IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Edgar R. Martinez-Orta, FILED Appellant-Defendant Mar 18 2025, 8:50 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court v. Court of Appeals and Tax Court
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
March 18, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-1456 Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court The Honorable Michael A. Morrissey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D06-2212-CM-3175
Opinion by Judge Foley Judges May and Weissmann concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 1 of 15 Foley, Judge.
[1] Edgar R. Martinez-Orta (“Martinez-Orta”) was convicted after a bench trial of
operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent (“ACE”) of .15 or
more 1 as a Class A misdemeanor and failure to dim headlights 2 as a Class C
infraction. On appeal, Martinez-Orta argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it determined that State’s Exhibit 8, the blood test results, was
admissible. He specifically asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
because:
I. The traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights because law enforcement failed to use the least intrusive means reasonably available to investigate Martinez-Orta’s traffic violation; and
II. The State failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the blood test results because Martinez-Orta claims that the State failed to prove that a nurse adhered to the foundational protocols defined in Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6.
[2] We affirm.
1 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b). 2 I.C. §§ 9-21-8-51, 9-21-8-49(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 2 of 15 Facts and Procedural History 3 [3] Around 3:20 a.m. on November 20, 2022, Indiana State Trooper Mitchell
McKinney (“Trooper McKinney”) was driving in West Lafayette, Indiana,
when he observed a vehicle driven by Martinez-Orta traveling in the opposite
direction with its high-beam headlights on. When Martinez-Orta failed to dim
his headlights as he passed Trooper McKinney, the trooper initiated a traffic
stop.
[4] For safety reasons, Trooper McKinney approached the passenger side window
and observed that Martinez-Orta was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Because
the window was closed, Trooper McKinney shined his flashlight into the
vehicle and knocked on the window to get Martinez-Orta to open it. When
Martinez-Orta opened the window, Trooper McKinney observed that he had
bloodshot, “glossy” eyes and “his speech was slow and slurred.” Tr. Vol. 2 p.
11. When questioned about where he was traveling from, Martinez-Orta stated
he had just dropped someone off but refused to say where he had been before
that. When asked if he consumed any alcohol, Martinez-Orta denied drinking
any alcohol.
[5] At that point, based on his training and experience and his observations,
Trooper McKinney believed that Martinez-Orta may have been impaired. He
3 Oral argument was heard on this case on February 25, 2025, at the Hulman Memorial Student Union at Indiana State University in Terre Haute, Indiana. We commend counsel on the excellent quality of their written and oral advocacy and thank Professor David Bolk and the University for their hospitality.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 3 of 15 asked Martinez-Orta to exit his vehicle and sit in the front passenger seat of the
patrol car while Trooper McKinney checked his license and registration and
completed paperwork. The traffic stop occurred in a dark location without
streetlights on a cold, windy night in November. Trooper McKinney asked
Martinez-Orta to sit in his patrol car because he did not want to leave him in
the driver’s seat due to the trooper’s suspicion that Martinez-Orta was impaired
and because of the cold, windy weather. While in the patrol car with Martinez-
Orta, Trooper McKinney noticed Martinez-Orta smelled of alcohol and
appeared to be trying to conceal the odor by opening the front passenger
window and exhaling outside.
[6] Trooper McKinney asked Martinez-Orta if he was willing to do standardized
field sobriety tests, and Martinez-Orta stated he would. Trooper McKinney
then administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, during which Martinez-
Orta exhibited all six possible indicators of impairment, resulting in failure of
the test. At that point, Trooper McKinney asked Martinez-Orta if he would
consent to a breathalyzer test or to a blood draw, and Martinez-Orta did not
consent to either test. Thereafter, Trooper McKinney obtained a search
warrant for a blood draw and transported Martinez-Orta to IU Health Arnett
(“IU Health”) hospital.
[7] At the hospital, registered nurse Samantha Barnett (“Barnett”) drew Martinez-
Orta’s blood at 4:38 a.m. After the blood was drawn, Barnett handed the blood
samples to Trooper McKinney, and adhering to chain of custody procedures,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 4 of 15 the blood samples were mailed to the Indiana State Department of Toxicology
for testing. Later testing revealed Martinez-Orta’s ACE was .237.
[8] On December 8, 2022, the State charged Martinez-Orta with Class C
misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated, Class A misdemeanor
operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15 or more, and Class C infraction failure
to dim headlights. Before trial, Martinez-Orta filed a motion to suppress all
evidence resulting from the traffic stop because of alleged Fourth Amendment
violations. Martinez-Orta also separately moved to suppress the blood test
results, alleging that the foundational requirements under Indiana Code section
9-30-6-6 were not met. The trial court scheduled a suppression hearing.
Martinez-Orta later filed a motion to waive jury trial and to vacate the
previously set suppression hearing, requesting that the suppression issues be
determined during the bench trial.
[9] On May 21, 2024, a bench trial was conducted, during which the trial court
determined Martinez-Orta’s suppression issues did not have merit and admitted
the blood test results, which were reflected in State’s Exhibit 8. At the
conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found Martinez-Orta not guilty of
operating while intoxicated but guilty of operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15
or more and determined he committed the infraction of failure to dim
headlights. The trial court sentenced Martinez-Orta to 365 days with 364 days
suspended to probation and imposed a fine of $500. Martinez-Orta now
appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 5 of 15 Discussion and Decision [10] During the bench trial, Martinez-Orta orally framed the issue as whether the
evidence should be suppressed. However, because Martinez-Orta now appeals
following a completed trial, the issue is appropriately framed as whether the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial. Clark v. State,
994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). An abuse of discretion involves a decision
that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before
the trial court. Cox v. State, 160 N.E.3d 557, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). We do
not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable
to the trial court’s ruling. Bell v. State, 81 N.E.3d 233, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017),
trans. denied. We also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the
defendant. Id. However, “when an appellant’s challenge to such a ruling is
predicated on an argument that impugns the constitutionality of the search or
seizure of the evidence, it raises a question of law, and we consider that
question de novo.” Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40–41 (Ind. 2014).
I. Traffic Stop [11] Martinez-Orta contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
State’s Exhibit 8, the blood test results, which were derived from the traffic stop,
because Trooper McKinney failed to use the least intrusive means reasonably
available to investigate the traffic violation. Because a traffic stop is a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement must possess at least
reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been violated or that other criminal
activity is taking place. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 6 of 15 “‘An officer’s decision to stop a vehicle is valid so long as his on-the-spot
evaluation reasonably suggests that lawbreaking occurred.’” Miller v. State, 188
N.E.3d 871, 875 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 870). “It is
unequivocal under our jurisprudence that even a minor traffic violation is
sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.”
Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). Here, Martinez-Orta does
not dispute Trooper McKinney was justified in stopping him for failure to dim
headlights; thus, our analysis turns on the reasonableness of Trooper
McKiney’s subsequent conduct.
[12] Such a detention for a minor traffic violation “must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop[,]” and “the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.”
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). A seizure that is lawful at its
inception may violate the Fourth Amendment “if its manner of execution
unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). “A seizure that is justified solely by the
interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Id.
A constitutional extension of the traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion of
some criminal activity other than the activity that prompted the original stop.
Powers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 440, 445–46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). An officer’s
decision to place someone in a squad car must be justified by some particular
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 7 of 15 circumstance that reasonably furthers a law enforcement purpose. Lucas v.
State, 15 N.E.3d 96, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
[13] Martinez-Orta argues that Trooper McKinney unlawfully extended the traffic
stop for failure to dim headlights by placing him in the trooper’s patrol car, and
therefore, any evidence discovered after such unlawful action, including the
blood test results, should not have been admitted. He asserts that Trooper
McKinney did not have any legitimate law enforcement purpose to place
Martinez-Orta in the patrol car. All in all, Martinez-Orta argues that Trooper
McKinney was not constitutionally justified in placing him in the patrol car,
and doing so made all subsequent evidence inadmissible.
[14] Here, it is undisputed that Trooper McKinney had a lawful basis for initiating
the traffic stop for failure to dim headlights. When Trooper McKinney
approached Martinez-Orta’s passenger side window to speak with him, the
window was closed, and Trooper McKinney had to shine his flashlight into the
vehicle and knock on the window to get Martinez-Orta’s attention to open the
window. Once Martinez-Orta opened the window, Trooper McKinney
observed that he had bloodshot, “glossy” eyes and “his speech was slow and
slurred.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 11. The trooper inquired as to where he was traveling
from, and Martinez-Orta stated he had just dropped someone off but refused to
say where he had been before that. At that point, Trooper McKinney testified
that he had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in that he believed that
Martinez-Orta may be intoxicated. Id. at 12. Based on the delayed reactions of
Martinez-Orta, his bloodshot and glossy eyes, slurred speech, and refusal to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 8 of 15 state where he was coming from, we conclude that reasonable suspicion existed
that Martinez-Orta may have been intoxicated.
[15] Trooper McKinney then asked Martinez-Orta to exit his vehicle and to have a
seat in the trooper’s patrol car. At that point, the traffic stop was still ongoing
as the trooper still needed to collect personal information from Martinez-Orta,
run all of that information to determine Martinez-Orta’s identity and driving
status, and write up the paperwork for the traffic infraction. Additionally,
because Trooper McKinney had reasonable suspicion that Martinez-Orta was
intoxicated, the trooper was justified in further investigating whether Martinez-
Orta was indeed intoxicated. Further, Trooper McKinney articulated a
legitimate law enforcement purpose for requesting Martinez-Orta to sit in the
patrol car because he believed it was not safe to leave Martinez-Orta in his own
car based on his suspected impairment and did not believe it was safe for
Martinez-Orta to stand on the side of the road because it was “very cold that
night and windy” and the area where they were stopped was dark with no
streetlights. Id. at 12, 16. Thus, Martinez-Orta was placed in the patrol car for
his own safety while Trooper McKinney continued his investigation into both
the traffic infraction and his suspicion that Martinez-Orta was intoxicated.
Once the two were in the patrol car, Trooper McKinney smelled the odor of
alcohol on Martinez-Orta and noticed that he appeared to be trying to conceal
the odor by opening the front passenger window and exhaling outside. This led
the trooper to obtain Martinez-Orta’s consent to administer the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test, which Martinez-Orta failed. After this failure and Martinez-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 9 of 15 Orta’s refusal to consent to a breathalyzer test or blood draw, Trooper
McKinney obtained a search warrant for a blood draw.
[16] In asserting that Trooper McKinney’s action of placing Martinez-Orta in the
patrol car violated the Fourth Amendment, Martinez-Orta asserts that the
present case is “strikingly similar” to Lucas v. State, 15 N.E.3d 96. Appellant’s
Br. p. 14. There, while driving behind the defendant, the officer ran the license
plate of the vehicle and determined that the registered owner had an expired
driver’s license, which led to the officer initiating a traffic stop. Id. at 98. After
first speaking with the defendant at her vehicle, the officer asked her to relocate
to his patrol car to discuss the expired license, and once inside his patrol car, he
detected alcohol on her breath and conducted field sobriety tests. Id. at 99. In
that case, the officer ultimately arrested the driver for operating a vehicle while
intoxicated but did not issue a citation for the expired driver’s license. Id. At
an ensuing suppression hearing, the officer admitted he could have conducted
the expired license investigation from beside the defendant’s vehicle, and he
had no safety concerns or other valid reasons for relocating the driver to his
patrol car. Id. at 104. On appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s denial of
the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, holding that the traffic stop
became unconstitutionally intrusive under the Fourth Amendment when the
officer required the defendant to move to his patrol vehicle without any
legitimate law enforcement purpose. Id. at 104–05. Because no legitimate law
enforcement purpose was articulated as a reason for placing the defendant in
the officer’s car, and the evidence of intoxication was only discovered after this
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 10 of 15 unjustified intrusion, all evidence obtained after the defendant was moved to
the patrol car had to be suppressed. Id.
[17] We find Lucas distinguishable from the present case. First, here, prior to asking
Martinez-Orta to sit in his patrol car, Trooper McKinney had already
developed reasonable suspicion that Martinez-Orta was intoxicated. Further,
unlike the officer in Lucas, Trooper McKinney identified legitimate law
enforcement purposes for placing Martinez-Orta in the patrol car, explaining
that his decision to move Martinez-Orta was motivated by his suspicion that
Martinez-Orta was intoxicated and should not be left behind the wheel, and the
fact that it was cold outside, and the area was unlit. Trooper McKinney
articulated a legitimate law enforcement purpose, and the traffic stop was not
unduly intrusive under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Therefore,
Martinez-Orta has not established that the blood test results were inadmissible
due to the nature of the traffic stop.
II. Foundation for Blood Test Results
[18] Martinez-Orta argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
the blood test results into evidence because he contends that the State failed to
lay a proper foundation for the admission of the evidence. Indiana Code
section 9-30-6-6(a) sets out the foundational requirements for the admission of
chemical tests on blood. Pursuant to that statute, blood samples collected at the
request of a law enforcement officer as part of a criminal investigation must be
obtained by “[a] person trained in . . . obtaining bodily substance samples and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 11 of 15 acting under the direction of or under a protocol prepared by a physician, or a
licensed health care professional acting within the professional’s scope of
practice and under the direction of or under a protocol prepared by a
physician[.]” Ind. Code § 9-30-6-6(a). “‘The foundation for admission of
laboratory blood drawing and testing results, by statute, involves technical
adherence to a physician’s directions or to a protocol prepared by a physician.’”
Martin v. State, 154 N.E.3d 850, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Hopkins v.
State, 579 N.E.2d 1297, 1303 (Ind. 1991)), trans. denied. “This is not a
requirement that may be ignored.” Combs v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1252, 1256 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
[19] In arguing that the State did not lay a proper foundation for admission of the
blood test results, Martinez-Orta asserts that the State did not present evidence
that Barnett acted under a protocol prepared by a physician when she drew his
blood. He contends that, because Barnett could not recite the protocol on the
stand at trial and testified that she did not have the protocol in front of her
when she completed the blood draw, an insufficient foundation was presented,
and State’s Exhibit 8, the blood test results, should not have been admitted. 4
4 At oral argument, Martinez-Orta’s counsel argued that State’s Exhibit 4, which was the Standard of Work Sheet prepared by Barnett, was a protocol and was not prepared by a physician as required under Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6(a), and therefore, this document did not adhere to the statutory requirements, making the blood test results inadmissible. However, neither in the Appellant’s Brief, nor at the trial court was it argued that State’s Exhibit 4 was not compliant with the statute, so we therefore disregard counsel’s argument.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 12 of 15 [20] At trial, Barnett testified that she was a registered nurse at IU Health, that over
her career, she had completed close to 200 “legal blood draws,” which she
referred to as blood draws where the police bring in “the patient . . . for a blood
alcohol level,” tr. vol. 2 p. 31, that IU Health maintains a protocol for a legal
blood draw, which was prepared by a physician and admitted into evidence as
State’s Exhibit 2, and that she collected Martinez-Orta’s blood pursuant to that
protocol. Barnett’s testimony was sufficient to lay an adequate foundation for
admission of the evidence. Indeed, there was foundational evidence
establishing that Barnett was a person trained in obtaining bodily substances,
there was a hospital protocol that was prepared by a physician for legal blood
draws, Barnett knew the protocol, and she followed the protocol when she
obtained a blood sample from Martinez-Orta. Barnett also testified about the
protocol for a legal blood draw and detailed how she obtained Martinez-Orta’s
blood, which included using betadine to clean the site, obtaining two tubes of
blood using grey tubes, properly filling out the chain of custody forms, and
handing the tubes to Trooper McKinney.
[21] Our court has previously found a sufficient foundation was laid for the
admission of blood test results where a nurse testified that she was trained in
legal blood draws, her hospital had a protocol for legal blood draws that was
approved by a physician, and she followed the physician-approved protocol.
Martin, 154 N.E.3d at 853. Additionally, in Pedigo v. State, 146 N.E.3d 1002
(Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied, this court found a sufficient foundation was
laid where a phlebotomist testified that she followed a protocol approved by a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 13 of 15 physician when drawing the defendant’s blood and testified about the steps she
took when collecting a blood sample for law enforcement; such evidence
established that the phlebotomist was a person trained in obtaining bodily
samples as required by Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6(a) and that she was
“acting under the direction of or under a protocol prepared by a physician[.]”
146 N.E.3d at 1014 (citing I.C. § 9-30-6-6(a)).
[22] Martinez-Orta contends that Barnett’s testimony was unreliable because she
could not articulate every step of the protocol verbatim in her testimony. This
argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Bell,
81 N.E.3d at 236. To the extent Martinez-Orta contends the testimony was
insufficiently detailed, we note that Barnett was not required to recite the
hospital protocol verbatim in her testimony, nor was she required to be viewing
the protocol at the time she completed the blood draw. The statute and Indiana
case law only require that blood samples collected at the request of a law
enforcement officer be obtained by “[a] person trained in . . . obtaining bodily
substance samples and acting under the direction of or under a protocol
prepared by a physician[.]” I.C. § 9-30-6-6(a). Barnett’s testimony was
sufficient to lay the proper foundation for admission of the blood draw results.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the blood test
results.
Conclusion [23] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the blood test results.
The actions of Trooper McKinney during the traffic stop of Martinez-Orta did Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 14 of 15 not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the State laid a proper foundation for
admission of the blood test results.
[24] Affirmed.
May, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Bruce W. Graham Graham Law Firm P.C. Lafayette, Indiana Shay J. Hughes Shay Hughes Law Office, LLC Lafayette, Indiana Michael D. Dean Laura L. Blaydes Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kathy J. Bradley Steven J. Hosler Deputy Attorneys General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1456 | March 18, 2025 Page 15 of 15