Edmonsond v. Brookwood Community

114 F. App'x 148

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: November 22, 2004
• Docket: 04-20315
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Sam Edmonsond has appealed the district court’s order and judgment granting the motion for summary judgment of The Brookwood Community (“Brookwood”) and dismissing his action under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) complaining that he had been discharged wrongfully in retaliation for taking temporary leave for medical reasons. “The FMLA requires a covered employer to allow an eligible employee up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave if the employee suffers from ‘a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.’ ” Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D)). Under the FMLA, an employer may not penalize an employee for exercise of FMLA rights. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l)-(2)).

The district court’s conclusions that Edmonsond had established a prima facie case for retaliation under the FMLA and that Brookwood has articulated legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for its adverse employment decision are not at issue. See Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., Inc., 179 F.3d 316, 319-20 (5th Cir.1999). Because Brookwood has rebutted Edmonsond’s prima facie case, to avoid summary judgment, Edmonsond “must produce substantial probative evidence that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision and that the real reason was the plaintiffs participation in the protected activity.” Id. at 320. Edmonsond’s excessive absenteeism and poor job performance provided legitimate reasons for his discharge. See Hypes ex rel. Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 726-27 (5th Cir.1998). Edmonsond has not presented substantial probative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue whether Brookwood retaliated against him for taking FMLA-protected medical leave. The judgment is

AFFIRMED.

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.