Edgar Parco Camacho v. Warden, Pike County Correctional Facility

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDGAR PARCO CAMACHO, A215 589 472,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-01197

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

WARDEN, Pike County Correctional Facility,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM On May 5, 2026, the Court received and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, signed and mailed by the pro se petitioner on April 29, 2026. Doc. 1. In this petition, Edgar Parco Camacho, a native and citizen of Peru, challenges the legality of his pre- removal immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing. At the time of filing, Parco Camacho was being held in the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Pike County Correctional Facility, located in Pike County, Pennsylvania. I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Parco Camacho originally entered the United States as a minor, crossing the border on foot from Mexico in 1990, at an otherwise unknown time and place.

The petitioner was first encountered by ICE on August 8, 2018, while in state criminal pretrial detention. On August 7, 2018, he had been arrested in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, and charged with simple

assault and harassment. On February 25, 2019, Parco Camacho pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and was sentenced to probation. He was not released, however, due to an ICE detainer. On February

27, 2019, Parco Camacho was taken into ICE custody, transported to Lehigh County Prison, where he was held in civil immigration detention, served with a notice to appear before an immigration judge. On May 7,

2019, an immigration judge granted Parco Camacho voluntary departure in lieu of removal to Peru. On May 23, 20219, Parco Camacho departed the United States, under ICE observation.

Parco Camacho re-entered the United States in July 2022, crossing the border from Mexico into Texas at an otherwise unknown time and place.

On October 24, 2025, Parco Camacho was arrested in Northampton County and charged with DUI. On February 19, 2026, ICE officers took Parco Camacho into custody in the courthouse lobby following his formal arraignment. The DUI charges remain pending.

Parco Camacho was transported to Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains in civil immigration detention. Following his detention, Parco Camacho was served with a Notice to Appear, DHS

Form I-862, dated February 19, 2026, which declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”1 and which directed him to appear for a hearing

before an immigration judge in Elizabeth, New Jersey, on March 2, 2026. Resp. Ex. 5, Doc. 6-6. He has been denied any opportunity to post bond or to be released on other conditions while his removal proceedings are

pending. II. DISCUSSION Since the United States began restricting immigration into this country in the late 19th century, it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking entry into the country and those already residing within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line” who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded to persons inside the United States. But once a noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s

1 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring her to be an “arriving alien” was checked. Resp. Ex. 5, Doc. 6-6. borders, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction between noncitizens who have entered and reside in the United States and those who have not yet entered “runs throughout immigration law.” , 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first quoting , 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting , 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted). Consistent with this distinction, “[t]wo statutory sections govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225 and 1226.” , 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025), , No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” , 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).

Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an ‘applicant for admission.’” , 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who ( ) are arriving in the United States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years without being admitted or paroled, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the “designation provision”),2 ( ) are inadmissible either for

misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of

2 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii), but the current scope of that designation is “the full scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1). , 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025); , 962 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii)); , 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same), , No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025). documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited

removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removal. § 1225(b)(1)(B). , 962 F.3d 612, 618–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing

expedited removal provisions); , 811 F. Supp. 3d 274, 291–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same); , 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025). Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the

United States.3 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); , 583 U.S. at 287. Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary (not expedited) removal proceedings. § 1225(b)(2)(A);

§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration

3 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not relevant here. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B). judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory

detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending. § 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting

removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather

than be detained); , 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (“Section 1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow humanitarian parole.”).

Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” , 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are

already present in the United States may be detained pending removal under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c). Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for

these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General,[4] an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain

pending. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the

alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities5 are tasked with an initial bond or custody determination, §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the

alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge, §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); § 1003.19 (setting out procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges).

, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (“If the alien is detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the

4 This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in the applicable regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2); §§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b). 5 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue arrest warrants. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8). Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge

(both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations

omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C. §§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3).

, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a) bond procedures). Finally, “Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of

aliens who may be released under § 1226(a).” , 583 U.S. at 289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond

hearing under § 1226(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community. § 1226(c)(4); , 583 U.S. at 289. The petitioner in this case, Edgar Parco Camacho, has been

detained by immigration authorities without a bond determination pending disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.6 Liberally construing his pro se petition, Parco Camacho argues that,

because he was detained within the interior of the United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre-removal-order detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he may only be properly detained under § 1226(a),

which requires that he be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. In addition to this statutory argument, the respondent has liberally construed the pro se petition to include an argument that Parco

Camacho’s detention without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights.7

6 The parties appear to agree that the petitioner has been putatively detained without an opportunity for a bond determination pursuant to § 1225(b)(2). The respondent has identified no other basis for his detention. Moreover, the petitioner has not been placed in expedited removal proceedings, as would be expected for a § 1225(b)(1) detainee, he has no predicate criminal convictions that would require mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and immigration officials have refused to give him a bond hearing, as required under § 1226(a). 7 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach any constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for relief. , 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of The respondent, on the other hand, argues that § 1225(b)(2) does

properly apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory detention. The respondent further argues that applying § 1225(b)(2) here comports with due process.8

The respondent purports to have detained Parco Camacho pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides for mandatory detention without the opportunity for release on bond. But, liberally

construed, the pro se petition contends that Parco Camacho could only be properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and under that statute, he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.

“[F]or section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking

admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’” , 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)), , No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.

Dec. 23, 2025); , No. 2:25-cv-05555, 2025

judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”). 8 note 7. WL 3188399, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (citing );

, No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (citing and ); , No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing

). Significantly, “Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is an applicant for admission and ‘seeking admission.’” , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (emphasis in original);

, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (citing and , 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, 406 (D.N.J. 2025)); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting ).

Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase

“seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe “active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the

United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (citing ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing ). “This reading preserves the distinction between

‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’ ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045,

at *4 (quoting ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting ). It also comports with the Supreme Court’s finding in that “§ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking

entry into the United States.” , 583 U.S. at 297; , 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting and ). “In

sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those already within the country.” , 2026 WL 296215, at *4;

, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”).

By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized, “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” , 583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting ). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by

permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it “permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” ,

583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting ); , 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (“Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[U]nder Section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, [an alien discretionarily detained pending removal proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge

at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a danger to the community[] or . . . that he is a flight risk, if it seeks to continue detaining him.” , 804 F. Supp. 3d

265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);9 , 812 F. Supp. 3d 459, 462–

9 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the court stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. , 804 F. Supp. 3d at 277 (citing , 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must prove either dangerousness flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. , 965 F.3d 203, 213–14 (3d Cir. 63 (D.N.J. 2025) (“Noncitizens who are arrested after having lived in the

United States for a while do not generally have to be detained. They are instead entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration court.” (citing ) (citations and footnote omitted)). ,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 (“[I]f an individual is detained attempting to enter the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for inspection and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant

to § 1225. If they are arrested after having already entered the country, they are subject to detention under § 1226 and are entitled to a bond hearing.”).

Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to the detention of Parco Camacho. We find that Parco Camacho is no longer seeking admission into the United States—at the time of his arrest and detention,

he was not actively attempting to come into the United States at a border

2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence.”); , 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[I]t is a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even temporarily, we hold the Government’ to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard in the context of civil detention . . . .”) (quoting ); , 547 F. Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting ). or port of entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the

United States for an extended period of time. , 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (finding that petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two years was not “seeking admission” but “already here”);

, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (citing ). Thus, Parco Camacho may only be properly detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and therefore he is entitled to a bond hearing. , 2026 WL

296215, at *5. , No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (“The overwhelming majority of federal district courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the

INA to find that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously entered the United States and are currently residing in the United States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision

of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.”); at *4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court

cases).10

10 , 175 F.4th 61, 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is

currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. Accordingly, the petition will be granted, and the government will be

ordered to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing within twenty-one days or to release him from custody.

are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible for entering the country without inspection and admission. . . . Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.’”); , 175 F.4th 828, 856 (7th Cir. 2026) (“[T]he text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing Executive practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants for admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”); , 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026) (“The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-bond detention generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country, and not to aliens who are simply present here.”); , 175 F.4th 713, 732 (6th Cir. 2026) (holding that noncitizens without lawful status who had lived in the United States for years were not “seeking admission” and thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention scheme). An appropriate order follows.

Dated: June 9, 2026 JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR. United States District Judge