Ecuador Importador-Exprotador Cia. Ltda v. ITF (Overseas) Corp.

94 A.D.2d 113, 463 N.Y.S.2d 208, 1983 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17956
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJune 7, 1983
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 94 A.D.2d 113 (Ecuador Importador-Exprotador Cia. Ltda v. ITF (Overseas) Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ecuador Importador-Exprotador Cia. Ltda v. ITF (Overseas) Corp., 94 A.D.2d 113, 463 N.Y.S.2d 208, 1983 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17956 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Milonas, J.

Following a trial in connection with the instant matter, the court found defendants Agustin Febres Cordero, ITF (Overseas) Corporation, Intrafina N. V., and William H. [114]*114Lewis liable to plaintiff in the amount of $650,000, plus interest and costs, for the conversion of the proceeds of the sale of certain promissory notes. The individual defendants Lewis and Cordero were engaged in the business of brokering promissory notes. ITF was incorporated in the State of Georgia and had its office in New York City. Cordero was not an officer, director or stockholder of ITF. Intrafina was a Netherlands Antilles corporation, whose principal shareholder was Lewis. Cordero was a director and one of two minority stockholders of Intrafina. Plaintiff Ecuador Importadora-Exportadora Cia. (Ecimex), an Ecuadorian corporation, entrusted six promissory notes to La Previsora Banco of Guayaquil, Ecuador, to be sold in New York. The notes were guaranteed by La Previsora, which then entered into an agreement with Lewis to discount the notes through ITF’s New York office and deposit the proceeds in La Previsora’s account at Chase Manhattan Bank in New York. Although Lewis did indeed sell the notes, he directed that the proceeds be placed in Intrafina’s account with Marine Midland Bank instead of La Previsora’s account with Chase Manhattan.

The trial court determined that Intrafina, with Cordero’s knowledge and approval, transferred the funds to another corporation, Intraland, in which both Cordero and Lewis had major interests. At the time of this transfer, Intraland’s financial condition was extremely precarious. According to the court, while a director of a corporation is not ordinarily liable for the tortious acts of a codirector, Intrafina was a closely held corporation with only three shareholders and accordingly Cordero “must have known the financial status of Intrafina and that if for any reason he did not, he had a duty to inquire into the sudden largess that befell Intrafina before agreeing to the transfer of funds to Intraland.” The court expressly stated that it was not basing its decision on a finding of negligence on the part of Cordero. However, since Cordero knew or ought to have known Intrafina’s financial situation, Cordero’s involvement in the matter amounted to a participation with Lewis in the conversion of plaintiff’s funds. The court also referred to the fact that at the time of the transfer of the proceeds to Intraland, that company was entangled in a [115]*115Colorado land transaction and desperately in need of capital to protect the investment by Lewis and Cordero.

While there appears to be little dispute concerning Lewis’ wrongful conduct, the question here surrounds the culpability of Cordero. Defendant-appellant Cordero contends that the evidence at trial clearly demonstrated that he neither had knowledge of, nor participated in, Lewis’ acts of conversion. He further alleges that he did not learn that Lewis might have diverted the proceeds of the Ecimex notes until after the Ecuadoran Government intervened in the operation of La Previsora, which occurred many months after the actual theft. Prior to that, Cordero asserts, he was not even aware that Lewis had received notes from plaintiff. It is Cordero’s position that in the absence of proof that he knew about, or took part in, Lewis’ diversion of the proceeds from the Ecimex notes, the judgment against him cannot be sustained. In addition, he claims that he cannot be held liable for failing to inquire into the financial condition of Intrafina or the source of the funds it loaned to Intraland since he had no reason and no legal duty to do so, but assuming, arguendo, that he did have a responsibility to investigate, that duty was owed exclusively to Intrafina, and his duty to perform cannot make him personally liable to plaintiff.

In Santa Barbara v Avallone & Miele (270 NY 1) a case bearing great similarity to the present situation, plaintiff delivered three bonds and a savings bank book to defendant Avallone corporation, which was engaged in the business of transmitting moneys to and from the United States, Italy and other European countries. The president of Avallone was instructed to collect the proceeds represented by these securities and credit them as lire in plaintiffs’ account at the Postal Savings Bank at Rome, Italy. However, of the total proceeds of 44,266 lire, only 400 lire were deposited in the Postal Savings Bank. The remainder was remitted to the United States and credited by the Italian Discount and Trust Company of New York in a “Special Lire Account” to Avallone. Shortly thereafter, the funds were transferred to the “Dollar Account” maintained by the corporation at the same bank. Subsequently, the money was withdrawn by checks signed by both the corpo[116]*116ration’s president and its treasurer, Stefano Miele. Special Term granted judgment against the president of Avallone (now deceased), and the corporation on the ground that they “had diverted, converted and misappropriated the proceeds of the securities and that the concealment of such fact from the plaintiffs constituted a fraud on them.” (270 NY, at p 5.) The complaint was dismissed as to the others, including Miele. The Appellate Division (243 App Div 357) reversed on the law as to Miele, who then appealed.

At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the treasurer, Miele, who was an officer of the corporate defendant but had no actual knowledge of the transaction in question, could be held personally liable for conversion of plaintiff’s funds. The court ruled (at p 6) that Miele could only be deemed an active participant in the wrongdoing by the corporation “if he participated as agent in the withdrawal of the money of the plaintiffs from the lire account, or had knowledge that the moneys of the plaintiffs in that account had been placed in the ‘Dollar Account.’ The findings do not show that Miele had knowledge that these moneys had gone into the ‘Dollar Account,’ nor is there any finding that Miele participated in the directions which transferred these moneys from the lire account to the ‘Dollar Account.’” According to the court, the facts did not demonstrate that Miele had any dealings with the plaintiffs prior to the death of Avallone’s president or that he was in any way connected with the transaction. The court noted (at p 7) that: “It is true that Miele was one of the signers of the checks withdrawing the credit arising from the deposit of the moneys belonging to the plaintiffs in the dollar account but he had no knowledge that the moneys were other than assets of the Avallone corporation, and, therefore, available for the purposes of its business. There is no finding that he received and retained any of these moneys for which he can be called upon to account. Nor is there any finding that he appropriated any property to himself.”

Thus, as the Court of Appeals declared in Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co. (50 NY2d 31, 44): “As a general proposition, corporate officers and directors are not liable for fraud unless they personally participate in the [117]*117misrepresentation or have actual knowledge of it * * * Mere negligent failure to acquire knowledge of the falsehood is insufficient” (see, also, Stell Mfg. Corp. v Century Inds., 15 AD2d 87). In the instant matter, Cordero testified without contradiction that he had no knowledge whatever that proceeds belonging to Ecimex had been deposited into Intrafina’s bank account. Cordero’s lack of knowledge is also supported by the circumstantial evidence introduced at trial.

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Bluebook (online)
94 A.D.2d 113, 463 N.Y.S.2d 208, 1983 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17956, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ecuador-importador-exprotador-cia-ltda-v-itf-overseas-corp-nyappdiv-1983.