Ekoue Dodji Aboussa et al. v. Community Bridges et al.

2023 DNH 061

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: December 28, 2022
• Docket: 22-cv-567-SE
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Ekoue Dodji Aboussa et al.

v. Case No. 22-cv-567-SE Opinion No 2023 DNH 061 Community Bridges et al.

O R D E R

Ekoue Dodji Aboussa and Images Des Reves LLC (“IDR”) bring

suit against Community Bridges and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation alleging claims that arise out of Aboussa’s

employment with Community Bridges. Viewed generously, the

amended complaint (“complaint”) alleges a claim of employment

discrimination based on Aboussa’s race or national origin and a

claim of sexual harassment, both in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and both against Community Bridges.1

Community Bridges moves to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs

fail to allege that they filed an administrative charge of

discrimination with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission

(“EEOC”) or a parallel state agency prior to filing suit. Doc.

no. 7. The FBI also moves to dismiss, arguing, among other

things, that the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for

1 As discussed further below, although the complaint references the FBI, the claim Aboussa intended to assert against the FBI is unclear. relief against it. Doc. no. 14. The plaintiffs object to both

motions.2

Standard of Review

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, a plaintiff must make factual allegations

sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is

facially plausible if it pleads “factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

To test a complaint’s sufficiency, the court must first

identify and disregard statements that “merely offer ‘legal

conclusions couched as fact’ or ‘threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action.’” Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño-

Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (alterations omitted)). Second, the court must credit as

true all nonconclusory factual allegations and the reasonable

inferences drawn from those allegations, and then determine if

2 The plaintiffs also filed a motion requesting a hearing on Community Bridges’ motion to dismiss. See doc. no. 13. Because the plaintiffs’ objection confirms that Community Bridges is entitled to dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims and because oral argument would not provide assistance to the court, see LR 7.1(d), the court denies that motion.

2 the claim is plausible. See id. In light of the plaintiffs’ pro

se status, the court liberally construes his pleadings.3 Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

Discussion

Viewed generously, the complaint alleges that Community

Bridges employed Aboussa for some period of time and, during his

employment, discriminated against him on the basis of either his

race or his national origin in various ways. A Community Bridges

employee also allegedly sexually harassed Aboussa. He brings

claims against Community Bridges under Title VII.

Before addressing the defendants’ arguments in their

motions to dismiss, the court notes that although IDR is

included as a plaintiff in the complaint’s caption, the

complaint does not allege any claim on IDR’s behalf. To the

extent that the complaint references IDR, it states only that

Aboussa is allegedly IDR’s “registered agent.” Therefore, the

court dismisses any purported claim asserted by IDR.

3 The court notes that one of the plaintiffs, IDR, is a limited liability company and is not permitted to litigate pro se. Hooper-Haas v. Ziegler Holdings, LLC, 690 F.3d 34, 36 n.2 (1st Cir. 2012). Because IDR has not alleged a viable claim against either defendant as discussed further below, the court dismisses the complaint on the merits rather than on that procedural ground. See Medeiros v. United States, 621 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir. 1980) (noting “the strong policy favoring disposition of cases on the merits”).

3 I. FBI’s Motion to Dismiss

The FBI moves to dismiss, arguing that the complaint fails

to state a viable claim for relief against it.4 Viewed

generously, the complaint alleges that the FBI at some point

spoke to Community Bridges about Aboussa, either in conjunction

with or without local police enforcement.5 Although the complaint

appears to state that this conduct is a violation 18 U.S.C. §

2261A, that is a “federal criminal statute involving stalking,”

and the statute “does not confer a private right of action.”

Ives v. Tyer, No. CV 17-30101-MGM, 2017 WL 6551361, at *2 (D.

Mass. Nov. 3, 2017).

The complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief

against the FBI. Consequently, the court grants the FBI’s motion

to dismiss.

4 The FBI argues that any claims asserted against it in the complaint should be dismissed for the additional reason that the plaintiffs have failed to complete service. See doc. no. 14 at 2-3. Because the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief against the FBI, the court addresses any claims against the FBI on the merits.

5 The complaint also references “illegal surveillance,” though it contains no allegation of surveillance of any kind by either defendant.

4 II. Community Bridges’ Motion to Dismiss

Community Bridges argues that Aboussa failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies under Title VII. An employee wishing to

file a civil action asserting a claim under Title VII “must file

an administrative claim with the EEOC or with a parallel state

agency before a civil action may be brought.” Thornton v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2009). “The

purpose of that requirement is to provide the employer with

prompt notice of the claim and to create an opportunity for

early conciliation.” Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22,

26–27 (1st Cir. 2009). “Similarly, an employee must obtain a

right-to-sue letter before bringing suit—and a court will

typically insist on satisfaction of that condition.” Mach

Mining, LLC v. E.E.O.C., 575 U.S. 480, 487 (2015). A

“plaintiff’s unexcused failure to exhaust administrative

remedies effectively bars the courthouse door.” Jorge v.

Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556, 564 (1st Cir. 2005).

The complaint does not allege that Aboussa filed an

administrative claim with the EEOC or a parallel state agency or

that he received a right-to-sue letter. In his objection to

Community Bridges’ motion, Aboussa states that “Plaintiffs have

filed their complaints with the New Hampshire Commission of

Human Rights on 2/1/23” and that the Commission of Human Rights

is “an agency parallel to EEOC.” Doc. no. 9 at 2. Aboussa,

5 however, instituted this action on December 28, 2022, before he

purportedly filed his administrative claim. Further, he does not

state that he received a right-to-sue letter. Therefore, Aboussa

did not exhaust his administrative remedies under Title VII

prior to bringing this suit.

For that reason, the court grants Community Bridges’ motion

to dismiss without prejudice to Aboussa’s right to refile after

exhausting his administrative remedies under Title VII.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the FBI’s

motion to dismiss (doc. no. 14), grants Community Bridges’

motion to dismiss (doc. no. 7) without prejudice as provided in

this order, and denies the plaintiff’s motion for a hearing

(doc. no. 13).

The clerk of court shall enter judgment accordingly and

close the case.

SO ORDERED.

______________________________ Samantha D. Elliott United States District Judge

May 15, 2023

cc: Ekoue Dodji Aboussa, pros e Paul Akouete Abousssa, pro se Counsel of Record