Edward R. Dalton, Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund, D/B/A Tulane Medical Center Hospital and Clinic, Intervenor v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.

703 F.2d 137, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28749
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedApril 18, 1983
Docket81-3768
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 703 F.2d 137 (Edward R. Dalton, Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund, D/B/A Tulane Medical Center Hospital and Clinic, Intervenor v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Edward R. Dalton, Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund, D/B/A Tulane Medical Center Hospital and Clinic, Intervenor v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 703 F.2d 137, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28749 (5th Cir. 1983).

Opinions

WILL, District Judge:

This case involves an automobile allegedly unsafe at no speed. The facts are that the plaintiff, Edward Dalton (Dalton), after leaving an office Christmas party on Christmas Eve, December 24,1978, drove his 1978 Toyota Corolla from his office in Mobile, Alabama, westward on Interstate 10 in the direction of New Orleans. He apparently became sleepy and pulled off the pavement onto the grassy median strip. Letting the engine idle (the weather was cold), he lit a cigarette and fell asleep. A passing motorist, Rodney Newman (Newman), noticed flames around the car and attempted to pull Dalton out. On the third attempt, he was successful. According to Newman, the inside of Dalton’s car was filled with smoke but contained no fire during his first two, unsuccessful attempts to pull Dalton out of the car. Newman testified that during his third and successful attempt, the vinyl or plastic “headliner” of the car (i.e., the top of the inside of the car) began to melt and caught fire. The fire caught the top of Dalton’s head as Newman pulled him from the car. Newman also testified that the back seat of the car also caught fire during his third attempt to pull Dalton out of the car, but that the front seat was not on fire at that time. According to Newman, Dalton was burned further when he (Dalton) fell in the burning grass three or four feet from the car. Newman was also burned while rescuing Dalton.

Dalton remembered nothing of the fire, his rescue or any other of the events between the time he fell asleep and the time he woke up in the Gulfport Memorial Hospital with second and third degree burns on his head, face, hands and arms. He filed this action in 1979 in the Eastern District of Louisiana against Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Toyota). The case was tried to a jury in March 1981. Both at the close of the plaintiff’s case and at the conclusion of all the evidence, Toyota moved for dismissal of the case or a directed verdict. The trial judge submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict of $250,000 for the plaintiff. The court entered a judgment for the plaintiff on the jury’s verdict. Toyota then filed motions either for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. A hearing was held on the motions in April 1981, and in November 1981 the trial judge, with an opinion, granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, the motion for a new trial. For the reasons which follow, we reverse and remand with directions to enter a judgment on the jury’s verdict, 526 F.Supp. 575.

In granting the defendant's motions, the court found that Dalton had failed to establish by competent evidence either of his two contentions: (1) that the catalytic converter (an emission control device) was improperly designed, which defect caused the fire, and (2) that the Toyota owner’s manual contained insufficient warnings with respect to the dangers involved in parking the car over combustible materials with the engine running. That warning, which is contained in the Owner’s Manual, and which Dalton acknowledged he had not read, states:

The catalytic converter is an emission control device installed in the exhaust system. It is installed only on Corolla’s sold in the U.S.A.
The catalytic converter looks somewhat like a muffler, but it performs an important job in maintaining cleaner air.

[139]*139If a large amount of unburned gasoline flows into the converter, it may overheat and create a fire hazard. To prevent this, observe the following precautions:

Do not drive with an extremely low fuel level. This may cause engine misfire which creates an extra load for the converter.
Do not allow the engine to run at fast idle speed for more than ten minutes or at normal idle speed for more than twenty minutes.
Do not park the car over dry grass or over anything that might burn easily. Do not turn off the ignition while the car is moving.

Toyota Owner’s Manual, Section 1, page 1.

The court found that the plaintiff’s expert, George Pappas (Pappas), was not qualified to express an opinion on the adequacy or inadequacy of catalytic converter designs and qualified as an expert only “in the field 6f engineering and fire investigation.” In any event, the court found that Pappas testified only that the skin temperature of the catalytic converter was about 1800 degrees Fahrenheit when in operation and that the fire did not originate within the car.

With respect to the adequacy of the warnings, the court found that the plaintiff had “introduced no evidence relating to industry standards of adequate warnings.” It further found that “No guidelines were presented indicative of a more effective warning — either hypothetical or actually utilized.”

The record, however, reveals testimony adduced by Dalton’s counsel from Pappas and others that the catalytic converter would normally get so hot that at night you could see it glow and radiate. On the vehicle in question, it was installed just forward of the rear wheels about 5% inches off the ground. A heat shield was installed on top of the converter between it and the floorboard of the ear but none was installed below the converter. The plaintiff’s expert also testified that he was aware of two safety features which are used on other makes of cars to protect motorists, neither of which was installed on Dalton’s Toyota. One was a heat shield installed underneath the catalytic converter between it and the ground. The other was a thermosensor which would detect heat build-up in the catalytic converter and either turn off the motor or stop the operation of the converter by stopping the flow of air to it. Plaintiff’s counsel also adduced evidence that Toyota models for the years 1975 through 1977 provided a dashboard warning light to advise of overheating of the catalytic converter which would not only warn an owner-user of actual overheating but be a remainder of the possibility of the converter overheating.

With respect to the adequate warnings, plaintiff’s counsel introduced evidence of warnings contained in other owner’s manuals for automobiles equipped with catalytic converters.

Plaintiff’s expert, Pappas, testified that in his opinion, “the fire started underneath the vehicle as a result of high intense heat, radiating from the catalytic converter, which caused combustible material under the vehicle, like grass to burn, and in addition cause [sic] heat by conduction to raise the temperature inside the passenger cqmpartment.” He testified categorically that in his opinion the fire “did not start inside the compartment” but that “the fire started under the’ car.” This, of course, was consistent with the testimony of the only eyewitness, Newman.

Cross-examination of one of Toyota’s experts, Jack Parcells (Parcells), an expert in emission control systems and exhaust systems, disclosed that Datsun and Mazda both utilized sensor relays connected to dashboard warning lights and that Toyota had removed the warning light from its 1978 models and substituted a pressure sensitive switch which under certain operating conditions would shut off the supply of air to the catalytic converter and diminish or stop its operation.

The plaintiff also introduced medical evidence as to the location and extent of his burns. Dr. George W. Byrne (Dr. Byrne) [140]

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Bluebook (online)
703 F.2d 137, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28749, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/edward-r-dalton-administrators-of-the-tulane-education-fund-dba-tulane-ca5-1983.