Eastern Mtn. v. Osprey

2005 DNH 036
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedMarch 2, 2005
DocketCV-04-086-SM
StatusPublished

This text of 2005 DNH 036 (Eastern Mtn. v. Osprey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eastern Mtn. v. Osprey, 2005 DNH 036 (D.N.H. 2005).

Opinion

Eastern Mtn. v. Osprey CV-04-086-SM 03/02/05 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Eastern Mountain Sports, Inc., Plaintiff

v. Civil No. 04-86-SM Opinion No. 2005 DNH 036 Osprey Packs, Inc., Defendant

O R D E R

In this patent suit. Eastern Mountain Sports, Inc. ("EMS")

alleges that Osprey Packs, Inc. ("Osprey") has made, used, and/or

sold backpacks that infringe EMS's patent, U.S. Patent No.

6,422,439 ("the '439 patent"). Osprey denies infringement, and

asserts a counterclaim against EMS for a declaratory judgment of

"patent invalidity, unenforceability, and noninfringement."

Answer and counterclaim (document no. 5) at 5.

Osprey moves for summary judgment as to the sole count in

EMS's complaint, saying that, as a matter of law, its accused

backpacks do not infringe the '439 patent, either literally or

under the doctrine of eguivalents. EMS objects, asserting that

genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on behalf of either party. The parties do, however, agree that the

'439 patent lends itself to judicial construction without the

need for a Markman hearing. See Markman v. Westview Instruments,

Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).

Standard of Review

I. Summary Judgment.

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must

"view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party

opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in

that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115

(1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record

reveals "no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this context, "a fact is 'material' if it

potentially affects the outcome of the suit and a dispute over it

is 'genuine' if the parties' positions on the issue are supported

by conflicting evidence." Intern'1 Ass'n of Machinists &

Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Center, 103 F.3d 196,

199-200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

2 Nevertheless, if the non-moving party's "evidence is merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative," no genuine dispute

as to a material fact has been proved, and "summary judgment may

be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-

50 (1986) (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit has observed, "the evidence illustrating the

factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must

have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of

the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.

Conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported

speculation will not suffice." Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957,

960 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations and internal guotation marks

omitted). See also Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440,

444-45 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[TJhough for pleading purposes the line

between sufficient facts and insufficient conclusions is often

blurred, we nonetheless reguire that it be plotted.") (citation

and internal punctuation omitted).

The key, then, to defeating a properly supported motion for

summary judgment is the non-movant's ability to support his or

her claims concerning disputed material facts with evidence that

3 conflicts with that proffered by the moving party. See generally

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conseguently, while a reviewing court

must take into account all properly documented facts, it may

ignore bald assertions, unsupported conclusions, and mere

speculation. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 987 (1st

Cir. 1997).

II. Patent Construction.

Patent infringement analysis involves two steps: first,

properly construing the asserted claim; and second, determining

whether the accused method or device infringes the asserted claim

as properly construed. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,

Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Markman v.

Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995),

aff'd , 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). Step one of that process - claim

construction - presents a guestion of law to be resolved by the

court. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d

1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The second step - determining

whether the accused process or device infringes the patent -

presents a guestion of fact. Id. "Thus, summary judgment of

non-infringement can only be granted if, after viewing the

4 alleged facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant,

there is no genuine issue whether the accused device is

encompassed by the claims." Pitney Bowes 182 F.3d at 1304.

Construing patent claim terms generally means ascertaining

the meaning of those terms in light of the intrinsic evidence of

record, which includes: the claims, the specification, and the

prosecution history. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. But, the

court may consider extrinsic evidence as well. See Apex Inc. v.

Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir.) ("Courts

may also review extrinsic evidence to assist them in

comprehending the technology in accordance with the understanding

of skilled artisans and as necessary for actual claim

construction."), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 922 (2003). Extrinsic

evidence is external to the patent, "such as expert testimony,

inventor testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and

articles." Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1308 (citing Vitronics, 90

F.3d at 1584). See generally Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls

v. Mega Systems LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The

ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term may be determined

by reviewing a variety of sources. Some of these sources include

5 the claims themselves, dictionaries and treatises, and the

written description, the drawings, and the prosecution history.")

(citations omitted).

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