East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Joseph Biden

93 F.4th 1130

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 21, 2024
• Docket: 23-16032
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 21 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT; et No. 23-16032 al., D.C. No. 4:18-cv-06810-JST Plaintiffs-Appellees, Northern District of California, Oakland v. ORDER JOSEPH R. BIDEN, President of the United States; et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Before: W. FLETCHER, PAEZ, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Order by Judges W. FLETCHER and PAEZ; Dissent by Judge VANDYKE.

The parties in this appeal have filed a Joint Motion to Place Appeal in

Abeyance (Dkt. No. 83) pending settlement negotiations in this case, and a related

case, M.A. v. Mayorkas, No. 1:23-cv-1843 (D.D.C.). The motion is GRANTED as

follows:

This appeal is placed in abeyance pending the parties’ settlement

discussions. The parties shall file a joint status report 60 days after the entry of this

order and every 60 days thereafter. If the parties settle this case or settlement

discussions fail, the parties shall promptly notify the court. Submission of this case

is vacated pending further court order. FILED FEB 21 2024 East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, No. 23-16032 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

The current administration promulgated the rule challenged in this case to help

manage the “historic surge in migration” that followed the end of the Title 42 order

and to relieve “significant strain on DHS’s operational capacity at the border.” See

88 Fed. Reg. 31314 (May 16, 2023) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.33, 1208.33). After

the plaintiffs brought this case to enjoin and vacate the rule, the federal government

spent the better part of a year vigorously defending the rule’s critical necessity before

the district court and in this court—all because, in the government’s words, “any

interruption in the rule’s implementation will result in another surge in migration

that will significantly disrupt and tax DHS operations.” Indeed, only a few months

ago, the government insisted that “[i]f the Rule is unavailable, [it] expects ‘a surge

… that could match—or even exceed—the levels seen in the days leading up to the

end of’ the Title 42 order,” and that “the negative consequences of such an increase

in migration—for the government, for migrants, and for the public—would be even

greater than [before].” The executive even went so far as to urge that if our court

were to rule against it in this appeal, we should nevertheless stay our decision

pending the filing of a petition for relief from the Supreme Court to avoid the

disastrous consequences of the rule not being in force even for a short period of time.

And while the outcome of this case in the lower courts (including this one) was

anything but certain given the mess we previously made of our precedent during our

1 court’s immigration wars with the prior presidential administration, the government

has to know the Supreme Court would likely not only reach the correct result in this

case, but in doing so rectify some of our court’s erroneous precedent. Any adverse

decisions from the Northern District of California and the Ninth Circuit would be

mere temporary speed bumps on the way to eventual, likely inevitable, vindication

of the rule from the Supreme Court.

Taking the government at its word about the pressing need for this crucial rule

to remain in effect and be enforced, our court granted a stay of the district court’s

decision enjoining the government’s rule. We heard oral argument and are now

poised to render our decision. Then suddenly, out of the blue, the parties come to us

hand-in-hand, jointly asking us to hold off making a decision while they “engage[]

in discussions regarding the Rule’s implementation and whether a settlement could

eliminate the need for further litigation.” For months, the rule was so important that

“any interruption” in its implementation, even for a short period of time, would

incapacitate the executive’s border response. This panel made decisions based on

those representations. Now, the government implies the rule isn’t so important after

all. Indeed, the government is now “engaged in discussions” that could result in the

rule going away. What?

The administration’s abrupt about-face makes no sense as a legal matter.

Either it previously lied to this court by exaggerating the threat posed by vacating

2 the rule, or it is now hiding the real reason it wants to hold this case in abeyance.

Given its success thus far in defending a rule it has consistently characterized as

critical to its control of the border, and the fact that it has to realize its odds of success

in this case can only improve as it works its way vertically through the federal court

system, the government’s sudden and severe change in position looks a lot like a

purely politically motivated attempt to throw the game at the last minute. At the

very least it looks like the administration and its frenemies on the other side of this

case are colluding to avoid playing their politically fraught game during an election

year.

This court is a legal institution, not a political one. Thus it must insist that

parties provide adequate legal justifications for the relief they seek, whatever their

underlying political motivations may be. While I am of course agnostic as to the

sufficiency of the government’s political reasons for suddenly reversing course, it

has provided no coherent legal reason why it has suddenly changed its position about

the importance of the continued enforcement of the rule challenged in this case, so I

would not grant the stay now requested.

While we often hold cases in abeyance during settlement negotiations, the

government has not given us any real reason to do so here. The vague reasons the

parties have provided for a stay of litigation are sharply at odds with the reasons the

government gave us just a few short months ago for granting a stay of the district

3 court’s preliminary injunction. The purported reason for halting this case is that

“there are currently two pending cases raising overlapping claims relating to the Rule

and its implementation that have been brought by some similarly situated plaintiffs

represented by overlapping counsel.” This sounds more like a normal day in the life

of a DOJ litigator than a compelling reason to stay a case. Having multiple cases

about the same issue in multiple courts is the norm for our federal government, so it

can’t be a real reason to slam the brakes on a case. And it’s not as if there is already

a decision from a lower court in another circuit awaiting a helpful verdict on appeal.

There are simply two similar proceedings, and since the present one has progressed

farther along than the one in the District Court for the District of Columbia, it makes

little sense to think that proceeding is a reason to stay this one. The federal

government routinely litigates similar issues in multiple courts, even when different

circuits reach different conclusions.

Aside from the non-reason provided by the parties, it is difficult to think of

any other legal reason why they would seek to hold this case in abeyance. The

parties raise the prospect of settlement but have provided no reason why either party

would actually want to settle at this point given what the parties have previously told

this court. Any effect of the government’s only loss at this point has been reversed

by winning a stay from this court of the district court’s vacatur. Based on the

issuance of that stay, the only reasonable conclusion was that a majority of the panel

4 in this case thought the government was likely to prevail on the merits. See Nken v.

Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425–26 (2009) (stating that one of the relevant factors in

deciding to grant a stay is “whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing

that he is likely to succeed on the merits” (emphasis added)). Even assuming the

government were to lose before this court on the merits, which would make our prior

decision to stay the district court’s vacatur all the more perplexing, it is clear enough

that the government is destined to prevail before the Supreme Court—whether on an

emergency or permanent basis. Indeed, the government has already strongly implied

that it planned to do exactly that if it lost before this court.

Given all of this, it’s hard to avoid any impression other than that the

administration is snatching defeat from the jaws of victory—purposely avoiding an

ultimate win that would eventually come later this year, whether from this court or

from the Supreme Court.

It is also unclear what a settlement would even look like in this case. In its

briefing, the government has repeatedly stressed the vital importance of this rule in

fending off the border crisis. As the government explained, “[w]ithout the Rule, the

expected increase in border encounters threatened to overwhelm the Departments’

‘ability to effectively process, detain, and remove, as appropriate, the migrants

encountered,’ with attendant increases in the number of migrants unlawfully present

in the country, strains on government operations and resources, health and safety

5 concerns for migrants at overcrowded processing facilities, and impacts on local

communities along the southwest border.” In the days before Title 42 ended, “‘DHS

saw a historic surge in migration’ … that ‘culminated with the highest recorded

encounter levels’ in history and ‘placed significant strain on DHS’s operational

capacity at the border.’” “Encounters between ports of entry nearly doubled in the

month before May 11, increasing ‘from an average of approximately 4,900 per day’

to ‘approximately 9,500 per day,’ including even higher numbers in the final few

days.” “Between May 8 and 11, the Border Patrol’s ‘daily in-custody average’ was

approximately 50% above ‘its holding capacity.’” According to the government,

“that overcrowding, combined with an increased average time in custody because of

the many noncitizens who CBP needed to process, generated serious ‘health and

safety risks to noncitizens, government personnel, and contract support staff.’”

“If the Rule is unavailable, the government expects ‘a surge in border

crossings that could match—or even exceed—the levels seen in the days leading up

to the end of’ the Title 42 order. The government thus ‘anticipates that any

interruption in the rule’s implementation will result in another surge in migration

that will significantly disrupt and tax DHS operations.’” Given the criticality of this

potential disruption in border operations, the government has repeatedly requested

that “if the Court affirms in whole or in part, it leave the stay pending appeal in place

pending the filing and disposition of any petition for further review.” In other words:

6 if you’re going to rule against us, please please please make sure we have the

opportunity to get a stay from the Supreme Court since this rule is so important.

Unless the government has grossly misrepresented the importance of its rule

and the ramifications of vacating it in its prior filings before this court, it seems that

any prospect of settling this case by recission of the rule would be a nonstarter.

Indeed, the government has been very careful not to suggest that in its intentionally

vaguely worded joint motion to hold this case in abeyance.

And it would make little sense for the plaintiffs—who are public interest

groups insisting they are harmed by the mere existence of the rule and that the rule

is contrary to law—to accept anything less than rescission of the rule. It is therefore

difficult to see what kind of acceptable middle ground the two parties could reach

that would satisfy the plaintiffs while allowing the government to keep enforcing the

rule.

The standardless timeline of the jointly requested abeyance is further evidence

that this seems to be nothing more than a collusive effort to postpone resolution of

this case until a more politically palatable time. The parties have given no indication

how long they expect the abeyance period to last, saying only that they will provide

status reports every 60 days. Should the court expect to sit on this case forever?

Until after election day in November? Until ballot counting is finished long after

that election? January 6, 2025? Given that the parties have provided no real reason

7 why they are asking to abruptly halt this appeal, we have no idea when they plan to

start it up again. My guess is that sometime after November would fit their

“settlement negotiations” needs nicely.

Even if the government’s recent explanations cannot be taken at face value,

we do know a few things for certain. This administration went to considerable

lengths to both promulgate this rule and vigorously defend it. Yet now, a mere nine

months before the general election, and in the face of an immigration crisis that has

produced one of the most intense showdowns between state and federal government

in recent memory, the administration is requesting something that is completely

inconsistent with its previous actions and representations to the court. So why? As

I see it, there are several interrelated possibilities, all of which are wholly political—

not legal—and thus do not merit the relief requested.

The administration may want to avoid going before the Supreme Court to

defend a rule that is obviously unpopular with its base during a presidential election

year in which immigration figures to be an important issue. The rule puts the

administration in a political pickle. It is both politically unpopular with some of its

own constituency, and, as the government has vigorously argued, deeply necessary

to prevent a worsening of the border crisis, which is perceived as one of this

administration’s political vulnerabilities. An abeyance splits the baby, temporarily

ensuring that an important tool in its immigration-enforcement toolbox remains in

8 place, while postponing any potential Supreme Court fight about that tool until after

the election. This temporary resolution to the political problems presented by this

litigation affords the administration plausible deniability it can pitch to its base while

it nevertheless continues to enforce the rule to stave off a worse crisis at the southern

border.

The government might also simply be trying to avoid another immigration

loss in court, the optics of which could be particularly devastating during the current

immigration crisis. Americans of all political persuasions are increasingly focused

on—and worried about—the situation on our southern border. 1 Placing these

proceedings in abeyance avoids the possibility of a loss before the Ninth Circuit that

could potentially exacerbate the issues at the border in the months leading up to the

1 See, e.g., Statement from President Joe Biden On the Bipartisan Senate Border Security Negotiations, The White House (Jan. 26, 2024), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements- releases/2024/01/26/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-the-bipartisan-senate- border-security-negotiations (President Joe Biden calling the border “broken”); Reese Gorman, Fetterman continues his feud with progressive Democrats and says they ‘left’ him, Washington Examiner (Jan. 20, 2024), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/2808370/fetterman-continues-his- feud-with-progressive-democrats-and-says-they-left-him/ (Pennsylvania Senator John Fetterman saying “There is a crisis …. We have a crisis at our border, and it can’t be controversial that we should have a secure border.”); Greg Abbott (@GregAbott_TX), Twitter (Sep. 20, 2023, 4:34 PM), https://twitter.com/GregAbbott_TX/status/1704640256429985863 (describing the border crisis as “an invasion”); ‘Secure our border along the southwest,’ Senator Cortez Masto speaks on protection issues, News 3 Las Vegas (Jan. 24, 2024) (Nevada Senator Catherine Cortez Masto calling to “secure our border along the southwest”).

9 election—a loss made even more damaging given that it would be meted out by a

panel comprised primarily of Democratic appointees, no less. The CNN headline

practically writes itself: “Biden Immigration Enforcement Policy Struck Down by

Two Clinton Appointees.”

Relatedly, the administration may be seeking to create policy that resonates

with its base while blaming the practical results of that policy on the courts. Such a

strategy would be remarkably simple for the government to enact. Step one: Stay

proceedings before a final vindication of its position. Step two: Settle, agree not to

enforce the rule, and blame the courts for tying its hands. If this is truly the

government’s plan, then it is for all practical purposes seeking to repeal the rule

without the need for notice and comment, and its pro forma defense of the rule has

been rendered nothing more than a half-measure—an illusion. It could take credit

for creating an important rule and defending it with one hand, and then, by colluding

with the plaintiffs, it can set the policy it actually wants with the other, all while

publicly blaming the result—cloaked as it is in the language of a judicial

“settlement”—on the courts. This would be even worse than “rulemaking-by-

collective-acquiescence.” Arizona v. City & County of San Francisco, 596 U.S. 763,

765–66 (2022) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). It’s “rulemaking by political settlement”

while dishonestly shifting the blame to the non-political branch of government.

10 Likewise, the executive may once again be trying to insulate bad Ninth Circuit

caselaw from Supreme Court review. As I and others have previously written, our

Easy Bay precedents are clearly wrong. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden,

993 F.3d 640, 696 (9th Cir. 2021) (VanDyke, J., dissenting from the denial of

rehearing en banc); id. at 687 (Bumatay, J., same). Yet they aided the Democratic

cause by invalidating Trump-era immigration rules. If this case gets before the

Supreme Court, the safe bet is that it would overrule those erroneous precedents.

This settlement tactic is therefore a powerful tool for the administration: it lets it

perpetuate bad—but politically favorable—law in the Ninth Circuit by settling

before reaching the Supreme Court, and then throw up its hands and say it is bound

by that law.

Ultimately, it is impossible to know the government’s exact motives for its

current course of action because it hasn’t even attempted to tell us. But putting aside

the political legitimacy of any of the potential motivations discussed above, one

thing is clear: none of them are a legally sufficient reason to grant a judicial stay of

this case, particularly since the request is directly at odds with the many dire

predictions the government has previously made before this court. Up until now, we

have been repeatedly assured that the rule is critical to the security of the border. But

now, astoundingly, the government seeks to abandon its defense of the rule—or at

least put that defense on ice until a more politically convenient time. Whatever the

11 parties’ real motivations are for seeking to stay this case, they haven’t provided us

with a legally sufficient basis for their sudden change of course. Accordingly, I

respectfully dissent from the panel’s decision to grant the stay motion.