Echevarria v. Beck

338 F. Supp. 2d 258, 2004 WL 2203303
District Court, D. Puerto Rico·Decided September 23, 2004·No. Civil 03-2096 (JAG)·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA-GREGORY, District Judge.

On October 9, 2003, Carmen Echevarria (“Echevarría”), Luis Morell Morell (“Mo-rell”), and Manuel Martinez Umpierre (“Martinez”) filed an action for damages citing breach of contract by defendants Richard L. Beck (“Beck”), and Health Care Auditors, Inc (“HCA”). (Docket No. 1). On February 17, 2004, defendant Beck filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of in personam jurisdiction (Docket No. 8). On February 17, 2004, defendant HCA filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state *260 a claim upon which relief may be granted (Docket No. 9).

For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES defendant Beck’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 8) and DENIES defendant HCA motion to dismiss (Docket No. 9).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1

On or about September 20, 2000, plaintiffs contacted Health Care Auditors, Inc., to retain a medical expert witness to testify on behalf of Carmen Echevarria in a medical malpractice case before the Maya-güez Superior Court. Writing on behalf of his client, attorney Manuel Martínez Um-pierre stated in his letter that “if the case goes to trial, I will need a surgeon willing to come to Puerto Rico” (Docket No. 1 at 2). HCA agreed to supply a medical expert, and, on January 23, 2001, received a payment of $2500 from plaintiffs to secure HCA’s services. On or about February 12, 2001, HCA confirmed that Doctor Richard Beck would serve as medical expert for the plaintiffs.

Beck’s expert witness report was delivered to the plaintiffs on or about May 11, 2001. In September of that year, plaintiffs contacted Beck to schedule his deposition. The deposition initially scheduled for May 18, 2002, was cancelled at Beck’s request with 12 days notice. Attempts to reschedule the deposition were unsuccessful.

On February 5, 2003, plaintiffs notified Beck that the malpractice case had been set for trial on April 28, 2003. On February 10, 2003, Beck informed plaintiffs that he was “not available to provide any deposition outside the United States” (Docket No. 1 at 3). Plaintiffs, unable to secure a replacement medical expert so late in the legal process, were forced to voluntarily dismiss Echevarria’s malpractice claim.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir.1995). The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990). The Court need not credit, however, “bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like” when evaluating the complaint’s allegations. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). When opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him.” McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Plaintiffs are responsible for putting their best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that will support their claim. Id. at 23 (citing Correar-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52). Plaintiffs must set forth “factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory.” Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988).

B. Defendant Beck’s Motion to Dismiss

Beck alleges that he does not have minimum contacts with Puerto Rico that would permit him to be sued in this Court.

In cases of diversity of citizenship, the determination of personal jurisdiction is governed by the state long-arm statute. *261 See Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int’l, 907 F.2d 1256, 1258 (1st Cir.1990); Rubi v. Sladewski, 641 F.Supp. 536, 537 (D.P.R.1986). The Commonwealth’s long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over a person not domiciled in Puerto Rico “if the action or claim arises because said person transacted business in Puerto Rico personally or through an agent.” P.R.R.Civ.P. 4.7(a)(1). The statute permits the extension of jurisdiction in personam as far as the federal Constitution allows. See Mangual v. Gen’l Battery Corp., 710 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1983); Swank, Inc. v. Carmona, 603 F.Supp. 1092, 1096 (D.P.R.1985). Therefore, this Court will focus on whether the Fourteenth Amendment allows this Court to exercise in personam jurisdiction.

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Echevarria v. Beck, 338 F. Supp. 2d 258, 2004 WL 2203303 (prd 2004).

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