Eckstein v. United States

452 F.2d 1036, 196 Ct. Cl. 644, 28 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6151, 1971 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 65
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 10, 1971
DocketNo. 83-66
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 452 F.2d 1036 (Eckstein v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eckstein v. United States, 452 F.2d 1036, 196 Ct. Cl. 644, 28 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6151, 1971 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 65 (cc 1971).

Opinion

Per Curiam:

This case was referred to Trial Commissioner Saul Richard Gamer with directions to make findings of fact and recommendation for conclusions of law under the order of reference and Rule 134(h). The commissioner has done so in an opinion and report filed on May 17, 1971. Exceptions to the commissioner’s report were filed by plaintiff and the case has been submitted to the court on oral argument of counsel and the briefs of the parties. Since the court is in agreement with the opinion, findings and recommendation of the trial commissioner, with minor modifications, it hereby adopts the same, as modified, as the basis for its judgment in this case as hereinafter set forth. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to recover and the petition is dismissed.

Commissioner Gamer’s opinion, with minor modifications by the court, is as follows:

Plaintiff sues to recover alleged overpayments on her individual income taxes for the years 1959 and 1960.

During such year plaintiff was an apartment tenant stockholder in a New York corporation (the 120 East 81st Street Corporation) which she contends was a “cooperative housing corporation” as defined in Section 216(b) of the Internal Eevenue Code of 1954 (26 TJ.S.C. § 216 (1964)). As such a stockholder, plaintiff would enjoy certain tax advantages, i.e., in the computation of her individual income tax, she would be allowed as a deduction amounts paid to the cooperative to the extent that such amounts represented her proportionate share (based on the total shares outstanding) of the real estate taxes and mortgage interest allowable as a deduction to the cooperative.

Under Section 216(b) (1) (D), however, a corporation can gain status as a “cooperative housing corporation” only if [648]*648at least 80 percent of its gross income (for the taxable year for which the tenant-stockholder claims the real estate and interest deductions) is derived from tenant-stockholders.1 Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that, for the years in question, the cooperative in which plaintiff was a tenant-stockholder did not so qualify, the deductions which plaintiff took for her pro rata portion of the mortgage interest and real estate taxes paid by the cooperative during such years were disallowed. Plaintiff here sues [649]*649to recover the increased taxes she was obliged to pay as a result of such disallowances.2

In determining that 80 percent of the cooperative’s gross income was not derived from its tenant-stockholder’s, the Commissioner treated three items in a manner which plaintiff contests. Had these items been treated as plaintiff contends they should have been, the cooperative would have met the 80-percent requirement. The three items are as follows:

1. Each tenant was required to sign a “proprietary lease.” This lease entitled the tenant to live in a specified apartment. In addition, the lease set forth, in certain respects, the manner in which the cooperative would be operated and the rent for the apartment would be determined. The annual rent (commonly referred to as “assessments” on the tenant-stockholders) was to be calculated as the tenant’s proportionate share of the aggregate amount of the cooperative’s “cash requirements” for the year, including mortgage interest and amortization payments. The lease then provided:

Any sums which the Lessee may pay hereunder which are allocated, used or to be used to meet cash requirements of the Lessor for mortgage amortization payments, or any other mortgage principal payments or for capital improvements or any other capital expenditure, shall not be deemed income to the Lessor but shall be credited by the Lessor upon its books as “Paid in Surplus.”

The 1959 and 1960 rental payments made by the tenant-stockholders totaled $400,000.08 for each year. In 1959, the cooperative paid $93,588.33 for reduction of the principal on its mortgage, and $97,871.41 for such purpose in 1960. The cooperative also credited equivalent amounts for such years to its “Paid-in Surplus” account and excluded such sums from its income accounts. Its corporate income tax returns similarly excluded these sums from gross income. The Commissioner did not object to these exclusions and there was and [650]*650is no controversy between the cooperative and defendant with, respect to these returns.3

In making his determination that during both 1059 and 1960, the cooperative did not meet the requirements of Section 216(b) that 80 percent or more of its gross income be derived from tenant-stockholders, the Commissioner similarly excluded from the cooperative’s gross income from tenant-stockholders sums equal to the mortgage amortization payments made by the cooperative, these amounts being the same as the cooperative had credited on its books as “Paid-in Surplus.”

Plaintiff challenges this exclusion by the Commissioner. She contends that the full amount received by the cooperative each year from its tenant-stockholders should be treated as income. Such treatment would, of course, result in a higher figure for the “gross income * * * derived from tenant-stockholders” referred to in Section 216 (b) (1) (I)), and thus help it to meet the 80-percent requirement.

2. In 1957, a New York corporation, the 1186 Lex Corporation, was in the process of constructing the apartment building here involved. The president and one-third stockholder of this corporation was Mr. Nourollah Elghanayan.4

The cooperative was organized on June 13, 1957, by the Lex Corporation for the specific purpose of having the cooperative purchase the land and apartment house being constructed thereon (the Lex Corporation sometimes being referred to by the parties as the “sponsor” of the housing project), and on July 1,1957, by a Plan of Organization and a Seller’s Agreement, the cooperative, subject to various terms and conditions, agreed to purchase the land and completed building for $4,875,000. The cooperative had an authorized capital stock of 40,000 shares, all of which were allocated to the apartments in the building.

The Plan provided that, upon its consummation at the time of the closing, which was to take place promptly [651]*651after the completion of the building), all of the 40,000 shares would be fully paid for by stockholders who would lease the apartments. The sale of all of such stock (by the leasing of the apartments) would permit the cooperative, at such closing time, to take over the property with no debts or obligations except for a permanent mortgage in the principal amount of $2,600,000. Thus, the leasing of all of the apartments and the sale of the stock allocated to such leases were prerequisites to the enabling of the cooperative to take over the property at the purchase price, the proceeds of the sale of all the stock producing the difference between the purchase price and the amount of the permanent mortgage. As assurance to the cooperative-purchaser that, at the time of the closing, all of such stock would be sold, the Plan provided that if, at such time, all of the stock had not been sold (to proprietary lessees), the Lex Corporation would provide “individual purchasers for such unsold stock and they will enter into proprietary leases for the apartments to which such shares are allocated * * *.”5 The Seller’s Agreement similarly provided.6

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Bluebook (online)
452 F.2d 1036, 196 Ct. Cl. 644, 28 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6151, 1971 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 65, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eckstein-v-united-states-cc-1971.