Eduardo Sauceda v. FCA US LLC

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 31, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-01018
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EDUARDO SAUCEDA, Case No. 1:24-cv-01018 JLT CDB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

13 (Doc. 9) v. 14 FCA US LLC, 15

16 Defendant. 17 In this action brought under California state law, alleging breach of warranty and 18 fraudulent inducement tied to the purchase of a vehicle, Plaintiff moves to remand arguing that 19 the amount in controversy (“AIC”) does not meet the jurisdictional minimum for diversity 20 jurisdiction in federal court. (Doc. 9-1 at 9.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is 21 GRANTED. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 On or around July 27, 2022, Plaintiff purchased a new 2022 Chrysler Pacifica to use 24 “primarily for family or household purposes.” (Doc. 1-3 at 7–8, ¶¶ 7, 9.) Plaintiff executed a 25 Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”) to finance the purchase of the vehicle. (Doc. 1-3 at 26 70–71.) The RISC indicates that the vehicle cost the Plaintiff a total of $58,229.28. (Id. at 70.) 27 Of that amount, Plaintiff agreed to finance $48,097.38 and incur $10,131.90 in finance charges. 28 (Id.) In doing so, Plaintiff promised to pay $808.74 per month beginning on August 26, 2022, 1 and ending on July 26, 2028. (Id.) The vehicle came with a series of “warranties, including . . . 2 bumper-to-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty, and emission warranty.” (Doc. 1-3 at 7, ¶ 8; 3 see also id. at 23–53.) “The warranties provided, in relevant part, that in the event of a defect . . . 4 during the warranty period, Plaintiff could deliver the Subject Vehicle for repair to Defendant’s 5 representatives and the Subject Vehicle would be repaired.” (Doc. 9-1 at 6.) During the express 6 warranty period, Plaintiff noticed “stalling defects, transmission defects, electrical defects, body 7 defects, infotainment defects; defects causing stalling; among other defects.” (Doc. 1-3 at 8, 8 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff presented the vehicle for repairs, but Defendant “failed to service or repair the 9 Vehicle to conform to the applicable express and implied warranties.” (Doc. 1-3 at 16, ¶ 68; Doc. 10 9-1 at 7.) 11 Subsequently, Plaintiff sued the Defendant in the Superior Court of California, County of 12 Kern for breach of contract in an unlimited civil case where the amount demanded “exceeds 13 $35,000.” (Doc. 1-3 at 64.) In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for breach of warranty 14 under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”), as well as claims for 15 fraudulent inducement. (Id. at 15–20.) Plaintiff argues that under the Song-Beverly Act, 16 Defendant breached its “affirmative duty to promptly offer to repurchase or replace” the vehicle 17 when “it failed to conform” to the “express warrant[ies] after [] reasonable . . . repair attempts.” 18 (Id. at 11, ¶ 37.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s conduct was “willful” because Defendant knew 19 of its inability to repair the vehicle after reasonable repair attempts, “yet . . . refused to promptly 20 replace the [v]ehicle or make restitution.” (Id. at 16, ¶ 64.) Plaintiff further claims that 21 Defendant “knew that the [v]ehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiff at the 22 time of sale and thereafter.” (Id. at 9, ¶18.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant knew that 23 “the 2022 Chrysler Pacifica vehicles equipped with a 9HP transmission and 3.6L engine are 24 defective, including Plaintiff’s 2022 Chrysler Pacifica, and contained one or more defect(s) which 25 may result in stalling, shutting off, and/or loss of power.” (Id. at 8, ¶ 16.) 26 Plaintiff claims damages including “reimbursement of the price paid for the vehicle,” 27 “replacement or reimbursement,” “recission of the contract,” “cover damages,” and “incidental 28 and consequential damages.” (Doc. 1-3 at 12, ¶ 39–43.) The complaint also requests “damages 1 in a sum to be proven at trial in an amount that is not less than $35,001,00,” (id. at 12, ¶ 44), and 2 claims that “Plaintiff is entitled to a civil penalty of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages.” (Id. at 3 16–18, ¶¶ 64, 71, 74.) Finally, the prayer for relief asks for (1) “general, special and actual 4 damages,” (2) “restitution,” (3) “diminution in value,” (4) “consequential and incidental 5 damages,” (5) “punitive damages,” (6) “a civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s 6 actual damages,” (7) “prejudgment interest,” (8) “costs of the suit and . . . reasonable attorneys’ 7 fees,” and (9) “other relief as the Court may deem proper.” (Id. at 21.) 8 On August 26, 2024, Defendant removed the case to federal court under 28 9 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) arguing that the AIC exceeds $75,000 and that complete diversity exists 10 between the parties. (Doc. 1 at 4–9). Defendant claims Plaintiff is a citizen of California, and 11 Defendant, as a limited liability company, is a citizen of every state where its members are 12 citizens. (Id. at 8.) Its sole member, FCA North America Holdings LLC, is incorporated in 13 Delaware and has its principal place of business in Michigan, thus complete diversity exists. (Id.) 14 Defendant also claims that AIC is met because Plaintiff seeks “$40,432.74 in restitution,” 15 “$80,865.48 in civil penalties,” “$40,432.74 in punitive damages,” and over $25,000 in attorney’s 16 fees, totaling approximately $186,730.96 in damages. (Id. at 6.) 17 Defendant uses the RISC sales price and Plaintiff’s request for an amount “not less than 18 $35,001” to argue that actual damages reach “a minimum of $40,432.74 in restitution.” (Doc. 1 19 at 4–6.) Included in that amount is a $12,945.13 deduction for Plaintiff’s use of the vehicle prior 20 to when the defects first manifested themselves, which turns on the date of first repair. (Id. at 6.) 21 Defendant claims that the first repair occurred on April 8, 2024, at the 39,644-mile mark. (Id. at 6 22 n.1.) As to civil penalties, Defendant relies on the complaint’s allegation that Plaintiff is “entitled 23 to a civil penalty . . . two times Plaintiff’s actual damages.” (Id. at 5.) As to attorney’s fees, 24 Defendant relies on a separate Song-Beverly case where Plaintiff’s counsel sought over $100,000 25 in attorney’s fees to argue that fees “commonly exceed $25,000” in these cases. (Id. at 6.) 26 Finally, as to punitive damages, Defendant offers an estimate of “at least $40,432.74,” which is a 27 one-to-one ratio between punitive and compensatory damages. (Id.) 28 On October 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case back to Kern County 1 Superior Court. (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff does not contest the citizenship of the parties. (See Doc. 9-1.) 2 Instead, Plaintiff argues that his request for “an amount not less than $35,001” refers to Plaintiff’s 3 total damages. (Doc. 9-1 at 11.) Plaintiff further argues that the $40,432.74 figure obtained using 4 the RISC is speculative, fails to “consider essential facts about the purchase price,” (Doc. 9-1 at 5 13), and fails to establish “Plaintiff’s actual payments under the [s]ales [c]ontract.” (Doc. 15 at 6 11.) Plaintiff also contends that Defendant’s deduction in damages, for Plaintiff’s use of the 7 vehicle, is speculative because Defendant chose “an arbitrary repair visit” and “fail[ed] to identify 8 the purported defect for the alleged repair.” (Doc. 9-1 at 14.) As to civil penalties, Plaintiff 9 argues that the Defendant fails to prove that Plaintiff will recover the maximum penalty, (id. at 10 16), and that because the underlying damages are speculative so too is the civil penalty. (Id. at 11 18.) As to attorneys’ fees, Plaintiff argues that the Court cannot consider attorney’s fees, but even 12 if it did, Defendant fails to offer sufficient evidence to prove Plaintiff’s fee recovery. (Doc. 9-1 at 13 19–20; Doc. 15 at 11–12.) Finally, as to punitive damages, Plaintiff claims that Defendant fails to 14 “provide any evidence, or argument, establishing a reasonable estimate of punitive damages for 15 this matter.” (Doc. 15 at 7.) 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, a defendant may remove a state action to federal court if “(1) the 18 case presents a federal question or (2) there is diversity of citizenship between the parties and the 19 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Quinonez v. FCA US LLC, No. 2:19-cv-2032-KJM, 20 2020 WL 3397565, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2020). A plaintiff may then challenge the removal 21 by filing a motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447. “[A]ny doubt about the right of removal 22 requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 23 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) 24 Defendant removed this case based on diversity jurisdiction, (Doc. 1 at 2), and Plaintiff 25 challenges only the jurisdictional amount, (Doc. 12-1 at 10–22). In evaluating AIC, courts first 26 “consider whether it is facially apparent from the complaint that the jurisdictional amount is in 27 controversy.” Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 690 (9th Cir. 2006) 28 (citations omitted). When the plaintiff’s complaint “does not contain any specific amount of 1 damages sought, the party seeking removal . . . bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance 2 of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory amount.” Lewis v. Verizon 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 397 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The AIC is “an estimate 4 of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Id. at 400. 5 The removing party’s notice of removal must include “a plausible allegation that the 6 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating 7 Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). The defendant must support its jurisdictional 8 allegations with “competent proof” and cannot rely on “mere speculation . . . with unreasonable 9 assumptions.” McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); 10 Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). The court may consider the 11 complaint, the notice of removal, and the opposition to plaintiff’s motion to remand. Quinonez, 12 2020 WL 3397565, at *2. The court may also consider affidavits, declarations, or other 13 “summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” 14 Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197 (citations omitted). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 A. Actual Damages 17 1. Song-Beverly Act Claims 18 As to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act claims, he may recover “restitution in an amount equal 19 to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer” minus “that amount directly attributable to use 20 by the buyer prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle . . . for correction of the . . . 21 nonconformity.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B), (C). The Ninth Circuit has held that this 22 reduction in damages, known as the “use offset,” should be deducted from the jurisdictional 23 amount when calculating AIC. Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 Fed. Appx. 699, 701 n.3 (9th 24 Cir. 2018) (“Consideration of the [u]se [o]ffset was appropriate. We have recognized that an 25 estimate of the amount in controversy must be reduced if ‘a specific rule of law or measure of 26 damages limits the amount of damages recoverable.’”) (citations omitted). 27 While Plaintiff requests “an amount not less than $35,001” and seeks “restitution” in his 28 complaint, (Doc. 1-3 at 12, 21), this Court holds that Defendant cannot simply rely on the 1 complaint’s generic damage allegations when establishing the AIC. West v. FCA US LLC, No. 2 1:24-cv-00293-JLT-CDB, 2024 WL 3298911, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2024). Instead, Defendant must 3 submit additional evidence, such as the purchase agreement of the vehicle, “to guide the 4 interpretation of the damages sum stated in the complaint.” Id.; see also Quinonez, 2020 WL 5 3397565, at *2–3. Using this approach, the Court finds that the phrase in Plaintiff’s complaint 6 requesting an amount “not less than $35,001” refers to actual damages. 7 Defendant attached a copy of the RISC to its notice of removal.1 (Doc. 1-3 at 70–71.) As 8 such, Defendant provided evidence beyond the face of the complaint in support of removal. As 9 the RISC indicates, the vehicle cost the Plaintiff $48,097.38, excluding $10,131.90 in finance 10 charges. (Doc. 1-3 at 70–71.) The closeness between the sales price ($48,097.38), or sales price 11 with finance charges ($58,229.28), and the stated sum ($35,001) serves as competent proof of 12 actual damages. West, 2024 WL 3298911, at *3; Quinonez, 2020 WL 3397565, at *2–3 (finding 13 more likely than not that plaintiff’s demand for damages “exceed[ing] $25,000” referred to actual 14 damages, no total damages, because the RISC indicated a $31,500 purchase price for the vehicle). 15 This is especially true when considering that the statutory offset will only reduce Plaintiff’s total 16 recovery. West, 2024 WL 3298911, at *3. As in Quinonez, the Plaintiff requests “restitution,” 17 which would include recovery of around $58,229 in the form of payments already made and 18 release from plaintiff’s obligations under the loan. (Doc. 1-3 at 15); Quinonez, 2020 WL 19 3397565, at *3 (explaining that plaintiff could recover “$31,500 in the form of [] payments made 20 to date” and “the value of the release from her personal loan”). Thus, this amount accurately 21 reflects the actual damages at issue in this case.2 22 1 Plaintiff does not dispute the admissibility or accuracy of the RISC, or the information contained therein, rather 23 only that Defendant cannot rely on the RISC alone without providing “essential facts about the purchase price,” such as “facts indicating how many payments had been made” under the sales contract. (Doc. 9-1 at 13) (citations 24 omitted).

25 2 Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, Defendant does not need to prove “actual payments” made under the sales contract to establish actual damages. (Doc. 9-1 at 13; see also Doc. 15 at 11). While this is true in the contexts of leases, it is 26 not true for purchase agreements. West, 2024 WL 3298911, at *5 (“In cases involving a purchase, courts have emphasized the contrast between leases and purchases in determining actual damages calculations.”); cf. Brady v. 27 Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (Limiting [plaintiff’s] recovery to payments actually made is consistent with the logic and purpose of the Song-Beverly Act to make the consumer whole. . . . 28 Moreover, similar lemon laws of other states either expressly, or have been interpreted to, require restitution only of 1 Turning to the offset calculation, there must be sufficient evidence that the use offset does 2 not reduce the AIC to a level below the jurisdictional minimum. Villegas v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3 1:22-cv-01628-ADA-SAB, 2023 WL 3144540, at *7 (E.D. Cal. April 28, 2023). This is 4 particularly true because Plaintiff requests “reimbursement of the price paid for the vehicle less 5 that amount directly attributable to use by the Plaintiff prior to the first presentation to an 6 authorized repair facility for a nonconformity.” Id.; (see Doc. 1-3 at 12, ¶ 39). In its notice of 7 removal, Defendant included a $12,945.13 deduction for Plaintiff’s use offset in its total measure 8 of restitution, (Doc. 1 at 6), and explained that this number was based on “the first attempted 9 repair” which “occurred on April 8, 2024, at 39,644 miles.” (Id. at 6 n.1.) However, Defendant 10 fails to explain why the proffered offset amount is accurate. Defendant offers no explanation for 11 why April 8, 2024, constitutes a date of material repair, includes no description of the defect 12 complained about, and provides no copy of the repair order submitted on that date. (See Doc. 1 at 13 6; Doc. 1-3 at 1–3.) 14 According to the Plaintiff, the offset calculation is speculative because Defendant chose 15 “an arbitrary repair visit” and “fails to identify the purported defect for the alleged repair at the 16 [v]ehicle’s 39,644 mileage mark.” (Doc. 9-1 at 14.) Plaintiff relies on authority from the Central 17 District of California in support of this proposition, which this Court finds persuasive. (Id. at 16; 18 see also Doc. 15 at 11.) In those cases, remand was proper, in part, because defendant failed to 19 “adduce evidence showing why the mileage offset should be calculated based on [the first visit] 20 instead of [plaintiff’s] subsequent visits to fix other complained-of defects.” Gutierrez v. Ford 21 Motor Co., No. 2:21-cv-05679-MCS-JPR, 2021 WL 4399517, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2021); Jones v. 22 FCA US, LLC, No. CV-22-859-JFW (GJSx), 2022 WL 1154534, at *2 (C.D. Cal. April 18, 2022) 23 (“Defendant fails to provide any factual or legal basis as to why the statutory mileage offset 24 should be based on the odometer reading the first time [p]laintiffs brought the [s]ubject [v]ehicle 25

26 purchase price or current value of the lease by the lessee.”). For purchases, the sales price listed in the RISC is sufficient to establish actual damages under the Song-Beverly Act. Quinonez, 2020 WL 3397565, at *3 (“Plaintiff’s 27 focus on payments . . . mischaracterizes the amount in controversy as a ‘prospective assessment of defendant’s liability’ as opposed to the ‘estimate of the total amount in dispute.’”); see also Messih v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 28 No. 21-cv-03032-WHO, 2021 WL 2588977, at *4, 4 n.3 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021) (expressly rejecting plaintiff’s 1 in for repair.”). In Gutierrez, the record indicated that plaintiff “sought repairs . . . when the 2 odometer read 504, 5,993, 15,332, 24,634, 34,537 miles” and thus it was unclear which repair 3 visit provided the proper measure of damages. 2021 WL 4399517, at *2. The court explained, 4 that “[i]f based on a later visit, the mileage offset would significantly diminish the measure of 5 actual damages.” Id. 6 It is similarly unclear whether Defendant’s proffered date of repair reflects the date in 7 which the first material defect manifested itself. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 8 “undertook to perform various defects repairs,” (Doc. 1-3 at 14, ¶ 55), made a “reasonable 9 number of repair attempts,” (Doc. 1-3 at 16, ¶ 64), and was “unable to service or repair the 10 [v]ehicle . . . after a reasonable number of opportunities.” (Doc. 1-3 at 15–16, ¶ 62.) Plaintiff 11 also alleges that there were a multitude of defects that “manifested themselves within the . . . 12 warranty period.” (Doc. 1-3 at 8, ¶ 12.) Based on these allegations, the Court concludes that 13 Plaintiff presented his vehicle for repairs on multiple occasions. Yet Defendant fails to explain 14 why a mileage offset “based on the first visit,” as opposed to the “second visit,” or “subsequent 15 visits to fix other complained-of defects” is more appropriate. Gutierrez, 2021 WL 4399517, at 16 *2. Defendant does not describe the defect presented on April 8, 2024, or explain whether such 17 defect is one covered by the contract’s express and implied warranties. (See Doc. 1-3 at 23–41); 18 see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1(a). 19 Defendant thus fails to prove the offset deduction by a preponderance of evidence.3

20 3 In cases where this Court has accepted the defendant’s offset calculation, it has done so when the amount was uncontested, or when the defendant submitted proof of the date of first material repair. See e.g., Fang v. Ford Motor 21 Co., No. 1:22-cv-0561-JLT-SAB, 2022 WL 3444715, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2022) (accepting defendant’s offset calculation because the “[p]laintiffs d[id] not dispute the accuracy of this calculation”); Villegas, 2023 WL 3144540, 22 at *8 (accepting defendant’s offset calculation for establishing AIC because defendant offered “a pointed calculation based on evidence of the service records pertaining to the [s]ubject [v]ehicle”); Cabrera v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:22- 23 cv-00431-NODJ-BAM, 2023 WL 8477970, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2023) (accepting defendant’s offset calculation, which included a copy of the repair order indicating the date of repair, odometer count, and alleged defect). As such, 24 this Court rejects Defendant’s proffered offset amount because Defendant entirely fails to describe the defect that prompted Plaintiff’s visit on April 8, 2024, (Doc. 1 at 6 n.1), and Plaintiff clearly challenges the offset calculation as 25 speculative, (Doc. 9-1 at 14). While in one instance, a judge in the Eastern District of California accepted defendant’s offset calculation based solely on the “assumption” that plaintiff had driven the vehicle for 4,500 miles 26 prior to presenting the vehicle for material repairs, that case is distinguishable. Cf. Cortez Martinez v. Ford Motor Company, No. 1:18-cv-01607-LJO-JLT, 2019 WL 1988398, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2019) (finding that 27 defendant’s offset calculation was “not speculative” because it was based on a reasonable estimate of the maximum miles plaintiff could have driven while still being covered by the implied warranty). That case relied entirely on the 28 outer limits of the implied warranty of merchantability for used vehicles, which is three months. Id. at *4; see also 1 Lewis, 627 F.3d at 397; McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189 (“If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are 2 challenged by his adversary . . . he must support them by competent proof.”). Absent these 3 details, the Court cannot reasonably determine whether the use offset reduces the AIC to a level 4 below the jurisdictional minimum. Accordingly, Defendant fails to prove actual damages as to 5 Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims. 6 2. Fraud Claims 7 Turning to Plaintiff’s fraud claims, “[i]t is reasonable to use the purchase price as a 8 measurement of actual damages.” Massey v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:21-cv-01392-NODJ-CDB, 9 2023 WL 8477945, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2023). In Massey, this Court found that AIC was met 10 based, in part, on the actual damages tied to the fraud claim. Id. While plaintiff similarly argued 11 that defendant failed to “justif[y] its decision to use 26,512 miles” as opposed to a “larger milage 12 figure” which would render a higher mileage offset deduction, this Court found it was “not 13 necessary to resolve this dispute.” Id. This Court explained that because plaintiff “also asserts a 14 claim for fraud” and “does not rely solely on the Song-Beverly Act,” the Court could rely on the 15 purchase price as an accurate “measurement of actual damages for her fraud claim.” Id. As such, 16 so long as the defendant “can show that other remedies in dispute exceed” the difference between 17 $75,001 and the purchase price, then defendant “will have satisfied its obligation to show the 18 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.” Id (explaining that AIC was met 19 because defendant showed that attorney’s fees and civil penalties reached a minimum of 20 $35,113.08, which was the difference between $75,001 and the vehicle’s purchase price of 21 $39,887.92). 22 Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle for a total of $58,229.28. (Doc. 1-3 at 70.) The 23 difference between $75,001 and $58,229 is $16,772. Accordingly, so long as Defendant proves 24 by a preponderance of evidence that the remaining remedies reach $16,772, the AIC is met. 25 Massey, 2023 WL 8477945, at *2. 26 /// 27 coverage period. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1(c); (Doc. 1-3 at 70). Further, the Court cannot rely on the “outer 28 limits” of the implied warranty alone because Plaintiff asserts claims under both express and implied warranties, each 1 B. Civil Penalties 2 The Song-Beverly Act provides that a buyer may recover “a civil penalty of up to two 3 times the amount of damages” if the manufacturer or seller “willfully” violated a warranty or 4 provision of the Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c); see also Ramos v. FCA US LLC, 385 F. Supp. 3d 5 1056, 1070–71 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (explaining that civil penalties may be imposed for the willful 6 failure of “vehicle manufacturers to promptly replace or pay restitution for their lemon vehicles”). 7 Generally, this civil penalty is properly included in determining the amount in controversy, as 8 “the civil penalty under the Song-Beverly Act is akin to punitive damages, because both have the 9 dual effect of punishment and deterrence for defendants.” Brady, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1008; 10 Hernandez, 2022 WL 819857, at *4. However, “[i]f the amount of actual damages is speculative, 11 [] an attempt to determine the civil penalty is equally uncertain.” West, 2024 WL 3298911, at *6 12 (citations omitted). 13 Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s “failure to comply with its obligations under Civil Code 14 section 1793.2, subdivision (d) was willful, in that Defendant . . . [was] aware that [it was] unable 15 to service or repair the [v]ehicle to conform to the . . . warranties after a reasonable number of 16 repair attempts.” (Doc. 1-3 at 16, ¶ 64.) Plaintiff claims that this entitles him to “a civil penalty 17 of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages” and reiterates this in the prayer for relief. (Id.; Doc. 1-3 18 at 21.) This Court and others previously determined that when, as here, a plaintiff alleges that 19 Defendant’s conduct was willful and the prayer for relief includes a request for civil penalties “in 20 an amount not to exceed two times the amount of Plaintiff’s actual damages,” inclusion of civil 21 penalties in the AIC is appropriate. See, e.g., Quinonez, 2020 WL 339756, at *3; Cortez 22 Martinez, 2019 WL 1988398, at *7 (where the plaintiff alleged that defendant’s failure to comply 23 with the Song-Beverly Act was willful and the prayer for civil penalty in an amount two times 24 actual damages, the civil penalties were “expressly placed in controversy by the complaint”). 25 Because Plaintiff clearly pled that Defendant acted willfully in failing to comply with the 26 Song-Beverly Act, and the prayer for relief asks for double the number of actual damages, this 27 specific amount was placed in controversy.4 Hernandez, 2022 WL 819857, at *5; see also Fang, 28 1 2022 WL 3444715, at *8. However, as Plaintiff notes, because the number of actual damages is 2 uncertain, the number of civil penalties is equally uncertain. (Doc. 9-1 at 18–19); West, 2024 WL 3 3298911, at *6 (“Because [d]efendant did not establish the amount of actual damages by a 4 preponderance of the evidence, the amount of civil penalties is equally uncertain.”); Newsome, 5 2022 WL 408631 at *5. As explained above, Defendant’s estimated sum of actual damages is 6 speculative because the use offset calculation relies on unsupported claims regarding the date of 7 first repair. Defendant therefore failed to satisfy its burden of proof required to include civil 8 penalties in the jurisdictional amount. West, 2024 WL 3298911, at *6. 9 C. Attorney’s Fees 10 Under the Song-Beverly Act, if the buyer prevails in the action, “the buyer shall be 11 allowed to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and 12 expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). 13 Plaintiff argues that this Court should not consider attorney’s fees in calculating the AIC due to 14 the “split in authority” across district courts in the Ninth Circuit. (Doc. 15 at 11–12.) However, 15 this Court has repeatedly considered attorney’s fees when calculating the AIC. See e.g., Cortez 16 Martinez, 2019 WL 1988398, at *7 (“An award of attorneys’ fees may be considered in 17 calculating the amount in controversy.”); Newsome, 2022 WL 408631, at *5–6; West, 2024 WL 18 3298911, at *6–7. Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, this Court explained that district courts

19 Beverly Act to include civil penalties in the damage’s calculation. (Doc. 9-1 at 16–18.) Plaintiff cites a series of cases—none from the Eastern District of California—which require “some showing regarding the possibility of civil 20 damages” apart from relying on a plaintiff’s boilerplate allegations in the complaint. E.g., Savall, 2021 WL 1661051, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021) (rejecting the inclusion of the full civil penalty amount in the AIC because “[o]ther 21 than referring to Plaintiff’s allegation that FCA acted willfully . . . FCA provides no support for the likelihood that a civil penalty based on its willfulness would actually be awarded”); Echemendia, 2020 WL 7311348, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 22 Dec. 11, 2020) (“[Defendant] cites no allegations suggesting the type of willfulness required to justify civil penalties, let alone has it demonstrated how much those penalties might be.”). Such cases are not controlling, nor do they 23 reflect how this Court has approached the issue. See e.g., Cabrera, 2023 WL 8477970, at *2 (“This court has determined that when a plaintiff both alleges that a defendant’s violations of the Song-Beverly Act are willful and 24 requests a civil penalty, the court must assume the amount in controversy includes the full civil penalty). Instead, this Court has found that such evidence is not necessary on removal because “Defendant is not required to prove the case 25 against itself.” Fang, 2022 WL 3444715, at *7 (citations omitted); see also Hernandez, 2022 WL 819857, at *5 (allowing the inclusion of civil penalties in the AIC based solely on plaintiff’s request for twice the number of actual 26 damages and plaintiff’s allegation that defendant’s conduct was willful). Fang explained that a defendant must only show by a preponderance of evidence that the complaint seeks the maximum civil penalty authorized by the Song- 27 Beverly Act, not that plaintiff will actually receive it. Fang, 2022 WL 3444715, at *7 (citations and quotations omitted). “It would be absurd to suggest a defendant must offer evidence showing it willfully failed to comply with 28 the Song-Beverly Act, given that most defendants . . . will deny that it willfully failed to comply . . .” Id (citations 1 are free to include future attorney’s fees awards when determining the AIC. Newsome, 2022 WL 2 408631, at *5 (citing Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 795 (9th Cir. 3 2018)). However, district courts may also exclude such awards if they are “too speculative” or if 4 the defendant fails to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the AIC exceeds the 5 jurisdictional threshold. Id.; Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 795. 6 To that end, Plaintiff contends that Defendant fails to meet its burden of proving 7 Plaintiff’s projected fee recovery for the AIC. (Doc. 9-1 at 19–20.) In establishing attorney’s 8 fees, Defendant’s counsel points to his experience, and a separate Song-Beverly case where 9 Plaintiff’s counsel sought over $100,000 in attorney’s fees to argue that fees “commonly exceed 10 $25,000” in these types of cases. (Doc. 1 at 6–7; Doc. 1-3 at 3.) According to Plaintiff, 11 Defendant’s reliance on such evidence is “insufficient” because it offers no insight into the “facts 12 . . . of this case” or the “value of attorneys’ fees Plaintiff is expected to incur.” (Doc. 9-1 at 20– 13 21.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff—none of the evidence supports Defendants’ theory that 14 attorneys’ fees amount to more than $25,000. A declaration stating that in the defense counsel’s 15 “experience litigating such cases, claims for attorneys’ fees through litigation commonly exceed 16 $25,000” is insufficient to prove attorney’s fees for AIC. See Hernandez, 2022 WL 819857, at 17 *5–6 (rejecting the very same assertion regarding counsel’s “experience litigating such cases” as 18 “lack[ing] the evidentiary support that may allow for the inclusion of fees”). “Defendant’s lump 19 sum estimate does not delineate the amount of time major tasks will take or approximate the 20 hourly billing rate.” Newsome, 2022 WL 408631, at *6. 21 Furthermore, Defendant’s reliance on the $108,135.31 fee sought by Plaintiff’s counsel in 22 another Song-Beverly case, (Doc. 1-3 at 3, 73–74), does not prove by the preponderance of 23 evidence what the future fees will be in this case. See West, 2024 WL 3298911, at *6 (rejecting a 24 similar assertion, where defendant claimed that attorneys’ fees exceeded $65,00 based on 25 plaintiff’s counsel’s “regular request [for] more than $65,000 in fees” in Song-Beverly cases). As 26 Schneider best explained:

27 Defendants fail to explain how that case accords with this case. All that Defendants claim is that the same counsel appears in each case 28 and that the subject-matter of the cases are the same. They do not, 1 however, compare or contrast the litigation strategies or the litigation timelines of the two cases. 2

3 Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d 909, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2021). Defendant’s counsel 4 fails to explain how the case he cites is analogous to the present case. (Doc. 1-3 at 3.) Defendant 5 merely states that the case is “a very similar matter” and that plaintiff’s counsel sought over 6 $100,000 “prior to the case even reaching trial.” (Id.) However, Defendant fails to acknowledge 7 that such case went through discovery, “numerous meet and confer conferences,” “a motion to 8 compel” and was not settled until the “eve of trial” after “substantial litigation” had been 9 conducted. (Doc. 1-3 at 78–79.) Therefore, Defendant’s bare comparison to a separate “similar” 10 case fails to establish the estimated attorney’s fees in this case. Nor does it meet the threshold of 11 evidentiary support that typically allows for the inclusion of fees. Cf. Cortez Martinez, 2019 WL 12 1988398, at *7 (including attorney’s fees in the AIC where defendant submitted “five petitions 13 for attorneys’ fees filed in other similar cases by the same counsel”). In sum, the Court rejects the 14 inclusion of Defendant’s $25,000 estimate of attorney’s fees to form part of the AIC. 15 D. Punitive Damages 16 In determining the AIC for Song-Beverly cases involving claims of fraud, some courts 17 have included punitive damages in the total measure of damages. See Amavizca v. Nissan N. Am., 18 Inc., No. CV22-02256 JAK (KK), 2023 WL 3020489, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. April 19, 2023); 19 Cassi v. General Motors, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-01801 WBS JDP, 2023 WL 7168348, at *2 (E.D. 20 Cal. Oct. 31, 2023). “It is well established that punitive damages are part of the amount in 21 controversy in a civil action.” Amavizca, 2023 WL 3020489, at *10 (citing Gibson v. Chrysler 22 Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001)). The defendant “may introduce evidence of jury 23 verdicts in cases involving analogous facts to establish probable punitive damages.” Cassi, 2023 24 WL 7168348, at *2 (citing Simmons v. PCR Tech., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 25 The court may also look to allegations of fraud in the complaint to assess “a pattern or practice of 26 misconduct” that if established, would result in “substantial punitive damages.” Amavizca, 2023 27 WL 3020489, at *11. 28 Moreover, California courts have “collapse[d] any state-law limits into the constitutional 1 analysis” and “have recognized that ‘the ratio should generally be no higher than four to one and 2 almost never nine to one.’” Amavizca, 2023 WL 3020489, at *11 (citing Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. 3 Co., 56 Cal. App. 5th 521, 561 (2020). They have further recognized that “a lesser ratio is 4 appropriate when compensatory damages are substantial, when only one reprehensibility factor is 5 present, or when the compensatory damages award appears to contain a punitive element.” Id 6 (citing Contreras-Velazquez v. Fam. Health Centers of San Diego, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 5th 88, 108 7 (2021)). Specifically, California courts have held that a “[one-to-one] ratio of punitive to 8 compensatory damages can in some cases—or perhaps in many cases where the compensatory 9 damages award is substantial—be the constitutional maximum.” Id (citing Contreras-Velazquez, 10 62 Cal. App. 5th at 109)). 11 Defendant claims that Plaintiff seeks “at least $40,432.74 in punitive damages,” but fails 12 to explain how it obtained that number and thereby fails to meet its burden of proof upon 13 removal. (Doc. 1 at 6; see also Doc. 14 at 3.) Defendant fails to include any evidence of 14 analogous cases or jury verdicts in similar cases to establish probable punitive damages in this 15 case. (See Doc. 1 at 5–6; Doc. 1-3). In Cassi, the Court accepted defendant’s claims regarding 16 punitive damages for establishing AIC because defendant offered “analogous cases where 17 punitive damages exceeded $50,000.” Cassi, 2023 WL 7168348, *2. Similarly, in Amavizca, the 18 court held that defendant established $20,873.89 in punitive damages, in part, because defendant 19 “incorporated by reference the discussion of three jury verdicts.” 2023 WL 3020489, at *11. In 20 all three cases, “an auto manufacturer was sued for concealing damage, or in one case, a 21 transmission defect, that affected a vehicle purchased by the plaintiffs” and “awards of $50,000, 22 $150,000, and $175,000 were upheld on appeal.” Id. In reaching its holding, the court also relied 23 on plaintiff’s allegations of fraud in the complaint showing “a pattern or practice of misconduct.” 24 Id. However, it did not rely exclusively on the allegations in the complaint but rather explained 25 that defendant’s reference to similar cases “reinforce[d] the conclusion that [defendant] has 26 shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that punitive damages contribute at least $20,873.89 27 to the amount in controversy. Id. 28 Though there are various allegations of fraud in the complaint, (Doc. 1-3 at 8–11), 1 Defendant nonetheless fails to offer any evidence or “reinforce[] the conclusion” that $40,432.74 2 in punitive damages is warranted in this case. (Doc. 1 at 6); Amavizca, 2023 WL 3020489, at 3 *11. This Court notes that $40,432 is the exact sum of Defendant’s alleged restitution amount, 4 (Doc. 1 at 6), which means that the proffered sum is a one-to-one ratio of punitive to 5 compensatory damages. However, as Amavizca explains, the one-to-one ratio can, in some cases, 6 serve as the “constitutional maximum” and there is “no fixed formula that requires a court to set 7 punitive damages equal to compensatory damages whenever compensatory damages are 8 substantial.” 2023 WL 3020489, at *11 (citing Contreras-Velazquez, 62 Cal. App. 5th at 109). 9 In other words, even considering Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud, Defendant offers no evidence to 10 prove that Plaintiff would receive the constitutional maximum, or the equivalent of compensatory 11 damages, in this instance. 5 Id.; see also Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 12 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1200–1201 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (explaining that, in the context of insurance bad 13 faith claims, defendant’s burden upon removal “cannot be met simply by pointing out that the 14 complaint seeks punitive damages and that any damages awarded under such a claim could total a 15 large sum of money”). Thus, Defendant fails to prove punitive damages for AIC by a 16 preponderance of evidence. 17 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 18 Without sufficient evidence to calculate the use offset, Defendant’s estimated actual 19 damages as to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims are uncertain, thereby rendering the number of 20 civil penalties equally uncertain. Defendant also fails to prove punitive damages as to Plaintiff’s 21 5 Defendant cites the Central District of California to argue that it need not “pinpoint an amount of punitive damages” 22 in instances where Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims fall short of the AIC threshold, because such “shortfall would not be great and is easily made up by punitive damages available through the fraud claim.” (Doc. 1 at 5); see In re Ford 23 Motor Co. DPS6 Powershift Transmission Products Liab. Litig., No. 18-ML-02814 AB (FFMX), 2018 WL 5905942, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2018). However, as explained above, this is not an instance where Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly 24 claims fall short of the AIC threshold, but rather an instance where Defendant fails to prove AIC by the preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, In re Ford Motor Co., the court also assessed analogous state court cases, 25 “which alleged the same claims based on an allegedly defective DPS6 transmission.” 2018 WL 5905942, at *4. The court explained that because in those cases, plaintiff’s counsel “calculate[ed] punitive damages to be [nine] times the 26 restitutionary amount” and “the jury awarded punitive damages of $500,000,” such evidence was sufficient to prove punitive damages for AIC in the instant case. Id (“Given that these cases are nearly identical to the cases before this 27 Court, the Court finds that this evidence establishes by a preponderance that the punitive damages claim is sufficient to at least make up any difference between the compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees put in issue by the Song- 28 Beverly claims, and the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold.”). Here, Defendant fails to provide analogous cases for this 1 | fraud claims and the estimated number of attorneys’ fees by the preponderance of the evidence. 2 | Accordingly, Defendant has not met its burden of proving AIC for diversity jurisdiction upon 3 | removal. For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS: 4 1. Plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc. 9) under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is GRANTED. 5 2. The Clerk of Court is directed to remand this case to the Kern County Superior Court. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: _ October 31, 2025 Cerin | Tower TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16