Eastep v. Jack-In-The-Box, Inc.

546 S.W.2d 116, 1977 Tex. App. LEXIS 2566
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 12, 1977
Docket1423
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 546 S.W.2d 116 (Eastep v. Jack-In-The-Box, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eastep v. Jack-In-The-Box, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 116, 1977 Tex. App. LEXIS 2566 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

CURTISS BROWN, Chief Justice.

Paula Eastep and her husband, Danny Eastep (the Easteps or appellants), filed suit against Jack-in-the Box, Inc. (appellee) and others to recover damages for injuries received by Paula while at a restaurant owned and operated by Jack-in-the-Box. All defendants other than Jack-in-the-Box were discharged prior to the submission of the case to the jury. The jury answered all liability issues favorably to appellants and found damages. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to disregard Special Issue 2(l)(a), (b), and Issue 2(2)(a), (b) and (c), and their motion for judgment non ob-stante veredicto. Judgment was entered that the plaintiffs take nothing.

On the night of August 24, 1973, Paula and Danny Eastep, along with Danny’s brothers Lloyd and Kenneth, and Kenneth’s wife, Charlene, went dancing at a local night club. When the club closed they went to a Jack-in-the-Box restaurant near their apartment in Pasadena, Texas, arriving there around 2:00 A.M. They placed their orders and sat down. Shortly thereafter, four men (the McDonalds) entered the restaurant, placed their orders, and also sat down. When the Eastep party’s food was ready, Danny went to the counter to obtain it. As he passed by the McDonald party’s table, they cursed him loudly. Further cursing and obscenities were exchanged between the two tables, whereupon the McDonalds jumped up and at least two of them drew out knives. After several minutes of taunting by the McDonalds, a fight ensued. The two women in the Eas-tep party made their way to one of the restaurant’s exit doors. However, Paula Eastep, apparently seeing her husband in danger of being stabbed or cut by the largest of the McDonalds, went back into the melee and grabbed the aggressor by the hair, pulling him over a table. Having retained the grasp on his knife, this individual got up and began slashing wildly at Paula. She threw up her hands to protect her face and sustained a severe laceration on her right arm. The fight ended a few minutes after Paula was cut, and the police arrived almost immediately thereafter.

In answer to Special Issue No. 1, the jury found that Jack-in-the-Box, acting through its employees were negligent in: (1) failing to demand that the McDonalds leave the premises before the fight began; (2) failing to timely notify the police; and (3) failing to warn the Easteps of the McDonalds’ acts and condition before the fight began. In answer to Special Issue No. 2, the jury found each of the above omissions were a proximate cause of Paula Eastep’s injuries. The jury further found that Paula’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances and did not constitute negligence. The trial court disregarded the jury’s answers to Special Issue No. 2 and entered judgment non obstante veredicto for Jack-in-the-Box.

Appellants’ two points of error assert that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for judgment n.o.v., and in failing to grant appellants’ motion for judgment. A judgment non obstante vere-dicto is sustainable only if there is no evidence upon which the jury could have made *118 the findings relied on. In reviewing such a judgment, we must consider all testimony in the light most favorable to the party against whom it was rendered, and every reasonable intendment deducible from the evidence is to be indulged in that party’s favor. Douglass v. Panama, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex.Sup.1974); Leyva v. Pacheco, 163 Tex. 638, 358 S.W.2d 547, 550 (1962).

The owner, of land is under a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of his invitees. Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex.Sup.1975). The weight of authority now recognizes that the duty of a proprietor of a restaurant, inn or similar establishment includes the exercise of reasonable care to protect his patrons from intentional injuries inflicted by third persons. See Annots., 70 A.L.R.2d 628 (I960); 10 A.L.R.3d 619, § 5 (1966); 40 Am.Jur.2d Hotels, Motels, and Restaurants §§ 111, 112 (1968). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (1965). Such a duty has been recognized in Texas for owners of public theatres. East Texas Theatres, Inc. v. Rutledge, 453 S.W.2d 466, 469-70 (Tex.Sup.1970); Marek v. Southern Enterprises, Inc., 128 Tex. 377, 99 S.W.2d 594 (1936, opinion adopted). As patrons, appellants were invitees of appellee; therefore, appel-lee owed appellants a duty of reasonable care to protect them from the assaults of third persons while on the premises.

Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) states that a possessor of land held open to the public for business purposes is liable for patrons’ injuries that are caused by the intentional acts of third persons and by “the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.” The portion of the rule requiring notice to the possessor that acts of violence are likely to be done

does not require a long and continued course of conduct to find that the proprietor had knowledge of the violent disposition of the other patron — all that is necessary is that there be a sequence of conduct sufficiently long to enable the proprietor to act for the patron’s safety. It is not necessary that the proprietor know of a history of a series of offenses against the peace.

Coca v. Arceo, 71 N.M. 186, 376 P.2d 970, 973 (1962). Accord, Kimple v. Foster, 205 Kan. 415, 469 P.2d 281, 286 (1970).

In the instant case the evidence showed that at the time of the incident there were four or five Jack-in-the-Box employees on duty and eight to twelve patrons present in addition to the McDonalds. Paula Eastep testified that she first noticed the McDonalds because they were talking loudly and banging on the counter where orders are taken. She said that they were acting “weird.” The Easteps’ order was called “two or three minutes” later, after the Mc-Donalds had sat down. It took Danny about a minute to get the food. Paula stated that after Danny came back with their order the McDonalds began shouting obscenities and making obscene gestures at them. After one of the Easteps returned an obscenity, the McDonalds jumped up and drew out their knives. She testified that after the McDonalds got up there was about a two-minute period before any blows were struck, during which time the Easteps were trying to stall off a fight while the McDonalds were hurling epithets, obscenities, and taunts at them. The fight then began, and it was, in her estimation, another two-and-a-half to five minutes before she was cut. She stated that the police arrived four-and-a-half or five minutes after she was cut.

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Bluebook (online)
546 S.W.2d 116, 1977 Tex. App. LEXIS 2566, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eastep-v-jack-in-the-box-inc-texapp-1977.