HAYS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court (197 F.Supp. 278) denying appellant’s petition for naturalization on the ground that petitioner failed to establish that he was “attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.” We affirm the action of the district court.
The statute which governs the present proceeding is Section 1427 of Title 8 of the United States Code which provides, in relevant part:
“(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his petition for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State in which the petitioner filed the petition for at least six months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the petition up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still, is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.
*- # * * * *
“(e) In determining whether the petitioner has sustained the burden of establishing good moral character and the other qualifications for citizenship specified in subsection (a) of this section, the court shall not be limited to the petitioner’s conduct during the five years preceding the filing of the petition, but may take into consideration - as a [314]*314basis for such determination the petitioner’s conduct and acts at any time prior to that period.”
Under this provision the petitioner has the burden of showing that he meets the statutory qualifications. Taylor v. United States, 231 F.2d 856 (5th Cir., 1956); Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 578, 46 S.Ct. 425, 70 L.Ed. 738 (1926).
The record shows that the petitioner here, Edward Sittler, was born in Delaware, Ohio, in 1916. His family was of German descent although German was not spoken in his home and he did not learn to speak German until he went to Germany at the age of 21.
Sittler was graduated from high school in Ohio and attended Ohio State University and Bard College for three years. In 1937 Sittler went to Germany where, after spending some time learning the language, he became a student at one of the German universities. In 1939, while still studying at a German university Sittler applied for naturalization as a citizen of Germany. It may be considered of some significance that Sittler’s application for naturalization was filed a few days after Hitler’s attack on Poland, which was the beginning of World War II. His application for German citizenship was granted in the spring of 1940. From the spring of 1940 until the final defeat of Germany in 1945 Sittler was employed in the Information Office of the German government.
During the period 1943 to 1945 he was a commentator broadcasting propaganda in English on a radio program directed to the United States.
Late in 1942 or early in 1943 Sittler joined the Nazi party.
In determining whether the petitioner had sustained his burden of establishing the qualifications enumerated in Section 1427, the district court took into consideration the petitioner’s conduct and acts during the period 1937-1945 as it was expressly authorized to do by that statute. The district court held that the petitioner “wholly failed to sustain his burden of proof.” We must affirm unless we find that the determination of the district court was clearly erroneous, and in our consideration of that question we must accord due weight to the opportunity of the district judge to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses, particularly the petitioner himself.1
On the basis of a careful review of the entire record we cannot find that clear error which we are obliged to find if we are to set aside the district court’s order. The district court could properly conclude from the evidence that Sittler had shown himself to be attached at one time (a time during which the United States was at war with Germany) to the principles of Nazism as those principles were exemplified by the government of Adolf Hitler. It is hardly arguable, though petitioner attempted to argue it, that one who is attached to the principles of Nazism can at the same time be attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. Therefore one who now claims to be attached to the principles of our Constitution but who was formerly a Nazi, can be required to prove that he has completely renounced and repudiated his attachment to Nazism. It was in this respect particularly that the district court found that the petitioner’s evidence fell short of that convincing character which the situation demanded.
There is nothing in the statute, nor in the cases decided under it, which would permit a court to deny naturalization to a petitioner solely on the ground that he was at one time a Nazi, however devoted he may have been at that time to Nazi principles. Nor could a court properly deny petitioner’s application on [315]*315the ground that his wartime activity m behalf of Hitler’s Germany would have constituted treason but for his timely acquisition of German citizenship. No past conduct of this kind, however deplorable, will bar access to citizenship to one who can establish that his ideas and allegiances have undergone a genuine change and that he is now, at the time of his petition for naturalization, in all good faith attached to the principles of the United States.
In the present case the district court did not purport to hold the petitioner ineligible for naturalization because of his activity during the war or because of his past adherence to principles which were hostile to the principles to which he now claims attachment. On the contrary the judge searched the record for evidence that the petitioner has changed his views since 1945 and is no longer sympathetic to a political system so completely at variance with the principles to which he now claims allegiance. The court sought without success to find in petitioner’s testimony any convincing renunciation of the former allegiance, let alone any expression of abhorrence for the Nazi system and its crimes.
Giving due weight to the district court’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of the petitioner we cannot say, in reviewing his testimony, that the conclusion of the district court was clearly erroneous. It is difficult to find in that testimony any direct, uncomplicated repudiation of the Nazi system. Partial repudiations are qualified and explained. There are repeated attempts at justification and rationalization.
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HAYS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court (197 F.Supp. 278) denying appellant’s petition for naturalization on the ground that petitioner failed to establish that he was “attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.” We affirm the action of the district court.
The statute which governs the present proceeding is Section 1427 of Title 8 of the United States Code which provides, in relevant part:
“(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his petition for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State in which the petitioner filed the petition for at least six months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the petition up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still, is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.
*- # * * * *
“(e) In determining whether the petitioner has sustained the burden of establishing good moral character and the other qualifications for citizenship specified in subsection (a) of this section, the court shall not be limited to the petitioner’s conduct during the five years preceding the filing of the petition, but may take into consideration - as a [314]*314basis for such determination the petitioner’s conduct and acts at any time prior to that period.”
Under this provision the petitioner has the burden of showing that he meets the statutory qualifications. Taylor v. United States, 231 F.2d 856 (5th Cir., 1956); Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 578, 46 S.Ct. 425, 70 L.Ed. 738 (1926).
The record shows that the petitioner here, Edward Sittler, was born in Delaware, Ohio, in 1916. His family was of German descent although German was not spoken in his home and he did not learn to speak German until he went to Germany at the age of 21.
Sittler was graduated from high school in Ohio and attended Ohio State University and Bard College for three years. In 1937 Sittler went to Germany where, after spending some time learning the language, he became a student at one of the German universities. In 1939, while still studying at a German university Sittler applied for naturalization as a citizen of Germany. It may be considered of some significance that Sittler’s application for naturalization was filed a few days after Hitler’s attack on Poland, which was the beginning of World War II. His application for German citizenship was granted in the spring of 1940. From the spring of 1940 until the final defeat of Germany in 1945 Sittler was employed in the Information Office of the German government.
During the period 1943 to 1945 he was a commentator broadcasting propaganda in English on a radio program directed to the United States.
Late in 1942 or early in 1943 Sittler joined the Nazi party.
In determining whether the petitioner had sustained his burden of establishing the qualifications enumerated in Section 1427, the district court took into consideration the petitioner’s conduct and acts during the period 1937-1945 as it was expressly authorized to do by that statute. The district court held that the petitioner “wholly failed to sustain his burden of proof.” We must affirm unless we find that the determination of the district court was clearly erroneous, and in our consideration of that question we must accord due weight to the opportunity of the district judge to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses, particularly the petitioner himself.1
On the basis of a careful review of the entire record we cannot find that clear error which we are obliged to find if we are to set aside the district court’s order. The district court could properly conclude from the evidence that Sittler had shown himself to be attached at one time (a time during which the United States was at war with Germany) to the principles of Nazism as those principles were exemplified by the government of Adolf Hitler. It is hardly arguable, though petitioner attempted to argue it, that one who is attached to the principles of Nazism can at the same time be attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. Therefore one who now claims to be attached to the principles of our Constitution but who was formerly a Nazi, can be required to prove that he has completely renounced and repudiated his attachment to Nazism. It was in this respect particularly that the district court found that the petitioner’s evidence fell short of that convincing character which the situation demanded.
There is nothing in the statute, nor in the cases decided under it, which would permit a court to deny naturalization to a petitioner solely on the ground that he was at one time a Nazi, however devoted he may have been at that time to Nazi principles. Nor could a court properly deny petitioner’s application on [315]*315the ground that his wartime activity m behalf of Hitler’s Germany would have constituted treason but for his timely acquisition of German citizenship. No past conduct of this kind, however deplorable, will bar access to citizenship to one who can establish that his ideas and allegiances have undergone a genuine change and that he is now, at the time of his petition for naturalization, in all good faith attached to the principles of the United States.
In the present case the district court did not purport to hold the petitioner ineligible for naturalization because of his activity during the war or because of his past adherence to principles which were hostile to the principles to which he now claims attachment. On the contrary the judge searched the record for evidence that the petitioner has changed his views since 1945 and is no longer sympathetic to a political system so completely at variance with the principles to which he now claims allegiance. The court sought without success to find in petitioner’s testimony any convincing renunciation of the former allegiance, let alone any expression of abhorrence for the Nazi system and its crimes.
Giving due weight to the district court’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of the petitioner we cannot say, in reviewing his testimony, that the conclusion of the district court was clearly erroneous. It is difficult to find in that testimony any direct, uncomplicated repudiation of the Nazi system. Partial repudiations are qualified and explained. There are repeated attempts at justification and rationalization. An American may be “mistaken” for sympathizing with Germany “but Americans can be for the underdog.” The United States was a republic, “but the Soviet Union was called a republic, too”. This took time for him to “understand.” Whether he would have fought in the German army against the United States was “a purely hypothetical question”, because Germany had the “humane policy” of not assigning former foreign nationals to fight against their former countries. When he was naturalized in Germany he took an oath of allegiance to Germany “but not to Adolf Hitler.”
Petitioner’s testimony on his reasons for going to Germany and adopting German citizenship is open to the construction that he found (and now finds) no contradiction between attachment to the United States and attachment to Nazi Germany.2
[316]*316And he finds an “ironic” parallel between the present situation with his son in the American Army in Germany protecting the West against communism,. [317]*317and his own action in taking German citizenship to help, protect the West against communism.3 (Although Sittler insists at great length that he was motivated in adopting German citizenship by fear of communism, it may be noted that he became a German citizen shortly after the announcement of the Hitler-Stalin pact.)
Petitioner was extremely prolix about reasons for joining the Nazi party, but, in summary, perhaps it can be said that petitioner thought of the Party as providing the best hope for Germany’s future.4 He was under no compulsion whatever to join the Party. He thought that he could make the Party better by joining it. However although petitioner [318]*318joined the Party partly to reform it, he never attended a meeting or engaged in any other party activity. Petitioner testified at a later point that he joined the Party because he knew by this time that the war was lost and he thought the Party would be able to give the German people some leadership after the debacle consequent upon the unconditional surrender policy which the Allies had formulated.
In petitioner’s testimony there are lengthy “explanations” of Nazi tenets, some of which may be read as denials or defenses.5
[319]*319In 1944 petitioner criticized the German propaganda effort in a memorandum which read in part as follows:
“All German propaganda to foreign countries must be National- • Socialist war propaganda in its most representative sense. It must interpret and present not only the military, but all national events and forces in the light of the ideology, which, for the very reason that it releases the powers of the people and raises them to their highest potential, is necessarily, fought against through war by an Anglo-Saxon constellation of States, whose own organic weaknesses make them regard the recovery and self-assertion of the Reich, as a danger and a challenge.”
His testimony explaining the recommendations of this memorandum is, at best, equivocal. At worst it may be read as a justification for Nazi “philosophy.” 6
[321]*321Petitioner’s testimony characterized his propaganda efforts on the German radio as inspired by an interest in getting the truth broadcast.'7,
In his propaganda broadcasts petitioner testified that he was not speaking for Hitler but for the twenty million men who were fighting, not for Hitler, but for the future of their country.8
Petitioner invented fictitious news items for his radio broadcasts because “given the mythical nature of this station,9 that is, it was a farce, a practical farce, I saw no harm in this, no harm could possibly be done.” “I don’t think that anybody ever took these programs seriously or these news items”. “If this man wanted to pretend or said he was somebody speaking from the heart of midwestern America when it was a short-wave band, a small weak signal on an overseas station — I don’t think any[322]*322body in his right mind would have swallowed this, nor was it intended to be swallowed”. It was all “a joke”. (When asked whether the motive of Burgman, a radio propagandist, with whom petitioner. worked, was to cause the people of the United States to lose confidence in their leadership) “Burgman had a motive, I had a motive, Mr. [X] had a motive”. .Burgman never informed the petitioner' what his motive was. Petitioner could have refused radio assignments and received military punishment for doing so,10 but in taking assignments he was not motivated by feár of punishment. He was willing to do “his duty as a German citizen”.
Petitioner testified, apparently with some pride, as to his proposal for solution of the “Jewish question”, a proposal which would have exiled “the minority” but permitted them to take their property with them.11 In any event the persecution of the Jews was not as all-inconclusive as it was generally reported to be12 because petitioner knew personally some army officers who were Jewish or part Jewish. .(The point here is, of course, not that the statement is false. Possibly it is true. But one may be permitted to ask what kind of man raises such a point in the context of the established fact of the extermination of millions of Jews.)
Petitioner testified at great length as to why he could not briefly and succinctly condemn Hitler and - Nazism.13
[323]*323The passages cited as favorable to the petitioner are the following excerpts from his testimony:
“Q. Tell us, then, what are your present views about Adolf Hitler and his regime. A. With regard to this one question to which my reported answer was that I could not judge him, what I said at some length, and repeatedly, was that between persons who are trying to arrive at a truth answer and not just agree with one another, that it is useless to say T condemn Hitler.’ We must be specific.
“I condemn many actions of many statesmen, and looking back upon their whole activity I can condemn them in toto.
“I said that Hitler was a scourge of mankind; that it was a disgraceful and a tragic chapter in German history, but this does not remove the fact that Hitler was an almost unavoidable, perhaps an unavoidable accident or happening in German history, and that the responsibility cannot rest upon him alone, but it rests upon the whole German people, their tradition, the way they did not come to grips with it, and therefore just to condemn the man without condemning all those things which produced him and brought him forth, and which helped him to be what he was — and they were not only in Germany alone — the answer served no purpose for our discussion as man to man.
“I can say, however, at any time that I condemn absolutely Hitler for what we now know him to have been, but I did not know that in 1937, nor did I even have enough sense to know it in 1939.
* * -X- -x- * *
“Once the outer conditions which led me to adopt German citizenship in the first place had radically changed, I tried to adapt myself and [324]*324my family to these new circumstances and to restore the balance.
“I could not become a German by taking out German citizenship, and in order to go on teaching - and being what I think I am — that is, somebody who has lived in both countries, who has ties in both, who has studied both — how this function of making clear the relationships between the two could be carried out best.
“I came to feel in assessing this whole situation over a period of years that it would be best carried out here. This was where my work was to be done primarily, and since my children were born and raised here, I felt that I was only adapting the outward form of my citizenship to what the realities of my own life and my family’s life were by reassuming or asking for American citizenship again.”
These passages are not without their share of equivocation; and when read in the context of the record as a whole they fail to carry with them that note of conviction which would permit us to hold that the district court’s determination was clearly erroneous. Moreover the petitioner’s statement of his reasons for wishing to become a citizen do not serve in any way to support his allegation of attachment. Basically he seems to want citizenship because he has had difficulty holding a job as a college professor and believes that his chances of doing so would be better if he regained his citizenship.
Much is sought to to be made of the testimony of Woerheide, a Justice Department attorney. But when reduced to its essence, by eliminating far the largest portion of it which related to the cases of Sittler’s friends, the traitors Burg-man, Chandler and Monte, Woerheide’s testimony is found to be directed mainly toward the proposition that Sittler was an unimportant cog in the Nazi machine and the, for us, irrelevant proposition that Sittler’s performance of acts which would have constituted treason but for his taking German citizenship, does not reflect on his moral character. The district court did not hold, and we do not suggest, that Sittler’s citizenship should be denied because of bad moral character. The only issue is whether Sittler has established that he is attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed towards its good order and happiness.
It is true that Woerheide, as well as several other witnesses, testified to the opinion that Sittler would make a good citizen. But, while this conclusion may be helpful to the court in reaching its own decision on all the evidence, the court is, of course, not bound to accept the views of these witnesses. Moreover the statutory test of eligibility is not whether Sittler will make a good citizen, but the considerably more specific test of allegiance as defined in the terms of the statute itself.
From a reading of the record one could readily conclude that- the petitioner is by no means the kind of man who would never be able to qualify for citizenship. If at some time in the future he should find himself able without qualification and without equivocation to renounce and repudiate his former allegiance, and to demonstrate his attachment to the United States, he can then be admitted to citizenship. On the present record we cannot say that he has done so so convincingly that we may hold that the district court, which had the advantage, not available to us, of observing Sittler’s conduct and demeanor while testifying,was clearly in error in denying him citizenship.
Judgment affirmed.