1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EDDIE RODRIGUEZ PARRA, an Case No. 2:25-cv-07316-SPG-JC 11 individual, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 12 Plaintiff, MOTION TO REMAND 13 [ECF NO. 12] v. 14 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a Delaware 15 limited liability company; and DOES 1-10, 16 inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 Before the Court is the Motion to Remand (ECF No. 12 (“Motion”)) filed by Plaintiff 21 Eddie Rodriguez Parra (“Plaintiff”). The Court has read and considered the Motion and 22 concluded that it is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 23 C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the 24 record in this case, the Court DENIES the Motion. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On or about February 23, 2019, Plaintiff purchased a 2019 GMC Sierra 1500, 27 manufactured and sold by Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”). (ECF No. 1-1 28 (“Complaint”) ¶¶ 6, 9). When Plaintiff purchased the vehicle, he received express written 1 warranties that provided that, in the event of a nonconformity during the warranty period, 2 Plaintiff could deliver the vehicle to Defendant’s authorized service facilities for repair. 3 (Id. ¶ 11). During the warranty period, the vehicle developed infotainment and engine 4 defects that impaired the vehicle’s use, value, and safety. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff delivered the 5 vehicle to Defendant, which failed to repair the vehicle even after a reasonable number of 6 opportunities to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14). Plaintiff states that, in light of the nonconformities, 7 he justifiably revoked acceptance of the vehicle and exercised his right to cancel the 8 contract. (Id. ¶ 23). 9 Plaintiff asserts claims under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act 10 (“Song-Beverly Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 et seq., and the federal Magnuson Moss 11 Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (Id. at 12-16). As relief, Plaintiff 12 seeks actual damages, restitution, civil penalties, remedies authorized by California 13 Commercial Code §§ 2711-13, and attorney’s fees. (Id. at 17). 14 Plaintiff initiated this action in Los Angeles County Superior Court on March 27, 15 2025. (Id. at 11). Defendant filed an answer on May 16, 2025. (ECF No. 1-2). On June 16 15, 2025, Plaintiff produced a copy of the vehicle’s sales agreement, which identifies a 17 total sales price of $68,185.00. (ECF No. 12-1 (“Yang Declaration”) ¶ 7). Defendant 18 removed the action to this Court on August 7, 2025. (ECF No. 1). 19 Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on September 5, 2025, arguing that Defendant’s 20 notice of removal was untimely filed. (Mot.). Defendant filed an opposition on September 21 30, 2025, (ECF No. 13 (“Opposition”)). Plaintiff has not filed a reply brief. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject-matter jurisdiction 24 only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian 25 Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a civil action 26 filed in state court to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction 27 over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original jurisdiction where an 28 action arises under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or where each plaintiff’s citizenship is 1 diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 2 exclusive of interest and costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 3 Federal law sets forth two separate deadlines, which, if triggered, require a defendant 4 to initiate removal within thirty days: (1) following service of an initial pleading that 5 affirmatively reveals the basis for removal; or (2) if “the case stated by the initial pleading 6 is not removable,” following receipt of “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper 7 from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 8 removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), (3). The first thirty-day deadline “only applies if the 9 case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face,” as determined “through 10 examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective 11 knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 12 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005). The second deadline, meanwhile, is only triggered where “an 13 amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper . . . [makes] a ground for removal 14 unequivocally clear and certain.” Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 15 2021). A defendant may remove a case “outside the two thirty-day periods on the basis of 16 its own information, provided that it has not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines.” 17 Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013). 18 There is a “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction, and “[f]ederal 19 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 20 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “The 21 removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires 22 resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 23 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal subject- 24 matter jurisdiction. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Plaintiff’s sole argument in favor of remand is that Defendant’s notice of removal 27 was untimely. (Mot. at 7). Plaintiff argues that removability was clear on the face of the 28 Complaint and that disclosure of the purchase agreement resolved any doubt about the 1 amount in controversy. (Id. at 7-10). Defendant responds that while it could have removed 2 the case at any time, it was not required to do so because neither the Complaint nor the 3 sales agreement contained sufficient information to ascertain the amount in controversy. 4 (Opp.). The Court will consider whether either of the thirty-day deadlines in § 1446(b) 5 was triggered. 6 A. The Complaint 7 Plaintiff first argues that removability was clear on the face of the Complaint because 8 the Complaint contained a claim under the MMWA, which is a federal cause of action. 9 (Mot. at 7). However, while the MMWA creates a federal cause of action, such claims 10 cannot serve as the basis for federal question jurisdiction unless the amount in controversy 11 equals or exceeds “the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) computed 12 on the basis of all claims to be determined” in the suit. 15 U.S.C.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 EDDIE RODRIGUEZ PARRA, an Case No. 2:25-cv-07316-SPG-JC 11 individual, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 12 Plaintiff, MOTION TO REMAND 13 [ECF NO. 12] v. 14 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a Delaware 15 limited liability company; and DOES 1-10, 16 inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 Before the Court is the Motion to Remand (ECF No. 12 (“Motion”)) filed by Plaintiff 21 Eddie Rodriguez Parra (“Plaintiff”). The Court has read and considered the Motion and 22 concluded that it is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 23 C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the 24 record in this case, the Court DENIES the Motion. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On or about February 23, 2019, Plaintiff purchased a 2019 GMC Sierra 1500, 27 manufactured and sold by Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”). (ECF No. 1-1 28 (“Complaint”) ¶¶ 6, 9). When Plaintiff purchased the vehicle, he received express written 1 warranties that provided that, in the event of a nonconformity during the warranty period, 2 Plaintiff could deliver the vehicle to Defendant’s authorized service facilities for repair. 3 (Id. ¶ 11). During the warranty period, the vehicle developed infotainment and engine 4 defects that impaired the vehicle’s use, value, and safety. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff delivered the 5 vehicle to Defendant, which failed to repair the vehicle even after a reasonable number of 6 opportunities to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14). Plaintiff states that, in light of the nonconformities, 7 he justifiably revoked acceptance of the vehicle and exercised his right to cancel the 8 contract. (Id. ¶ 23). 9 Plaintiff asserts claims under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act 10 (“Song-Beverly Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 et seq., and the federal Magnuson Moss 11 Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (Id. at 12-16). As relief, Plaintiff 12 seeks actual damages, restitution, civil penalties, remedies authorized by California 13 Commercial Code §§ 2711-13, and attorney’s fees. (Id. at 17). 14 Plaintiff initiated this action in Los Angeles County Superior Court on March 27, 15 2025. (Id. at 11). Defendant filed an answer on May 16, 2025. (ECF No. 1-2). On June 16 15, 2025, Plaintiff produced a copy of the vehicle’s sales agreement, which identifies a 17 total sales price of $68,185.00. (ECF No. 12-1 (“Yang Declaration”) ¶ 7). Defendant 18 removed the action to this Court on August 7, 2025. (ECF No. 1). 19 Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on September 5, 2025, arguing that Defendant’s 20 notice of removal was untimely filed. (Mot.). Defendant filed an opposition on September 21 30, 2025, (ECF No. 13 (“Opposition”)). Plaintiff has not filed a reply brief. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject-matter jurisdiction 24 only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian 25 Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a civil action 26 filed in state court to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction 27 over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original jurisdiction where an 28 action arises under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or where each plaintiff’s citizenship is 1 diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 2 exclusive of interest and costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 3 Federal law sets forth two separate deadlines, which, if triggered, require a defendant 4 to initiate removal within thirty days: (1) following service of an initial pleading that 5 affirmatively reveals the basis for removal; or (2) if “the case stated by the initial pleading 6 is not removable,” following receipt of “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper 7 from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 8 removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), (3). The first thirty-day deadline “only applies if the 9 case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face,” as determined “through 10 examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective 11 knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 12 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005). The second deadline, meanwhile, is only triggered where “an 13 amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper . . . [makes] a ground for removal 14 unequivocally clear and certain.” Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 15 2021). A defendant may remove a case “outside the two thirty-day periods on the basis of 16 its own information, provided that it has not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines.” 17 Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013). 18 There is a “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction, and “[f]ederal 19 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 20 instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “The 21 removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires 22 resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 23 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal subject- 24 matter jurisdiction. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Plaintiff’s sole argument in favor of remand is that Defendant’s notice of removal 27 was untimely. (Mot. at 7). Plaintiff argues that removability was clear on the face of the 28 Complaint and that disclosure of the purchase agreement resolved any doubt about the 1 amount in controversy. (Id. at 7-10). Defendant responds that while it could have removed 2 the case at any time, it was not required to do so because neither the Complaint nor the 3 sales agreement contained sufficient information to ascertain the amount in controversy. 4 (Opp.). The Court will consider whether either of the thirty-day deadlines in § 1446(b) 5 was triggered. 6 A. The Complaint 7 Plaintiff first argues that removability was clear on the face of the Complaint because 8 the Complaint contained a claim under the MMWA, which is a federal cause of action. 9 (Mot. at 7). However, while the MMWA creates a federal cause of action, such claims 10 cannot serve as the basis for federal question jurisdiction unless the amount in controversy 11 equals or exceeds “the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) computed 12 on the basis of all claims to be determined” in the suit. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B); see 13 Shoner v. Carrier Corp., 30 F.4th 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Although the MMWA is a 14 federal statute, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over an MMWA claim if the amount 15 in controversy is less than $50,000.”). Thus, Plaintiff must still show that the amount in 16 controversy was evident from the face of the Complaint to trigger the thirty-day deadline. 17 Next, Plaintiff argues that the Complaint contained sufficient allegations such that 18 Defendant could plausibly allege satisfaction of the amount in controversy requirement. 19 (Mot. at 8). Plaintiff cites to Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 20 81 (2014), for the proposition that a notice of removal requires only plausible allegations 21 that the threshold requirements are met. However, Dart set out the standard for a 22 defendant’s notice of removal, not the standard to trigger either of the thirty-day deadlines 23 in § 1446(b). See Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1141 n.3 (9th 24 Cir. 2013) (“[W]hether a defendant can establish that federal jurisdiction exists and the 25 question of when the thirty-day time period begins are not two sides of the same coin.”). 26 As set forth above, the standard here is not whether the Complaint contains sufficient 27 allegations such that Defendant could plausibly allege federal jurisdiction, but whether “the 28 case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its face.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. 1 Finally, Plaintiff argues that “Defendant had more than sufficient information at its 2 disposal to provide a plausible allegation regarding the satisfaction of the jurisdictional 3 threshold.” (Mot. at 9). Specifically, Plaintiff points to allegations in the Complaint as to 4 the make, model, year, and VIN of the vehicle, which would allow Defendant “to ascertain 5 an approximation” of the vehicle’s market value. (Id.). Plaintiff also argues that the 6 Complaint lays out the specific forms of statutory relief sought, such that Defendant could 7 calculate an approximate amount in controversy. (Id. at 10). 8 The Ninth Circuit has previously rejected such arguments. A defendant is required 9 to examine only “the four corners of the applicable pleadings” and need not rely on 10 “subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. Even 11 assuming Defendant had documents in its possession from which it could approximate the 12 amount in controversy, it was not required to “rely on pre-complaint documents to ascertain 13 whether a case stated by an indeterminate initial pleading is actually removable.” Carvalho 14 v. Equifax Inf. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, absent any specific 15 allegations of the dollar value of the claims, bare allegations of the make and model of the 16 vehicle and claims for broad categories of damages are insufficient to trigger the removal 17 deadline. See, e.g., Alvarez-Munguia v. Ford Motor Co., No. 23-cv-02751-BLF, 2024 WL 18 69076, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2024) (concluding that complaint did not trigger thirty-day 19 removal deadline because it alleged only categories of relief and did not identify any 20 “specific measure of damages, nor [did] it allege the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs 21 incurred”); Pastrana v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 8:24-cv-00515-FWS-ADS, 2024 WL 22 2817533, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2024) (concluding that thirty-day deadline was not 23 triggered where “the Complaint does not list a dollar amount corresponding to the 24 damages”). Plaintiff does not point to anywhere in the Complaint that affirmatively 25 revealed the amount in controversy. Accordingly, the first thirty-day deadline in § 1446(b) 26 was not triggered. 27 28 1 B. Service of Sales Agreement 2 To the extent that Plaintiff argues that production of the vehicle’s sales agreement 3 was sufficient to trigger the second thirty-day deadline for removal, the Court rejects this 4 argument under the facts of this case. 5 Because the MMWA does not specify the appropriate measure and type of damages, 6 courts have turned to applicable state law to determine the available remedies. See Romo 7 v. FFG Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1239 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The applicable state law 8 for Plaintiff’s claims is the Song Beverly Act.1 See id. Under the Song Beverly Act, the 9 purchaser of a vehicle may obtain restitution equal to “the purchase price paid by the buyer, 10 less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(1). 11 The usage offset is calculated by multiplying the purchase price by a fraction with a 12 denominator of 120,000 and a numerator of “the number of miles traveled by the new 13 motor vehicle prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer.” 14 Id. § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). In addition, under newly enacted California law, defendants in 15 actions seeking restitution for motor vehicles are entitled to offset from the purchase price 16 any negative equity, manufacturer’s rebate, third-party sold optional equipment, and 17 unpaid financing. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 871.27(b), (c), (d), (f).2 The Ninth Circuit has 18 explained that, because “an estimate of the amount in controversy must be reduced if ‘a 19 1 Defendant notes that some courts have found that California’s version of the UCC 20 provides an alternative basis for calculating MMWA damages to the Song Beverly Act. 21 (Opp. at 16); see Orichian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 226 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1332 (2014) (finding error in trial court’s conclusion that the only available remedies under the MMWA 22 were those available under the Song Beverly Act). While Plaintiff makes no argument to 23 this effect, the Complaint does seek remedies under California Commercial Code §§ 2711- 13 in addition to those under the Song Beverly Act. However, to the extent these remedies 24 provide an alternative measure of the amount in controversy under the MMWA, the sales 25 agreement still does not make it “unequivocally clear and certain” that the amount in 26 controversy requirement is met under these theories. 2 Section 871.27 was enacted as part of Assembly Bill 1755 and went into effect on January 27 1, 2025. See A.B. 1755, 2023-24 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2024). Because this action was 28 initiated after January 1, 2025, these requirements apply here. 1 specific rule of law or measure of damages limits the amount of damages recoverable,’” 2 consideration of the Song Beverly Act’s offsets in calculating the amount in controversy is 3 “appropriate.” Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 F. App’x 699, 701 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) 4 (quoting Morris v. Hotel Riviera, Inc., 704 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983)). 5 Taking into account these statutory offsets, the disclosure of the sales agreement did 6 not make it “unequivocally clear and certain” that the case was removable. See Dietrich, 7 14 F.4th at 1095. While Plaintiff disclosed the purchase price of the vehicle, he did not 8 provide information about the vehicle’s “payoff history” or the number of miles driven. 9 See (Yang Decl. at 9). Defendant therefore lacked information needed to calculate the 10 available damages. See Lopez v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. CV 25-06549-MWF(MAAx), 11 2025 WL 2629545, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2025) (denying motion to remand because 12 “Defendant could not have calculated the unpaid financing offset without the loan payment 13 history”); see also Covarrubias v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:25-cv-00328-JLS-MAA, 2025 14 WL 907544, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2025) (finding amount in controversy to be 15 “indeterminate” where the complaint “fail[ed] to provide information from which the 16 vehicle’s mileage use offset can be determined” and failed to provide “the total cash price 17 paid for a purchased, or monthly payments made on a leased, vehicle”). 18 While the inclusion of attorney’s fees and civil penalties, coupled with the disclosure 19 of the vehicle’s purchase price, may have made it likely that the amount in controversy 20 requirement was met, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a “bright-line approach” requiring that 21 removability be “unequivocally clear and certain” to trigger the removal deadline. 22 Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095; Harris, 425 F.3d at 697. Because actual damages were 23 uncertain, Defendant had no basis to calculate civil penalties. See Lopez, 2025 WL 24 2629545, at *4 (“Defendant could not have calculated civil penalties in this action until the 25 actual damages were certain.”); see also Crescencio v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 24-10946- 26 MWF (BFMx), 2025 WL 1122096, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2025) (“Because the Complaint 27 does not include sufficient information from which [the defendant] could reliably calculate 28 actual damages, any estimate of civil penalties was equally uncertain.”). As to attorney’s 1 Plaintiff provided no information from which Defendant could calculate any such 2 || award, let alone with unequivocal certainty. See Lopez, 2025 WL 2629545, at *4 (finding 3 “implausible at this early stage of the action” that defendant could determine that 4 || attorney’s fees would exceed the $50,000 threshold). 5 Accordingly, Plaintiff's disclosures did not trigger the second thirty-day deadline for 6 ||removal. Because neither of the thirty-day deadlines in § 1446(b) was triggered, and 7 ||because the case was removed within a year of its commencement, see 28 U.S.C. 8 || § 1446(c)(1), Defendant’s removal was timely. 9 CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion to Remand. 11 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 |} DATED: November 14, 2025
16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28