Edna G. Randall, Administratrix of the Estate of Francis E. Randall, Deceased v. United States

282 F.2d 287, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 317, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3966
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJuly 21, 1960
Docket15227_1
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 282 F.2d 287 (Edna G. Randall, Administratrix of the Estate of Francis E. Randall, Deceased v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Edna G. Randall, Administratrix of the Estate of Francis E. Randall, Deceased v. United States, 282 F.2d 287, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 317, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3966 (D.C. Cir. 1960).

Opinions

EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.

Francis E. Randall, a government employee traveling on government business, was killed in an airplane accident due to the negligence of a pilot employed by Eastern Air Lines and of a control tower operator employed by the United States. As her husband’s executrix, his widow sued Eastern and agreed to a $37,500 settlement. Eastern paid the money into court, because the United States asserted a lien for the amount it had paid the widow as compensation under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act. The District Court sustained the claim of the United States, and the widow appeals.

[288]*288Section 27 of the Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 747-748, 5 U.S.C.A. § 777, provides that “if an injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the United States to pay damages therefor, and a beneficiary entitled to compensation from the United States for such injury or death receives, as a result of a suit brought by him or on his behalf, or as a result of a settlement made by him or on his behalf, any money or other property in satisfaction of the liability of such other person, such beneficiary shall, after deducting the costs of suit and a reasonable attorney’s fee, apply the money or other property so received in the following manner: (A) If his compensation has been paid in whole or in part, he shall refund to the United States the amount of compensation which has been paid by the United States * *• *

It is not disputed that Randall’s death was “caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in” Eastern. In our opinion the suit of the administratrix against Eastern was brought, and her settlement with Eastern was made, either wholly or partly on “behalf” of Randall’s widow. The wrongful death statute of the District of Columbia forbids “payment of the debts or liabilities” of the deceased out of money recovered by an administrator because of a wrongful death. D.C.Code § 16-1203. The entire amount recovered is to be allocated “to the spouse and next of kin * * * according to the finding of damage to said spouse and next of kin.” D.C.Code § 16-1201. In the absence of such a finding, the widow and the next of kin, if any, are to share in the amount according to the statute of distribution. D.C. Code § 16-1203; see §§ 18-702 to 18-704.

It follows that the United States is entitled to the statutory refund, but only to the extent that it does not exceed the widow’s share of Eastern’s payment. We think it immaterial that a government employee’s negligence was one cause of Randall’s death. We find nothing in § 27 of the Compensation Act to suggest that when the negligence of one government employee causes an accident to another government employee for which the United States pays compensation, the beneficiary is excused from refunding the compensation to the United States out of money the beneficiary receives “in satisfaction of the liability of [an] other person.” In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 411-412, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143, the Supreme Court upheld the right of a negligent private employer, in similar circumstances, to a refund of compensation that had been paid under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901. There are cases to the same effect under similar State compensation acts; e. g., Cyr v. F. S. Payne Co., D.C.Conn., 112 F.Supp. 526, 530-531. These acts are not intended to allow a beneficiary what amounts to a double recovery on account of the injury or death of an employee, in order to punish his employer for the negligence of another employee.

The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and remanded.

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282 F.2d 287, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 317, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3966, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/edna-g-randall-administratrix-of-the-estate-of-francis-e-randall-cadc-1960.