Wright, J.
Appellant, A-P, presents three propositions for the court’s consideration. The first attacks the verdict entered by the appellate court [30]*30based upon the interrogatories returned by the jury. The second attacks the jury verdict as against the manifest weight of the evidence. The last attacks the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of hearsay statements of Warfel offered by A-P. We will address the second and third propositions initially, and close with the first proposition.
I
A-P contends that the verdict was not supported by the evidence and, thus, the trial court erred when it denied A-P’s motion for a directed verdict. At the outset, we note that this court is not required to weigh the evidence in a case before it. R.C. 2503.43. Generally, this court will not upset “ ‘[j]udgments supported by some competent, credible evidence * * * as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 OBR 408, 411, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276, quoting C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus.
At trial, the plaintiff introduced expert testimony, based upon facts in evidence, that the duct system was negligently designed by A-P, and that this negligence was a proximate cause of Eberly’s death. The weight to be given this evidence was properly a matter for the jury. Consequently, we will not overturn the verdict as being against the weight of the evidence, and the judgment of the court of appeals in this respect is affirmed.
II
A-P also asserts as error the exclusion of hearsay testimony relating to statements made by Warfel, A-P’s former sole owner and president, now deceased. A-P contends that, although hearsay, these statements are admissible under Evid.R. 804(B)(5), which provides an exception to the exclusion of hearsay when the declarant, if alive, would have been a party to the suit. Evid.R. 804(B)(5) provides:
“Statement by a deceased, deaf-mute, or incompetent person. The statement was made by a decedent, or a deaf-mute who is now unable to testify, or a mentally incompetent person, where (a) the estate or personal representative of the decedent’s estate, or the guardian or trustee of the deaf-mute or incompetent person is a party, and (b) the statement was made before the death or the development of the deaf-mute condition or the incompetency, and (c) the statement is offered to rebut testimony by an adverse party on a matter which was within the knowledge of the decedent, deaf-mute, or incompetent person.”
[31]*31The plaintiff responds that A-P fails to satisfy the first criterion: A-P is not the estate or the personal representative of Warfel. Therefore, the exception is not available to A-P.
A-P responds twofold. First, as sole owner and president of A-P, Warfel and A-P were in essence one, and therefore A-P satisfies the rule as being Warfel’s representative. Second, fairness requires admission of these statements in that the plaintiff was able to admit many of Warfel’s statements throughout trial on the basis that they were admissions of a party-opponent pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(2).2 A-P argues that it is unfair to employ some of Warfel’s statements against A-P while excluding those that favor A-P.
The second rationale in support of admission misconstrues Evid.R. 804(B)(5) and in so doing reveals a more fundamental reason why the proffered testimony is inadmissible.
Evid.R. 804(B)(5) was not intended as a counterpart to Evid.R. 801(D)(2); rather, Evid.R. 804(B)(5) was promulgated in response to the abrogation of the “dead man’s” statute, R.C. 2317.03. Johnson v. Porter (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 58, 14 OBR 451, 471 N.E.2d 484, syllabus. Without dwelling on its history, the “dead man’s” statute3 was a remnant of the ancient rule barring parties [32]*32from testifying. When the absolute bar was lifted, the “dead man’s” statute remained, barring a party from testifying against an executor or administrator of an estate based upon a claim against the deceased. Johnson, supra, at 60-61, 14 OBR at 453-454, 471 N.E.2d at 486, and sources cited therein. As held in Johnson, Evid.R. 601 abrogated R.C. 2317.03 by removing this bar to giving testimony. However, along with Evid.R. 601, Evid.R. 804(B)(5) was promulgated to level the playing field: if the adverse party may testify, the decedent may testify from the grave through hearsay to rebut the testimony by the adverse party.
While it is not particularly clear what testimony the proffered statements were intended to rebut, from the nature of the arguments to each court that considered the issue, it appears that the statements were intended to rebut certain of Warfel’s statements admitted pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(2). Evid.R. 804(B)(5) only permits hearsay offered to rebut testimony by an adverse party. Certainly Warfel was not an adverse party to himself. Considering that the proffered statements concern the design and manufacture of the duct system, it is truly unlikely, and no proffer was made to suggest, that the statements are offered to rebut testimony by the adverse party, Nancy Eberly, the executrix of Eberly’s estate. Therefore, this hearsay was inadmissible, and based on the foregoing reason, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in this respect.
A-P’s other contention, that as sole owner and principal executive officer Warfel and A-P are the same party, is an interesting proposition; however, [33]*33under the facts presented, this contention is not reached and we therefore leave that question for another day.
Ill
A
Although the parties and the court of appeals have confused the issue, the propriety of the two disparate verdicts entered by the lower courts based upon the interrogatories returned by the jury raise two distinct errors. First, Barraet should not have been included in the interrogatories submitted to the jury. Second, the case should not have been submitted to the jury based upon the comparative negligence statute, the former R.C. 2315.19.4
[34]*34The court of appeals considered the inclusion of Barmet in the interrogatories as improper both under R.C. 2315.19 and under traditional negligence law. The appellate court, finding that the plaintiff never objected to the use of R.C. 2315.19, invoked plain error as the basis for reversal. There are few reported decisions interpreting R.C. 2315.19. One of them, Couch v. Thomas (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 55, 26 OBR 228, 497 N.E.2d 1372, held that R.C. 2315.19 relieved a joint tortfeasor from liability for the percentage of negligence attributable to a statutorily immune employer. While Couch was seemingly on point, the court of appeals distinguished Couch by finding R.C. 2315.19 inapplicable. In so doing, the court also avoided certifying a conflict.
However, we hold that Couch was wrongly decided, for R.C.
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Wright, J.
Appellant, A-P, presents three propositions for the court’s consideration. The first attacks the verdict entered by the appellate court [30]*30based upon the interrogatories returned by the jury. The second attacks the jury verdict as against the manifest weight of the evidence. The last attacks the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of hearsay statements of Warfel offered by A-P. We will address the second and third propositions initially, and close with the first proposition.
I
A-P contends that the verdict was not supported by the evidence and, thus, the trial court erred when it denied A-P’s motion for a directed verdict. At the outset, we note that this court is not required to weigh the evidence in a case before it. R.C. 2503.43. Generally, this court will not upset “ ‘[j]udgments supported by some competent, credible evidence * * * as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 OBR 408, 411, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276, quoting C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus.
At trial, the plaintiff introduced expert testimony, based upon facts in evidence, that the duct system was negligently designed by A-P, and that this negligence was a proximate cause of Eberly’s death. The weight to be given this evidence was properly a matter for the jury. Consequently, we will not overturn the verdict as being against the weight of the evidence, and the judgment of the court of appeals in this respect is affirmed.
II
A-P also asserts as error the exclusion of hearsay testimony relating to statements made by Warfel, A-P’s former sole owner and president, now deceased. A-P contends that, although hearsay, these statements are admissible under Evid.R. 804(B)(5), which provides an exception to the exclusion of hearsay when the declarant, if alive, would have been a party to the suit. Evid.R. 804(B)(5) provides:
“Statement by a deceased, deaf-mute, or incompetent person. The statement was made by a decedent, or a deaf-mute who is now unable to testify, or a mentally incompetent person, where (a) the estate or personal representative of the decedent’s estate, or the guardian or trustee of the deaf-mute or incompetent person is a party, and (b) the statement was made before the death or the development of the deaf-mute condition or the incompetency, and (c) the statement is offered to rebut testimony by an adverse party on a matter which was within the knowledge of the decedent, deaf-mute, or incompetent person.”
[31]*31The plaintiff responds that A-P fails to satisfy the first criterion: A-P is not the estate or the personal representative of Warfel. Therefore, the exception is not available to A-P.
A-P responds twofold. First, as sole owner and president of A-P, Warfel and A-P were in essence one, and therefore A-P satisfies the rule as being Warfel’s representative. Second, fairness requires admission of these statements in that the plaintiff was able to admit many of Warfel’s statements throughout trial on the basis that they were admissions of a party-opponent pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(2).2 A-P argues that it is unfair to employ some of Warfel’s statements against A-P while excluding those that favor A-P.
The second rationale in support of admission misconstrues Evid.R. 804(B)(5) and in so doing reveals a more fundamental reason why the proffered testimony is inadmissible.
Evid.R. 804(B)(5) was not intended as a counterpart to Evid.R. 801(D)(2); rather, Evid.R. 804(B)(5) was promulgated in response to the abrogation of the “dead man’s” statute, R.C. 2317.03. Johnson v. Porter (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 58, 14 OBR 451, 471 N.E.2d 484, syllabus. Without dwelling on its history, the “dead man’s” statute3 was a remnant of the ancient rule barring parties [32]*32from testifying. When the absolute bar was lifted, the “dead man’s” statute remained, barring a party from testifying against an executor or administrator of an estate based upon a claim against the deceased. Johnson, supra, at 60-61, 14 OBR at 453-454, 471 N.E.2d at 486, and sources cited therein. As held in Johnson, Evid.R. 601 abrogated R.C. 2317.03 by removing this bar to giving testimony. However, along with Evid.R. 601, Evid.R. 804(B)(5) was promulgated to level the playing field: if the adverse party may testify, the decedent may testify from the grave through hearsay to rebut the testimony by the adverse party.
While it is not particularly clear what testimony the proffered statements were intended to rebut, from the nature of the arguments to each court that considered the issue, it appears that the statements were intended to rebut certain of Warfel’s statements admitted pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(2). Evid.R. 804(B)(5) only permits hearsay offered to rebut testimony by an adverse party. Certainly Warfel was not an adverse party to himself. Considering that the proffered statements concern the design and manufacture of the duct system, it is truly unlikely, and no proffer was made to suggest, that the statements are offered to rebut testimony by the adverse party, Nancy Eberly, the executrix of Eberly’s estate. Therefore, this hearsay was inadmissible, and based on the foregoing reason, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in this respect.
A-P’s other contention, that as sole owner and principal executive officer Warfel and A-P are the same party, is an interesting proposition; however, [33]*33under the facts presented, this contention is not reached and we therefore leave that question for another day.
Ill
A
Although the parties and the court of appeals have confused the issue, the propriety of the two disparate verdicts entered by the lower courts based upon the interrogatories returned by the jury raise two distinct errors. First, Barraet should not have been included in the interrogatories submitted to the jury. Second, the case should not have been submitted to the jury based upon the comparative negligence statute, the former R.C. 2315.19.4
[34]*34The court of appeals considered the inclusion of Barmet in the interrogatories as improper both under R.C. 2315.19 and under traditional negligence law. The appellate court, finding that the plaintiff never objected to the use of R.C. 2315.19, invoked plain error as the basis for reversal. There are few reported decisions interpreting R.C. 2315.19. One of them, Couch v. Thomas (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 55, 26 OBR 228, 497 N.E.2d 1372, held that R.C. 2315.19 relieved a joint tortfeasor from liability for the percentage of negligence attributable to a statutorily immune employer. While Couch was seemingly on point, the court of appeals distinguished Couch by finding R.C. 2315.19 inapplicable. In so doing, the court also avoided certifying a conflict.
However, we hold that Couch was wrongly decided, for R.C. 2315.19 did not provide for apportioning negligence to persons or entities not parties to the action.5 R.C. 2315.19 was specific. It provided in subsection (B) for apportionment only among parties to the action:
“In any negligence action in which contributory negligence is asserted as a defense, the court in a nonjury trial shall make findings of fact, and the jury in a jury trial shall return a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, that shall specify:
a * * *
“(2) The percentage of negligence that directly and proximately caused the injury, in relation to one hundred per cent, that is attributable to each party to the action.”
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court improperly included Barmet in the interrogatories under R.C. 2315.19.
The court of appeals also ruled that R.C. 2315.19 did not govern the case. The court held that because there was no contributory negligence,6 R.C. 2315.19 was inapplicable. This was a correct statement of law in this difficult field. An explanation of R.C. 2315.19’s function in conjunction with R.C. [35]*352307.32(E) may clear up some of the confusion about joint tortfeasor actions under Ohio law.
R.C. 2315.19 provided for several, or allocated, liability among joint tortfeasors who are parties to an action based upon comparative fault; however, several liability was triggered only upon a finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. R.C. 2315.19(A). Accordingly, R.C. 2315.19(B) required interrogatories allocating fault whenever the plaintiffs contributory negligence was pled as a defense. If a jury returned answers to interrogatories finding no negligence attributable to the plaintiff, then joint and several liability would lie.7 In that circumstance, the interrogatory allocating fault among multiple tortfeasors set forth contribution rights among them pursuant to R.C. 2307.32(E).8
Consequently, in cases potentially involving multiple tortfeasors and plaintiff negligence, under either the old or new R.C. 2315.19, all potential tortfeasors amenable to process should be joined as defendants pursuant to Civ.R. 14 and 20, and cross-claims for contribution should also be pled in anticipation of the possibility that a plaintiff may not be found contributorily negligent.9 Cf. Robinson v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (1982), 4 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 4 OBR 257, 444 N.E.2d 1084, Part 2 of the opinion and appendix. Such a proceeding avoids the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in subsequent contribution actions, conserves judicial resources, and harmonizes R.C. 2315.19 with 2307.31 and 2307.32.
B
We next consider the relief appropriate for the trial court’s error of including Barmet in the interrogatories and in reducing the jury’s monetary finding. The court of appeals determined that because the trial court erroneously included Barmet in the interrogatories and because A-P’s negligence was a proximate cause of Eberly’s injury, A-P was liable for the entire one [36]*36million dollar assessment of damages. Judge Milligan, in his dissent from the opinion below, found this remedy extreme:
“The result fashioned by the majority is unconscionable. It invokes the limited provisions of App.R. 12(B) and multiplies the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court ten-fold (from $100,000 to $1,000,000), and fails to certify conflict with Couch v. Thomas (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 55, 26 OBR 228, 497 N.E.2d 1372.
“And this all in the name of ‘plain error. ’
“The most severe remedy this court should grant — assuming plain error, or error at all, is an order of remand for a new trial.” (Emphasis sic.)
We agree with Judge Milligan’s concerns as to the appropriate remedy. The trial court submitted this case to the jury on the (unspoken) premise that no party would be held responsible for the negligence of the non-party, Barmet. While we cannot know precisely the thought processes of the jury, the interrogatories could well have misled the jury to believe that A-P would only be accountable for its percentage of fault.10 In light of the answers to the interrogatories returned by the jury, we are not completely confident that a jury would find A-P negligent, its negligence a proximate cause, and would award one million dollars assuming Barmet was entirely left out of the interrogatories. In our view, the nature of the charge and interrogatories submitted undermined the proper function of the jury in this case so as to render the verdict unreliable as to A-P. This error, though not objected to, results in a manifest miscarriage of justice and, as such, constitutes plain error. See O’Connell v. Chesapeake & Ohio RR. Co. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 226, 569 N.E.2d 889. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed in part and the cause remanded for a new trial against A-P consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., Holmes and H. Brown, JJ., concur.
Sweeney, Douglas and Resnick, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.