BIJAN EFTEKARI, Case No.: 24-CV-2274 JLS (KSC)
Plaintiff, ORDER: v. (1) DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S EX INC., et al., PARTE EMERGENCY MOTION Defendants. FOR TRO, AND
(2) ORDERING PLAINTIFF BIJAN EFTEKARI TO SHOW CAUSE AS TO SUBJECT MATTER
(ECF No. 3) Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Bijan Eftekari’s Ex Parte Emergency Motion for TRO to Enjoin January 13, 2025 Trustee Sale (“TRO Mot.,” ECF No. 3). Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s filing and the applicable law, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s TRO Motion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) governs the issuance of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The standard for a TRO is identical to the standard for a preliminary injunction. Frontline Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Coventry Healthcare Worker’s Comp., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2009). A plaintiff seeking preliminary relief must establish “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief” and is “never awarded as a matter of right.” Id. at 22, 24. “Because it is a threshold inquiry, when a plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits, [the court] need not consider the remaining three [Winter elements].” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 944 (9th Cir. 2013)). When a plaintiff has not provided notice of his application to the defendant, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) imposes specific requirements prior to the issuance of a TRO. Namely: The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). “The stringent restrictions imposed . . . by Rule 65[] on the availability of ex parte temporary restraining orders reflect the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438–39 (1974) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, “courts have recognized very few circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO.” Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006). “For example, an ex parte TRO may be appropriate ‘where notice to the adverse party is impossible either because the identity of the adverse party is unknown or because a known party cannot be located in time for a hearing.’” Id. (quoting Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1984)). Alternatively, “[i]n cases where notice could have been given to the adverse party, courts have recognized a very narrow band of cases in which ex parte orders are proper because notice to the defendant would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.’” Id. (quoting Am. Can Co., 742 F.3d at 322). The Court finds several defects in Plaintiff’s TRO Motion. As a threshold matter, it is not entirely clear that the Court has jurisdiction to hear this case. Plaintiff first contends in his Complaint that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims because the subject property is located in the County of San Diego and because Section 10 of Article VI of the California Constitution grants this Court original jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 7, 8. He then pivots in his Motion by arguing that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1 Mot. at 2. None of Plaintiff’s arguments are persuasive. First, the California Constitution is the wrong place to look for this Court’s sources of jurisdiction. Rather, Article III, § 2, of the United States Constitution “delineates the absolute limits on the federal courts’ jurisdiction.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695 (1992). The only potential source of jurisdiction Plaintiff cites that is provided for by “the Laws of the United States,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, is diversity jurisdiction as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Even there, however, jurisdiction is uncertain. “Jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that the parties be in complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.” Matheson v. Progressive
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BIJAN EFTEKARI, Case No.: 24-CV-2274 JLS (KSC)
Plaintiff, ORDER: v. (1) DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S EX INC., et al., PARTE EMERGENCY MOTION Defendants. FOR TRO, AND
(2) ORDERING PLAINTIFF BIJAN EFTEKARI TO SHOW CAUSE AS TO SUBJECT MATTER
(ECF No. 3) Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Bijan Eftekari’s Ex Parte Emergency Motion for TRO to Enjoin January 13, 2025 Trustee Sale (“TRO Mot.,” ECF No. 3). Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s filing and the applicable law, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s TRO Motion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) governs the issuance of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The standard for a TRO is identical to the standard for a preliminary injunction. Frontline Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Coventry Healthcare Worker’s Comp., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2009). A plaintiff seeking preliminary relief must establish “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief” and is “never awarded as a matter of right.” Id. at 22, 24. “Because it is a threshold inquiry, when a plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits, [the court] need not consider the remaining three [Winter elements].” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 944 (9th Cir. 2013)). When a plaintiff has not provided notice of his application to the defendant, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) imposes specific requirements prior to the issuance of a TRO. Namely: The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). “The stringent restrictions imposed . . . by Rule 65[] on the availability of ex parte temporary restraining orders reflect the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438–39 (1974) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, “courts have recognized very few circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO.” Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006). “For example, an ex parte TRO may be appropriate ‘where notice to the adverse party is impossible either because the identity of the adverse party is unknown or because a known party cannot be located in time for a hearing.’” Id. (quoting Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1984)). Alternatively, “[i]n cases where notice could have been given to the adverse party, courts have recognized a very narrow band of cases in which ex parte orders are proper because notice to the defendant would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.’” Id. (quoting Am. Can Co., 742 F.3d at 322). The Court finds several defects in Plaintiff’s TRO Motion. As a threshold matter, it is not entirely clear that the Court has jurisdiction to hear this case. Plaintiff first contends in his Complaint that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims because the subject property is located in the County of San Diego and because Section 10 of Article VI of the California Constitution grants this Court original jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 7, 8. He then pivots in his Motion by arguing that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.1 Mot. at 2. None of Plaintiff’s arguments are persuasive. First, the California Constitution is the wrong place to look for this Court’s sources of jurisdiction. Rather, Article III, § 2, of the United States Constitution “delineates the absolute limits on the federal courts’ jurisdiction.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695 (1992). The only potential source of jurisdiction Plaintiff cites that is provided for by “the Laws of the United States,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, is diversity jurisdiction as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Even there, however, jurisdiction is uncertain. “Jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that the parties be in complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.” Matheson v. Progressive
1 Plaintiff alleges only state-based causes of action in his Complaint: (1) violation of California Homeowner Bill of Rights, (2) unfair competition, (3) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (4) negligence. See generally Compl. Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, therefore, Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). For the parties to be in complete diversity, “each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.” In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). “[A] corporation is typically a citizen of two states for determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction: the state of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place of business.” Breitman v. May Co. Cal., 37 F.3d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)). Here, Plaintiff alleges he resides in San Diego County, making him a resident of the state of California. Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff fails to allege the state of citizenship for Defendant Clear Recon Corp. (“CRC”), see id. ¶ 5, but the Court ascertains from public records maintained by the California Secretary of State that CRC was incorporated in California, thereby making it, like Plaintiff, a resident of California.2 California Secretary of State, Clear Recon Corp (3521772), Business Search, https://bizfileonline.sos.ca.gov/search/business (last visited January 13, 2025). Thus, Plaintiff’s only possible source of jurisdiction fails, and he has not met his burden of pleading the requirements of any of the “numerous theories” upon which he claims this Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction. The Court is, therefore, unable to proceed assured of its jurisdiction. See Flint v. Krause, No. 11cv0480 AJB (WMC), 2011 WL 4626149, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011). The Court is aware of the concept of a nominal party and “acknowledges that the trustee on a deed of trust is often a nominal party,” thereby removing the trustee from the Court’s jurisdictional analysis. Silva v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 2011 WL 2437514, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2011) (first citing Reynoso v. Paul Fin., LLC, No. 09-3225, 2009 WL 3833494, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009); then citing Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2009); and then citing Lawrence v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, No. 09-1598, 2010 WL 449734, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
2 The Court may take judicial notice of records from the California Secretary of State’s website pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See, e.g., GCIU-Emp. Ret. Fund v. Shelton-TurnbuII Printers, Inc., Feb. 8, 2010)). However, “an exception is made where the complaint contains substantive allegations against the trustee or seeks to recover money damages from the trustee.” Osorio v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 12-02645 RS, 2012 WL 2054997, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (citing Latino v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 2:11-cv-02037-MCE-DAD, 2011 WL 4928880, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2011)). Plaintiff has made no attempt to argue that CRC is a nominal party, and it appears unlikely for that to be the case with the Complaint as currently pled. Plaintiff has asserted all four causes of action in his Complaint against all named Defendants and seeks “disgorgement of Defendants’ illegal profits and gain . . . .” See generally Compl. Plaintiff alleges each of the Defendants “failed to abide by their own guidelines in qualifying or reviewing Plaintiff for a loan modification in violation of Civil Code § 2923.6” and “failed to provide the required statutory notifications and undertake the required courses of action as mandated under California Civil Code.” Compl. at 19–20. Where the complaint includes substantive allegations against and seeks damages from the trustee, courts consistently find that the trustee’s “citizenship must be considered in ascertaining whether diversity jurisdiction exists.” Jenkins v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV 14-04545 MMM (JCx), 2015 WL 331114, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2015) (collecting cases). Accordingly, CRC’s presence as a named Defendant in this action destroys diversity jurisdiction. Where a “court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over [an] action, it necessarily is powerless to grant [a] TRO,” so the Court must defer ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for the time being. See Diaz v. Gaura, No. 16-00036 JMS-BMK, 2016 WL 447446, at *4 (D. Haw. Feb. 3, 2016). Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s TRO Motion. Just as problematic for Plaintiff is the fact that “there is absolutely no showing in the TRO request that explains why Plaintiff waited until—quite literally—the eve of the foreclosure sale to file” his TRO Motion. Avila v. Citi Mortg. Inc., No. 1:17-cv-1581-LJO-BAM, 2017 WL 5871473, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017). Plaintiff filed this action on December 5, 2024, over one month ago. See Compl. At that time, Plaintiff alleged a trustee sale was to occur on December 9, 2024. Id. 9 5. Said trustee sale was apparently postponed until today, January 13, 2025, Mot. at 6, yet Plaintiff waited to file the instant Motion until yesterday, January 12, 2025, see id. Under California Civil Code § 2924.8, notice of a trustee’s sale must be given at least twenty-one days in advance of the sale, and Plaintiff does not claim notice of today’s trustee’s sale was faulty nor does he provide any other justification for his delay in filing the instant TRO Motion. Plaintiff only entitled to ex parte relief to the extent he “is without fault in creating the” emergency, so his TRO Motion is independently denied on that ground as well. See □□□□□□ v. Wash. Mut. Bank FA, 2011 WL 13218030, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011) (citing Mission Power Eng’g Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 883 F. Supp. 488, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1995)). In light of the foregoing, the Cour. DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs TRO Motion (ECF No. 3). Further, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause as to why federal subject matter jurisdiction exists over this matter. Plaintiff SHALL file a response /to this Order on or before January 27, 2025. Defendants MAY file a reply to Plaintiff's response on or before February 3, 2025. Dated: January 13, 2025 (een on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge