[Cite as Eastlake Milford, L.L.C. v. Jones, 2025-Ohio-5638.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
EASTLAKE MILFORD, LLC, ET AL., :
Plaintiffs-Appellees, : No. 115082 v. :
GEORGE JONES, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 18, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-24-996865
Appearances:
McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman Co., L.P.A., David M. Cuppage, Lawrence R. Acton, and Taylor S. Mehalko, for appellees.
George Jones, pro se.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
This cause came to be heard on the accelerated docket pursuant to
App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. Consistent with the purpose of an accelerated
appeal, this court shall render a brief and conclusory decision. Sholakh v. Shah, 2025-Ohio-2533, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.), citing Imani Home Health Care L.L.C. v. Visionary
Group, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-173, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.); see also App.R. 11.1(E).
Defendant-appellant George Jones, pro se, appeals the trial court’s
decision granting the motion for summary judgment of plaintiffs-appellees
Eastlake Milford, LLC, and Eastlake Edison, LLC, and awarding judgment against
him. Upon review, we affirm.
Under his first assignment of error, appellant claims “[t]he trial
court erred in granting summary judgment against [him] where genuine issues of
material fact remained in dispute, in violation of Civ.R. 56.” Appellate review of
summary judgment is de novo, governed by the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56.
Argabrite v. Neer, 2016-Ohio-8374, ¶ 14. Summary judgment is appropriate only
when “[1] no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, [2] the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and [3] viewing the evidence most
strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach a conclusion
only in favor of the moving party.” Id., citing M.H. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 2012-Ohio-
5336, ¶ 12.
In their complaint, appellees asserted claims against appellant for
conversion of funds and civil theft. “‘[C]onversion is the wrongful exercise of
dominion over property to the exclusion of the rights of the owner, or withholding
it from his possession under a claim inconsistent with his rights.’” Disciplinary
Counsel v. Squire, 2011-Ohio-5578, ¶ 40, quoting Joyce v. Gen. Motors Corp., 49
Ohio St.3d 93, 96 (1990). “To succeed on a conversion claim, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) * * * ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of conversion;
(2) defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff’s property
rights; and (3) damages.’” Cedar Creek Mall Props., L.L.C. v. Krone, 2017-Ohio-
7884, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), quoting 6750 BMS, L.L.C. v. Drentlau, 2016-Ohio-1385, ¶ 28
(8th Dist.). In a civil action for theft, the property owner may recover damages as
specified under R.C. 2307.61(A). See Jacobson v. Kaforey, 2016-Ohio-8434, ¶ 70.
A theft offense is defined in R.C. 2913.01(K) to include a violation of R.C. 2913.02,
among other provisions. Relevant hereto, R.C. 2913.02(A) provides: “No person,
with purpose to deprive the owner of property . . . shall knowingly obtain or exert
control over . . . the property” “(1) Without the consent of the owner or person
authorized to give consent; (2) Beyond the scope of the express or implied consent
of the owner or person authorized to give consent; (3) By deception . . . .”
The record herein shows that requests for admission were deemed
admitted pursuant to Civ.R. 36 after appellant failed to answer them. Those
admissions along with evidence submitted by appellees established that appellees
were entitled to summary judgment on their claims. Among other facts, appellees
established that after issuing a check with a print error and freezing the funds, they
paid Allegiance Contracting Incorporated (“Allegiance”) $40,500 with a
replacement wire transfer. Thereafter, appellant and another individual, who are
officers, directors, and/or shareholders of Allegiance, withdrew the initial funds in
the same amount without appellees’ permission. Although the other individual
returned $20,250, appellant refused to return and wrongfully retained $20,250 of the withdrawn funds after a demand letter was sent. The evidence showed
appellant converted $20,250 of funds that are the rightful property of appellees.
Appellees also established that appellant’s actions constituted a theft offense under
R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), (2), and/or (3), and appellees elected to pursue treble damages
pursuant to R.C. 2307.61(A)(1)(b). Additionally, appellees demonstrated
appellant acted with malice or aggravated or egregious fraud, and punitive
damages were recoverable pursuant to R.C. 2315.21(C). Upon review, we find that
appellees are entitled to summary judgment and that the trial court properly
entered judgment in favor of appellees and against appellant with “compensatory
damages in the amount of $20,250.00, and punitive and treble damages in the
amount of $40,500.00, for total damages of $60,750.00, and interest at the
statutory rate per annum from the date of judgment and the costs of [the] action.”
Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Under his second assignment of error, appellant claims “[t]he trial
court erred by proceeding to judgment without affording [him] a fair opportunity
to be heard, due to lack of service and notice, violating [his] due process rights.”
The record shows service was completed on appellant by regular
mail on June 4, 2024, in accordance with Civ.R. 4.6(D). “Where the plaintiff
follows the civil rules governing service of process, courts presume that service is
proper unless the defendant rebuts this presumption with sufficient evidence of nonservice.” In re K.J., 2023-Ohio-615, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing Hook v. Collins,
2017-Ohio-976, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).
Appellant failed to rebut the presumption of proper service. Indeed,
appellant appeared for a telephone hearing on October 10, 2024, he was granted
leave to plead, and he filed an answer that shows the same address listed in the
complaint. Other pleadings were sent by certified U.S. mail and regular mail to the
same address. Nonetheless, appellant routinely failed to appear, he did not
respond to discovery, and he did not oppose summary judgment. Appellant’s
assertions of notice being sent to an incorrect address and of the courts being
closed due to a cyberattack were unavailing. As the trial court indicated, “notice
went to the address defendant used in his answer,” “Cleveland Municipal Court
was closed due to a cyberattack but this did not affect the court of common pleas,”
and “the last two court dates that defendant missed were telephone calls not in
person hearings.” On appeal, appellant makes an unsupported assertion that his
mailing address had known delivery issues, and he alleges a mistaken belief that
the matter was in municipal court despite having filed his answer in the court of
common pleas. Appellant fails to demonstrate, and the record does not show, any
violation of due process occurred. Appellant’s second assignment of error is
overruled.
Under his third assignment of error, appellant claims “[t]he trial
court erred in holding [him] personally liable for funds he neither received nor
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as Eastlake Milford, L.L.C. v. Jones, 2025-Ohio-5638.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
EASTLAKE MILFORD, LLC, ET AL., :
Plaintiffs-Appellees, : No. 115082 v. :
GEORGE JONES, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 18, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-24-996865
Appearances:
McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman Co., L.P.A., David M. Cuppage, Lawrence R. Acton, and Taylor S. Mehalko, for appellees.
George Jones, pro se.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
This cause came to be heard on the accelerated docket pursuant to
App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. Consistent with the purpose of an accelerated
appeal, this court shall render a brief and conclusory decision. Sholakh v. Shah, 2025-Ohio-2533, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.), citing Imani Home Health Care L.L.C. v. Visionary
Group, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-173, ¶ 1 (8th Dist.); see also App.R. 11.1(E).
Defendant-appellant George Jones, pro se, appeals the trial court’s
decision granting the motion for summary judgment of plaintiffs-appellees
Eastlake Milford, LLC, and Eastlake Edison, LLC, and awarding judgment against
him. Upon review, we affirm.
Under his first assignment of error, appellant claims “[t]he trial
court erred in granting summary judgment against [him] where genuine issues of
material fact remained in dispute, in violation of Civ.R. 56.” Appellate review of
summary judgment is de novo, governed by the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56.
Argabrite v. Neer, 2016-Ohio-8374, ¶ 14. Summary judgment is appropriate only
when “[1] no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, [2] the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and [3] viewing the evidence most
strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach a conclusion
only in favor of the moving party.” Id., citing M.H. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 2012-Ohio-
5336, ¶ 12.
In their complaint, appellees asserted claims against appellant for
conversion of funds and civil theft. “‘[C]onversion is the wrongful exercise of
dominion over property to the exclusion of the rights of the owner, or withholding
it from his possession under a claim inconsistent with his rights.’” Disciplinary
Counsel v. Squire, 2011-Ohio-5578, ¶ 40, quoting Joyce v. Gen. Motors Corp., 49
Ohio St.3d 93, 96 (1990). “To succeed on a conversion claim, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) * * * ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of conversion;
(2) defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff’s property
rights; and (3) damages.’” Cedar Creek Mall Props., L.L.C. v. Krone, 2017-Ohio-
7884, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), quoting 6750 BMS, L.L.C. v. Drentlau, 2016-Ohio-1385, ¶ 28
(8th Dist.). In a civil action for theft, the property owner may recover damages as
specified under R.C. 2307.61(A). See Jacobson v. Kaforey, 2016-Ohio-8434, ¶ 70.
A theft offense is defined in R.C. 2913.01(K) to include a violation of R.C. 2913.02,
among other provisions. Relevant hereto, R.C. 2913.02(A) provides: “No person,
with purpose to deprive the owner of property . . . shall knowingly obtain or exert
control over . . . the property” “(1) Without the consent of the owner or person
authorized to give consent; (2) Beyond the scope of the express or implied consent
of the owner or person authorized to give consent; (3) By deception . . . .”
The record herein shows that requests for admission were deemed
admitted pursuant to Civ.R. 36 after appellant failed to answer them. Those
admissions along with evidence submitted by appellees established that appellees
were entitled to summary judgment on their claims. Among other facts, appellees
established that after issuing a check with a print error and freezing the funds, they
paid Allegiance Contracting Incorporated (“Allegiance”) $40,500 with a
replacement wire transfer. Thereafter, appellant and another individual, who are
officers, directors, and/or shareholders of Allegiance, withdrew the initial funds in
the same amount without appellees’ permission. Although the other individual
returned $20,250, appellant refused to return and wrongfully retained $20,250 of the withdrawn funds after a demand letter was sent. The evidence showed
appellant converted $20,250 of funds that are the rightful property of appellees.
Appellees also established that appellant’s actions constituted a theft offense under
R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), (2), and/or (3), and appellees elected to pursue treble damages
pursuant to R.C. 2307.61(A)(1)(b). Additionally, appellees demonstrated
appellant acted with malice or aggravated or egregious fraud, and punitive
damages were recoverable pursuant to R.C. 2315.21(C). Upon review, we find that
appellees are entitled to summary judgment and that the trial court properly
entered judgment in favor of appellees and against appellant with “compensatory
damages in the amount of $20,250.00, and punitive and treble damages in the
amount of $40,500.00, for total damages of $60,750.00, and interest at the
statutory rate per annum from the date of judgment and the costs of [the] action.”
Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Under his second assignment of error, appellant claims “[t]he trial
court erred by proceeding to judgment without affording [him] a fair opportunity
to be heard, due to lack of service and notice, violating [his] due process rights.”
The record shows service was completed on appellant by regular
mail on June 4, 2024, in accordance with Civ.R. 4.6(D). “Where the plaintiff
follows the civil rules governing service of process, courts presume that service is
proper unless the defendant rebuts this presumption with sufficient evidence of nonservice.” In re K.J., 2023-Ohio-615, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing Hook v. Collins,
2017-Ohio-976, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).
Appellant failed to rebut the presumption of proper service. Indeed,
appellant appeared for a telephone hearing on October 10, 2024, he was granted
leave to plead, and he filed an answer that shows the same address listed in the
complaint. Other pleadings were sent by certified U.S. mail and regular mail to the
same address. Nonetheless, appellant routinely failed to appear, he did not
respond to discovery, and he did not oppose summary judgment. Appellant’s
assertions of notice being sent to an incorrect address and of the courts being
closed due to a cyberattack were unavailing. As the trial court indicated, “notice
went to the address defendant used in his answer,” “Cleveland Municipal Court
was closed due to a cyberattack but this did not affect the court of common pleas,”
and “the last two court dates that defendant missed were telephone calls not in
person hearings.” On appeal, appellant makes an unsupported assertion that his
mailing address had known delivery issues, and he alleges a mistaken belief that
the matter was in municipal court despite having filed his answer in the court of
common pleas. Appellant fails to demonstrate, and the record does not show, any
violation of due process occurred. Appellant’s second assignment of error is
overruled.
Under his third assignment of error, appellant claims “[t]he trial
court erred in holding [him] personally liable for funds he neither received nor
controlled, without evidentiary support or findings of fact on individual responsibility.” Appellant’s assertions regarding the corporate form are
misplaced. As argued by appellees, appellant’s personal conduct formed the basis
for the conversion and civil theft claims, and he could be held personally liable.
Further, the record shows that appellant was an owner and/or employee of
Allegiance, and the admissions reflect that appellant received, had possession of,
and retained control over the funds or a portion of the funds. Additionally, we note
that appellant’s brief fails to contain citations to authorities, statutes, and parts of
the record to support his arguments as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). “In Ohio, ‘pro
se litigants are held to the same standard as all other litigants: they must comply
with the rules of procedure and must accept the consequences of their own
mistakes.’” In re C.J.F., 2025-Ohio-4677, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Bikkani v. Lee,
2008-Ohio-3130, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.). Appellant’s third assignment of error is
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR