supreme Court

erred in finding his confession was voluntary under the Fourteenth Amendment’s

due process requirements. This claim also fails under AEDPA’s deferential

standard of review. The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision considered the relevant

factors set forth in Schneckloth. As with Samuel’s Miranda claim, “fairminded

jurists” could disagree as to whether his confession was voluntary. Mays, 592 U.S.

at 392. Under AEDPA, we are therefore bound to defer to the Idaho Supreme

Court’s decision. Id.

3. Samuel cites our decision in Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011),

to support both of his claims. Under AEDPA, “circuit precedent does not constitute

‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the [U.S.] Supreme Court.’”

Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48 (2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). To

5 the extent our decisions have persuasive value, see Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852,

859 (9th Cir. 2011), we find Doody distinguishable. In Doody, the detective

implied that the right to an attorney existed only if the suspect was involved in the

crime, and the suspect eventually became “unresponsive” during the questioning,

answering just one out of forty-five questions. Doody, 649 F.3d at 1006, 1009.

Based upon our review of the record, this case does not present such egregious

circumstances.

In sum, the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and it was not based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly,

we affirm the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.

AFFIRMED.