Edwards v. Keen

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedDecember 26, 2024
Docket4:24-cv-00861
StatusUnknown

This text of Edwards v. Keen (Edwards v. Keen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Edwards v. Keen, (E.D. Mo. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

DERRICK EDWARDS ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 4:24-CV-00861-NCC ) DANIEL KEEN, MEDICAL DAVID, ) MEDICAL SARAH, and MEDICAL BRYN, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on self-represented Plaintiff Derrick Edwards’s application to proceed in the district court without prepaying fees or costs. Having reviewed the application, the Court finds Plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $13.22. Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will order Plaintiff to amend his complaint. Initial Partial Filing Fee Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action without prepayment of fees and costs is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id. Plaintiff has submitted his inmate account statement from the Fulton Correctional Center for the time period June 29, 2024 through August 12, 2024. He states this was the only information

his case worker could provide. Based on the month of June 29, 2024 through July 29, 2024, the Court finds Plaintiff has a monthly deposit of $66.11. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s application and assess an initial partial filing fee of $13.22, which is twenty percent of his monthly deposit. Legal Standard on Initial Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,” the court should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within

-2- the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even self-represented complaints must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980).

The Complaint Plaintiff brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising out of injuries he allegedly suffered because of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to his medical needs while he was incarcerated in the St. Charles County Department of Corrections (DOC). He names as Defendants Daniel Keen, Director of the St. Charles County DOC, and three medical personnel identified only as Medical David, Medical Sarah, and Medical Bryn. He names all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff states over the course of four or five months while he was incarcerated, he suffered a medical emergency that went untreated by Defendants resulting in the subsequent loss of all vision in his right eye.1 He states he was having trouble with his eyesight and needed to see an eye

doctor, but his requests were repeatedly denied by Defendants. Discussion Liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is personal. See Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 2017). In other words, “[g]overnment officials are personally liable only for their own misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). As such, § 1983 liability

1 Plaintiff’s complaint is inconsistent as to the date of his injuries. Initially, Plaintiff states this happened in December 2023. ECF No. 1 at 3. He later states his injuries occurred over the course of four months. Id. at 4. He later states this was over the course of five months. Id.

-3- “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing plaintiff’s excessive bail claims because none of the defendants set plaintiff’s bail, and therefore, “there can be no causal connection between any action on the part

of the defendants and any alleged deprivation” of plaintiff’s rights); Love v. Schoffman, 142 Fed. Appx. 278, 279 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming pre-service dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because the complaint “did not specify which of the many named defendants was responsible for each of the alleged harms”). To that end, a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the defendant to the challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts connecting any of the Defendants to his alleged claims of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Neither the Court nor Defendants have any information regarding what each Defendant did or failed to do to harm Plaintiff.

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Samvel Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
760 F.3d 843 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
James Solomon v. Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas
795 F.3d 777 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
Robert Jerry Love v. Dorn Schoffman
142 F. App'x 278 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)
S.M. v. Michael Krigbaum
808 F.3d 335 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
Barton Ex Rel. Estate of Barton v. Taber
820 F.3d 958 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)
Darrell Frederick v. City of Rogers, Arkansas
873 F.3d 641 (Eighth Circuit, 2017)
Mark Bitzan v. Jerry Bartruff
916 F.3d 716 (Eighth Circuit, 2019)
Kohl v. Casson
5 F.3d 1141 (Eighth Circuit, 1993)
Martin v. Aubuchon
623 F.2d 1282 (Eighth Circuit, 1980)
Madewell v. Roberts
909 F.2d 1203 (Eighth Circuit, 1990)

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Bluebook (online)
Edwards v. Keen, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/edwards-v-keen-moed-2024.