Edward Williams v. Fairfax County Government

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-1636
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1636

EDWARD M. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

FAIRFAX COUNTY GOVERNMENT,

Defendant – Appellee,

and

FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Michael Stefan Nachmanoff, District Judge. (1:23-cv-01004-MSN-IDD)

Argued: May 7, 2025 Decided: July 16, 2025

Before NIEMEYER and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Roya Vasseghi, VASSEGHI LAW GROUP, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Jamie Marie Greenzweig, FAIRFAX COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1636 Doc: 54 Filed: 07/16/2025 Pg: 2 of 13

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Edward Williams was fired by his employer, Fairfax County, Virginia (the County).

Williams later brought this action against the County alleging, among other things,

retaliation and discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title

VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17. He now appeals from the district court’s

award of summary judgment to the County. After reviewing the record, we conclude that

Williams failed to meet his burden of persuasion to show that the County’s reasons for

firing him were pretextual. We therefore affirm the district court’s award of summary

judgment on both claims.

I.

In July 2019, the Fairfax County Department of Family Services (Family Services)

hired Edward Williams, an openly homosexual male, as a Child Protective Services (child

protection) supervisor. In that role, Williams supervised multiple social service specialists.

In consultation with those social service specialists, Williams was responsible for

identifying “crisis situations” and for “guid[ing] intervention as needed to address difficult

or dangerous [child protection] situations.” JA 339.

Williams was expected to hold weekly supervisory meetings with the social service

specialists in his unit and to record notes after those meetings. Williams’ supervisor

explained that those notes should contain a summary of the specialists’ findings and

actions, and the guidance that Williams gave them regarding what further protective action

should be taken.

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Soon after joining Family Services, Williams expressed concern that he had not

been trained adequately. As a result, he requested assistance in learning how to better

perform his job duties.

In response to Williams’ request, Family Services assigned Sonia Aronow, a former

child protection supervisor, to “coach” Williams. Aronow and Williams met for a few

hours each week to discuss his job duties. During those sessions, Aronow discussed

applicable child welfare laws, the required job skills, Williams’ strengths and weaknesses,

and recommendations for Williams to improve his job performance. After Williams met

with Aronow for about four months, Williams informed Family Services that he was ready

to discontinue the coaching sessions. Williams’ supervisor approved Williams’ request,

provided that he complete an additional one or two coaching sessions.

A.

In mid-January 2020, Williams had his next-to-last coaching session with Aronow.

He asked Aronow to review with him the mid-year evaluation that Family Services had

given him. That evaluation showed that Williams’ job performance was satisfactory but

also listed some areas for improvement. Williams wanted Aronow to assist him in

developing methods for improvement in the areas identified in his evaluation.

During Williams’ conversation with Aronow about his mid-year evaluation,

Aronow mentioned Williams’ sexual orientation. Aronow told Williams that he should be

“mindful of the environment” before discussing his husband. JA 678. Aronow stated that

Williams “seem[ed] like the type of person who just wants to get [his homosexuality] out

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there … and make people deal with it or not.” JA 678; JA 1109. Williams agreed that he

is “kind of that way.” JA 678.

Nonetheless, Williams stated that he had a right to talk about his husband because

it was legal for them to be married and “[t]he topic of marriage is a conversation starter.”

JA 678. Aronow responded that some people might be “bothered” by the fact Williams is

married to a man. JA 678; JA 1109. She also told him that, if he chose to disclose that

fact, he “must be willing to accept the consequences.” When Williams asked Aronow what

she meant by using the term “consequences,” Aronow did not directly answer. Instead,

she stated that some people prefer not to share information about their private lives, to

which Williams responded, “that is [their] choice.” JA 679.

The day after this conversation, Williams reported Aronow’s comments to his

supervisor. Williams recalled that his supervisor “was apologetic and appalled that

Ms. Aronow treated [him that] way.” JA 679. Williams’ supervisor stated that she would

cancel his final meeting with Aronow and offered Williams her help in obtaining further

information about Fairfax County’s Employee Assistance Program.

Williams also met with employees in the human resources department of Family

Services (HR personnel), who said that they would investigate the matter. A short time

later, employees from that department interviewed Aronow. Aronow did not deny making

the above-described comments to Williams, but she also explained that those comments

were made in the context of her advice that Williams set boundaries at work to deal with

discussions about his personal life.

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The HR personnel ultimately determined that there was insufficient evidence to

substantiate that a discriminatory act had occurred. But the County informed Aronow that

her comments were “inappropriate” and “didn’t align with what Fairfax County

represented.” JA 1088. A few weeks later, Aronow’s temporary position with the County

ended. The County had intended to recommend that Aronow receive additional training in

cultural diversity, but did not do so given Aronow’s departure.

B.

Almost four months after Williams’ conversation with Aronow, Williams was fired

from his position with the County. The County based its decision on its review of

Williams’ open and closed cases, including Williams’ actions and later failure to act in a

particular case.

This cited case (the drug addiction case) involved a father, who was experiencing a

manic mental health episode, and a mother, who gave the father their infant to hold in an

attempt to calm the father down. When asked, both parents admitted to using heroin and

cocaine. After learning about this incident, certain child protection specialists that

Williams supervised developed a safety plan. That plan dictated that the “father would not

be alone with the infant;” the plan also called for the maternal grandparents “to supervise

contact between the infant and the father.” JA 1599. After approving the safety plan,

Williams recommended that the case be closed.

One month later, the mother in the drug addiction case was driving under the

influence of narcotics and “overdosed” while transporting her two children, including her

infant. A different Family Services unit opened a new case file (the overdose case) and

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discovered the drug addiction case handled by Williams’ unit. One of Williams’

supervisors, who was assigned to work on the overdose case, expressed concern about

Williams’ earlier handling of the drug addiction case. Williams’ supervisor observed that

“there were minimal notes and only one supervision note from Williams,” and that the file

did not contain any references to case history or to “ongoing consideration of the safety of

the children or risk to the children.” JA 1600. Williams’ supervisor also “was unable to

ascertain whether the safety plan had been monitored” or whether “anyone from [child

protection services] had visited the family.” JA 1600. In addition, Williams’ supervisor

met with the maternal grandparents and discovered that “[t]hey were extremely upset that

they were included in the safety plan … because they did not want to be responsible for

supervising visits between the children and the father.” JA 1600.

When asked by his supervisor, Williams could not recall much information about

the drug addiction case. Later, in his deposition, Williams stated that he did not believe

that his supervisor was “fabricating” her concerns, but he thought that she was “nitpicking.”

JA 331.

Based on their concerns about Williams’ handling of the drug addiction case,

Williams’ supervisors conducted a review of his open child protection cases. That review

revealed “deficiencies … related to … putting safety plans in place, monitoring the safety

plans once they were in place, assessing child abuse and neglect cases, providing and

documenting supervisory guidance, and completing required administrative tasks.”

JA 1601.

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Williams’ supervisors also asked a quality assurance manager for the County to

conduct a review of Williams’ closed cases to determine whether Williams’ work exhibited

“a consistent pattern or practice of failing to meet mandated requirements related to child

welfare work” as a child protection supervisor. JA 755–56. To complete that task, the

quality assurance manager considered the data reflected in Williams’ case notes. She

concluded that Williams had approved the closure of over 50% of his cases “without

making a determination as to whether the involved children were safe.” JA 1806–09. She

further noted, among other issues, deficiencies with the safety plans crafted by Williams’

unit. The quality assurance manager documented her findings in a report that she submitted

to Williams’ supervisors.

Williams’ supervisors ultimately concluded that Williams had “failed to meet the

minimum standards of performance” required for his job. Fairfax County terminated

Williams from his position in May 2020.

C.

A few months later, Williams filed a Charge of Discrimination with the United

States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC investigated

Williams’ allegations and issued a “Right to Sue” letter. 1 Williams later sued Fairfax

County, alleging that the County (1) discriminated against him based on his homosexuality;

1 When the EEOC dismisses a charge of discrimination or takes no remedial action within a certain time limit, the aggrieved employee may file a civil action in district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). In this situation, the EEOC issued to the employee a “Right to Sue” letter, which serves as “a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” See Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1092–93 (4th Cir. 1982). 8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1636 Doc: 54 Filed: 07/16/2025 Pg: 9 of 13

(2) created a hostile work environment; 2 and (3) retaliated against him after he reported

Aronow’s discriminatory comments, all in violation of Title VII. After discovery was

conducted in the case, the district court granted the County’s motion for summary

judgment. Williams now appeals from the district court’s judgment.

II.

“We review an award of summary judgment de novo.” Haynes v. Waste

Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2019). “Summary judgment is appropriate

if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

In reviewing an award of summary judgment, we consider the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, and we draw all reasonable inferences in the non-

moving party’s favor. Id.

“Title VII forbids (i) employment practices that discriminate against an employee

on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... and (ii) retaliation against an

employee for opposing adverse actions that she [or he] reasonably suspects to be unlawful

under Title VII.” Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 326–27 (4th Cir. 2018)

(citations omitted). When, as Williams has done here, a plaintiff asserts discriminatory

treatment under Title VII but does not allege direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff

2 Because Williams’ opening brief in this Court does not discuss his hostile work environment claim, that claim is not before us. See United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[C]ontentions not raised in the argument section of the opening brief are abandoned.”). 9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1636 Doc: 54 Filed: 07/16/2025 Pg: 10 of 13

may proceed under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223. This framework also

applies to Williams’ retaliation claim. Id.

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff first must

make out a prima facie case of retaliation or discrimination. Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d

327, 342 (4th Cir. 2019). After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation or

discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory justification for its adverse employment action.

Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223. If the employer satisfies this burden, then the plaintiff must prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s purportedly neutral reasons were

pretext for discrimination or retaliation for protected activity. Id. Ultimately, the burden

of persuasion rests with the plaintiff to show that he was subjected to sex discrimination,

or to retaliation for his protected activity. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S.

133, 143 (2000).

Here, the district court held that Williams’ retaliation and discrimination claims

failed at step one of the McDonnell Douglas framework, namely, that Williams failed to

establish prima facie cases of retaliation and discrimination. However, because we may

affirm the district court’s judgment on any grounds apparent from the record, U.S. ex rel.

Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), we turn directly

to the final two requirements of the McDonnell Douglas framework after assuming,

without deciding, that Williams has established prima facie cases of discrimination and

retaliation.

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Under the first of these two final steps, we consider whether the County has met its

burden of producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory basis for

firing Williams. See Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223. The answer here clearly is “yes.” The

record is unrefuted that Fairfax County articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and

nonretaliatory reasons for this adverse employment action: (1) the results of two

investigations conducted by the County, which revealed serious deficiencies in Williams’

work performance; and (2) Williams’ substandard handling of the drug addiction case. So,

we proceed to consider the final requirement of the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Under that final step, Williams had the burden of showing that there was a material

dispute about whether the County’s reasons for firing him were pretextual. To show

pretext, Williams needed to demonstrate that the County’s reasons for firing him were false

and that retaliation and/or discrimination was one reason for the County’s action. Foster

v. Univ. of Maryland-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015); Strothers, 895 F.3d at

328. Williams could do so by demonstrating that the County’s “‘proffered

nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination [were] inconsistent over time, false, or based

on mistakes of fact.’” Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc., 19 F.4th 643, 652 (4th Cir.

2021) (quoting Haynes, 922 F.3d at 225). If Williams were able to identify such evidence,

summary judgment would not be proper and the case would need to be determined by a

trier of fact. Haynes, 922 F.3d at 225. However, Williams could not meet his burden of

showing that the County’s rationale was pretextual “by focusing on minor discrepancies

that [did] not cast doubt on the explanation’s validity, or by raising points that [were]

wholly irrelevant to it.” Hux v. City of Newport News, 451 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2006).

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We hold that Williams has failed to show that the County’s reasons for firing him

were pretextual. We reach this conclusion after considering Williams’ two primary

arguments. 3 First, Williams argues that the County did not have a legitimate reason to fire

him because he had a good history of performing his job well, and he should have been

given additional counseling or other opportunities to improve necessary job skills. Second,

Williams generally alleges that his termination letter contained numerous inaccurate

representations. As an example, Williams references a statement in the letter that his

supervisor required Williams to receive additional coaching in November 2019, while

Williams maintains that he initiated the request for additional support.

Neither of Williams’ arguments is persuasive. Williams’ first contention that he

should have received additional counseling lacks merit because it misperceives the pretext

inquiry. In analyzing pretext, we do not determine whether the County’s reasons for firing

Williams were “wise, fair, or even correct.” Dugan v. Albemarle Cty. Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d

716, 722 (4th Cir. 2002). Nor do we scrutinize the disciplinary decisions made by his

employer in this context. See Villa v. CavaMezze Grill, LLC, 858 F.3d 896, 901 (4th Cir.

2017) (citing DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998)). Instead, we

confine our consideration to the reasons the County gave for firing Williams, and since

there is no evidence of discrimination or retaliation, we decline to second-guess the

County’s decision to take this action rather than to take disciplinary action short of

termination. See DeJarnette, 133 F.3d at 299 (explaining that a court in a Title VII action

3 Williams raises various other arguments on appeal, which we reject as lacking merit. 12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1636 Doc: 54 Filed: 07/16/2025 Pg: 13 of 13

“does not sit as a kind of super-personnel department weighing the prudence of

employment decisions” made by employers charged with employment discrimination

(citation omitted)).

Williams’ second contention regarding pretext is that certain non-material

statements in the County’s termination letter were incorrect. But such an argument fails

because it is merely an attack on “minor discrepancies that do not cast doubt” on the

County’s explanation for his firing. Hux, 451 F.3d at 315. Crucially, Williams does not

directly challenge the reasons for his firing. Nor does Williams claim that the County’s

reasons for firing him have changed over time. Given these deficiencies in his position,

Williams’ argument concerning non-material discrepancies in the termination letter is

insufficient to establish pretext. See id.

In sum, we hold that the record does not provide a basis for a jury to conclude that

Fairfax County’s reasons for firing Williams were pretextual. Williams has not carried his

burden to show that he was subjected to sex discrimination or to retaliation for his protected

activity. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of the County.

AFFIRMED