NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: December 9, 2025
S25A1298. EDWARDS v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
A jury found Jalon Dante Edwards and his co-defendants
Colton Sims and Monte Glover, Jr., guilty of malice murder and
other crimes in connection with the shooting death of DeCoby
Barlow.1 We previously affirmed Sims’s and Glover’s convictions.
1 The crimes occurred on December 8–9, 2018. On February 21, 2019, a
Henry County grand jury jointly indicted Edwards, along with Sims and Glover, for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault based on the shooting of Barlow and shooting in the direction of a security guard (Counts 5 and 6), respectively, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 9 and 10). Sims and Glover were each charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts 7 and 8) and felony murder predicated on the felon-in-possession charge (Counts 3 and 4). At a jury trial in January through February of 2020, the defendants were found guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Edwards to serve life in prison on Count 1, twenty years concurrent on Count 6, and five years consecutive on Count 9. The remaining counts were vacated or merged. Edwards filed a timely motion for new trial on February 10, 2020, which he later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the amended See Sims v. State, 321 Ga. 627 (2025). In this appeal, Edwards
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions,
argues that the trial court erred in several respects, and asserts that
trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. As set forth in Sims, 321 Ga. at 628–29, and viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial
showed the following.
On the evening of December 8, 2018, Sims and his friend Colby Toles got into a dispute with Glover and co- defendant Jalon Edwards at a nightclub. During the ensuing scuffle between Toles and Edwards, Edwards brandished a firearm, and the dispute moved outside. The group and several patrons, including Barlow, likewise exited the building.
A witness, Chris Jackson, testified that he saw Sims, whom he knew, fire several shots in the air near the club at the corner of the building and that he thought Sims was “taking up” for Toles. Jackson then heard shots being fired by another person.
motion on May 31, 2024. Subsequently, on Edwards’s motion, the trial court vacated the order denying the motion for new trial and re-entered it on November 7, 2024. Edwards then filed a timely notice of appeal, which was docketed to the August 2025 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 Security guards outside the club observed Glover retrieve a firearm from his vehicle and then heard shots ring out from different directions outside the club. [Landon] Brown, one of the security guards, saw several people with firearms, heard shots fired toward him and the other security guards at the front of the club, and heard shots returned between the front of the club and the adjacent building. While fleeing the barrage of shots, Barlow was struck in the crossfire, sustaining a fatal gunshot wound to his back.
During the investigation into the crimes, ballistics evidence confirmed that shots were fired between the two locations. Police ultimately recovered a Glock handgun belonging to Edwards, which was determined to have fired the bullet that killed Barlow. A detective obtained surveillance video showing the crimes, which was played for the jury at trial, and which the detective testified showed Edwards and Glover firing weapons. The jury also heard testimony that one of the security guards, who was present during the crimes and who knew Glover, reviewed the security footage of the incident and observed Glover fire his weapon.
Id. at 628–29.
2. In his first enumeration of error, Edwards contends that
there was not sufficient evidence “to convict [him] of the crimes
charged.” But he asserts specific argument only with respect to the
evidence supporting the felony murder count and the underlying
aggravated assault that was based on the shooting of Barlow.
3 Reviewing only those claims, see Supreme Court Rule 22 (“Any
enumerated error or subpart of an enumerated error not supported
by argument, citations to authority and citations to the record shall
be deemed abandoned.”), we conclude that Edwards’s claim fails.
The underlying aggravated assault count merged with the malice
murder count, and the felony murder count was vacated, see
footnote 1, so Edwards was not sentenced on those counts.
Edwards’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on these
counts is therefore moot. See Milton v. State, 318 Ga. 737, 742 n.5
(2024) (where charges either merged into defendant’s murder
conviction or were vacated, challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support those merged or vacated crimes were moot).
3. Edwards next complains that the trial court erred when
instructing the jury on justification, transferred justification, and
excessive force. Because Edwards did not object to these instructions
at trial, we review this claim only for plain error. See Hill v. State,
310 Ga. 180, 194 (2020); OCGA § 17-8-58(b).
4 To prevail on plain-error review, an appellant must show that the alleged instructional error was not affirmatively waived; was clear and obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; likely affected the outcome of the trial; and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Hill v. State, 321 Ga. 177, 181 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). And
“the appellant squarely bears the burden of satisfying the exacting
standard required by plain-error review, a task that is difficult, as
it should be.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
At trial, Edwards raised a justification defense, arguing that
he fired his weapon in self-defense only after shots were fired at him
and the security guards outside the club. And because Barlow was
not the aggressor but, rather, an unintended victim caught in the
crossfire, Edwards relied on the principle of transferred justification
to support that defense. See Howard v. State, 307 Ga. 12, 22 (2019)
(noting that under “the principle of transferred justification,” “no
guilt attaches if an accused is justified in shooting to repel an
assault, but misses and kills an innocent bystander” (quotation
marks omitted)), disapproved on other grounds by Johnson v. State,
5 315 Ga. 876, 889 n.11 (2023). To that end, Edwards requested that
the trial court charge the jury on justification and transferred
justification. When charging the jury on these principles, the trial
court also gave the pattern charge on excessive force, instructing the
jury that
[t]he use of excessive or unlawful force while acting in self defense is not justifiable and the defendant’s conduct in this case would not be justified[ ] [i]f you find that the force used exceeded that which a defendant reasonably believed was necessary to defend against the victim’s use of unlawful force, if any[.] See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 3.16.20
(2019). Though Edwards raised no objection to this instruction at
trial he complains on appeal that the reference to “the victim’s use
of unlawful force” was misleading to the jury because Barlow, while
the victim, was not the aggressor. Instead, Edwards says, the charge
should have referred to “the aggressor’s use of unlawful force,” not
“the victim’s.” Considering the excessive force instruction in the
context of the entire jury charge, as we must, see Gold v. State, 319
Ga. 149, 151 (2024), we conclude that Edwards has failed to show
6 that the alleged instructional error likely affected the outcome of the
trial.
To begin, the trial court’s initial charge on the affirmative
defense of justification — that “a defendant is justified to kill
another person in the defense of self or others” (Emphasis added.)—
made clear that the jury should acquit Edwards “if it determined he
was justified in firing his weapon, regardless of whom the bullet
struck.” Allen v. State, 290 Ga. 743, 746 (2012). The trial court’s
subsequent charge on excessive force, which tracked the pattern
charge, was correct in substance and sufficiently apprised the jury
that it was required to determine whether the force used by Edwards
was excessive. See Robbins v. State, 320 Ga. 19, 25–26 (2024). And
immediately after giving the excessive force charge, the trial court
instructed the jury that: “[U]nder the principle of transfer[red]
justification, no guilt attaches if a defendant is justified in shooting
to repel an assault, but misses and kills an innocent bystander,” but
that transferred justification is inapplicable where the defendant
“shot carelessly, and in a wanton and reckless disregard of the
7 danger resulting to the bystander.” This charge fairly covered the
legal principles that Edwards requested regarding transferred
justification. See Howard, 307 Ga. at 22; Allen, 290 Ga. at 746. Thus,
considered as a whole, the trial court’s charge made clear to the jury
that it should acquit Edwards if it determined he was justified in
firing his weapon, regardless of whom the bullet struck and
regardless of whose unlawful force Edwards was responding to. See
Patel v. State, 278 Ga. 403, 405 (2004) (“[T]he trial court adequately
covered the principle of transferred justification when it charged the
jury on the twin principles of transferred intent and justification.”
(quotation marks omitted)). As such, Edwards has failed to show
that the use of “victim” rather than “aggressor” in the excessive force
instruction likely affected the outcome of his trial, and this claim
fails.
4. Edwards next argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to sever his trial from his co-defendants. Edwards argues,
as he did below, that evidence of his co-defendants’ prior felony
convictions created a “spillover” effect that unfairly prejudiced the
8 jury against him. He also argues that his defense strategy diverged
from that of his co-defendants and that the trial court failed to
conduct the proper analysis in rejecting his motion. We disagree.
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to sever for an
abuse of discretion. Campbell v. State, 320 Ga. 333, 339 (2024). And
as we have explained,
[a] trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion to sever in a murder case in which the death penalty is not sought. When ruling on such a motion, a court should consider: (1) the likelihood of confusion of the evidence and law; (2) the possibility that evidence against one defendant may be considered against the other defendant; and (3) the presence or absence of antagonistic defenses. To show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to sever, a defendant must do more than raise the existence of antagonistic defenses or the possibility that a separate trial would have given him a better chance of acquittal. The defendant must make a clear showing that a joint trial was so prejudicial as to amount to a denial of his right to due process.
Saylor v. State, 316 Ga. 225, 230–31 (2023) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Edwards has failed to make this showing. 2 This case involved
2 Edwards does not go so far as to argue in his appellate brief that the
9 only three defendants who were tried for largely the same offenses
relating to the same incident, with the only variance in charges
being that Glover and Sims were charged with possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and felony murder predicated on the
felon-in-possession charges. Moreover, the law and the evidence
were substantially the same for all three defendants, and the State
argued that the defendants were all involved in the singular
shooting incident underlying the charges. See Saylor, 316 Ga. at 231
(holding that the trial court did not abuse discretion in denying
defendant’s motion to sever when the case “involved only three
defendants who were tried for almost all the same offenses relating
to the same incidents,” and “[t]he law and evidence were
substantially the same for all of them”); Bolden v. State, 278 Ga. 459,
462 (2004) (“[T]he evidence with which each appellant takes issue
defendants had antagonistic defenses — just “different” ones. Regardless, to prevail on a claim that the trial court erred by denying a motion to sever, a defendant must show more than the mere existence of antagonistic defenses; he must also make a showing of resulting prejudice arising from those antagonistic defenses. See Chapman v. State, 322 Ga. 237, 247 (2025). This Edwards has failed to do also. 10 was admissible against both of them inasmuch as each played a
separate role in the aggravated assaults and murder, and the
evidentiary facts and the law applicable to each were substantially
the same.”).
In advancing this enumeration, Edwards emphasizes the
perceived prejudice to him arising from the admission of his co-
defendants’ prior felony convictions. It is true that the State
introduced into evidence certified copies of Sims’s and Glover’s prior
convictions — Sims for tampering with evidence and Glover for
trafficking a controlled substance, trafficking a controlled substance
near a school, and tampering with physical evidence. But on their
face, these prior convictions were non-violent, the underlying details
about the prior convictions were not admitted into evidence, and the
jury was instructed about the limited purpose for which it could
consider evidence of the prior convictions. Under these
circumstances, even if Edwards suffered some prejudice from the
admission of his co-defendants’ prior convictions, “it did not amount
to the denial of due process necessary to constitute an abuse of
11 discretion.” Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428, 430 (2012). See also Guffie
v. State, 304 Ga. 352, 355 (2018) (no abuse of discretion in denial of
motion to sever where jury did not hear underlying details of co-
defendant’s prior convictions).
Finally, Edwards complains in passing that the trial court
failed to make findings on the record before denying his motion to
sever. But “[a] trial court is not required to make explicit findings
with respect to the severance factors when it is obvious from the
transcript that the trial court properly considered these factors
when denying the defendant’s motion to sever.” Tabor v. State, 315
Ga. 240, 251 (2022) (punctuation omitted). And here, Edwards
argued the applicable law and facts in his motion to sever, which the
trial court took under advisement before later orally denying the
motion. “When, as here, a trial court makes no explicit findings in
ruling on a motion that does not require such findings to be made,
we presume that the trial court implicitly made all the findings in
support of its ruling that the record would allow.” Id. Accordingly,
this claim fails.
12 5. In his fourth enumeration of error, Edwards contends that
the trial court erred by failing to remove a juror who expressed
concerns about her personal safety. But the record reflects that
Edwards expressly requested that the juror at issue remain on the
jury. As such, Edwards has waived appellate review of this claim.
See Sims, 321 Ga. at 632; Draughn v. State, 311 Ga. 378, 385–86
(2021) (defendant affirmatively waived right to appellate review of
issue where he invited the complained-of action).
6. Lastly, Edwards asserts that his trial counsel provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to seek removal of
the concerned juror and by failing to object to the excessive force jury
instruction discussed in Division 3 above. Edwards’s claims fail.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, an appellant
must show both that his trial counsel performed deficiently and that
the deficiency prejudiced his defense. Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357,
365 (2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687
(1984)). The deficiency prong requires the appellant to “show that
his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way
13 considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing
professional norms.” Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 304, 314–15 (2023)
(quotation marks omitted). And because an appellant “must
overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell
within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and that
counsel’s decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment,” this is no easy showing. Payne v. State, 313
Ga. 218, 223 (2022). The prejudice prong requires the appellant to
show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Smith, 315 Ga. at 365. Showing that the error had “some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding” is not enough; the appellant
instead must “establish a reasonable probability of a different result,
which means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Neuman v. State, 311 Ga. 83, 96–97 (2021) (quotation
marks omitted). Demonstrating ineffective assistance is a “high
bar,” and if an appellant fails to make the required showing on
either the deficiency or the prejudice prong, we are not required to
14 consider the other. Mohamed v. State, 307 Ga. 89, 93 (2019).
(a) Edwards first argues that trial counsel performed
deficiently by failing to seek the removal of the juror who expressed
concern for her safety. “[J]uror selection is a matter of trial tactics
and strategy,” and “a decision implicating trial tactics and strategy
can serve as the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if it is so
patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made
such a decision.” Capps v. State, 300 Ga. 6, 12–13 (2016). Edwards
has not made that showing here.
As an initial matter, at the motion for new trial hearing,
Edwards never asked trial counsel why he did not seek the juror’s
removal. Of course, “when trial counsel does not testify at the motion
for new trial hearing about the subject, it is extremely difficult to
overcome the presumption that his conduct was reasonable.” Shaw
v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 876 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). And the
circumstances of this case reflect that it was objectively reasonable
for trial counsel not to seek the juror’s removal. Indeed, as recounted
in Edwards’s co-defendant’s appeal in which this same claim was
15 raised and rejected, Sims’s trial counsel testified that
he did not think the alternate jurors would be favorable to the defense and that he was “more afraid of the alternate” than he was of the juror at issue here. Counsel also noted that, despite her safety concerns, the juror indicated that she could remain impartial and, for that reason, he did not think a motion to excuse her from service would succeed.
321 Ga. at 635–36. Accordingly, Edwards has not met his burden of
showing that counsel’s failure to seek the juror’s removal was so
unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have done the same,
and this claim fails. See id.
(b) Edwards’s next claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
likewise fails. Edwards argues that trial counsel should have
objected to the trial court’s instruction that the jury must assess
justification by determining whether the victim, Barlow, used
unlawful force. As we explained above in Division 3, there was no
plain error because Edwards cannot demonstrate that the use of
“victim” rather than “aggressor” in the excessive force instruction
likely affected the outcome of his trial. Coextensive with that
determination, he cannot demonstrate prejudice in regard to this
16 claim. See Hampton v. State, 302 Ga. 166, 168–69 (2017) (“[T]his
Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain error standard
with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.”).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.