1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE 8 EDUARDO POPULUS-REVUELTA, 2:26-cv-00636-RAJ 9 Petitioner, 10 ORDER GRANTING IN PART v. HABEAS PETITION
11 BRUCE SCOTT, Warden, Northwest ICE Processing Center, et al., 12
Respondents. 13
14 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner Eduardo Populus-Revuelta’s 17 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition,” Dkt. # 1). 18 Petitioner seeks immediate release or release upon a “reasonable ICE bond,” and an order 19 prohibiting his transfer outside the Western District of Washington during the pendency of 20 this action. Dkt. # 1 at 7. Respondents filed a Return opposing Petitioner’s requests for 21 relief and seeking dismissal of the Petition (the “Return,” Dkt. # 4), along with the 22 supporting declaration of a Deportation Officer employed by U.S. Immigration and 23 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) (the “Correa Declaration,” Dkt. # 5). For the reasons set 24 forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition. 25 1 II. BACKGROUND1 2 Petitioner Eduardo Populus-Revuelta was born in Veracruz, Mexico in 1960. Dkt. 3 # 1 at 2. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on or about 4 January 5, 1966, and has lived in the United States ever since. Id.; Dkt. # 5 ¶ 3. Petitioner 5 is married to a U.S. citizen and has nine children who are citizens. Dkt. # 1 at 2. He 6 previously maintained employment in the mortgage industry and as a handyman. Id. at 3. 7 On July 10, 2016, Petitioner was arrested by the Spokane County Sheriff’s Office 8 for the offense of Rape of a Child First Degree – Attempt, RCW 9A.44.073. Dkt. # 5 ¶ 9 4(a). Petitioner represents that a plea offer was presented in connection with this charge, 10 but that immigration consequences were not discussed before the offer was rejected. Dkt. 11 # 1 at 4. On October 15, 2019, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of Attempted 12 Rape of a Child in the First Degree and sentenced to 81 months of incarceration and lifetime 13 community custody. Id. at 3; Dkt. # 5 ¶ 4(a). The record reflects that Petitioner served 14 approximately 72 months of this sentence before being released directly into ICE custody 15 pursuant to a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) on October 20, 2025. Dkt. # 1 at 3; Dkt. # 5 ¶ 5. 16 Petitioner reports that he has no criminal history except for his 2019 conviction, and that 17 he “received only positive behavioral reports” during his incarceration. Dkt. # 1 at 3. 18 Petitioner’s NTA charges him as removable under Sections 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 19 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), on the bases of his 20 conviction of an aggravated felony and of a crime of child abuse, respectively. Dkt. # 5 ¶ 21 5. On December 3, 2025, Petitioner filed an Application for Asylum, Withholding of 22 Removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture in the Tacoma, Washington 23 Immigration Court. Id. ¶ 7. Petitioner filed an amended Application on February 2, 2026. 24
25 1 This factual background is drawn from the Petition, as well as uncontroverted information from the Return and the Correa Declaration. 1 Id. On February 4, 2026, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s Application and 2 ordered Petitioner removed to Mexico. Id. ¶ 9; Dkt. # 1 at 3. On February 24, 2026, 3 Petitioner appealed his removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”); 4 Petitioner’s appeal remains pending. Dkt. # 1 at 3; Dkt. # 5 ¶ 10. Petitioner has not 5 requested a bond hearing in his proceedings before the Immigration Court, and explains 6 that he has not done so because the IJ lacks jurisdiction to grant bond. Dkt. # 1 at 6; Dkt. 7 # 5 ¶ 11; Dkt. # 6 at 2. 8 On the basis of the foregoing, Petitioner asserts that his continued detention violates 9 due process, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Dkt. # 1 at 10 6–7. Petitioner therefore requests that the Court order his immediate release or 11 alternatively release him on a “reasonable ICE bond,” and enter a non-transfer order 12 prohibiting removal from the Western District of Washington during the pendency of this 13 action without prior notice. Dkt. # 1 at 7. 14 15 III. LEGAL STANDARD 16 “Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . the district courts . . . within their 17 respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The district courts’ habeas jurisdiction 18 includes challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687. A 19 petitioner may seek habeas relief by showing that he or she is “in custody in violation of 20 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). The 21 petitioner bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Davis v. 22 Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). 23 IV. DISCUSSION 24 A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention 25 Petitioner challenges his “post-order” detention as “unlawful[ly] prolonged” under 1 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and Zadvydas. Dkt. # 1 at 2, 5–7. However, as Respondents correctly 2 note, Petitioner is detained under Section 1226(c) of the INA, not Section 1231(a). Dkt. # 3 4 at 1–2. Because Petitioner’s February 4, 2026 removal order remains pending before the 4 BIA, it is not yet final and Petitioner is therefore not yet subject to Section 1231(a) of the 5 INA. See Dkt. # 5 ¶¶ 9–10; Ho v. Noem, No. C25-2222-RSM-MLP, 2025 WL 3466923, 6 at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 24, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. C25-2222- 7 RSM, 2025 WL 3471855 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 3, 2025) (petitioner was “not yet subject to a 8 final order of removal and, thus . . . not subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a)” 9 while his appeal remained pending with the BIA). Petitioner concedes on Reply that he is 10 detained pursuant to Section 1226(c) pending the BIA’s resolution of his appeal. Dkt. # 6 11 at 1. In light of the parties’ agreement regarding the statutory basis for Petitioner’s current 12 detention, the Court assumes that Petitioner’s detention is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 13 B. Administrative Exhaustion 14 Respondents argue that this Court should deny the Petition because Petitioner has 15 not exhausted his administrative remedies by seeking a custody redetermination hearing 16 before an IJ. Dkt. # 4 at 3. Petitioner responds that exhaustion is not required because the 17 IJ lacks jurisdiction to grant bond to a detainee held under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Dkt. # 6 at 18 2 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(D)). The exhaustion requirement is “prudential, rather 19 than jurisdictional,” and a court may waive the requirement if “administrative remedies are 20 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, 21 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Hernandez 22 v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 23 The Court finds that requiring Petitioner to request a custody redetermination or 24 bond hearing before an IJ, only to be denied one pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), would be 25 “an exercise in futility.” See E.C. v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-01789-RFB-BNW, 2025 WL 1 2916264, at *8 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2025) (citation omitted) (waiving exhaustion where 2 government argued that petitioner should be required to request custody redetermination 3 hearing, despite binding BIA decision precluding IJ from finding it has jurisdiction to 4 consider bond). If Petitioner requests a custody redetermination, the IJ would be forced to 5 conclude that it lacked jurisdiction to consider bond under Section 1226(c), rendering 6 habeas relief the only meaningful avenue available to Petitioner to challenge the 7 constitutionality of his ongoing detention. Id. at *10; see also Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 8 1:25-CV-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *4 n.7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) 9 (waiving prudential exhaustion requirement due to futility because petitioner was 10 mandatorily detained under the INA and was therefore ineligible for a bond hearing); 11 Crispin M. C. v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-01487-KES-HBK (HC), 2026 WL 70553, at *3 n.5 12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2026) (similar). 13 The authority upon which Respondents rely does not disturb the Court’s conclusion. 14 See Dkt. # 4 at 3 (citing Cristobal v. Asher, No. C20-1493-RSM-BAT, 2020 WL 8678097, 15 at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 14, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. C20-1493- 16 RSM-BAT, 2021 WL 796597 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 2021)). The petitioner in Cristobal 17 was detained pursuant to Section 1226(a) and failed to seek bond redetermination on the 18 basis of changed circumstances after a prior denial by the IJ. 2020 WL 8678097, at *3. 19 The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments that a bond redetermination request would be 20 futile on the bases that (1) the respondents disputed the presence of a material change in 21 circumstances; and (2) the requested hearing would “contravene[] immigration agency 22 policy and shift[] the burden of detention upon the agency.” Id. Here, Petitioner does not 23 seek to circumvent the administrative process based on a factual dispute or a desire to alter 24 the burden of proof—he is simply unable to obtain a bond hearing from an IJ given the 25 statutory basis for his detention. Unlike in Cristobal, the Court here need not “guess at 1 what the IJ would do if petitioner requested redetermination”—in this case, it is clear that 2 the IJ will deny a bond hearing due to its lack of jurisdiction. Id. As such, “pursuit of 3 administrative remedies would almost certainly be futile” in this case. Gurrola v. Cruz, 4 No. 1:25-CV-02078-JLT-HBK (HC), 2026 WL 494478, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2026), 5 report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Herredia Gurrola v. Cruz, No. 1:25-CV- 6 02078 JLT HBK (HC), 2026 WL 622124 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026)). 7 Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion to waive the requirement of 8 prudential exhaustion in this case, and proceeds to the merits of Petitioner’s due process 9 claim. 10 C. Due Process 11 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court held that “the 12 Government may constitutionally detain” noncitizens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 13 1226(c) “during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.” Id. at 530. 14 The Court reasoned that mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) is typically “brief” 15 and “has a definite termination point” usually resulting in detention of less than five months 16 (the petitioner in Demore had been detained for six months). Id. at 513, 529–31. In the 17 years following the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore, the Ninth Circuit has declined 18 to resolve the question of whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens 19 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). See Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 20 2022), judgment vacated on other grounds, 144 S.Ct. 1339 (2024) (“Whether due process 21 requires a bond hearing for [noncitizens] detained under § 1226(c) is not before us today. 22 And we take no position on that question.”). However, many district courts, including 23 within this District, “agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal 24 proceedings, without a bond hearing, ‘will—at some point—violate the right to due 25 process.’” Martinez v. Clark, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), report 1 and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019) (quoting 2 Sajous v. Decker, 2018 WL 2357266, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) and collecting 3 cases)). In cases involving noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(c) who have yet to 4 receive a bond hearing, courts in this District apply a “multi-factor analysis . . . to determine 5 whether § 1226(c) detention has become unreasonable” and therefore violates due process. 6 Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9. Under this analysis, known as “the Martinez test,” 7 courts consider the following factors: 8 (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) whether the detention will exceed the time the petitioner spent in prison for the 9 crime that made him [or her] removable; (4) the nature of the crimes the petitioner 10 committed; (5) the conditions of detention; (6) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner; (7) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the 11 government; and (8) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final 12 order of removal. Id. 13 The Court therefore proceeds to apply each of the eight Martinez factors to 14 Petitioner’s detention. 15 16 1. Length of Detention to Date 17 The first factor, the length of detention to date, is the most important of the eight 18 Martinez factors. 2019 WL 5968089, at *9. The longer that mandatory detention continues 19 beyond the “brief” period authorized in Demore, the more likely it is to contravene due 20 process without the opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Id. (citations omitted). 21 In this case, Petitioner has been detained for approximately six months. Accordingly, the 22 first Martinez factor weighs slightly in favor of Petitioner. See Odimara v. Bostock, No. 23 C24-572, 2024 WL 3862256, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 12, 2024) (“Petitioner was detained 24 for four months at the time he filed his Petition, and his detention has now extended to 25 approximately six months . . . [T]his first factor is neutral or, at most, weighs slightly in 1 favor of [petitioner].”) 2 2. Likely Duration of Future Detention 3 The second Martinez factor requires the Court to consider “how long the detention 4 is likely to continue absent judicial intervention; in other words, the anticipated duration of 5 all removal proceedings including administrative and judicial appeals.” 2019 WL 6 5968089, at *9. Respondents summarily argue that “Petitioner’s removal proceedings are 7 not expected to last much longer” based on the IJ’s order of Petitioner’s removal and denial 8 of his claims for relief. Dkt. # 4 at 4. However, as Respondents acknowledge, Petitioner 9 filed an appeal of the IJ’s removal order to the BIA on February 24, 2026. Id.; Dkt. # 5 ¶ 10 10. As a court in this District recently found, BIA appeals may take over six months. 11 Toktosunov v. Wamsley, No. 2:25-CV-1724-TL, 2025 WL 3492858, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 12 Dec. 5, 2025).2 Furthermore, if the BIA denies Petitioner’s appeal, he may seek review in 13 the Ninth Circuit, and this appellate process may take an additional two years or longer. 14 Hong v. Mayorkas, No. 20-CV-01784-LK, 2022 WL 1078627, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 15 2022). 16 Courts in this District have found that, where a petitioner has already filed a BIA or 17 Ninth Circuit appeal, the second factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. See Bojorge-Sequeira 18 v. Geo Grp. Inc., No. 2:25-CV-01807-KKE-GJL, 2026 WL 288378, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 19 Jan. 15, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:25-CV-01807-KKE-GJL, 2026 20 2 Toktosunov involved a claim of prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and the 21 court therefore applied the six-factor test articulated in Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2019). However, the Banda test is “nearly identical” to the Martinez test, except that 22 it omits the two factors related to the petitioner’s criminal history and detention. See Rahmani v. Bondi, No. C26-362-KKE, 2026 WL 638364, at *4 n.1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2026). The six Banda 23 factors are “derived directly from Martinez,” and “the analysis under each factor is the same 24 regardless of whether it is in the context of the six-factor Banda test or all eight Martinez factors.” Hong v. Mayorkas, No. 20-CV-01784-LK, 2022 WL 1078627, at *4 n.3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 25 2022). The Court therefore relies on cases applying both the Banda test and the Martinez test throughout this Order. 1 WL 285657 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2026) (collecting cases involving already-filed Ninth 2 Circuit petitions for review, and finding that second factor favored the petitioner in light of 3 his pending BIA filing). This Court agrees and finds that the second Martinez factor weighs 4 in Petitioner’s favor “[g]iven the length of time the appeals process can take.” Id. 5 3. Length of Criminal Detention 6 Under the third Martinez factor, the Court reviews the length of detention compared 7 to the time the petitioner spent in prison for the crime that made him removable. 2019 WL 8 5968089, at *9. Here, the record reflects that Petitioner served approximately 72 months 9 in prison for his conviction of attempted first degree rape of a child in violation of 10 Washington state law. Dkt. # 1 at 3; Dkt. # 5 ¶ 4–5 (citing RCW 9A.44.073). At this stage, 11 the length of Petitioner’s current detention (approximately six months) remains 12 significantly shorter than the length of his criminal sentence. Accordingly, this factor 13 weighs in favor of Respondents. 14 4. Nature of Criminal Offense 15 The fourth factor requires the Court to consider the nature of the crimes that 16 petitioner committed. Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9. Petitioner was convicted by a 17 jury of attempted first degree rape of a child. Dkt. # 5 ¶ 4. Rape of a child in the first 18 degree is a class A felony in Washington state. RCW 9A.44.073(2). The Correa 19 Declaration indicates that Petitioner’s counsel acknowledged at an immigration court 20 hearing that Petitioner has been convicted of a “particularly serious crime.” Id. ¶ 8. 21 Petitioner does not contest this characterization in his Reply, but notes that he has “never 22 had any other criminal history whatsoever” and is actively pursuing post-conviction relief. 23 Dkt. # 1 at 3–4; see generally Dkt. # 6. Based on its review of the record as a whole, the 24 Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of Respondents. 25 1 5. Conditions of Detention 2 Under the fifth Martinez factor, the Court considers the conditions of the detention 3 facility where the petitioner is detained. 2019 WL 5968089, at *9. “The more that the 4 conditions under which the [non-citizen] is being held resemble penal confinement, the 5 stronger [the] argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing.” Juarez v. Wolf, No. C20- 6 1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021), report and 7 recommendation adopted, No. 20-1660 RJB - MLP, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash. June 8 7, 2021) (quoting Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 860 (D. Minn. 2019)). While 9 neither party makes any specific arguments regarding the conditions of Petitioner’s 10 detention at NWIPC, courts in this District have recently found that conditions at NWIPC 11 resemble those in many prisons and jails. See Gomez v. ICE Field Off. Dir., No. 2:25-CV- 12 02242-TL-TLF, 2026 WL 449536, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2026), report and 13 recommendation adopted sub nom. Osuna Gomez v. ICE Field Off. Dir. & Facility Adm’r, 14 No. 2:25-CV-02242-TL-TLF, 2026 WL 447409 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 17, 2026) (collecting 15 cases). Accordingly, this factor favors Petitioner. 16 6. Delays in Removal Proceedings 17 Under the sixth and seventh Martinez factors, the Court considers “the nature and 18 extent of any delays in the removal proceedings caused by petitioner and the government, 19 respectively.” 2019 WL 5968089, at *10. Petitioners detained in immigration custody are 20 “entitled to raise legitimate defenses to removal,” and these challenges “cannot undermine 21 [a] claim that detention has become unreasonable.” Id. (citing Liban M.J. v. Sec’y of Dep't 22 of Homeland Sec., 367 F. Supp. 3d 959, 965 (D. Minn. 2019)). The sixth factor, therefore, 23 only weighs against a petitioner who “has ‘substantially prolonged his stay by abusing the 24 processes provided,’” not one who has “simply made use of the statutorily permitted 25 appeals process.” Gomez, 2026 WL 449536, at *5 (quoting Hechavarria v. Sessions, 891 1 F.3d 49, 56 n.6 (2d Cir. 2018)). In this case, Petitioner has filed an appeal to the BIA, and 2 further states that he is pursuing post-conviction relief in connection with the offense that 3 the Government contends renders him removable. However, Respondents make no 4 allegations that Petitioner has unduly delayed his removal proceedings. See generally Dkt. 5 # 4. Based on the available record, the Court has no basis to conclude that Petitioner’s 6 pursuit of relief from removal reflects any abuse of process. 7 With respect to the Government, “[i]f immigration officials have caused delay, it 8 weighs in favor of finding continued detention unreasonable . . . [c]ontinued detention will 9 also appear more unreasonable when the delay in the proceedings was caused by the 10 immigration court or other non-ICE government officials.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, 11 at *10 (citing Sajous, 2018 WL 2357266, at *11). Here, there is no allegation or evidence 12 of undue delay caused by Respondents. Accordingly, the Court finds that the sixth and 13 seventh Martinez factors weigh neutrally. 14 7. Likelihood Removal Proceedings Will Result in a Final Order of Removal 15 Finally, the Court considers the eighth Martinez factor, “the likelihood that the 16 removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal.” 2019 WL 5968089, at *10. 17 “Where a noncitizen has not asserted any grounds for relief from removal, presumably the 18 noncitizen will be removed from the United States, and continued detention will at least 19 marginally serve the purpose of detention, namely assuring the noncitizen is removed as 20 ordered.” Id. (citing Sajous, 2018 WL 2357266, at *11). On the other hand, “where a 21 noncitizen has asserted a good faith challenge to removal, ‘the categorical nature of the 22 detention will become increasingly unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 23 486, 495 (1st Cir. 2016)). 24 In this case, Petitioner is pursuing an appeal of his removal order before the BIA. 25 This Court joins other courts in this District in declining to speculate as to the likelihood 1 of Petitioner’s success on appeal. See, e.g., Gomez, 2026 WL 449536, at *6; Murillo- 2 Chavez v. Garland, No. C22-303-LK-MLP, 2022 WL 16555994, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 3 30, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-CV-0303-LK, 2022 WL 4 16553176 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2022) (“[I]n the absence of any evidence Petitioner’s 5 appeal is frivolous or taken in bad faith, the court concludes this factor is neutral.”); Juarez, 6 2021 WL 2323436, at *7 (finding factor neutral where the petitioner’s appeal was pending 7 and the court was “unwilling to conclude, based on the record before it, that the appeal is 8 frivolous or that Petitioner will not ultimately prevail.”). The Court therefore finds that the 9 eighth Martinez factor is neutral. 10 8. Weighing the Factors 11 As reflected in the above discussion, three of the Martinez factors weigh in favor of 12 granting Petitioner a bond hearing, two factors weigh in Respondents’ favor, and the 13 remaining factors are neutral. The Court thus concludes that Petitioner’s continued 14 mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) has become unreasonable and violates due 15 process. 16 While Petitioner requests immediate release from custody, or release upon a 17 “reasonable ICE bond,” Dkt. # 1 at 7, there is “no authority supporting [his] claim that he 18 is entitled to an order of release.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *10. Rather, the 19 appropriate remedy is an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. See 20 Maliwat v. Scott, No. 2:25-CV-00788-TMC, 2025 WL 2256711, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21 7, 2025) (collecting cases). At the bond hearing, Respondents must be required to meet 22 the clear and convincing standard of proof to justify Petitioner’s continued detention, 23 consistent with Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). See Maliwat, 2025 WL 24 2256711, at *10; Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2024) (concluding 25 that the BIA applied the correct legal standard in requiring the government to prove by 1 clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen detained under Section 1226(c) was a 2 danger to the community). If Respondents fail to provide Petitioner with a constitutionally 3 adequate bond hearing within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, Respondents 4 must immediately release Petitioner from custody. See Barrios Osorio v. Bondi, No. 2:26- 5 CV-00317-JNW, 2026 WL 607765, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2026) (citation omitted). 6 D. Petitioner’s Request for Order Preventing Transfer 7 With respect to Petitioner’s request for an order “prohibiting removal from this 8 District during the pendency of this action without 48-hour notice to Petitioner and 9 counsel,” Dkt. # 1 at 7, the Court construes this request as seeking an order requiring pre- 10 transfer notice until Petitioner receives habeas relief. Toribio v. Scott, No. 2:25-CV-02540- 11 TMC, 2025 WL 3906472, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2025). This request will be moot 12 once this Order partially granting habeas relief is entered. Id. 13 V. CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 15 1. The Petition is GRANTED IN PART. Dkt. # 1. 16 2. Respondents’ request that the Petition be dismissed is DENIED IN PART. Dkt. 17 # 4. 18 3. Respondents are ordered to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond 19 hearing that complies with the requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 20 (9th Cir. 2011), within fourteen (14) calendar days of this Order. 21 4. Within two (2) business days of the bond hearing, Respondents shall file a status 22 report confirming compliance with this Order. The status report shall detail if 23 and when the ordered bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and 24 if denied, the reasons for that denial. 25 5. If Respondents fail to provide Petitioner with a constitutionally adequate bond 1 hearing within fourteen (14) calendar days of this Order, Respondents shall 2 immediately release Petitioner from custody under reasonable conditions of 3 supervision. Respondents shall file with the Court a notice confirming 4 Petitioner’s release within two (2) business days of release. 5 6. All other requested relief is DENIED without prejudice, as set forth in this 6 Order. 7 Dated this 20th day of April, 2026.
8 A 9
10 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16
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