Eastern Mtn. v. Osprey

2005 DNH 036
District Court, D. New Hampshire·Decided March 2, 2005·No. CV-04-086-SM·Published

Opinion

Eastern Mtn. v. Osprey CV-04-086-SM 03/02/05 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Eastern Mountain Sports, Inc., Plaintiff

v. Civil No. 04-86-SM Opinion No. 2005 DNH 036

Osprey Packs, Inc., Defendant

O R D E R

In this patent suit. Eastern Mountain Sports, Inc. ("EMS")

alleges that Osprey Packs, Inc. ("Osprey") has made, used, and/or sold backpacks that infringe EMS's patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,422,439 ("the '439 patent"). Osprey denies infringement, and asserts a counterclaim against EMS for a declaratory judgment of "patent invalidity, unenforceability, and noninfringement." Answer and counterclaim (document no. 5) at 5.

Osprey moves for summary judgment as to the sole count in EMS's complaint, saying that, as a matter of law, its accused backpacks do not infringe the '439 patent, either literally or under the doctrine of eguivalents. EMS objects, asserting that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on

behalf of either party. The parties do, however, agree that the '439 patent lends itself to judicial construction without the need for a Markman hearing. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).

Standard of Review

I. Summary Judgment.

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals "no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this context, "a fact is 'material' if it potentially affects the outcome of the suit and a dispute over it is 'genuine' if the parties' positions on the issue are supported by conflicting evidence." Intern'1 Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Center, 103 F.3d 196, 199-200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, if the non-moving party's "evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative," no genuine dispute as to a material fact has been proved, and "summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249- 50 (1986) (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has observed, "the evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial. Conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation will not suffice." Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations and internal guotation marks omitted). See also Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444-45 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[TJhough for pleading purposes the line between sufficient facts and insufficient conclusions is often blurred, we nonetheless reguire that it be plotted.") (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

The key, then, to defeating a properly supported motion for summary judgment is the non-movant's ability to support his or her claims concerning disputed material facts with evidence that

conflicts with that proffered by the moving party. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conseguently, while a reviewing court must take into account all properly documented facts, it may ignore bald assertions, unsupported conclusions, and mere speculation. See Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 987 (1st Cir. 1997).

II. Patent Construction.

Patent infringement analysis involves two steps: first, properly construing the asserted claim; and second, determining whether the accused method or device infringes the asserted claim as properly construed. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd , 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). Step one of that process - claim construction - presents a guestion of law to be resolved by the court. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The second step - determining whether the accused process or device infringes the patent - presents a guestion of fact. Id. "Thus, summary judgment of non-infringement can only be granted if, after viewing the

alleged facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue whether the accused device is encompassed by the claims." Pitney Bowes 182 F.3d at 1304.

Construing patent claim terms generally means ascertaining the meaning of those terms in light of the intrinsic evidence of record, which includes: the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. But, the court may consider extrinsic evidence as well. See Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir.) ("Courts may also review extrinsic evidence to assist them in comprehending the technology in accordance with the understanding of skilled artisans and as necessary for actual claim construction."), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 922 (2003). Extrinsic evidence is external to the patent, "such as expert testimony, inventor testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and articles." Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1308 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584). See generally Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Systems LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term may be determined by reviewing a variety of sources. Some of these sources include

the claims themselves, dictionaries and treatises, and the written description, the drawings, and the prosecution history.") (citations omitted).

Giving proper effect to disputed technical terms in a patent reguires a court to construe them as they would be construed by those skilled in the relevant art. See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("A technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention, unless it is apparent from the patentand the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning."). See also Ferguson, 350 F.3d at 1338 ("In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to the claim terms, the words take on the full breadth of the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art."). Here, nothing suggests that the terms in dispute are used in the '439 patent in any way other than as they would be commonly understood by those skilled in the relevant art.

In construing the disputed claim terms in the '439 patent, the court has relied upon the patent's specification (including the claim language itself), its prosecution history, and the exhibits submitted by the parties, including an EMS "Waterslide Hydration Pack," which utilizes the patented invention, and an Osprey "Eclipse 26+5" backpack, which is one of the allegedly infringing products manufactured and/or sold by Osprey.

Background

I. The Claims at Issue.

The '439 patent teaches a "combination backpack and hydration pack" which are "detachably connected to each other." '439 patent. Abstract. "The two portions can thus be used together as a hydration pack/standard backpack combination or separately as a pack solely for hydration purposes." I_d. The '439 patent sets forth two independent claims (one and five), and four dependent claims (two, three, four, and six).

The first independent claim of the '439 patent (claim one)

teaches:

A combination backpack and hydration pack, comprising:

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