Eddie Lee Thomerson v. A.L. Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Dept. Of Correction

835 F.2d 1257, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16840, 1987 WL 26584

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: December 30, 1987
• Docket: 86-2000
• Status: Published

Opinions

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

Eddie Lee Thomerson, an Arkansas prisoner, appeals from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

I. FACTS

Thomerson returned home one evening to the house he shared with his girl friend and found her in the house with an unknown man. Before entering the house, Thomerson saw the man leave through the back door. Thomerson became angry and began arguing with his girl friend. He then started beating her with his fists. Thomer-son continued to beat his girl friend for over an hour until “[s]he finally stopped moving.” The woman was dead. After covering her with a curtain, Thomerson left the house to spend the night in a car parked outside. The victim’s curtain-covered body was discovered the next morning by Thom-erson’s mother and nephews after Thomer-son complained about being locked out of his house.

The State of Arkansas charged Thomer-son with first-degree murder, see Ark.Stat. Ann. § 41-1502, and a jury found Thomer-son guilty of that crime. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Thomer-son's conviction. See Thomerson v. State, 274 Ark. 17, 621 S.W.2d 690 (1981). That court later denied his pro se petition for postconviction relief.

Having exhausted his state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), Thomerson filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. After carefully considering all Thomerson’s contentions, the district court dismissed the petition. Thomerson now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

Thomerson asserts several bases for relief: he was denied due process by the state trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance; he was denied due process by the prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; he was denied due process by the trial court's refusal to suppress Thomer-son’s signed confession to police; and he was denied effective assistance of counsel. On review we agree with the district-court’s determination that these grounds lack merit. We turn to Thomerson’s final ground for relief: the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to convict Thomer-son of first-degree murder.

In asserting this ground, Thomerson does not challenge the controlling principles of state law. In Arkansas, the trier of fact must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused premeditated and deliberated the killing in order to find the accused guilty of first-degree murder. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1502(l)(b). Premeditation and deliberation need not be proven by direct evidence. Rather, these elements may be properly “ ‘inferred from the circumstances, such as the character of the weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the nature, extent and location of the wounds inflicted, the conduct of the accused and the like.’” McLemore v. State, 274 Ark. 527, 626 S.W.2d 364, 365 (1982) (quoting Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23, 26 (1978)).

Additionally, premeditation and deliberation do not have to exist in the assailant’s mind for any definite period of time. Robinson v. State, 269 Ark. 90, 598 S.W.2d 421, 424 (1980). They “can be formulated in the assailant’s mind upon an instant. * * * jg necessary js for [them] to exist when the assailant commits the act.’” Shipman v. State, 252 Ark. 285, 478 S.W. 2d 421, 422 (1972) (quoting Jackson v. State, 133 Ark. 321, 202 S.W. 683, 684 (1918)).

Thomerson argues the State presented no evidence to show premeditation and deliberation. In fact, he argues the evidence, including his confession, shows the killing was done impulsively. The record, however, reflects differently. The coroner testified the victim’s entire body was severely beaten. The victim suffered repeated, severe blows to her head and neck. Her arms showed multiple hemorrhages. Further, her torso and legs were covered with bruises, blisters, and abrasions. Finally, the victim’s legs and feet were burned.

Hemorrhages, bruises, and abrasions, including fingernail marks, in the victim’s neck area constitute persuasive evidence Thomerson choked the victim both with his hands and with a cord or wire. The victim’s various injuries also support the conclusion Thomerson struck the victim with different objects in addition to his fists. Although Thomerson indicated the bums on the lower half of the victim’s body occurred accidently when she fell over a heater, the jury was free to disbelieve Thomer-son’s story and to infer the victim was deliberately burned. Further, “a federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2793, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

The record thus shows Thomerson systematically abused the victim’s entire body for over an hour, leaving almost no part of the victim unscathed. He used his fists, his hands, a cord or wire, and other objects. He terminated his attack on the victim only when “[s]he finally stopped moving.” Although Thomerson may have begun to beat his girl friend out of anger over her unfaithfulness, a reasonable jury could infer from the evidence that as Thomerson continued to assault the woman his actions became calculated and deliberate. Under McLe-more, a jury could find the nature, extent, and location of these wounds in addition to Thomerson’s conduct in inflicting them indicate he premeditated and deliberated the murder.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine not whether we believe the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but instead “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (emphasis in original). Further, Thomerson’s challenge to eviden-tiary sufficiency in this case has been rejected by the Arkansas Supreme Court. See Thomerson v. State, 274 Ark. 17, 621 S.W.2d 690, 693-94 (1981). That decision is entitled to deference by this court. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 323, 99 S.Ct. at 2791.

The Arkansas Supreme Court determined that “ample substantial evidence [existed] to support the [jury’s] verdict.” Thomerson, 621 S.W.2d at 694. We agree the record reveals a substantial evidentiary base from which a jury could circumstantially infer “there [was] a weighing in [Thomerson’s] mind of the consequences of [his] course of conduct as distinguished from acting upon sudden impulse without the exercise of reasoning powers.” Robinson, 598 S.W.2d at 424. From Thomer-son’s conduct of alternately beating, choking, and burning the victim for over an hour and until she no longer moved, a rational jury could infer that sometime during his assault Thomerson did premeditate and deliberate the murder.

Based on this record, a jury could have found the killing was done solely in anger. This jury, however, found the killing was deliberate, and we cannot interfere with the result merely because we disagree with the findings of the trier of fact. This jury’s determination properly conforms with the Jackson standard: when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution a rational trier of fact could find the necessary elements, here premeditation and deliberation, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, we affirm.