Edgerton v. Maine Ctr. on Deafness

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedFebruary 5, 2008
DocketCUMcv-07-139
StatusUnpublished

This text of Edgerton v. Maine Ctr. on Deafness (Edgerton v. Maine Ctr. on Deafness) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Edgerton v. Maine Ctr. on Deafness, (Me. Super. Ct. 2008).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE :0 SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. . CIVIL ACTION '. DOCKET NO: CV-07-139 . ,~ ,r: ~ [1 h .V -' 812 f\ C-- (' v.j'('l-;J /.;::,0·;'. 00,:/« - ...."'. ------! , ...

MARY EDGERTON,

Plaintiff, ORDER v.

MAINE CENTER ON DEAFNESS, DONALD L GARB RECHT LAW LIBRARY Defendant. FEB 1 ~) 2008

This case comes before the Court on Defendant Maine Center on Deafness

(MCD's) Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56.

BACKGROUND The issues in this case arise from the July 19, 2005 employment

termination of Plaintiff Mary Edgerton (Ms. Edgerton) by the then Executive

Director of MCD, Mr. Jonathan Connick (Mr. Connick). MCD is a nonprofit

organization that serves people in Maine who are D / deaf, late-deafened or hard­

of-hearing. Ms. Edgerton asserts that she was fired in violation of Maine's

Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 26 M.R.S.A. §§ 831-840 (WPA). 1

1 The WPA states in pertinent part:

§833. Discrimination against certain employees prohibited

1. Discrimination prohibited. No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of employment because: A. The employee, acting in good faith, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports orally or in writing to the employer or a public body what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a violation of a law or rule adopted under the laws of this State, a political subdivision of this State or the United States; B. . c . 1 Ms. Edgerton was employed as MCD's Director of Civil Rights from

September 1997 through July 19, 2005. Mr. Connick was MCD's Executive

Director during that time and Ms. Edgerton's supervisor.

Not long after her tenure at MCD began, Ms. Edgerton began to have

concerns about Mr. Connick's work performance. Specific concerns that may be

pertinent to a WPA claim are 1) that Mr. Connick wrote and circulated a

memorandum to staff that limited staff access to the board of directors in

violation of 13-B M.R.S.A. § 701;2 and 2) that Mr. Connick unlawfully allocated

MCD funds.

Ms. Edgerton reported her concerns variously to Mr. Connick directly, to

Mr. Larry Taub (Mr. Taub), President of the MCD Board of Directors and

Superintendent for the Governor Baxter School for the Deaf, and to Ms. Jan

DeVinney (Ms. DeVinney), Director of the Division of Deafness at the Maine

D .

E .

2. Initial report to employer required; exception. Subsection 1 does not apply to an employee who has reported or caused to be reported a violation, or unsafe condition or practice to a public body, unless the employee has first brought the alleged violation, condition or practice to the attention of a person having supervisory authority with the employer and has allowed the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct that violation, condition or practice. Prior notice to an employer is not required if the employee has specific reason to believe that reports to the employer will not result in promptly correcting the violation, condition or practice.

2 The memo, which Ms. Edgerton asserts is in violation of 13-B M.R.S.A § 701, stated:

Any internal issues with MCD administration must be discussed with Executive Director as set forth in the Personnel Policy Procedures, and no outside discussion with any Board Members will be tolerated.

Def. SMF

2 Department of Labor/Bureau of Rehabilitation Services. Ms. DeVinney allotted

State contracts to MCD.

Ms. Edgerton's reports are characterized by MCD as openly critical,

insubordinate behavior that rightfully led to her dismissal in July 2005. Ms.

Edgerton characterizes the reports as her protected right, under the WPA, to

apprise the Board of Directors and the State agency of possible illegal activities

by Mr. Connick.

The discord reached its apex in July 2005 when, MCD asserts, Ms.

Edgerton's "open and obvious disrespect" for Mr. Connick made it impossible

for him to work with her and led him to consult an attorney and an outside

consultant regarding Ms. Edgerton's possible termination. Def. SMF <[34. MCD

asserts that the decision to fire Ms. Edgerton was made on July 14, 2005. On July

18, 2005, Ms. Edgerton met with Mr. Taub and laid out her continued concerns

regarding Mr. Connick's work performance. She was terminated on July 19,

2005.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where there exist no genuine issues of

material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, <[ 4, 770

A.2d 653, 655. A genuine issue is raised "when sufficient evidence requires a

fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." Parrish v.

Wright, 2003 ME 90, <[ 8, 828 A.2d 778, 781. A material fact is a fact that has "the

potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, <[ 6, 750

3 A.2d 573, 575. "If material facts are disputed, the dispute must be resolved

through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, <]I 7, 784 A.2d 18, 22.

When a defendant seeks summary judgment, a "plaintiff must establish a

prima facie case for each element of her cause of action." Champagne v. Mid­

Maine Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, <]I 9, 711 A.2d 842, 845. At this stage, the facts are

reviewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Lightfoot v. Sch.

Admin. Dist. No. 35, 2003 ME 24, <]I 6, 816 A.2d 63, 65.

II. Whistleblowers' Protection Act

MCD moves for summary judgment asserting that Ms. Edgerton's actions

are not protected activities under the WPA, or alternatively that no causal link

exists between her firing and any alleged protected activity. In order to "prevail

on a WPA claim, an employee must show that 1) [s]he engaged in activity

protected by the WPA; (2) [s]he experienced an adverse employment action; and

(3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action." Currie v. Industrial Security, Inc., 2007 ME 12, <]I 12, 915 A.2d

400,404 (citations omitted). To survive summary judgment Ms. Edgerton must

establish a prima facie case for each of the three elements. Champagne, 1998 ME

87, <]I 9, 711 A.2d at 845.

a. Protected Activity

Ms. Edgerton asserts that her reports to Ms. DeVinney and the MCD

Board of Directors were protected because they alleged that Mr. Connick had

engaged in illegal activities. Under the WPA an employer is prohibited from

"terminating an employee for reporting illegal activities." Bard v. Bath Iron Works

Corp., 590 A.2d 152, 154 (Me. 1991). Accordingly, to bring a claim under the

WPA, an employee must meet the threshold burden of showing "that [s]he had

4 'reasonable cause to believe' that [her employer] had violated [a] 'law or rule

adopted under the laws of this State, a political subdivision of this State or the

United States."' Id. (quoting 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1)(A)).

The issue thus becomes not whether or not Mr. Connick's actions were in

fact illegal, but whether Ms. Edgerton could reasonably have believed that her

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Related

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Bishop v. Bell Atlantic Corp.
299 F.3d 53 (First Circuit, 2002)
DiCentes v. Michaud
1998 ME 227 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
Burdzel v. Sobus
2000 ME 84 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2000)
Parrish v. Wright
2003 ME 90 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2003)
Currie v. Industrial Security, Inc.
2007 ME 12 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2007)
Champagne v. Mid-Maine Medical Center
1998 ME 87 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
Curtis v. Porter
2001 ME 158 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)
Lightfoot v. School Administrative District No. 35
2003 ME 24 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2003)
Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp.
2001 ME 77 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)
Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp.
590 A.2d 152 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1991)
Kaplan v. Epstein
3 A.2d 573 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1939)

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