Edgar Batres-Alvarado v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 16, 2026
• Docket: 16-72280
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 16 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDGAR AMADOR BATRES- No. 16-72280 ALVARADO; VICTORIA VILLEGAS- ACUNA; GALA VICTORIA BATRES- Agency Nos. A200-790-876 VILLEGAS, A200-790-877 A200-790-878 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 12, 2026** Las Vegas, Nevada

Before: BENNETT and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,*** District Judge.

Petitioner Edgar Amador Batres Alvarado and his wife and daughter,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. Victoria Villegas Acuna and Gala Victoria Batres-Villegas, natives and citizens of

Mexico, petition for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their

applications for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

To the extent the BIA “adopts or relies on the IJ’s reasoning,” we review

both agency decisions. Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019). The

agency’s findings on internal relocation are reviewed for substantial evidence,

Singh v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 560, 565 (9th Cir. 2025), and legal questions are

reviewed de novo, Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir.

2023). Under the “highly deferential substantial evidence standard . . . the agency’s

findings of fact are considered ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude the contrary.’” Id. (quoting Ruiz-Colmenares v.

Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022)).

An applicant for asylum must show either that he “has suffered past

persecution” or that he “has a well-founded fear of future persecution.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(a)–(b). An applicant “does not have a well-founded fear of persecution

if the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the

applicant’s country of nationality” and “under all the circumstances it would be

reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii)); cf.

2 Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2020). In assessing whether

relocation is reasonable, the adjudicator must consider factors like “the size of the

country,” as well as “the geographic locus of the alleged persecution,” and the

known “reach of the alleged persecutor.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)); see also

Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing

reasonableness factors for internal relocation). Because Batres-Alvarado has not

established past persecution, and because the persecution he fears is not “by a

government” and is not “government-sponsored,” he “bear[s] the burden of

establishing that it would not be reasonable for him or her to relocate.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(3)(i). Indeed, in such a case, there is “a presumption that internal

relocation would be reasonable unless the applicant establishes, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that it would be unreasonable to relocate.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(3)(iii).

Batres-Alvarado, a former federal police officer, argues that the IJ failed to

correctly apply the law regarding the reasonableness of internal relocation. We

disagree. In determining that Batres-Alvarado could relocate to Mexico City, the IJ

evaluated the “totality of the relevant circumstances,” appropriately relied on

record evidence and relevant precedent, and applied the correct legal standard. See

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)). The IJ considered factors such as Batres-Alvarado’s

prior connection to Mexico City, the geographical reach of Los Zetas, the distance

3 from Zacatecas to Mexico City, and whether Los Zetas and other cartels routinely

target former government officials throughout Mexico.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s internal relocation determination.

While Petitioners have presented evidence that Los Zetas operate heavily in

Zacatecas, the record does not indicate that the group has similar influence in

Mexico City or would pursue Batres-Alvarado there. The record does not indicate

that Los Zetas are looking for Batres-Alvarado or that he has received any threats,

and he testified that he would not be recognized as a former police officer in

Mexico City. Batres-Alvarado fears that corrupt government officials or former

colleagues may share his identity or whereabouts with cartels, but he testified he

has had no contact with these colleagues since he left Mexico, and the record

contains no evidence of their motivations for harming him or of their current

connection to armed groups. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (uncorroborated credible

testimony must be persuasive and refer to “specific facts”); see Aguilar Fermin v.

Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that a petitioner bears the burden

of supplying “specific facts” to prove eligibility for asylum). Under the deferential

substantial evidence standard, the record before us does not compel a conclusion

contrary to the agency’s determination.

PETITION DENIED.1

1 The stay of removal will remain in place until the mandate issues. The motion

4 for stay of removal is otherwise denied.